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Abstract 
The main aim of this thesis is to investigate available techniques and develop a 
methodology for the fault detection and diagnostics for two engineering systems, 
namely railway point systems and three-phase separators. The two systems 
represent two different situations occurring when dealing with fault detection and 
diagnostics. The first system has only one observable sensor which represents the 
operation of the system, while for the second system several sensors are available to 
monitor the operation of the system. 
The fault detection of the railway point systems (RPS) was performed on the 
measured current from the motor of point operating equipment (POE). A threshold 
based alarm technique is commonly used by railway infrastructure operators. The 
inability to timely detect the incipient faults of the RPS is a big deficiency of such a 
technique. The method of One Class Support Vector Machines (OCSVM) together 
with some elastic metrics has been proposed to overcome this weakness of the 
threshold based alarm technique. 
The OCSVM has been chosen as the fault detection model. OCSVM is a 
classification algorithm designed to distinguish between two classes when data of 
one class is underrepresented. Two different approaches of using similarity 
measures with OCSVM model have been proposed. The first approach was to use 
the similarity measures as replacements of the OCSVM kernel distance function. The 
second approach was to use the outputs of the comparison between two consecutive 
movements of POE, carried out using the similarity measures, as inputs to OCSVM. 
Their effectiveness has been tested and the first approach proved to perform better. 
The standard Euclidean distance used to compare the similarity of two time series 
was not capable to deal with certain features of in-field RPS data. Elastic similarity 
measures, such as edit distance with real penalties (ERP) and dynamic time warping 
(DTW), were chosen to compare the data of POE operations. A combination of 
Euclidean distance and elastic similarity measures has been proposed in order to 
take into account the absolute values and shape properties of the two compared time 
series. Several pre-processing techniques have been considered to get a better 
estimate of the similarity between two time series, as well as to decrease the 
computational time taken to obtain the elastic similarity measures. 
The proposed methodology has been tested on the in-field RPS data. The results 
indicated that the fault detection model was able to detect changes in absolute 
values and/or shape of the time series of measured current. However, not in all 
cases these changes could be related to a recorded failure of RPS in the database. 
Furthermore, deficiencies were found in recording faulty and fault-free RPS condition 
in the database available in this study. Such deficiencies prevented further 
development of the methodology and practical usage. 
The fault detection of three-phase separators (TPS) on chemical process plant was 
performed given the sensor readings of flow and level transmitters of TPS. A 
threshold based alarm technique is commonly used by oil and gas infrastructure 
operators to monitor the operation of TPS. The late detection of faults of the TPS is a 
big deficiency of such a technique, since it causes the oil and gas processing plants 
to be shut down. The method of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) has been proposed 
to overcome this weakness of the threshold based alarm technique. 
The BBN has been chosen as the fault detection and diagnostics model. BBN is a 
causal graphical network designed to model causal relationships between variables 
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in a probabilistic way. An approach to observe sensor readings of TPS in several 
adjacent time intervals and to update the prior probabilities in the BBN after inserting 
the sensor readings as evidence was proposed. Generic rules to build the BBN in a 
modular way for TPS which can be easily adjusted to similar systems were proposed. 
A TPS simulation model was built and software with graphical user interface was 
developed to perform the simulation of selected failure effects on the TPS. Simulation 
models are favoured for the testing of fault detection and diagnostics techniques, 
since they can capture main operating conditions of the real systems, are cheap to 
implement and even hazardous failure modes can be easily tested. The proposed 
methodology has been tested on the data obtained from a TPS simulation model. 
The results indicated that the fault detection and diagnostics model was able to 
detect inconsistencies in sensor readings and link them to corresponding failure 
modes when single or multiple failures were present in the TPS. However, not in all 
cases the multiple failures were detected, mainly due to the hidden failures. Further 
testing of the methodology on in service TPS is needed before using it in practice. 
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Nomenclature 
AID ฀– Asset information database 
BBN ฀– Bayesian Belief Networks 
CO ฀– control output 
CPT ฀– Conditional probability tables 
CVi ฀– ith control valve ߜா ฀– Euclidean distance using non-scaled data ߜாோ௉ ฀– Edit Distance with Real Penalties using non-scaled data ߜ஽்ௐ ฀– Dynamic Time Warping using non-scaled data ߜாா ฀– Edit Distance with Real Penalties combined with Euclidean distance using non-
scaled data ߜ஽ா ฀– Dynamic Time Warping combined with Euclidean distance using non-scaled 
data ߜாோ ฀– Euclidean distance using rescaled data ߜாோ௉ோ  ฀– Edit Distance with Real Penalties using rescaled data ߜ஽்ௐோ  ฀– Dynamic Time Warping using rescaled data ߜாாோ  ฀– Edit Distance with Real Penalties combined with Euclidean distance using 
rescaled data ߜ஽ாோ  ฀– Dynamic Time Warping combined with Euclidean distance using rescaled data 
DTW ฀– Dynamic Time Warping 
ERP ฀– Edit Distance with Real Penalties 
FLD ฀– Fault logging database 
FC ฀– failed closed 
FH ฀– failed high 
FL ฀– failed low 
FMEA ฀– Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
FO ฀– failed opened 
FS ฀– failed stuck 
FTi ฀– ith flow rate transmitter 
GUI ฀– Graphical user interface 
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K-NN ฀– K-Nearest Neighbours 
LCi ฀– ith level controller 
LTi ฀– ith level transmitter 
MLD ฀– Movement logging database 
NN ฀– Neural Network 
OCSVM ฀– One Class Support Vector Machines 
OOBN ฀– Object Oriented Bayesian Belief Network ܲீ  ฀– Classification accuracy of fault-free movements 
ிܲ ฀– Classification accuracy of faulty movements 
PCA ฀– Principal Component Analysis 
PI ฀– proportional integral 
POE ฀– Point operating equipment 
RPS ฀– Railway point systems 
SVM ฀– Support Vector Machines 
TPS ฀– Three phase separators 
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1 Introduction 
The research presented in this thesis considers two engineering systems: railway 
point systems and chemical process plant three-phase separators. The fault 
detection and diagnostics techniques were analysed in order to propose a 
methodology how fault detection and diagnostics could be performed for the 
considered systems. The two systems represented two different situations, which 
might occur when considering fault detection and diagnostics. 
The railway point systems have only one variable which is observed to determine the 
system condition, i.e. the current of motor of point operating equipment. Due to this 
the fault detection and diagnostics become a very challenging task, since usually the 
operation of the railway point system is affected by multiple causes and contextual 
data would be highly beneficial. 
On the contrary, the three-phase separators have several sensors to monitor the 
operation of the system, i.e. flow and level transmitters. This way the readings of the 
sensors can be cross-checked in order to identify the operating conditions which drift 
from an expected behaviour. 
These differences influenced the choice of a technique to perform fault detection and 
diagnostics. The two systems and the techniques chosen in the proposed 
methodology are briefly discussed in the next sections. 
1.1 The need for a fault detection system of railway point systems 
An increasing demand for railway transportation requires railway systems to be fault 
tolerant and secure for both passengers and cargo transport. In 2012/2013, Network 
฀R฀a฀i฀l฀,฀ ฀B฀r฀i฀t฀a฀i฀n฀’฀s฀ ฀r฀a฀i฀l฀w฀a฀y฀ ฀i฀n฀f฀r฀a฀s฀t฀r฀u฀c฀t฀u฀r฀e฀ ฀o฀p฀e฀r฀a฀t฀o฀r฀,฀ ฀w฀a฀s฀ ฀r฀e฀s฀po n฀s฀i฀b฀l฀e฀ ฀f o฀r฀ 8.7 million minutes 
of train delays: almost 7.4 million of delay minutes were recorded for passenger 
trains, while the remaining delay minutes were assigned for freight transport 
(Network Rail, 2013). One of the main causes of train delays was failures of point 
systems with 575,679 minutes of total delays (Network Rail, 2013). If the target for 
the delays set out by Office of Rail Regulation is not met, fines are imposed to 
Network Rail. Network Rail was fined £53.1 million after the 4th control period ended 
and was obliged to make an additional £25 million investment to improve the 
resilience of the network (The Office of Rail and Road, 2015). 
A railway point system (RPS) allows trains to change tracks, by moving a set of rails 
from one track to another before the train reaches the crossing. There are a number 
of different point systems, but they all work in a similar way. The rails are moved in 
one of two directions: normal to reverse or reverse to normal. Once the movement is 
completed the rails are locked in their position and the train can pass. 
Most problems with point systems are associated with the wear or misalignment of 
their components. Therefore, railway points require regular adjustment to 
compensate for the wear or to correct any misalignments (Atamuradov et al., 2009). 
Even though this process requires a lot of time resources and is very costly, it is 
essential to keep point systems in a good condition. Poor maintenance and missed 
faults might lead to deadly accidents, e.g. Potters Bar crash on 10th of May 2002. 7 
people were killed and 76 injured in the train derailment in Potters Bar, when the 
points broke down while the train was passing through (Bagwell, 2004). The last 
carriage of the train crashed into a bridge turning on the side and eventually crashing 
into the station, while the locomotive and the first two carriages proceeded up the line. 
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Several loose bolts were found prior to the crash and they were screwed back again, 
however the inspection after the crash showed that there were more loosened bolts 
and the maintenance of the point system was performed poorly. 
To avoid such disasters and improve the RPS fault detection and maintenance, 
researchers all over the world are trying to implement advanced algorithms to detect 
and classify point system faults. Approaches used to assist the engineers to monitor 
the condition of RPS can be broadly classified into: condition monitoring systems and 
fault detection and diagnosis systems. Condition monitoring systems are used to 
monitor the behaviour of observed parameters of RPS, e.g. current or power 
consumption of railway point operating equipment motor. However, they do not 
provide any diagnostic capabilities. Condition monitoring systems are increasingly 
used by infrastructure operators. They often contain an alarm system based on the 
threshold technique. A threshold for faulty behaviour of observed parameter has to 
be predefined and it is usually chosen based on expert knowledge. However, the 
choice of the threshold is not intuitive and requires careful consideration throughout a 
certain length of time to incorporate the changes of operating conditions of the 
railway point systems. 
A fault detection and diagnosis system is a more advanced version of a condition 
฀m฀o฀n฀i฀t฀o฀r฀i฀n฀g฀ ฀s฀y฀s฀t฀e฀m฀,฀ ฀i฀n฀c฀o฀r฀p฀o฀r฀a฀t฀i฀n฀g฀ ฀‘฀i฀n฀t฀e฀l฀l฀i฀g฀e฀n฀t฀’฀ ฀a฀l฀g฀o฀r฀i฀t฀h฀m฀s.฀ T h e s e  ฀s฀y฀s฀t฀e m s฀ ฀a r e  o f  
interest to railway engineers and maintenance personnel because they can be 
capable of detecting a deteriorating condition prior to a system failure and diagnosing 
incipient faults. A methodology of how the fault detection of RPS could be 
approached instead of using alarm threshold technique is proposed in this thesis. 
1.1.1 One Class Support Vector Machines for fault detection 
The fault detection of RPS can be considered as a classification task, i.e. to classify 
the movements of railway point system into different classes: one class for good and 
the other classes for faulty movements. Due to specific features of the data available 
in this study (to be discussed later), One Class Support Vector Machines (OCSVM) 
(Scholkopf et al., 2001) are used to classify movements. Their idea is based on the 
learning of the features of one class in the training phase and then detecting the 
abnormal data, when the OCSVM is used to classify the new data. Such an approach 
avoids an issue of using a highly imbalanced proportion of the data available for good 
and faulty classes. 
The OCSVM forms a boundary between a good class and an abnormal class, by 
picking out the best representatives from the good class in the training phase. These 
representatives of the good class, which form the boundary of OCSVM, are known as 
Support Vectors. Only the Support Vectors and their respective coefficients are then 
used to decide whether the new data should be classified as good or as abnormal. 
Such an approach, further described in section 2.3.5, allows using only a fraction of 
training data for classification of new data, which is advantageous for fast fault 
detection. 
1.1.2 Similarity measures of time series 
One of the key points in this study, when using the classification methodology, is the 
definition of the similarity of data of point movements, obtained from infield railway 
point systems. The main measurement that is available for the analysis is the 
measurement of current used by a motor moving a set of points. This data is 
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represented by a time series, of current measurements recorded over a single 
movement of points. A similarity of two time series is usually represented by the 
Euclidean distance between these time series. However, the Euclidean distance is 
only defined for the time series which are of equal length. Due to the nature of a 
railway point system, any movement of the switch rails might take different time to 
complete and thus it results in time series of different length. The Euclidean distance 
cannot be used on the raw data in this case and some data pre-processing has to be 
considered, which is presented in section 2.4.3.1. 
Alternatively, different similarity measures that are defined for the time series of 
different length can be used. These include Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) (Sakoe 
and Chiba, 1978), Edit distance with Real Penalties (ERP) (Chen and Ng, 2004), 
Time Warp Edit Distance (TWED) (Marteau, 2009) and others. Their idea is based on 
allowing elastic matching by comparing data points which are recorded at different 
time points, deleting an observation or repeating the same observation a number of 
times in the time series. Each of these operations is penalised in some way, specific 
to each similarity measure. The majority of commonly used similarity measures of 
time series are defined in detail in section 2.3.6, presenting the way they allow elastic 
matching and how the operations of elastic matching are penalised. A combination of 
elastic similarity measures (ERP and DTW) and Euclidean distance was proposed in 
this thesis. The resulting similarity measures are defined in sections 2.3.6.5 and 
2.3.6.6. 
1.2 The need for a fault detection system of three-phase separators 
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration approximately 90 million 
barrels of oil products were produced every day around the world in 2013 (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, 2013). An increasing demand for oil products 
requires the oil and gas processing facilities to work at maximum efficiency and every 
second spent without producing oil results in economic losses. The biggest losses 
are experienced, when the offshore oil and gas plants need to be shut down 
unexpectedly due to a failure of its equipment. Three-phase separators are one of 
the key components of offshore processing facilities. A failure in the three-phase 
separator can cause the whole oil processing plant to be stopped. Thus, a timely 
detection of failing components in the three-phase separators is necessary. 
Faults in three-phase separators are commonly detected by using either thresholds 
of the process variables (e.g. oil level, water level and etc.) or precise mathematical 
models simulating the operation of the three-phase separator and then comparing its 
outputs with the readings of the actual separator. The first approach usually detects 
failures when their effect is already critical and the prevention of the shutting down of 
the separator is unavoidable. The second approach needs a very good 
understanding of the process conditions and usually requires extensive changes if 
operating conditions change. 
A novel fault detection and diagnostic methodology for three-phase separators is 
proposed in this study. It can give an early warning of a failure in the system and has 
an ability to be easily adapted for the specific system. The methodology was built 
using the Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) technique. Such an approach was chosen 
due to several reasons, including graphical representation of the modelled system, 
inclusion of expert knowledge about failure modes of the system, ability to model 
uncertainties in a probabilistic way, ability to build the model in a structured and 
modular way and update the prior knowledge about occurrence of certain failure 
modes without altering the structure of the model. 
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1.2.1 Bayesian Belief Networks for fault detection 
BBN is a common technique used for the fault detection of industrial systems. BBNs 
are directed acyclic graphs consisting of nodes (they can represent process variables, 
states of components of the system) and arcs between the nodes, which describe 
causal relationships between the nodes. Causal relationships between nodes in a 
BBN model are quantitatively determined by conditional probability tables (CPT), 
which represent the likelihood of a node being in a particular state given the states of 
other nodes and allow uncertainty to be included in the system model. The latter 
feature is highly advantageous when modelling systems (usually combined from 
multiple subsystems) where a precise mathematical model of the system cannot be 
developed. 
Another important feature of the BBN technique is that models can be built in a 
structured way, for example, using the same logic as that used to build Fault trees, 
which are commonly used in industrial applications due to their intuitive 
representation of possible failure scenarios. A similar approach was taken in this 
thesis to build the BBN in a structured way, however the fault trees were only used 
as an initial state of the research to develop generic rules for building the BBN for 
three-phase separator. The detection and diagnostics of three-phase separator faults 
was performed using the BBN by monitoring the probabilities of certain states of the 
nodes, which represented states of the components of three-phase separator. The 
information from various transmitters of the system was inputted into the BBN model 
resulting in changes in the probabilities of BBN nodes. These changes were the 
decisive factors for determining of a certain failure occurrence. More details on fault 
detection and diagnostics using the BBN can be found in section 3.4.3. 
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1.3 Research objectives 
The main aim of this research is to create fault detection and diagnostics tools for two 
engineering systems given readings from sensors, which inform about the operation 
of considered systems. The objectives that were set for both systems were similar: 
x Propose a methodology for the fault detection and diagnostics of the 
considered system; 
x Implement the proposed methodology in software; 
x Validate the proposed methodology on data representing the operation of 
considered system. 
The research objectives that were specifically chosen for each considered system 
are presented in the next subsections. 
1.3.1 Research objectives for the fault detection of railway point systems 
The main aim of this research is to create a fault detection tool for the railway point 
systems, based on measurements of current, which could identify faults prior to their 
occurrence. The following objectives have been fulfilled: 
x Propose a methodology for the fault detection of railway point systems; 
x Implement the proposed methodology in software; 
x Validate the proposed methodology on the data obtained from the infield 
railway point systems. 
1.3.1.1 Propose a methodology of how the fault detection of railway point 
systems could be approached 
The main objective of this research is to propose a new methodology for fault 
detection of railway point systems that could be used with the data of infield railway 
point systems. A comprehensive literature review has been performed to identify the 
methods that have already been used for the fault detection and prediction of railway 
point systems. From the literature review, a gap in research was identified, when the 
fault detection of railway point systems was considered: 
x Majority of the methods were validated on small sample sizes of data 
obtained from laboratory RPS, which did not represent the operating 
conditions (e.g. severe weather conditions, presence of big forces when the 
train is passing through RPS etc.) of the infield RPS well enough. 
x Similar amount of data representing failures and good movements was 
needed to train and test the proposed methods. However, the available 
amount of data representing failures of infield RPS is usually significantly 
smaller than the amount of data representing failures obtained from the 
laboratory RPS. 
x The methodologies proposed were only able to detect specific faults that were 
present in historical data. 
x Majority of the methods were trained and tested to detect the failure when 
one of the observed parameter had abruptly changed (e.g. current drawn by 
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POE, power used by POE, duration of operation etc.). This makes the 
detection of a deteriorating condition impossible. 
Based on these findings, requirements for a new fault detection technique of infield 
railway point systems have been formed and they will be presented in section 2.2.5. 
A new methodology has been proposed for the fault detection of railway point 
systems using measurements of current. 
1.3.1.2 Implement the proposed methodology in software 
The proposed methodology was implemented in software, so that it could be 
demonstrated. MATLAB was chosen as a graphical interface and data input-output 
software, while the main calculations were done by calling C++ LIBSVM package 
from within the MATLAB platform. Such an approach allowed the user to take 
advantage of the running speed of C++, while the MATLAB was used for the 
visualisation of results. Special functions were written to input data from MATLAB 
into C++ and convert the results from C++ to MATLAB. Results showed that the C++ 
speed advantage over MATLAB was very significant. 
1.3.1.3 Validation of the approach using data obtained from infield railway 
point systems 
The proposed methodology for the fault detection of railway point systems was 
validated on data obtained from infield railway point systems. The majority of the 
researchers so far validated their approaches on data obtained from laboratory point 
systems. However, the operating conditions of infield railway point systems can be 
different from the ones that are provided in the laboratory test field, therefore, some 
important features of real data can be missed out and not incorporated in the models, 
if they are based on the data obtained from laboratory railway point systems only. 
Moreover, the features of data obtained from infield railway point systems also 
introduce difficulties for the timely and accurate detection of faults. Thus the results, 
presented in this thesis, illustrate the performance of the proposed methodology if it 
was to be applied on a real RPS. 
1.3.2 Research objectives for the fault detection and diagnostics of three-
phase separators 
The main aim of this research is to create a fault detection and diagnostic tool for the 
three-phase separator, which could identify faults of components before an alarm is 
raised in the system or an undesirable event develops, based on the readings of flow 
and level transmitters of the three-phase separator. The following objectives have 
been fulfilled: 
x Propose a methodology for the fault detection and diagnostics of three-phase 
separators based on BBN technique; 
x Develop the software to implement the methodology; 
x Develop a simulation model of the three-phase separator and its software; 
x Validate the proposed methodology on the data obtained from the simulation 
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1.3.2.1 Propose a methodology for the fault detection of three-phase 
separators 
In this study, a methodology for the fault detection of three-phase separators based 
on the method of BBN was proposed. Generic rules for building BBNs for individual 
sections and for the system as a whole were formulated, allowing the development of 
the BBN in a structured way. The whole system BBN model, known as Object 
Oriented Bayesian Belief Network (OOBN), was then used to analyse sensor 
readings of the three-phase separator, when components of the separator were free 
from faults and when faults were present. The fault detection and diagnostic stages 
were performed simultaneously. The posterior probabilities of the states of nodes in 
the OOBN that represented the condition of the components of the three-phase 
separator were updated as new system sensor readings were made available to the 
OOBN. An increase in the posterior probabilities of the states of certain nodes that 
represented the fault of a certain component was considered as a sign of a fault of 
that component. 
1.3.2.2 Develop software to implement the methodology 
The OOBN model was implemented using the commercial software HUGIN. The 
OOBN and individual BBNs were built using the graphical user interface of HUGIN 
and were then used for fault detection and diagnostics by exploiting the HUGIN 
Application Program Interface (API) for C++. The use of the API allowed a custom 
software to be created for the automated data input (sensor readings of a three-
phase separator) into the developed OOBN model. It also allowed producing an 
automated summary of results with plots of posterior probabilities for each failure 
mode over time. The analysis of the OOBN model was very fast, thus the proposed 
methodology has the potential of being implemented as an online monitoring and 
fault detection and diagnostics tool for three-phase separators. 
1.3.2.3 Develop a simulation model of the three-phase separator and its 
software 
A model of the three-phase separator for simulating the operation of the system was 
built using C++. A graphical user interface (GUI) was developed with wxWidgets for 
C++ to allow the user to perform numerous tasks such as to interactively insert 
selected failures of components at specific times, to change the type of inflow as well 
as physical parameters of the three-phase separator, to plot results from the 
simulation and export readings of various transmitters for the fault detection and 
diagnostics stage. The developed GUI and the simulation model are presented in 
section 3.3. 
1.3.2.4 Validation of the approach using data obtained from a three-phase 
separator simulation model 
The validation of the proposed method is a necessary step in order to evaluate the 
performance of the method proposed for fault detection and diagnostics when the 
three-phase separator operates under different conditions. The validation also allows 
the strength and weaknesses of the proposed approach to be identified. 
The proposed methodology for fault detection and diagnostics was validated with a 
number of scenarios by inserting single and multiple failures at different time points 
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and using different inflow options in the simulation model of the three-phase 
separator. The sensor readings obtained from the simulation model were used as 
inputs to the BBN. Such a validation method is commonly used for the initial testing 
of fault detection and diagnostic techniques of industrial systems, due to its low cost, 
the ease of repetitive testing for a number of distinct failure scenarios and the 
possibility to test the ability to diagnose critical failure modes, which could lead to 
hazardous events.  
The rest of the thesis is structured in the following way: 
x Study on fault detection of railway point systems is presented in chapter 2. 
o An overview of the railway point system, its components, failure 
modes and features of the data available in this study is presented in 
section 2.1. 
o A literature review of the state of the art methods for fault detection 
and prediction of RPS is given together with the common industrial 
solutions for RPS fault detection in section 2.2. 
o Possible approaches for the fault detection of RPS and similarity 
measures to compare the measurements of current of POE are 
presented in section 2.3. 
o The proposed methodology with OCSVM as fault detection model, 
giving the details of data input, pre-processing techniques and chosen 
training and testing techniques of OCSVM, is presented in section 2.4. 
o Results with the proposed methodology applied on the data of infield 
RPS, highlighting the effects of different pre-processing techniques 
and similarity measures used, are presented in section 2.5. 
o Conclusions and future recommendations for the RPS study 
performed in this thesis are given in sections 2.6 and 2.7 respectively. 
x Study on fault detection and diagnostics of three-phase separators is 
presented in chapter 3. 
o An overview of the three-phase separator, its components, 
undesirable events, failure modes and automatic control is presented 
in section 3.1. 
o A literature review of the state of the art methods for fault detection 
and diagnostics of TPS is given in section 3.2. 
o Three-phase separator simulation model and the developed software 
are presented in section 3.2.2.5. 
o The proposed methodology with BBN as fault detection and 
diagnostics model for TPS is presented in section 3.4. 
o Results with the proposed methodology applied on the data from TPS 
simulation model with single and multiple failures are presented in 
section 3.5. 
o Conclusions and future recommendations for the TPS study 
performed in this thesis are given in sections 3.6 and 3.7 respectively. 
x Final remarks are given in chapter 4, followed by references and appendices. 
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2 Study on fault detection for railway point systems 
2.1 Railway point systems 
2.1.1 Introduction 
In the next subsections an introduction to railway point systems is given. All main 
components of the system are presented and the operation of point system is 
described. Then possible operating problems are introduced by listing the component 
and system failure modes that occur commonly. Afterwards, maintenance and fault 
rectification intervals and regimes are introduced. The condition of a railway point 
system can be observed by monitoring several parameters of the system, which are 
introduced in this section. The behaviour of these parameters when no failure is 
present in the system is described. Then the expected change of these parameters 
behaviour, when the failure occurs in the system, is given. Finally, data available for 
this study is presented. The data available from several databases is combined to 
obtain a dataset required for the analysis of fault detection of railway point systems. 
Main features of the data of infield railway point systems are presented, highlighting 
the ones that differ from the data obtained from laboratory RPS. 
2.1.2 Railway point system operation and components  
A railway point system (in literature also referred to as switches and crossings (S&C)) 
is combined of electrical and mechanical installations enabling railway trains to be 
guided from one track to another. An example of a railway point system can be seen 
in Figure 2.1. Main components and their roles in the operation of the railway point 
system are discussed next. 
 
Figure 2.1. Railway point system fitted with a clamp lock as point operating 
equipment (Skipsey, 2010) 
Railway sleepers can be wooden (as in Figure 2.1) or concrete rectangular shaped 
objects that give the support for the rails, which are fastened to the sleepers. Stock 
rails are the rails which are not moveable in a railway point system. A pair of linked 
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movable rails lying between the stock rails are called switch rails. The switch rails are 
maintained at a correct distance apart by stretcher bars. The switch rails are usually 
laid on additional metal structure, called slide chairs. To reduce the friction between 
slide chairs and switch rails, the slide chairs are greased regularly. An additional 
component that helps to move the switch rails is known as a back drive. It moves the 
switch rails with the help of an additional stretcher bar and ensures that the switch 
rails are moved evenly. The number of back drives and stretcher bars can vary 
between installations depending on the length, curvature and speed limit of the 
railway point system. The drive of the switch rails is provided by a point operating 
equipment (POE). Various types of POE can be used within a railway point system. 
In this case, the railway point system is operated by a clamp lock (hydraulic POE). Its 
drive is provided by pumping oil through a hydraulic circuit. 
Other commonly used POE in UK railways is GEC HW electric point machine and 
Westinghouse M63 electric point machine. Depending on the type of POE, some 
components of RPS may differ. For example a drive rod together with a stretcher bar 
is used to move the switch rails, when HW is used as POE, while the clamp lock 
uses a hydraulic actuator and a stretcher bar to move the switch rails. In this study, 
railway point systems with the clamp locks are considered, but the same fault 
detection methodology can be applied to point systems with other types of POE. 
Since the measurements of current depend on the type of POE, the same idea of 
comparing the shapes of the measurements of current can be used. 
The clamp lock consists of a power pack, two pump motors and a hydraulic actuator. 
Two movement directions are identified: normal to reverse or reverse to normal. For 
each direction a different pump motor is used. If the switch rails were to be moved 
from the position that is pictured in Figure 2.1, such a movement would be called 
reverse to normal. The operation of RPS can be described as follows: 
1. A signal is received by the RPS to change the direction of track from normal 
to reverse or reverse to normal. The oil pump motor starts up (motor start-up 
phase in Figure 2.2). 
2. The switch rails are unlocked (unlocking phase in Figure 2.2). 
3. The corresponding pump motor pumps oil to the hydraulic actuator, which 
together with the back drive moves the switch rails (switch rail movement 
phase in Figure 2.2). 
4. When the switch rails move to the desired position, they are locked and a 
signal is sent to the signaller that the railway point system has successfully 
completed the operation (locking phase in Figure 2.2). Due to a slight delay in 
detecting the locking, the motor keeps running after the points have 
completed their movement. This is common to clamp ฀l฀o฀c฀k฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀t฀h฀u฀s฀ ฀a฀ ฀‘฀s฀h฀a฀r฀k฀ 
฀f฀i฀n฀’฀ ฀a฀t฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀e฀n฀d฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀o฀p฀e฀r฀a฀t฀i฀o฀n฀ ฀i฀s฀ ฀o฀b฀s฀e฀r฀v฀e฀d฀,฀ ฀a฀s฀ ฀s฀h฀o฀w฀n฀ ฀i n฀ Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2. Operating phases of the clamp lock in a typical electric current trend 
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Various failure modes might occur during this operation and they are presented in the 
following sections. 
2.1.3 Failure modes of railway point system 
The successful operation of a railway point system mostly depends on the reliable 
performance of its components. However, some externals factors might disrupt the 
operation even if all of the components of the railway point system are working. Both 
component failures and external causes that result in a failure of a railway point 
system are described in the next sections. 
2.1.3.1 Component failure modes 
Stretcher bar. A stretcher bar can fail in two ways. It can become loose from the 
switch rails or it might break due to corrosion or overstress. In the case of a failure of 
the stretcher bar, the switch rails are moved unevenly. This should result in some 
abnormal behaviour during the switch rails movement phase. The switch rails might 
even be moved at one end of the point system, but not at the other, depending on the 
number of stretcher bars used. A hazardous situation for railway users would occur if 
the railway point system was used with this failure present. 
Slide chairs. There are two failure modes of slide chairs. One of them is dry slide 
chairs, which might occur due to heavy rain or inappropriate maintenance frequency. 
The grease on the slide chairs might be washed off after a heavy rain and thus 
increase the friction between the switch rails and slide chairs. The other failure mode 
is the contamination of slide chairs. The slide chairs might get contaminated by sand, 
crushed ballast or fallen leaves. Both failure modes, dry or contaminated slide chairs, 
increase the friction between the slide chairs and switch rails. Thus, the railway POE 
has to put more effort in, in order to move the switch rails. 
Pump motor. A failure of a pump motor would result in the lack of oil delivery to the 
hydraulic actuator. In such case, after the unlocking phase, no movement of switch 
rails would be possible and the pump motor of clamp lock should time out after 
running longer than usual. 
Hydraulic actuator. A failure of a hydraulic actuator, as in the case of a failure of the 
pump motor, would also result in no movement of switch rails after the unlocking 
phase. The pump motor of clamp lock should also time out. 
Back drive. The failures attributed to the back drive are usually due to misalignment. 
The back drive might be under driven or over driven. The under driving of the back 
drive means that the switch rails are not moved to their end position properly, leaving 
a bigger than usual gap between the stock and switch rails. The overdrive of the back 
drive means that the back drive forces to move the switch rails further when they 
already are at their end position. The overdrive might cause the stretcher bar to crack 
due to overstress. 
Locking mechanism. The locking mechanism might fail in two ways: fail to unlock 
the switch rails and fail to lock the switch rails. In the first case, the switch rails 
cannot be moved from their position and thus the railway point system is inoperable. 
In the second case, a more hazardous situation occurs. If the train passes the railway 
point system when the switch rails are not properly locked, the switch rails might 
move while some of the train carriages are still passing through. This could result in a 
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catastrophic event of train derailment. The degraded condition of the locking 
mechanism might be detected by an increase of current used in the locking phase. 
Detection mechanism. The failure of the detection mechanism would result in an 
undetermined or an incorrectly determined position of the switch rails. If the locked 
position of switch rail is not detected, the point system cannot be used, because it is 
unclear if the operation of switch rail movement was performed successfully. A more 
hazardous situation might occur if the position of the switch rails is falsely identified 
as locked. As in the case of a failure of locking mechanism, this could result in a train 
derailment. 
Failures of sleepers, switch rail and stock rail are not considered in this section. The 
reasoning behind this is that such failures would not be observed from the behaviour 
of the usually monitored parameters (presented in section 2.1.5) of a railway point 
system. 
The following component failure modes of UK railway point systems were identified 
as the most common ones (INNOTRACK, 2006): 
x Failure of detection mechanism. 
x Dry or contaminated slide chairs. 
x Failure of back drive. 
x Failure of locking mechanism. 
However, situations described as ฀“no fault found฀”, were more frequent than any 
failure mode listed in a study conducted by INNOTRACK (INNOTRACK, 2006). Very 
often, when maintenance engineers are called to rectify faults of point systems, they 
cannot find any particular problem as the point system operates normally at that time. 
This might be due to several reasons. The first reason is that the fault occurs 
spuriously and the cause of such fault might depend on seasonal conditions (e.g. low 
temperature, heavy rain, flooding, etc.) which change in a time span between the 
fault detection and the arrival of maintenance team on site. The second reason is that 
the fault detection system raised a false alarm. Such uncertainty in the actual 
condition of RPS makes it difficult to differentiate between the data, representing 
working and failed state of the RPS. 
2.1.3.2 External causes 
Obstruction. One of the frequent external causes that alter the operation of a railway 
point system is an obstruction of the gap between stock rails and switch rails. Pieces 
of ballast, empty cans, bottles or any type of object that might get into the railway 
point system from the surrounding area might cause problems to the successful 
operation of the system. The obstruction in the system forces the POE to use more 
force when moving the switch rails. If the obstruction is not crushable, the POE might 
fail to complete the switch rails movement. 
Icing. Icing can alter the operation of locking and switch rail movement phases of the 
railway point system. If the switch rails are frozen, the POE has to use more force to 
start moving the rails. Moreover, if the locking mechanism is frozen, the unlocking of 
the switch rails could fail, resulting in the failure to operate the point system. Icing is 
temperature dependant external cause and is more likely to occur in the regions, 
where the weather conditions are more severe during the winter. 
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2.1.4 Maintenance and rectification of faults 
Two types of maintenance can be performed on a railway point system. The first type 
is preventive maintenance, which is performed at certain time intervals, disregarding 
the condition and performance of the point system. The second type is corrective 
maintenance, carried out by the engineers, only when a faulty behaviour of the RPS 
has been identified: for example, points fail to lock in the desired position. Using a 
strategy of corrective maintenance only, unpredictable delays on the network might 
occur, or in the worst case, a disastrous event might occur. 
Preventive maintenance is a safer, but usually more expensive way, of maintaining 
the RPS. This type of maintenance has a regular schedule, which is determined for 
each point system. The schedule is determined based on the risk it is exposed to, for 
example, the number of trains passing per day or the number of switch rail 
movements per day. The maintenance could be performed from as frequently as 4 
week intervals for high risk point systems, and as rarely as 52 week intervals for low 
risk point systems. A visual inspection is carried out during the maintenance. Any 
faults found are rectified immediately if possible. If the fault cause has not been found 
or the fault cannot be rectified straight away, the line might be closed or a temporary 
line speed restriction might be introduced, until the failure is rectified. As part of the 
routine maintenance, the cleaning and greasing of slide chairs for a smoother 
movement of switch rails is also performed. In this study, only the information about 
the corrective maintenance was available and no records of preventive maintenance 
were obtained. Preventive maintenance schedule can also be based on the condition 
of the RPS. In the next section, a way to monitor the condition of railway point system 
is presented. 
2.1.5 Measurements for monitoring the condition of railway point systems 
Several parameters on the railway point systems can be observed in order to monitor 
the condition of the system. Measurements of current and force used by POE and 
the displacement of switch rails are the most commonly observed parameters. These 
parameters were found to be most affected by incipient faults (INNOTRACK, 2009). 
Among them, the effect on displacement parameter was of the smallest magnitude. 
All measurements are usually taken via non-intrusive way, i.e. the introduction of 
sensors for current, force and displacement measurement does not affect the 
behaviour of the system in any way. The data used from infield railway point systems 
was obtained in this study as measurements of current. The current is measured 
using a current transducer, which is installed on the current supply to the pump motor 
of a clamp lock. The current drawn during each operation of the RPS is recorded in 
the database, identifying the start and the end of the operation together with 
intermediate measurements throughout the operation. 
In the next section the expected behaviour of faulty systems is presented. Different 
fault types will be considered to see whether a distinct failure type can be identified 
from the changes in the measurements of current. 
2.1.5.1 Expected behaviour of faulty railway point system 
Marquez et al. looked at the failure modes of a specific RPS with type M63 point 
machine (Márquez et al., 2007a), however some failure modes are common to all 
types of POE. The authors tried to determine current profiles of the POE during point 
movement when different types of faults were present. Three failure modes common 
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to all railway point systems were mentioned, namely obstruction in the point system, 
dry slide chairs and contaminated slide chairs. The expected profiles of the current 
measurements for these failure modes were described as follows: 
Obstruction. The current profile should be normal until the switch hits the 
obstruction. The motor current should increase while attempting to overcome the 
obstruction and if the obstruction cannot be overcome, the motor will time out after 
certain time. The points will not lock, so the increase of current will be observed until 
the motor times out. If the obstruction can be forced out of the way, the increase of 
the current drawn should be observed until the point, when the obstruction is 
overcome. Afterwards, the points will lock normally. 
Dry slide chairs. When the slide chairs are too dry the motor current should 
increase. The dry slide chairs are expected to increase the friction between the 
switch rails and slide chairs. 
Contaminated slide chairs. When there is sand or leaves on slide chairs, the 
friction between slide chairs and the switch rails is expected to increase, similarly as 
in the case of dry slide chairs. This increase of friction should be seen in the increase 
of the current drawn by the point machine. 
From the communication with railway infrastructure engineers, profiles of current 
measurements, which represented different faulty conditions and failure modes 
(obstruction, dry slide chairs, back drive out of adjustment and tight lock), were 
obtained and are presented next. All the numerical information has been removed 
due to confidentiality. 
Obstruction. The first failure mode, described by railway infrastructure engineers, 
was an obstruction, forcing the POE to time out. As presented previously, existence 
of obstruction should be indicated by an excess of current used, when the obstruction 
is hit. Then two scenarios can occur: the obstruction is not forced out of the way and 
the motor of POE times out after running for a long time or the obstruction is crushed 
and the railway point system completes the operation. The latter scenario can be 
observed from Figure 2.3 (a). Here the movement with the fault present is 
represented with blue colour and a fault-free movement with brown colour. 
Dry slide chairs. A similar situation to that of an obstruction can be observed for dry 
slide chairs as shown in Figure 2.3 (b). However, this faulty condition leads to the 
successful completion of the whole operation with a slight delay and excess current 
required. The blue line represents the measurements of current of faulty movement 
and the brown line represents the fault-free movement. The dry slide chairs force the 
POE to put in more effort (draw more current) to move the switch rails, as can be 
seen in Figure 2.3 (movement in blue is above the movement in brown). 
Back drive out of adjustment. The current profile obtained when the back drive is 
out of adjustment is pictured in Figure 2.3 (c). As previously, blue line represents the 
faulty condition and brown line represents a good condition of the RPS. As it can be 
observed from the figure, the motor of the POE had to use more effort, as in the case 
of the dry slide chairs failure mode. This time, it is due to the fact that the POE had to 
work harder to compensate for the poorly adjusted back drive. The excess of energy 
used can be seen throughout the whole operation of the railway point system. 
Tight lock. The last faulty condition presented, is known as a tight lock. This faulty 
condition represents a deteriorated state of the RPS, which would lead to the failure 
of the locking mechanism if no preventive actions were carried out. The profile of 
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measurements of current with this faulty condition is also given in Figure 2.3 (d). It 
can be seen from the figure, that there is an increase in current at the end of the 
operation of RPS, i.e. locking phase. This indicates that there are some problems in 
the locking operation of the railway point system. 
 
Figure 2.3. Expected profiles of current, as indicated by railway infrastructure 
engineers, when there is (a) an obstruction in point system, (b) slide chairs are dry or 
contaminated, (c) the back drive is out of adjustment and (d) there is a tight lock 
In general, for the faulty conditions and failure modes, considered from the 
communication with railway infrastructure engineers and observed in the data 
available, the excess of current usage was the typical symptom. The effects of failure 
modes, described by Marquez et al. (Márquez et al., 2007a) were the same as the 
ones described by the railway infrastructure engineers. The failure modes that were 
observed in the databases used in this study, will be graphically analysed in the next 
section. 
2.1.5.2 Summary 
From the graphical analysis of the expected trends of faulty conditions, one can 
identify that there is no significant distinction between certain fault types. For 
example, if dry slide chairs and back drive out of adjustment failure modes are 
considered (see Figure 2.3), both of them have an increase of current used. The 
same can be said about the obstruction failure mode. Even though, in the latter case 
sometimes it results in the timing out of POE. Due to existing similarities among 
current trends of different failure modes the research performed in this study focused 
on the detection of faults by distinguishing only between good and abnormal 
movements. In the next subsections, the databases that were used in this analysis 
and the data they contained are presented in more details. 
2.1.6 In-field data and its main features 
2.1.6.1 Databases used 
In-field data used in this study came from three databases: movement logging 
database (MLD), fault logging database (FLD) and asset information database (AID). 
Data logged throughout a one year period was analysed. 
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Each movement data extracted from the MLD consists of current measurements (in 
amperes) over time (in seconds) when the switch rails were moved, the date and 
time when the movement was started and when it was finished, the POE ID and the 
direction of the movement (normal to reverse (N->R) or reverse to normal directions 
(R->N)). Together with the movement data, the corresponding alarms were also 
extracted from the MLD. The alarms are raised in the MLD if certain thresholds for 
the observed parameters during the movement of points are reached to indicate 
possible faults. Two levels of alarms are used: low level alarm and high level alarm. 
Low level alarms are of lower priority which might indicate a deteriorating condition of 
the RPS but usually a big percentage of them are false alarms, while high level 
alarms are usually warnings about a faulty condition that already causes problems to 
the operation of RPS. The alarms are based on the motor running duration, the 
maximum and the average values of the measurements of current. More details 
about the threshold based alarm technique will be presented in section 2.2.4.2. 
The FLD consists of information about system faults. Specifically, fault description, 
repairs or adjustments made to the RPS, the cause of the failure, the time when the 
failure occurred and the time of repair. The AID is used to identify each RPS and link 
it to its faults. The type of POE of each RPS is extracted from the AID, since current 
trends depend on the type of POE. 
2.1.6.2 Data cleaning and preparation for analysis 
Current data stored in the MLD is the current from POE motor sampled with a 0.01 
second sampling rate during the movement of switch rails. In some cases the data 
extracted from the MLD can be partially incomplete, i.e. contain some missing values, 
and thus some data filtering and corrective actions are performed before the analysis. 
Some movements had a NULL value or one value from the whole movement missing 
(the time difference between two consecutive points in the time series of 
measurements of current was twice greater than the sampling rate) but the remaining 
values were present. In these cases a linear interpolation is used to estimate the 
missing values of current time series: 
 
ݔ௠௜௦௦ ൌ ሺݐ௠௜௦௦ െ ݐ௠௜௦௦ିଵሻݔ௠௜௦௦ାଵ െ ݔ௠௜௦௦ିଵݐ௠௜௦௦ାଵ െ ݐ௠௜௦௦ିଵ ൅ ݔ௠௜௦௦ିଵǡ 2.1 
where ݔ௠௜௦௦ is the missing value of current time series, ݔ௠௜௦௦ାଵ is the value of current 
time series after the missing value, ݔ௠௜௦௦ିଵ is the value of current before the missing 
value in time series, ݐ௠௜௦௦ is the time when current measurement is missing, ݐ௠௜௦௦ିଵ is 
the time before the current measurement is missing, ݐ௠௜௦௦ାଵ is the time after the 
current measurement is missing. 
2.1.6.3 Features of the in-field data 
A number of specific features have been observed in the in-field data of railway point 
systems. They have been of great importance in choosing a suitable method for the 
analysis. Since the data comes from the in-field point systems, the data features are 
different from the ones that come from the laboratory-based equipment, which was 
used to develop most of the approaches so far, which will be discussed in section 2.2. 
The features of the data obtained from the in-field point systems are discussed next, 
including the diversity of operational behaviour reflected in current trends within a 
group of same type POE (section 2.1.6.3.1), the variable duration of the RPS 
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operations (section 2.1.6.3.2) and the changing behaviour of fault-free RPS (section 
2.1.6.3.3). 
2.1.6.3.1 Diversity of operational behaviour within a group of the same type 
POE 
The idea of grouping RPS with the same type of POE for fault diagnostics is of great 
interest. That way, large data samples for each type of fault could be obtained 
allowing the standard multi-class classifiers such as Neural Networks, k-Nearest 
Neighbours, Naïve Bayes classifiers or Support Vector Machines to be used for the 
analysis. However, it has been observed that each POE seems to have its own 
specific current trend and thus POE of the same type cannot be grouped for the 
analysis. This feature can be simply observed just by looking at some POE current 
measurements plotted against time. For example, 4 point systems with Clamp locks 
and the same turnout type have been selected extracting 5 movements in each 
direction for each individual RPS over one week period of operation. 
 
Figure 2.4. Measurements of current of RPS with clamp locks 
From Figure 2.4 one can observe that not only the shapes of measurements of 
current curves are different, i.e. different phases of a movement start at different 
฀t฀i฀m฀e฀s฀,฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀‘฀s฀h฀a฀r฀k฀ ฀f฀i฀n฀s฀’฀ ฀a฀t฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀e฀n฀d฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀m฀o฀v฀e฀m฀e฀n฀t฀ ฀a฀r฀e฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀d฀i฀f฀f฀e฀r฀e฀n฀t฀ ฀m฀a฀g n i t u d e฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀a฀l s o฀ 
the durations of the movements differ. Larger differences in the shape of current 
curves can be seen in Figure 2.5, where the first 50 milliseconds (where the shapes 
are very similar) are ignored. 
 
Figure 2.5. Measurements of current of RPS with clamp lock (zoomed in) 
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Even for two POEs that are used on a single RPS, the shape of the current trend 
differs substantially, as it can be seen in Figure 2.6. Two POEs on a single RPS is a 
common thing, when the length of the switch rails is too big to be operated by one 
POE. 
 
Figure 2.6. Measurements of current of paired clamp locks  
The variation in current measurements observed for clamp locks is also observable 
for other types of POE. The issue of a unique operational behaviour of each POE has 
also been raised by Tunley (Tunley, 2010). Such behaviour can depend on the age 
and frequency of usage of POE, configuration of the RPS, etc. Due to this diversity, it 
is therefore possible that fault-free movements of some point systems are similar to 
faulty movements of other point systems and therefore the same classification of 
such movements becomes likely. Thus data sets of individual point systems, not their 
groups, have to be analysed separately. Furthermore there are far more current 
trends from good movements than those from faulty movements. Thus multiclass 
classification algorithms that require similar size data samples for each class are of 
limited use in this case and a single class algorithm should be used instead. 
2.1.6.3.2 Variable duration of POE operations 
Varying durations of the operations of the same POE is the other feature observed in 
the in-field data, as demonstrated in Figure 2.7. 
 
Figure 2.7. Measurements of current of clamp lock 
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As mentioned in section 1.1.2, the time series of measurements of current will be 
compared using similarity measures. However, the standard similarity measure, 
known as the Euclidean distance, cannot be defined for two time series of different 
length. In order to use Euclidean distance to compare two time series the following 
time series pre-processing approaches are the most common: 
1. Adding trailing zeros to the shorter current time series to obtain the length of 
the longer time series. 
2. Dividing the current time series into a fixed number of segments and 
calculating the mean of each segment. 
3. Rescaling the time series to make them of equal length (Fu et al., 2008). 
However, for the data available for this study, using the first method, differences 
between zero values and the available measurements of current would be of a big 
order (for example, values of measurements of current at the end of the switch rail 
movement are around 8-9 amperes) and thus it could significantly misrepresent the 
difference between two time series. Using the second case, a lot of information would 
be lost due to segmenting. Moreover, different phases of the movements might even 
be compared, giving us misleading information. As any two time series usually differ 
by a small number of data points available, an appropriate way of pre-processing the 
available data in this study seems to be the stretching or shrinking of the data to 
make the time series of equal lengths, as suggested in third approach. However, 
even after the rescaling some problems might arise, e.g. if the phases of the 
movements do not match in time, since the Euclidean distance allows only one to 
one matching between two time series. 
Alternatively, there are several other similarity measures that allow elastic matching, 
i.e. allow the scaling of the time axis to compare two data points, which were 
measured at different time points. From such similarity measures, Dynamic Time 
Warping (DTW) (Sakoe and Chiba, 1978), Edit Distance with Real Penalty (ERP) 
(Chen and Ng, 2004), Time Warp Edit Distance (TWED) (Marteau, 2009) are the 
most commonly used ones. Due to the elastic matching, such methods can be 
applied without rescaling the time series. The drawback of such methods is that they 
are more time-consuming than the Euclidean distance method, since they calculate 
the differences of one point of the time series with all the possible points of the 
second time series. Thus their complexity is ܱሺ݊ଶሻ , while Euclidean distance 
complexity is ܱሺ݊ሻ, where ݊  is the number of time series data points. Moreover, 
some parameter values of these algorithms need to be determined on individual case 
basis. These methods will be described in more detail in section 2.3.6. 
Since POE current was the only observable parameter of the RPS, an accurate 
comparison of this parameter, i.e. a correct estimate of similarity measure values of 
this parameter is essential. Misleading results of similarity measures would result in 
the fault detection algorithm giving incorrect results (good movements classified as 
faulty and vice versa). Therefore, there is a need to investigate the suitability of using 
specific similarity measures in classification methods proposed for fault detection on 
railway point systems. 
2.1.6.3.3 Changing behaviour of fault-free point system 
Another feature unique to the infield railway point systems data that cannot be 
observed in the data obtained in the laboratory environment is the variability of 
current trends obtained during fault-free movements of the same point system. Such 
variability might be due to deterioration of the point system, weather conditions, 
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performed maintenance or some other causes. To illustrate this variability in the data 
available in this study, graphical analysis of one point system is given, but similar 
situations can be observed for all of the point systems. 5 current time series logged 
at the beginning of the observed period are plotted together with 5 current time series 
logged later in the observed period. This is done repeatedly to show how the current 
trends of fault-free point system are constantly changing. The movements from 
several different time intervals are plotted in Figure 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8. Changing behaviour of fault-free point system 
The movements plotted in orange and labelled 1-5 (on the top left hand side of 
Figure 2.8) were performed during the first days of January. The movements plotted 
in black and labelled 51-55 (on the top left and top right hand side of Figure 2.8) were 
performed during the first days of February. The movements plotted in green and 
labelled 101-105 (on the top right and bottom left hand side of Figure 2.8) were 
performed in the middle of March. The movements plotted in indigo and labelled 201-
205 (on the bottom left and bottom right hand side of Figure 2.8) were performed 
during the last days of May and first days of June. The movements plotted in brown 
and labelled 301-305 (on the bottom left hand side of Figure 2.8) were performed 
during the first days of August. One can observe from Figure 2.8 that the behaviour 
of fault-free system changed through time. The movements that were plotted in pairs 
in Figure 2.8 are also plotted on one plot in Figure 2.9. 
A variety of current profiles can be observed from Figure 2.9. Such changing 
behaviour of POE during fault-free operation of points might cause difficulties 
detecting faults in the RPS. 
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Figure 2.9. Variety of fault-free movements for one POE PM9A 
A similar situation to the one discussed in section 2.1.6.3.1 can occur, when the 
diversity between current trends of two different POE might lead to a possibility that 
fault-free movements of one POE are similar to faulty movements of the other POE 
and therefore they can be misclassified. This time fault-free and faulty movements of 
the same POE might be more similar, if they were performed in a short time span 
between them, than two fault-free movements, which were performed with a longer 
time span between them. Thus, the changing behaviour of a fault-free RPS should be 
taken into account, when choosing an appropriate method for fault detection. In the 
next section the identification of faulty and good movements is presented. 
2.1.6.4 Identification of faulty and good movements 
Correct labelling of data used in a classification algorithm is of critical importance. 
Mislabelled data could lead to a potential decrease of the classification accuracy. 
Moreover, it could cause problems to find the optimal values of classification 
algorithm parameters, since these values are usually found by comparing the 
classification rates of the classification algorithms. Using the available data, the 
automatic labelling of POE operations data was done in two ways: 
1. Label the movement data according to failure dates in fault records in FLD. 
2. Label the movement data according to movement alarm dates recorded in 
MLD. 
In the first case, dates of faults were used to determine, which movements were 
performed by faulty system. Based on these dates, the labelling was done in the 
following way: the movements recorded between the date of fault occurrence and 
fault rectification were labelled as faulty, other movements were labelled as good. 
However, in this case, one has to rely on the fact that the dates of fault occurrence 
and rectification have been recorded accurately in FLD, which might not always be 
the case. 
If the data was labelled according to alarm dates, movements that raised an alarm 
were labelled as faulty and all the other movements were labelled as good. In this 
case, one has to assume that the alarms were raised only for the movements that 
correspond to the faulty (or deteriorating) condition of the point system, which again 
might not always be the case. If the labelling is misleading, poor classification 
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accuracy is likely to occur, independent of the algorithm chosen. Therefore, there is a 
need to investigate the suitability of the two labelling approaches. 
2.1.6.5 Current profiles of failure modes observed in in-field data 
In this section, the measurements of current of RPS with certain failure modes 
present in the database used in this study are described. The movements that were 
found to be faulty are plotted in red colour and the good movements are plotted in 
green. The same failure modes are analysed as those described in section 2.1.5.1, 
except for the tight lock failure mode, which was not found among the data that was 
available for the analysis. 
Obstruction 
As described in the previous sections, an obstruction in the railway point system 
should result in an increase of the current usage, when the obstruction is met and 
until the end of the operation. Depending on whether the obstruction can be forced 
out of the way, the railway point system is able or not to complete the operation. An 
increase of current usage can be observed in the example, taken from the movement 
database plotted in Figure 2.10. 
 
Figure 2.10. Profiles of current when there is an obstruction in RPS 
In this case, the profiles of measurements of current indicate a presence of 
obstruction, which is only forcing the POE to use excess of current. The movement 
operation is completed, but its duration is longer than normal. 
Dry or contaminated slide chairs 
A similar situation can be observed for dry or contaminated slide chairs in Figure 2.11. 
The excess of current usage can be seen throughout the movement phase of the 
switch rails, from somewhere around first second of the movement. As in the case of 
obstruction, the faulty operations take longer to complete. This is due to a higher 
friction between the switch rails and slide chairs, since the slide chairs are 
contaminated or not properly lubricated. 
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Figure 2.11. Profiles of current when the slide chairs are dry or contaminated 
Back drive out of adjustment 
The movements, which represented a back drive out of adjustment failure mode in 
the movement database, are given in Figure 2.12. An excess of current throughout 
the movement was expected, but it can be observed from the figure, that the excess 
of current is used only at the end of operation. Moreover, the motor of POE 
eventually times out after running for a long time. This profile is different from that 
expected to appear when a back drive is out of adjustment as described in 2.1.5.1. 
 
Figure 2.12. Profiles of current when the back drive was out of adjustment 
2.1.7 Summary 
An introduction to the railway point systems was given in this section. A diagram, 
identifying the main components of the railway point system, was given with a brief 
introduction of each component and how it affects the operation of the whole system. 
Failure modes of railway point system caused by components and external causes 
were then overviewed. Different maintenance regimes of railway point systems were 
presented, indicating advantages and disadvantages of each. 
Analysis of system operation under different failure modes present revealed an 
increase of current used by POE motor for most of the cases. Thus the discrimination 
between different fault types using only current measurements is impossible in most 
of the cases and therefore fault diagnostics will not be considered in this study. 
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The main features of the data available in this study, which influenced the choice of 
suitable data analysis methods, were overviewed. Three main features of the data 
were identified: diversity of operational behaviour of the same type of POE, variable 
duration of the operation of the same railway point system and the changing 
behaviour of the fault-free point system. 
Finally, an automatic labelling method of faulty and good movements was presented 
based on two types of data: alarm dates and failure dates. Both labelling options 
were used in this study and the results are presented in section 2.5. 
In the next section a literature review of the state of the art techniques applied to 
railway point systems fault detection and prediction is given. 
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2.2 Literature review 
2.2.1 Introduction 
An extensive literature review has been performed in this study to identify the 
methods used for fault detection or prediction of the railway point systems. The 
variety of methods applied for fault detection shows that the research is still ongoing 
and one suitable method has not been found yet. In the next sections methods for 
fault detection and fault prediction are presented. The fault detection methods are 
grouped in the following categories: statistical analysis methods, classification 
methods, model based approaches and other methods. The fault prediction methods 
are presented individually as only several of them were found in literature. 
A summary of each method is given in the following fashion, depending on the 
information available: introduction of the model, the failures considered, observed 
parameters for monitoring the condition of a railway point system, data obtained for 
the analysis, results obtained with the proposed method, advantages and 
disadvantages of the proposed method and a discussion whether it can be useful in 
this study. 
At the end of this chapter, industrial solutions for fault detection of railway point 
systems are overviewed. A typical alarm threshold technique for fault detection is 
presented. Major disadvantages of this technique are illustrated with simple 
examples. 
Finally, the key requirements for a new fault detection method that can accommodate 
the features of infield railway point system data (section 2.1.6) and deficiencies of 
previous methods found from literature review are formed. 
2.2.2 Methods for fault detection of railway point systems 
A wide variety of techniques have been used to develop a fault detection 
methodology for railway point systems. One of the most commonly used techniques 
is Principal Component Analysis (PCA). It has been used as a standalone technique 
and in a combination with some other technique, e.g. Support Vector Machines (Eker 
et al., 2012), Hotelling coefficient (Ardakani et al., 2012) or simply visual inspection 
(McHutchon et al., 2005, Márquez and Chacón Muñoz, 2010, Márquez and Garcia-
Pardo, 2010). Other statistical techniques used included an analysis of squared sums 
of errors (Oyebande and Renfrew, 2002), a three statistical criterion technique 
introduced by Marquez (Márquez et al., 2003), a curve statistical parameters analysis 
(Zwanenburg, 2006), a qualitative trend analysis (Márquez and Schmid, 2007, 
Silmon and Roberts, 2010), a mixture discriminant analysis (Chamroukhi et al., 2008), 
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Bolbolamiri et al., 2012) and a discrete wavelet 
transformation together with Support Vector Machines (Asada et al., 2013). 
An expert system based on rules and thresholds was suggested by only one 
research team in (Atamuradov et al., 2009). Several model based approaches have 
been introduced, such as H2 norm criterion based on a linear model (Zattoni, 2006), 
an unobserved component model (Márquez et al., 2007b), a state-space and 
harmonic regression models (Pedregal et al., 2009) and a vector auto-regressive 
moving-average model (Márquez et al., 2010). Only one researcher looked at the 
influence of external conditions of the railway point system, i.e. temperature and 
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weather conditions (Böhm, 2012). More details of these approaches are given in the 
next subsections. 
2.2.2.1 Statistical analysis methods 
Sum of Squared Errors (SSE) and Net Energy Analysis (NEA) 
Oyebande and Renfrew (Oyebande and Renfrew, 2002) tried several different 
methods to detect RPS faults. Data was obtained from experiments with 3 point 
machines: a HW 2000 point machine in the laboratory, a HW 2000 point machine 
located in Manchester Metrolink's Queen's Road depot and a HW 2000 point 
machine located in the Undercroft of Piccadilly Station. The current used by point 
machine motors was measured by a Hull effect current transducer and the voltage 
was measured by a resistor. The motor speed was measured from pulses obtained 
by an inductive proximity detector, mounted adjacent to the step-down gearing stage 
on the motor shaft. 
The authors were examining the performance of point machines when different loads 
were applied to the machines, rather than introducing distinct failures to the system. 
They based this idea on the findings that faults like a lack of lubrication, an 
obstruction or motor problems would reflect on the increased load of the point 
machine. Different load profiles were attained by adjusting the position of the piston 
attached to the tension spring with respect to the main cylinder with a screw thread. 
Several techniques were employed to discriminate between the point machine 
performances. Data from each point machine was tested separately. 
The authors first performed a transient analysis of current waveforms by comparing 
the sum of squared errors (SSE) between them. In this test, the data was obtained by 
operating the point machine ten times at five different piston gap settings. Intuitively, 
the SSE values for the waveforms, which represent the operations with the same 
piston gap setting, should be smaller than for the waveforms which represent the 
operations with different piston gap setting. The SSE values were inspected visually 
by plotting them as a three dimensional surface. However, a clear trend has not been 
observed for the different loads applied neither for the laboratory point machine nor 
for the ฀Q฀u฀e฀e฀n฀’฀s฀ ฀R฀o฀a฀d฀ ฀m฀a฀c฀h฀i฀n฀e, used in this testing phase. 
A spectral analysis of current waveforms was applied next. Spectral patterns were 
first extracted for the same data that was used for calculation of SSE values. The 
power spectral density (PSD) of each discrete signal was calculated. The SSE pairs 
were then calculated, replacing current waveforms with the corresponding PSD 
vectors of those waveforms. The results were compared in a same manner as 
previously, by plotting the SSE values in a three dimensional surface plot. Once more, 
the visual inspection indicated that there was a lack of discrimination between 
different operation conditions with different load profiles, and that the method could 
not lead to any valuable deduction. 
The durations of switching operations were analysed by calculating the mean and 
standard deviation of movements in the normal direction. The duration of the 
switching operation was defined as a period of time between activating the power 
supply of the point machine and cutting the power supply off. Results obtained for the 
laboratory point machine showed that the mean time of all the switching operations 
was 1.71 s and the width of the deviation was 1.8%. Therefore this approach could 
only give good results in cases of a severe disruption of the POE operation, since the 
durations of the switching operations were very similar for different load profiles. 
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The analysis of the end-stroke positions was used to determine the problems caused 
by the lack of adjustment of the railway point machine. An end-stroke position was 
defined as a position of switch rails when they are locked after the switching 
operation. Trend analysis of the end positions over a period of time was performed 
using data acquired from 70 consecutive switching operations of the laboratory point 
machine. The positions of the switch rails were measured during the switching 
operation and that way a corresponding position waveform was obtained. Values of 
the position waveform registered after the completion of the switching operation were 
averaged. The averages of the end positions were then plotted on a scatter diagram 
with the best straight-line fits. After a visual inspection of the graph, this method was 
also concluded to lack the distinction between different loads applied to the point 
machine. 
A more robust approach to identify the different load influence on the point machine 
behaviour proved to be the usage of at least two different types of waveforms, that is, 
measurements of current and voltage data. In that way random fluctuations in one 
measurement had less effect on the overall result. For that purpose, a Net Energy 
Analysis (NEA) technique was used, which involved the calculation of the net energy 
(EP) expended in moving the switch rails during one switching operation. Plotting the 
scatter of EP values showed a clearly distinguishable trend between different piston 
gap settings. 
From all of the methods applied in this study, the NEA technique performed the best. 
The authors showed that there is evidence of different point machine behaviour when 
different loads are applied. However, the distinction between various load settings 
was done heuristically by looking at scatter plots of EP values. This is one of the 
biggest deficiencies of this approach, if considering using it as an online condition 
monitoring system. All other methods that were used by the authors failed to 
accurately distinguish between the different load settings. Thus, all of the proposed 
techniques from this research cast doubt on using them if one is interested in the 
automated detection of the RPS deteriorated or failed condition. 
Statistical criterion testing 
Marquez et al. (Márquez et al., 2003) carried out research on the fault detection of 
RPS using data of force (in newton) versus time (in seconds). They suggested 
analysing absolute values of the difference (equation 2.2) between the actual data 
and reference data, because from the actual curves of force versus time, faults could 
not be detected directly. 
 
୧୨ ൌ ቚ୧୨ െ ୧ୱቚ, 2.2 
where ݔ௝ is actual data and ݔ௦ is the reference data given by: 
 ୧ୱ ൌ ୧ୱିଵ ൅ ୧୨ ? ǡ 2.3 
where  െ  ? is the previous reference data set,  is the new fault free data set, ݏ is the 
new reference data set containing ݔ௜ ฀– the data value at time-step ݅. 
฀W฀i฀t฀h฀ ฀n฀o฀ ฀f฀a฀u฀l฀t฀s฀ ฀p฀r฀e฀s฀e฀n฀t฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀‘฀a฀s฀ ฀c฀o฀m฀m฀i฀s฀s฀i฀o฀n฀e฀d฀’฀ tests resulted in the curves of force 
difference ݀௝ which were very similar. 
The first criterion used for the fault detection involved checking whether the shape of 
the test data curve was irregular. If the irregularities were not sufficiently distinctive to 
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detect a fault with the first criterion, the maximum position ݐ௠௔௫௝  of the curve ݀௝ was 
tested with an allowed margin of ݐ௠௚. Finally, if the first two criteria have not resulted 
in the detection of a fault, then a third criterion was applied. It checked whether the 
curve of force difference ݀௝ was symmetric with respect to the maximum position, 
again with a margin of a given width: 
 ൭ ݐ௠௔௫௝ܶ௝ െ ݐ௠௔௫௝ ൱ ෍ ݀௡௝௧೘ೌೣ
ೕ
௡ୀ଴ ൎ ෍ ݀௠௝்ೕ௠ୀ௧೘ೌೣೕ ǡ 2.4 
where ݐ௠௔௫௝  and ܶ௝ are the maximum position and the total time respectively,  ? ݀௡௝௧೘ೌೣೕ௡ୀ଴  
and  ? ݀௠௝்ೕ௠ୀ௧೘ೌೣೕ  are the areas under and above ݐ௠௔௫௝  position of curve ݀௝. 
Any set of the test data that satisfied the three criteria was considered to be the result 
฀o฀f฀ ฀a฀ ฀t฀e฀s฀t฀ ฀w฀i฀t฀h฀o฀u฀t฀ ฀a฀ ฀f฀a฀u฀l฀t฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀w฀a฀s฀ ฀d฀e฀f฀i฀n฀e฀d฀ ฀‘฀a฀s฀ ฀c฀o฀m฀m฀i฀s฀s฀i฀o฀n฀e฀d฀’฀. 
To increase the reliability of the last criterion, the authors employed a Kalman filter 
(Kalman, 1960) to smooth the curves. The Kalman filter approach was used to filter 
out the noise from the data, which improved results quite significantly. A total of 151 
experiments were carried out, 79 in the reverse to normal direction and 72 in the 
normal to reverse direction, when 12 failure modes were introduced in the 
experiments. With the Kalman filter, authors could detect 100% of faults in the 
reverse to normal direction in the 79 experiments. Without the Kalman filter the result 
dropped to 97.33%. In the other direction, 97.1% of faults were detected when using 
the Kalman filter and without it the result dropped to 94.2%. 
Very good results were obtained with the proposed approach in the experimental part 
of this study. However, in the study, it was not clearly stated how many movements 
represented a failed condition and what type of failure modes were considered. 
Therefore, it is difficult to judge the suitability of this method to our study. 
Principal components analysis (PCA) 
McHutchon et al. used signal processing techniques by analysing statistical and 
geometrical parameters of force data, applying wavelet-transform and Principal 
Component Analysis, to detect the faults of railway point systems in (McHutchon et 
al., 2005). Experimental data was obtained from a laboratory Type HW point machine. 
The current data was obtained using a current transducer in a non-intrusive way. The 
force data was acquired using a load pin inserted in a place of the bolted connection 
between the drive bar and the drive rod. 8 different faults were artificially introduced 
in the system: 
1. Tight lock on the reverse side (sand on bearers both sides). 
2. 12mm obstruction at toe on the reverse side. 
3. Back drive slackened, toe end, left hand side. 
4. Back drive slackened, toe end, right hand side. 
5. Back drive tightened, heel end, left hand side. 
6. Back drive tightened, heel end, right hand side. 
7. Diode snubbing block disconnected. 
8. Drive rod stretcher bar loose right hand side. 
151 switching operations were performed to obtain the faulty and fault free data: 79 
in the reverse to normal and 72 normal to reverse directions. Each fault was 
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simulated three times, resulting in 24 faulty movements with faults present for each 
direction. The following statistical parameters were used in the study to extract the 
information from current and force measurements: maximum, minimum, mean, peak-
to-peak, standard deviation, root mean square, shape factor, crest factor, impulse 
factor, kurtosis and absolute area. 
27 movements were chosen to test the method฀:฀ ฀2฀4฀ ฀f฀a฀u฀l฀t฀y฀ ฀m฀o฀v฀e฀m฀e฀n฀t฀s฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀3฀ ฀‘฀a฀s฀ 
฀c฀o฀m฀m฀i฀s฀s฀i฀o฀n฀e฀d฀’฀.฀ Faults, numbered 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 were detected by plotting the root 
mean square against maximum force values. However, this was only deduced by 
visual inspection and no automated way of detecting faults based on the statistical 
parameters was suggested. 
In the next phase of the study, the original data was transformed with a discrete 
Daubeches wavelet transformation and then the same statistical parameters were 
obtained as those for the non-transformed data. A detailed algorithm of the 
Daubeches wavelet transformation can be found in (Daubechies, 1992). Once more, 
the extracted statistical parameters were plotted against one another and a visual 
inspection was performed to discriminate between the different failure modes. 
However, again there was no automation in the fault detection technique. 
Lastly, the PCA method was applied in a similar manner. The idea of PCA is to 
convert original data, which is possibly highly correlated, into a set of principal 
components, which are linearly uncorrelated. The PCA method allows a reduction of 
the dimensionality of the data by transforming the data into a few principal 
components that reproduce the majority of the variability in the original data and thus 
is frequently used in practical applications to pre-process the raw data. Details of 
PCA can be found in (Pearson, 1901). Principal components were found from the 
statistical parameters. The principal components were then plotted against one 
another and a visual inspection was performed once more. Only three faults were 
detectable in this case: faults numbered 2, 6 and 8. 
Some faults were detectable with the techniques proposed in this research. However, 
the distinction between different failure modes was finally done by visually looking at 
the plots obtained from applied methods. Thus neither of the approaches gives 
quantitative information on differences among failure modes and they could not be 
used if an automated fault detection technique was required. 
Marquez together with Chacon Munoz (Márquez and Chacón Muñoz, 2010) and 
Garcia-Pardo (Márquez and Garcia-Pardo, 2010) further extended the research on 
PCA for point system fault detection. 476 experiments were carried out collecting 
time, force and operating current data. The current and force data were used in the 
experimental part for both normal to reverse and reverse to normal movements. The 
same failure modes and the same statistical features were considered as those in 
(McHutchon et al., 2005). 3 dimensional vectors as Principal Components were 
extracted from these statistical features using PCA. Data of 26 movements was then 
used to test the results obtained by PCA. As in the previous research, the fault 
detection was made by visually inspecting the plots of Principal Components. 
However, some faults were not clearly separable by the visual inspection, and as in 
(McHutchon et al., 2005) no quantitative analysis was performed to separate them. 
Similar results were also obtained in (Márquez and Garcia-Pardo, 2010), as the 
same idea of PCA was used. Thus, the main limitation of the proposed approach was 
the heuristic reasoning for the fault detection. 
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Hotelling T2 coefficient 
Ardakani et al. combined PCA with a Hotelling T2 coefficient for the identification of a 
health state of point machines (Ardakani et al., 2012). The authors investigated the 
behaviour of double point machines that consisted of two motors working 
consecutively. In this study, operation of RPS was segmented into 4 segments and 
each of them was analysed individually. The first segment corresponded to the 
operation of the first POE, the second segment represented the locking function of 
the first POE, the third segment represented the operation of the second POE and 
the fourth segment was the locking function of the second POE. Three categories of 
data inputs were considered for each segment: statistical features (area, crest factor, 
impulse factor, kurtosis, maximum, mean, minimum, shape factor, standard deviation 
and the location of the maximum point) of the measurements of current, statistical 
features of the difference between measurements of current of the reference signal 
and the input signal, and the energy of a signal (the product of current and the 
voltage). Ratios of the energy values for each segment and energy values were 
considered as data inputs to PCA. 
The PCA technique was employed to pick out the features of the energy of a signal 
that are the most important and explain the most variation in the data. PCA reduced 
the number of features from 10 to 4: energy of fourth segment, ratios of energy 
between first and fourth, second and fourth and third and fourth segments. The 
Hotelling ܶଶ  coefficient was then calculated based on the principal components 
picked out by PCA. The Hotelling ܶଶ coefficient is a multivariate generalisation of the 
฀S฀t฀u฀d฀e฀n฀t฀’฀s฀ ฀t฀ ฀t฀e฀s฀t฀ (Hotelling, 1931) and i  used to test whether the mean value of a 
multivariate object is equal to a chosen mean value. It was used as a health indicator 
of a point machine in the following way: 
x Point machine was considered as healthy at the beginning of the analysed 
period. The initial health state of the POE was attributed number 5. 
x Hotelling ܶଶ coefficient was calculated comparing the next operation of the 
point machine with a baseline operation. The resulting Hotelling coefficient 
was subtracted from number 5 and a new health state was obtained. 
Authors did not reason their choice of using number 5 as an indicator of a healthy 
point machine. The obtained health state values were analysed graphically and the 
authors concluded that there was a strong correlation between maintenance events 
and the drop in health state values before the maintenance occurred. However, no 
suggestion was given how the health state values should be interpreted to identify a 
deteriorated state of the point machine, except for stating that the health state value 
should be around 5. 
Kolmogorov ± Smirnov (K-S) test 
Bolbolamiri et al. used a K-S test to detect faults of RPS that occur due to other 
reasons than point machine components (Bolbolamiri et al., 2012). Such failures 
might include slide chair friction, obstacle between the stock and the switch rails, 
damage to the rails etc. Authors assumed that when this type of a fault occurs, the 
mean value of the current measurement will change from its base value ߤ଴ towards 
some new increased value ߤଵ ൐ ߤ଴. 
Two failure modes were analysed in this study: obstruction and dry slide chairs. The 
obstruction was analysed with two levels of severity: insertion of soft rock and hard 
rock. For the investigation of dry slide chairs, the slide chairs were degreased 
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manually. This type of failure reflected on the increase of current drawn by the point 
machine throughout the movement. 
16 movements were sampled for the normal state and each failed state, giving total 
of 64 movements. For the K-S test (Massey, 1951) a reference signal (non-faulty 
movement) was used to decide whether a new movement was faulty or not. The idea 
of the K-S test is to compare empirical cumulative distribution functions of the two 
given samples and to test the hypothesis that the distributions are equal with a given 
significance level ߙ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?. The p-values of the K-S test for the faulty movements, 
which were compared to reference (non-faulty) movements, should be less than the 
given significance level ߙ. This would show that the empirical distributions of the 
measurements of current were statistically significantly different for faulty and non-
faulty movements. 
The approach was tested with 5 non-faulty and 15 faulty movements. Measurements 
of 4 out of 5 good movements were found to have the same empirical distributions 
with the given significance level ߙ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?. The measurement of current of fifth good 
movement had small p-values (0.053, 0.075, 0.063) with first, third and fourth good 
movement measurements. One p-value, for second movement measurement of 
current, was even smaller than the significance level ߙ (0.0496<0.05), indicating that 
the measurements of current of those movements had different empirical 
distributions. The empirical distributions of faulty and non-faulty movements differed 
in all cases. Thus, there was only one error when the empirical distributions of two 
good movements did not match, with the given significance level. 
Results obtained using the K-S test were very good, however the authors stated that 
this approach assumes that the fault should strongly influence the empirical 
distribution function of the measurements in order for the fault to be detectable. Thus 
this approach probably would not be able to detect a deteriorating condition of the 
point machine, since the changes to the measurements of the current are not that 
abrupt as those in the obstruction and dry slide chairs failure modes, which were 
manually introduced in this study. 
2.2.2.2 Classification methods 
Mixture Discriminant analysis (MDA) 
F. Chamroukhi et al. (Chamroukhi et al., 2008) considered the RPS fault detection as 
a pattern recognition problem. The proposed approach using signals of electrical 
power consumed during the switch actuation period consisted of three steps: 
x Feature extraction from the signal; 
x Learning of parameters for different classes from a labelled collection of 
signals; 
x Classifying the new data based on the learned parameters. 
Each electrical power signal consisted of 550 points sampled at 100 Hz. Each signal 
was parameterized with the help of a regression model with a hidden logistic process 
by a parameter vector of dimension 21 (7 parameters for each of the 3 central 
phases ฀– unlocking, moving of the switch rails and locking). 
According to the MDA approach, signals were grouped into classes, each class ܥ௞ 
density was modelled by a Gaussian Mixture distribution. The mixture distribution 
parameters for each class ܥ௞ were estimated by the Expectation-Maximization (EM) 
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algorithm. The optimal number of Gaussian distributions ܴ௞  for each class ܥ௞  was 
computed by maximizing the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Each new signal 
designed by the feature vector ݔ௜ was assigned to the class ݇כ which maximized the 
posterior probability that ݔ௜ originated from the class ܥ௞. 
A database of 119 real signals with known classes has been used for the 
experimentation part: 90 signals for training and 29 signals for the evaluation of the 
classifier. Three different classes of signals were considered in this paper: ܥଵ ฀– class 
without defect, ܥଶ ฀– class with minor defect and ܥଷ ฀– class with major defect. The 
classification accuracy obtained by the proposed MDA approach was compared with 
the accuracy provided by: the Neural Network (NN) approach based on a multilayer 
perceptron with a single hidden layer of 13 neurons, the K Nearest Neighbours (KNN) 
approach and the Bayesian discrimination (BD) approach based on a single 
Gaussian distribution per class. 
The results in Table 2.1 show that the MDA approach outperformed the alternative 
approaches, as it classified 95% of the data correctly, while the best alternative 
approach (Neural Network) achieved 90% classification accuracy. However, the 
differences between the movements representing different classes had clear visual 
differences and thus this approach should be tested, when the data is more difficult 
to distinguish. 
Table 2.1. Comparison of percentage of good classification 
Approach Percentage, % 
MDA 95 
NN 90 
KNN 88 
BD 75 
Support Vector Machines (SVM) 
Asada and Roberts proposed a new approach to detect faults of AC point machines 
(Asada and Roberts, 2011). They chose to analyse the faults that develop gradually 
(incipient faults) and are mainly caused by a misalignment of components. Two types 
of incipient faults were considered: under driving and over driving of the drive rod. 
Data was collected from an AC point machine in training facility at the Central Japan 
Railway Company in Tokyo. Drive force, electrical current and electrical voltage were 
the observed parameters used in the study. 
Initial K-means clustering analysis of the parameters showed that the drive force data 
has the best potential to distinguish between the normal and faulty behaviour of the 
point machine. However, the drive force data is hard to collect in practice and the 
additional sensors needed might introduce additional failure modes and additional 
costs. For this reason, an additional parameter was derived from the electrical 
current and voltage data. This new parameter, called electrical active power, was 
used in the K-means analysis. The electrical active power performed slightly poorer 
than the drive force, but for practical reasons, the electrical active power data was 
used in the further analysis. 
In the next phase of the study, Discrete Wavelet Transform with level 9 Haar 
wavelets was performed to extract features of the original waveform of the electrical 
active power. The idea of Haar wavelets is to decompose the original data into a 
group of square shaped waves that allow a representation of the original data in a 
reduced dimensionality. The extracted features were used as inputs to the SVM. Two 
kernels of SVM were used: linear and radial basis function kernel. The kernel of the 
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SVM is a function that transforms the input data into an inner product space, which 
allows the input data to be better classified. Both kernels performed equally good 
achieving a 100% classification accuracy. 
More testing on the AC point machines has been performed in a later work by Asada 
et al. (Asada et al., 2013). Different health states of the point machines have been 
considered. Testing was done with three combinations of point machine health states: 
1. Over driving and under driving of the drive rod versus non-faulty movements 
2. Minor over driving and minor under driving of the drive rod versus non-faulty 
movements 
3. Minor under driving versus under driving; non-faulty movements versus minor 
under driving; minor overdriving and overdriving. 
In the first two cases the SVM was able deal with the classification problem perfectly, 
by achieving a 100% classification accuracy. However, in the last case, when minor 
under driving was compared to non-faulty movements, the SVM classified all the 
movements as non-faulty. Thus, a small under driving of the drive rod could not be 
separated from the non-faulty movements by the proposed approach. 
The same methodology as proposed for the AC point machines was tested with the 
DC point machines by Asada and Roberts (Asada and Roberts, 2013). This time four 
different faults of driving rod were considered: 
1. Left-hand over driving; 
2. Right-hand over driving; 
3. Left-hand under driving; 
4. Right-hand under driving. 
One versus one multiclass SVM approach with voting was chosen as a fault 
classification method. 142 movements were used to test the approach: 30 fault-free 
and other reflecting one of the 4 faulty conditions. 5-fold cross validation was used to 
test the performance of the multiclass SVM. 99.33% accuracy rate was achieved for 
this approach. The minor fault conditions as in the case of AC point machines were 
introduced to test the SVM abilities further. In this case, Radial basis function kernel 
outperformed the linear kernel of the SVM by achieving a 99.57% classification 
accuracy rate. 
Eker et al. performed fault detection of RPS based on the measurements of linear 
ruler to detect the misalignment of drive rod (Eker et al., 2012). Statistical features 
were extracted from the measured ruler data: mean, standard deviation, variance, 
slope, maximum and minimum. 20 measurements in total have been made: 10 for 
the faulty class and 10 for the fault free class. Maximum and minimum values were 
selected as the most important features after the t-test. PCA was also applied on the 
statistical features. The features selected by t-test and principal components 
extracted by PCA were then used as inputs to the SVM. The effect of different inputs 
on the performance of SVM was tested based on the classification accuracy of SVM. 
SVM with Gaussian kernel was chosen for this analysis. The approach with feature 
selection by t-test gave 83.3% classification accuracy, while the approach with PCA 
outperformed the t-test by achieving 100% classification accuracy. However, the 
SVM model was built to identify only one type of failure ฀– drive rod out of adjustment. 
The proposed approach needs to be tested with the data of more failure modes if it is 
to be used as a fault detection tool. 
 
43 
 
Neural networks 
Thomas Böhm suggested using external data (e.g. weather conditions) for the 
improvement of the railway point systems fault diagnosis (Böhm, 2012). The author 
analysed the diagnostic capabilities of the industrial railway point system fault 
diagnostics solution, known as SIDIS W (Siemens AG, 2011). SIDIS W used the 
alarm threshold technique for the early faulty detection. For this purpose, effective 
power was measured throughout the movement of points system. Each movement 
was divided in several subsections, representing a specific operation of the RPS. 
Eight different indicators were used to assess the point system condition. If any of 
these indicators fell below or exceeded the predefined thresholds, an alarm was 
raised: yellow alert identified a smaller deviation from the normal condition and a red 
alert identified a big deviation from the normal condition. These alerts were 
indications of an actual or potential failure occurrence. 
11 point systems were considered for the evaluation of SIDIS W performance. The 
amount of alerts raised by the SIDIS W system highly varied for different point 
systems, starting from as little as 3.83% of yellow alerts up to 68.44%. The same 
tendency was observed with the red alerts where the percentage varied between 
0.49% and 33.07% of all movements. Interestingly, the biggest fraction of red alerts 
was for the point system, which had no failures, while the smallest fraction was for 
the point system which had 2 failures. 
The issue of the alarm threshold technique was the high number of false alarms. 
Thus, the author looked for the additional information, which could increase the 
accuracy of the alarm threshold technique. Temperature was considered in this study, 
as one of the possible addition to the power data. The weather data was obtained 
from the weather stations that were not further than 10 km from the RPS. The point 
systems were clustered by the same constructional characteristics, e.g. the switch 
type, the curve radius, the type of sleepers etc. Then a Neural Network was used to 
learn the alert thresholds for the power data. Correlation between the indicators of 
SIDIS W system and temperature data was calculated and when the value of 
correlation was below -0.6 or above 0.6, the coefficient of determination was 
calculated. Then an average change of the indicator per °C was multiplied by the 
coefficient of determination, giving the correction value per each °C. The average 
temperature of 11.3 °C was used as a reference temperature. Any deviation from this 
temperature was adjusted by adding a correction value, calculated as described 
before, to the power data. A Neural Network was used once more to calculate the 
alerts for the adjusted data. 
The amount of yellow alerts was reduced by 16.84% (from 16997 to 14134) and 
91.83% for the red alerts (from 4724 to 386). Such decrease in alerts, especially the 
red ones, shows a good potential of the usage of additional data to improve the 
performance of alarm threshold technique. However, the inclusion of temperature did 
not detect any new failures. The author showed that this additional information, which 
comes with no extra cost (the weather information is accessible openly), significantly 
reduces the amount of false alarms. The proposed approach to include the 
temperature information has successfully reduced the number of false alarms. Thus, 
the temperature information could be used to reduce some of the variability of failure-
free movements. 
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2.2.2.3 Model based approaches 
H2 norm criterion with linear time-invariant model 
Zattoni (Zattoni, 2006) suggested using an ܪଶ-norm criterion for detection of incipient 
failures by using a linear time-invariant model. The ܪଶ-norm criterion of the linear 
model transfer function matrix specifies the root mean square residuals of the model 
at a given time. The residuals are then commonly compared to white noise for fault 
detection. A root mean square value of the residuals that is significantly bigger than 
the expected root mean square value of white noise is considered as an indication of 
faulty behaviour. The author was able to model behaviour of the current of the point 
machine in the switch rail moving stage with a linear parametric model. However, 
only the linear part of the current data from a point machine was considered. Linear 
models cannot be applied to model the current of a whole movement of point 
machine, because it clearly acts non-linearly. Since all of the other phases of the 
point machine operation were not considered, more details of this approach are not 
given. For more details on how the linear part of the movement was modelled using 
this approach, the reader is referred to (Zattoni, 2006). 
Bivariate integrated random walk model 
F. Marquez et al. (Márquez et al., 2007b) implemented a model from the class of 
unobserved component models to assess wear in railway points. Authors referred to 
an earlier work (Márquez et al., 2003) that used differences between time series of 
measurements of current. A bivariate integrated random walk model was used by the 
authors to forecast the measurements of current or force. A correlation coefficient ߩ 
between the modelled measurements of current or force was compared with a 
predefined high threshold value at individual points in time, since the correlation 
between similar movements should result in a high correlation coefficient value. If 
correlation value ߩ fell below a threshold this was an indication of a lack of correlation 
with the reference current curve and therefore the curve would be classified as 
฀‘฀‘฀f฀a฀u฀l฀t฀y฀’฀’ if the reference current was non-faulty. The authors showed visually how the ߩ  values slowly degrade for faulty curves. However, the authors did not give a 
procedure of how an adequate threshold to distinguish between a faulty and a good 
curve should be chosen. 
State-space and harmonic regression models 
Pedregal et al. used a state space and harmonic regression model based approach 
(Pedregal et al., 2009) to tackle the problem of failure detection of point machines. 
The current signals were measured from sensors installed in the point machine as 
the point machine performed operations in both directions: normal to reverse and 
reverse to normal. Movement duration or operating time was also measured. The 
fault detection system proposed was based on the comparison of the expected and 
actual shape of the current drawn over time. The proposed fault detection algorithm 
can be summarised in these steps: 
1. Determine which historical data to use. In the given example, 50 previous free 
from failure movements were used. 
2. Forecast the duration (together with 95% confidence interval) of the next 
movement with state space model. 
3. Forecast the current signal by using the harmonic regression model with a 
time varying period (a range of durations were considered from the 95% 
confidence interval). In this way forecasts become available for a time horizon 
long enough to cover a full movement of the point mechanism. 
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4. Compare new data points measured by the sensors to all of the forecasts 
produced in step 3. The best forecast is chosen as the one with the minimum 
of the standard deviation of the error between the forecast signal and actual 
data. 
5. If the best forecast from step 4 has a bigger standard deviation value than a 
pre-specified threshold value, then system issues a warning that a fault has 
occurred. 
The algorithm was tested with a dataset of 380 movements in the normal to reverse 
direction, where 8 movements were abnormal and 380 non-faulty movements in the 
reverse to normal direction. The failure modes that were considered in this analysis 
reflected on longer operation of the point machine (operation takes 4 seconds 
instead of usual 2 seconds). The best discrimination between faulty and non-faulty 
movements was found experimentally with a standard deviation threshold of 0.4 units. 
No false alarms were raised and no faulty movements were missed. However, the 
proposed technique was not tested on the failure data, when differences between the 
faulty and non-faulty movements are not that severe. 
Vector Auto-Regressive Moving-Average (VARMA) model 
Marquez et al. (Márquez et al., 2010) used a similar approach to that of Pedregal et 
al. in (Pedregal et al., 2009), where the SS model was replaced by the vector auto-
regressive moving-average model. The vector auto-regressive moving-average 
model (VARMA(p, q)) was used to forecast the duration of the movement. To be able 
to apply the VARMA model, the time series should have a stationary mean and 
variance. This is gained by taking the first differences of the signals. Multivariate 
autocorrelation and multivariate partial autocorrelation functions were used to identify 
the orders ݌ and ݍ of VARMA(p, q) model. For this particular dataset, these were 
found to be ݌ ൌ  ?ǡ ݍ ൌ  ?. 
The testing conditions of the algorithm were identical to the ones used in (Pedregal et 
al., 2009). As in the previous case, all the abnormal movements were identified and 
no false alarms were generated. To test the on-line capability of the system to detect 
faults, a recursive estimation of the standard deviation of the forecast signal error 
was obtained. If a fault was present, the standard deviation increased with time and 
when it reached a predetermined threshold value, a fault was detected. However, as 
in the previous study (Pedregal et al., 2009), the fault detection algorithm was tested 
only on the data, where failures were severe and showed a big increase in the 
duration of the operation (approximately 4 seconds instead usual 2 seconds). Thus 
such fault could also be detected using a simple threshold technique. In order to 
prove the validity of this model, more testing should be done on faults that deviate 
from the normal behaviour in some other way rather than the duration of the 
operation. 
2.2.2.4 Other methods 
Expert rule based decision systems 
In their work, F. Marquez and F. Schmid (Márquez and Schmid, 2007) focused on 
the data received from a current sensor installed on a point machine motor. The 
obtained measurements of current were noisy, thus there would be a problem of a 
high number of falsely detected failures. The authors suggested using a Kalman filter 
(Kalman, 1960) to smooth and remove the irrelevant noise from the data. The 
parameters for the Kalman filter were found experimentally. 
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In the study, several extracted amplitude or time values from the measurements of 
current ฀w฀e฀r฀e฀ ฀c฀o฀m฀p฀a฀r฀e฀d฀ ฀t฀o฀ ฀”฀n฀o฀r฀m฀a฀l฀”฀ ฀v฀a฀l฀u฀e฀s฀: the current absorbed during switch rails 
movement, the locking force expressed as current, the time elapsed from lock 
engagement until power off and the symmetry of three-phase currents. A rule-based 
detection of faults was performed using these extracted values. However details of 
the rules used for the detection of faults were omitted in this paper. 
The fault detection algorithm was first tested by adjusting the measurements of 
current signals by superimposing distortions of +0.05A and +0.1A in a selected time 
interval to simulate mechanism faults. Random noise was added to fault-free signals. 
100 simulations of fault detection algorithm were run to detect this manually 
introduced distortion of the measurements of current. Simulations showed that, even 
after using the Kalman filter, the accuracy of fault detection was 29%, when 0.05A 
increase in the measurements of current was introduced. When a bigger increase of 
0.1A was inserted in the measurements of current, the accuracy of fault detection 
was 88% with Kalman filter and 50% without filtering. After this simulation, data from 
laboratory point machines was used to test this approach. The obtained data was the 
same as that used in several previous studies (Márquez et al., 2003, McHutchon et 
al., 2005). The fault detection accuracy in the reverse to normal direction was 100% 
with Kalman filter and 97.33% without filtering. In the normal to reverse direction the 
corresponding results were 97.1% with filtering and 94.2% without. 
The fault detection results achieved in this study were very good. The authors 
showed how the filtering of data with a Kalman filter could improve the accuracy of 
the fault detection. However, little information was given how the actual fault 
detection was performed. Furthermore such a technique usually suffers from a big 
falsely detected failure level. An extensive expert knowledge is also required to build 
the rules for the fault detection. Therefore, if the condition of the point machine 
degrades over the time, even if no faults occur, the decision values for the rules 
would have to be changed to reflect the degraded condition. 
F. Marquez et al. (Márquez et al., 2007a) improved the results of research in 
(Márquez and Schmid, 2007) by employing a moving average filter instead of Kalman 
filter for raw data filtering. This time, more parameters of point machine operation 
were used for the analysis: supply voltage of the point machine, current drawn by 
electric motor of point machine, current drawn by the whole system and force in the 
drive bar. After the raw signals have been smoothed with a moving average filter, 
comparison of the faulty and fault-free signals was made. However, the details of 
how the fault detection decision was made were not given in the paper. The authors 
only stated that differences between the observed parameters were calculated and 
were used in a pattern recognition model. 
24 failure modes were tested in both the normal to reverse and reverse to normal 
directions of the operation. All of the faults were identified from the voltage, force and 
current drawn by the point machine data for normal to reverse operation. 16 out of 24 
fault modes were identified from the current drawn by the whole system. Similar 
results were obtained for reverse to normal operation. All fault modes were identified 
from current drawn by the point machine and force data, but 19 of 24 fault modes 
were identified from the voltage data and 18 of 24 from the current drawn by the 
whole system. 
It is hard to evaluate the actual performance of the proposed approach with such 
detail of the results presented in this paper: there was no information provided on 
how many measurements were used to represent each failure mode or the fault free 
mode, what was the accuracy of the fault detection. The authors just indicate whether 
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the faults could be identified from the observed parameters. Moreover, no information 
was given on whether there were any false alarms.  
V. Atamuradov et al. (Atamuradov et al., 2009) used a time series analysis combined 
with an expert system for detecting faults. Data was first pre-processed using the 
smoothing of a moving average. After the noise was removed from the time series 
data, the time series were compared with the control signal, which represented the 
normal behaviour of the railway point system. The time series were divided into 
phases as in (Márquez and Schmid, 2007). A similarity measure between two time 
series was determined by the Dynamic Time Warping algorithm: the optimisation 
process was performed using dynamic programming to find the warping that 
minimised the area between the curves in time. 
An expert system was then chosen to be simple decision rules to identify failed and 
healthy modes. Every decision rule had a boundary value, by which faulty modes 
were classified. Three different modes (two failure modes and a healthy mode) were 
modelled. Progression of a failure mode from the healthy state was simulated by 
calculating the weighted average of corresponding healthy and faulty time series data. 
This method worked well when the sample data was not noisy, identifying healthy 
and failure modes with 100% accuracy. The increase of the noise in the data led to 
the worse results of identification of the fault, giving the accuracy of round 80% for 
both failure modes. All of the data representing the healthy mode was still classified 
with 100% accuracy. 
Fuzzy rules with qualitative trend analysis 
J. A. Silmon and C. Roberts (Silmon and Roberts, 2010) used qualitative trend 
analysis (QTA), to isolate the common characteristics of waveforms of measured 
parameters (power or current drawn by point machine motor) and form rules, which 
would describe the behaviour of the measured parameters under faulty conditions. 
The idea of the proposed method was to turn a waveform of measured parameters 
into a sequence of shapes, which would describe the qualitative and quantitative 
characteristics of the waveform. The waveforms were partitioned into equal 
segments and, based on the shape of that partition, a letter was assigned. The letters 
for representing the shape of the curve are shown in Figure 2.13. 
 
Figure 2.13฀.฀ ฀‘฀A฀l฀p฀h฀a฀b฀e฀t฀’฀ ฀f฀o฀r฀ ฀r฀e฀p฀r฀e฀s฀e฀n฀t฀i฀n฀g฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀s฀h฀a฀p฀e฀s฀ of measured waveforms 
The consecutive parts of the waveforms that had the identical letters were 
concatenated to make up an episode. The start and end values of the observed 
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parameter together with the number of the identical letters were added to each 
episode to represent and quantify the whole shape of the waveform of the measured 
parameter. 
The proposed process to obtain the data for the training and testing phase of the 
analysis can be described in several steps: 
x Simulate all the faults as well as a control test with no failures for each point 
machine. This dataset is called a test actuator (TA) dataset. 
x Collect a dataset of fault-free data for each point machine. This dataset is 
called a fault-free monitored actuator (FFMA) dataset. 
x Measure a new set of data for testing for each point machine. This dataset is 
called an operational monitored actuator (OPMA) dataset. 
The differences between the episodes of fault-free (FFMA dataset) and faulty signals 
(TA dataset) were used to construct a set of fuzzy rules for the detection of each fault.  
The data to test the approach was obtained from three laboratory based HW point 
machines: two with a back drive and one without. The measured parameters during 
operation of the point machine were current, force and displacement. However, the 
authors did not indicate which measurements were used to test the approach. The 
faults that were considered in this study were due to misalignments of the main drive 
or back drive (if the point machine had one): main drive overdriven to normal, main 
drive overdriven to reverse, back drive overdriven and back drive underdriven. 
The fuzzy rules created in the training phase were applied to every measurement in 
the OPMA dataset, to compare the measurements with the ones in the FFMA dataset 
giving a membership value to each fuzzy rule. Over time, a trend of membership 
values was observed. An increasing trend of membership values for a specific fault 
indicated a potential failure. 
When faults were introduced, the episode sequence (in terms of shapes) remained 
largely the same, but the quantities associated with each episode changed. The fault 
detection accuracy for both directions (normal to reverse and reverse to normal) was 
tested on two scenarios: 
1. System must detect that the simulated fault is increasing in strength. 
2. System must diagnose the fault by showing that the simulated fault is the 
strongest. 
The results were measured by successfully fulfilled scenarios for different 
combinations of point machines used to obtain and test the fuzzy rules. For the main 
drive faults, one point machine (out of three) was used to obtain the fuzzy rules, while 
one out of remaining two was left to test the chosen scenario. This way, there were 6 
possible combinations to obtain and test the fuzzy rules. For the back drive faults 
only two combinations were possible since there were only 2 point machines with a 
back drive. 
Dealing with the correct identification of underdriven back drive was the biggest 
difficulty for this approach (3 out of 8 successful scenarios). The best effectiveness 
was achieved for the fault free and main drive overdriven to normal conditions, with 
the perfect identification of both scenarios. However, for the other type of conditions, 
the obtained results were worse, especially for the failures of back drive (9 out 16 
successful scenarios). The authors indicated that such results were expected since 
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the failures of main drive were of bigger magnitude than the failures of back drive 
when the visual comparison of measured parameters was performed. 
Thus this method might only be used for the detection of faults, where the failure 
condition significantly differs from the failure-free state. Furthermore, the information 
provided in this study did not indicate the number of operations which were 
successfully identified as faulty or fault-free. Such information would give a better 
idea how the method performed in terms of true fault detection and false alarms. 
2.2.2.5 Summary 
Various techniques and methods have been applied by researchers in order to detect 
faults of railway point systems. Some of them, namely three statistical criterion 
(Márquez et al., 2003), mixture discriminant analysis (Chamroukhi et al., 2008), state-
space model (Pedregal et al., 2009), vector auto-regressive model (Márquez et al., 
2010), Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Bolbolamiri et al., 2012) and Support Vector 
Machines (Asada et al., 2013) performed well, detecting over 90% of faults. However, 
most of these approaches that achieved more than 90% fault detection accuracy 
were tested only on small datasets, e.g. 29 movements in (Chamroukhi et al., 2008), 
20 movements in (Eker et al., 2012), 64 movements in (Bolbolamiri et al., 2012). The 
biggest dataset was combined from 380 movements, however only 8 of them 
represented the faulty condition (Pedregal et al., 2009, Márquez et al., 2010). 
Moreover, the data for the experiments were either obtained from laboratory point 
machines (Márquez et al., 2003, Asada et al., 2013), or by manually introducing the 
fault to the system. Such data might not represent actual operating conditions of the 
point systems well which is influenced by extreme weather conditions or big forces 
from the passing trains. Furthermore, the behaviour of the railway point system 
changes with time and this factor has not been taken into account in the previously 
discussed approaches. Recent research by Thomas Böhm showed that external 
information, such as temperature, could be a likely reason to explain the varying 
behaviour of good movements, presented in section 2.1.6.3.3 (Böhm, 2012). 
Data-based methods seem to be more suitable than the model-based methods for 
the fault detection of RPS. Support Vector Machines (Asada and Roberts, 2011, Eker 
et al., 2012, Asada et al., 2013, Asada and Roberts, 2013) was a widely used 
example of data-based methods. In one example, the combined PCA and SVM 
approach (Eker et al., 2012) was applied to the data of linear ruler, which only 
measured the position of rail during the movement. This sensor is capable to detect 
specific faults, namely only the ones that are related to any misalignment in the 
system. The approach of using SVM proposed by Asada and Roberts (Asada and 
Roberts, 2011, Asada and Roberts, 2013) achieved good results with classification 
accuracies close to 100%, however the data that was used in the analysis was again 
obtained from system operating in the laboratory. 
A procedure to segment the movements of RPS with the required precision of 
regression models was given in (Chamroukhi et al., 2009). The coefficients of the 
regression models were used to classify the movement as belonging to class with or 
without a defect, obtaining 94% classification rate. Results obtained using the 
classification algorithms with real data were very good, and their effectiveness could 
be further tested when the trends between the classes are difficult to distinguish. 
Most of the research has been done on the fault detection methodology and only a 
few papers have been published where authors suggest some automated fault 
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diagnostic capabilities of their methods (Asada and Roberts, 2011, Asada et al., 2013, 
Asada and Roberts, 2013). SVM was the technique considered in these three 
different publications. However, as mentioned before, small datasets were used to 
validate this approach and thus more testing could be done to test the efficiency of 
the method. 
The key finding from the literature review was that most of the methods used for fault 
detection were tested on data, which did not have the features observed in the in-
field data used in this study as discussed in section 2.1.6. The data features 
observed in this study are more challenging than the features of laboratory data, 
where variety of good movements is very little, the labelling of the data is perfect, etc. 
Moreover, most of the techniques presented in this section need a good 
representation of faulty data and need to be trained with both good and faulty data. 
However, in practice, the amount of failure data is very small and usually significantly 
smaller than the amount of data representing a fault-free condition. Thus the training 
of the model on both good and faulty data cannot be an option for each RPS. The 
research presented in this study is trying to fill such gaps by taking into account all 
the features of infield railway point systems data. 
The methods for fault prediction of railway point systems are reviewed in the next 
section.  
2.2.3 Methods for fault prediction of railway point systems 
In the previous section approaches for fault detection of railway point systems were 
overviewed. Nevertheless, the ability to detect faults does not prevent their 
occurrence and possible safety issues and financial losses. Thus, detection of 
system degradation and fault prediction are highly desirable as repairs can be 
scheduled, avoiding major disruptions to train services (Márquez et al., 2008). 
However, the fault prediction problem has not been widely researched (Yilboga et al., 
2010, Eker et al., 2011, Chamroukhi et al., 2011). The approaches proposed in the 
literature are reviewed in the following part of this section. 
Time Delay Neural Network 
H. Yilboga et al. (Yilboga et al., 2010) focused on predicting point system failures 
instead of identifying their occurrences after they already had happened. In their work 
they used a time-delay neural network approach to predict the Remaining Useful Life 
(RUL) of a point system. A Time Delay Neural Network (TDNN) is a neural network 
that incorporates time information in the network structure. The structure of a TDNN 
is set so that the input of the Neural Network consists of parameters at different time 
points. Thus, the effect of past values of parameters can be incorporated into the 
problem. The input can also include the past outputs of the TDNN. The Levenberg-
Marquardt (Levenberg, 1944) learning method was applied to train the TDNN. 
The degradation level of the system was modelled with an exponential degradation 
model. The result of the exponential degradation model was then converted to 
discrete degradation levels (health states) as shown in Figure 2.14, where different 
curves represent different degradation paths modelled by the exponential 
degradation model. Then, the TDDN is used to predict the future degradation levels 
of the system using past degradation levels. The number of predictions of health 
states made until the health state reached a predefined failure threshold is defined as 
RUL. 
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The RUL predicted values were compared with the real RUL values for 10 turnout 
systems. The results are given as a mean of the coefficient of determination ܧሺܴଶሻ ൌ ?Ǥ ? ? and a mean of root mean square error ܧሺܴܯܵܧሻ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?. The mean of the 
coefficient of determination, ܧሺܴଶሻ, is high, so there is only 8% (on average) of data 
variability not explained by the model. 
 
Figure 2.14. Degradation paths conversion to degradation levels 
Simple State-Based Prognostic model 
Eker et al. extended the work by H. Yilboga et al. in RUL prediction (Eker et al., 
2011), where a Simple State-Based Prognostic (SSBP) model was presented. The 
same degradation model was used as in the previous work. A failure was defined at 
a point when the health state reached a predefined threshold. 
The SSBP model included three steps: clustering of the continuous health states to 
determine the discrete degradation levels, cluster evaluation in terms of the optimal 
number of clusters and expected RUL calculation. For clustering, data from the 
different health states of multiple systems was clustered using k-means algorithm. 
The Calinski-Harabasz (CH) cluster validity index was chosen as the most robust one 
for the data set used. The optimal number of clusters, and thus health states, was 
chosen as the one that had the biggest CH index value. 
The expected RUL was calculated using the transition probabilities between health 
states. The current health state of the system, ݄௖, was obtained using the clustering 
method. The probability of each value of the RUL between 1 and the RUL upper limit 
was calculated one by one. Only transitions from one health state to itself or to a 
consecutive state were allowed. The probability of staying in health state ݄௖ for ݏݐ௛೎ 
time intervals means that the health state transitions to itself ݏݐ௛೎ െ  ? times and then 
transitions to the consecutive health state one time. The RUL was defined as follows: 
 ሾܴܷܮȁݏݐ ൌ ݄௖ሿ ൌ ෍ ݅ ൈ ෑ ݍ௡ǡ௡௦௧೙ିଵ൫ ? െ ݍ௡ǡ௡൯௛೑௡ୀ௛೎ோ௎௅ೆ௜ୀଵ ǡ 2.5 
where ݄௖ is current health state, ݅ is the current time moment, ܴܷܮ௎ is the upper limit 
of RUL, ௙݄ is the failure time, ݍ௡ǡ௡ is the probability that current health state ݊ does 
not change and  ? െ ݍ௡ǡ௡ is the probability that the health state transitions from ݊ to ݊ ൅  ?Ǥ  
An electromechanical type turnout with two drive rods, one for each rail, was used to 
collect the data for analysis. Force sensors were used to measure the tensile and 
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compressive forces. Current sensors measured DC current levels. Time series data 
was acquired for both normal to reverse and reverse to normal movements of the 
turnout system. A dry slide chair failure mode was considered in this paper, which 
was obtained manually. To obtain this failure state, the slide chairs have not been 
lubricated for a long time. Collection of the data was then carried out when oiling 
slide chairs one by one from the farthest to the closest slide chair of the turnout 
system until all of the slide chairs were oiled. The final state represented the fault-
free state. 
Samples were divided into 80% for the training data and the rest were used for the 
testing data. The CH cluster validity index obtained from training data indicated that 8 
health states should be considered when modelling the failure progression. The 
authors compared this approach with a hierarchical hidden Markov model and 
showed that the SSBP outperforms the Markov model. The results were presented in 
a same manner as in previous work, by giving the mean of coefficient of 
determination ܧሺܴଶሻ  and the mean of root mean square error ܧሺܴܯܵܧሻ . To 
differentiate between the Hierarchical Hidden Markov and Simple State-Based 
Prognostic models, they have been noted as HHM and SSBP: ܧሺܴௌௌ஻௉ଶ ሻ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?Ǣ ܧሺܴܯܵܧௌௌ஻௉ሻ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?Ǣܧሺܴுுெଶ ሻ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?Ǣ ܧሺܴܯܵܧுுெሻ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?Ǥ 
The authors managed to increase the coefficient of determination of their model to ܧሺܴௌௌ஻௉ଶ ሻ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?. The downside of this approach is that the results were compared to 
RUL data from a modelled degradation process, so more testing needs to be done 
using real degradation data. 
Switching autoregressive model governed by a hidden logistic process 
Chamroukhi et al. extended their research on the hidden logistic process 
(Chamroukhi et al., 2011). Data of power curves was pre-processed in the same way 
as in (Chamroukhi et al., 2009), with the help of regression models. In this way, a 
parameter vector of 33 dimensions for each movement was obtained. Then the 
observation sequence ሺݕଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݕ்ሻ was assumed to be generated by the multivariate 
autoregressive model governed by a stochastic process ሺݖଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݖ்ሻ. 
The stochastic process ሺݖଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݖ்ሻ  controls the switching from one autoregressive 
model to another from among ܭ models. It differs from the basic models in such a 
way that it has time dependent model parameters and covariance matrices. That way 
the non-stationary behaviour of the time series can be captured. Process ࢠ ൌሺݖଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݖ்ሻ was assumed to be logistic. The conditional probability, ߨ௞, of each state ݇ ൌ  ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ܭ is given by: 
 
ߨ௞ሺݕ௧ିଵǢ ࢝ሻ ൌ ݌ሺݖ௧ ൌ ݇ȁݕ௧ିଵǢ ࢝ሻ ൌ ൫࢝௞்ݕ௧ିଵ൯ ? ൫࢝௝் ݕ௧ିଵ൯௄௝ୀଵ ǡ 2.6 
where ࢝௞ is the parameter vector associated with ݇-th logistic process component ݖ௞. 
The proposed model was parameterised by a parameter vector Ȳ ൌ ሺ࢝ǡ ܤଵǡ ǥ ǡ ܤ௄ ǡ ȭଵǡ ǥ ǡ ȭ௄ሻ. The Expectation ฀– maximisation algorithm was used to 
estimate these parameters. 
This approach could be used for current health state identification of a POE or even 
the prediction of a future state. The current state can be identified by using the 
maximum a posterior rule: 
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ݖ௧ෝ ൌ  ଵஸ௞ஸ௄ ݌൫ݖ௧ ൌ ݇หݕଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݕ௧Ǣ Ȳ෡൯ǡ 2.7 
where ݌൫ݖ௧ ൌ ݇หݕଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݕ௧Ǣ Ȳ෡൯  is the posterior probability of the state ݇  for the new 
observation ݕ௧ given observation ݕ௧ିଵ and model parameters Ȳ෡ . The prediction of the 
future state ݖ௧ାଵ  given historical data up to ݐ  is performed by maximizing the 
prediction probability with respect to ݇: 
 
݌൫ݖ௧ାଵ ൌ ݇หݕଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݕ௧Ǣ Ȳ෡൯ ൌ ݌൫ݖ௧ାଵ ൌ ݇หݕ௧Ǣ Ȳ෡൯ ൌ ߨ௞ሺݕ௧Ǣ ࢝ሻǡ 2.8 
which is given by equation 2.6. 
The proposed model was tested with real data in terms of future state predictions as 
in equation 2.8. 120 observations were obtained with 3 different states as in 
(Chamroukhi et al., 2009): ݇ ൌ  ? no defect state, ݇ ൌ  ? minor defect state, ݇ ൌ  ? 
crucial defect state. For this data, the state prediction error rate was 10.92%. The 
proposed approach gave very promising results for the prediction of the state of the 
railway point system. The effectiveness of the approach could be further tested when 
the trends between the three classes are difficult to distinguish. 
2.2.3.1 Summary 
Yilboga et al. and Eker et al. proposed a novel technique to predict the RUL of point 
systems by identifying their health state (Yilboga et al., 2010, Eker et al., 2011). A 
TDNN method has been used to predict the RUL in (Yilboga et al., 2010) and SSBP 
model in (Eker et al., 2011). The testing of these two approaches showed very good 
results, when the predicted RUL was compared with RUL from the exponential 
degradation model. TDNN approach predicted RUL with ܴଶ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? and the SSBP 
approach with ܴଶ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?. These coefficients of determination show that the predicted 
RUL explains 92% of the real RUL variation in the case of TDNN approach and 96% 
in the case of SSBP. 
However, the downside of these approaches is that they were tested on a modelled 
degradation path, which might be very different in the real system. The other 
downside of the TDNN approach is the choice of the optimal health states. Outputs of 
this degradation model were divided into discrete levels with a chosen number of 
health states determining the current health state of the point system. If too few 
health states were chosen, information was lost and the progression of degradation 
from one health state to another was too rapid. Furthermore, predictions based on 
too few health states might be over predictive (predicting RUL longer than the actual 
RUL). This issue has been dealt within the SSBP approach in (Eker et al., 2011) by 
finding the optimal number of health states. However, once more the validation of the 
model was done using the modelled degradation process, thus applying this method 
to real data could be misleading. 
A better approach was proposed in (Chamroukhi et al., 2011). The authors extended 
their research from fault detection to fault prediction by using autoregressive models 
with a hidden logistic process. The approach was tested on real data of railway point 
machines. The state of the railway point machine was predicted with a 10.92% error. 
However, as most of the approaches, this approach was tested on data where the 
variability of good movements was low and the difference between faulty state and 
fault-free state was clear. 
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2.2.4 Industrial solutions for fault detection of railway point systems 
2.2.4.1 Overview 
There are a number of solutions available in the industry that offer monitoring 
services for railway point systems: starting from sensors and logging equipment and 
finishing with software solutions for fault detection and even prediction. Some of the 
solutions are based on measurements of the current (POSS from Struktron Systems 
(Strukton Rail, 2013)), Sidis W from Siemens (Siemens AG, 2011)), others are based 
on measurements of power (SPX Point machine monitoring system (SPX Rail 
Systems, 2013)). The last group measures a lot of different parameters, including 
current, power, temperature, displacement etc. including CDSRail Point Condition 
Monitoring (CDS Rail, 2013) and Integrated Remote System for Monitoring Point 
Machines from Thinking Forward (Thinking Forward, 2013)). A novel approach was 
suggested by Struktron Rail to inspect the points with a video inspecting train. 
Most of these industrial solutions are based on the threshold alarm systems for fault 
detection and they also allow users to visually compare the trending values of the 
observed parameters. Alarm levels usually have to be specified manually and might 
not always detect changes in the point system operations, which might lead to a 
failure. 
2.2.4.2 Typical condition monitoring system based on alarm threshold 
technique 
An online condition monitoring system used for RPS commonly consists of several 
parts: sensors, loggers, modems and servers. Usually, current data is collected from 
the POE via a non-intrusive system, e.g. current transducers can be fitted to the POE 
motor feed cable so they do not affect the operation of the equipment under 
observation. Loggers are used to collect the data from the POE. It could be current 
versus time measurements, the time and the direction of the movement. The data is 
further passed to a server that allows engineers to view the data and measurement 
trends. Simple alarm thresholds for fault detection are usually implemented in the 
server. The values of the alarm levels must be tuned from time to time due to 
seasonal changes and the wear-out of the equipment. Two alarm levels are defined: 
low alarm with a lower priority, meaning that the changes in the observed parameter 
are of small magnitude but require a closer look at the trends of the parameter and 
high alarm, which indicates a significant deviation from normal operation, requiring 
attention from the maintenance personnel. 
Commonly, such an approach based on threshold values is incapable of detecting a 
fault at its earliest stage. Engineers could benefit from the early detection of the 
incipient fault in several ways: 
x Improve the degraded condition of the railway point system before the actual 
failure occurs. 
x Plan the maintenance of the railway point systems and prioritise the 
maintenance of the worst condition systems. 
This way, the chance of delayed trains would be minimised, since the condition could 
be improved when the traffic is low. The unexpected failure, by contrast, would result 
in speed restrictions on the line or even the closure of the whole line, leading to 
delays. 
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In a condition monitoring system based on the alarm threshold technique the major 
role is played by a correct threshold setting. If one uses too high threshold values the 
deteriorating condition of the system, e.g. increases in current, might be undetectable. 
On the other hand, if one uses very low threshold values a lot of false alarms can be 
raised for good movements. Usually the alarms are set for three types of variables: 
average and peak values of the current used throughout the movement of the point 
system and the motor running duration. Separate thresholds are set for each of these 
variables and the raised alarms indicate which of them exceeded the predefined 
thresholds. 
The main deficiency of the alarm technique is that it does not take into account any 
changes in the shape of the measurements of current and thus only detects the failed 
condition when there are some severe changes in the data. Thus, this type of 
condition monitoring does not allow detecting the degrading condition of the RPS. 
Several simple examples are given to illustrate some of the deficiencies of the alarm 
threshold technique. 
In the first case, the measurements of one good movement are taken which are then 
replicated with some modifications: 
x Concentrate the values in a small area near the end of the movement, 
between time points 182 and 222 (plotted on the left hand side of Figure 2.15). 
This might indicate a problem in the locking phase of the point system. 
x Concentrate the values in a wide area throughout the movement, between 
time points 95 and 222 (plotted on the right hand side of Figure 2.15). This 
could be just a small variation in the non-faulty behaviour of the railway point 
system. 
The same average values of replicated movements are obtained in both ways. 
 
Figure 2.15. Different curves with the same average value 
The difference between the two replicated curves can be observed visually. However 
with the alarm threshold technique both curves are treated as equal, since their 
average and maximum values of the measurements of current are identical as well 
as the motor running durations. 
Another situation when the alarm threshold technique fails to identify the changes in 
the current shape, is when a peak and a valley in the shape of the curve cancel one 
another. The measurements of current of the same movement, as in previous 
example, are considered. This time a peak in the current is heightened, between time 
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points 135 and 159, and a valley is deepened by the same values, between time 
points 215 and 239. The resulting curves can be seen in Figure 2.16. 
 
Figure 2.16. Different curves with the same average value 
The alarm threshold technique treats both curves (original movement and replicated 
movement with two bumps) as equal, since their mean, maximum and duration 
values are identical. However, visually, a difference between these two curves can 
be observed. 
These simple examples show that a lot of information can be lost if only the average 
and peak of the current is used. Even if both movements raised an alarm due to 
higher than normal average value, nothing more could be said about the 
performance of the system if visual inspection of the currents is not performed. The 
methodology that is developed in this study is capable of detecting that curves like 
the ones presented in these examples are different and provides a solution to 
overcome the main limitation of the alarm threshold technique. 
2.2.5 Requirements for a new fault detection system  
The main disadvantage of most of the fault detection systems described in section 
2.2.2 is that they can detect a fault after it happens and cannot predict its occurrence. 
Only a few researchers so far tried to predict the deteriorating condition of railway 
point system (Yilboga et al., 2010, Eker et al., 2011, Chamroukhi et al., 2011). 
However, the systems, described in (Yilboga et al., 2010) (Eker et al., 2011), are 
based on modelling the degradation processes, thus their performance on real data 
still needs to be tested further. The approach described in (Chamroukhi et al., 2011) 
was tested on real data, however, the three tested classes were easily 
distinguishable and the approach needs further testing on the data with more subtle 
changes between the normal and defective operations. Taking into account features 
of existing fault detection systems and their deficiencies, requirements for a new fault 
detection and classification system (FDC) can be formulated: 
x Able to identify a deteriorating condition prior to a fault occurrence; 
x Universal in terms of using data from any type of point system; 
x Able to deal with a lack of historical data of faulty conditions; 
x Able to detect failure modes that were not present in historical data; 
x Have a small as possible false alarm ratio; 
x Have an automated and fast fault detection algorithm, suitable for on-line 
regime.  
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2.3 Possible approaches for the fault detection of railway point systems 
As mentioned in section 2.1.6.3, the features of the data available in this study highly 
influenced the selection of a method for fault detection of railway point systems. The 
methodology proposed in this study is the first step towards achieving a fault 
detection and diagnostics system with the focus on fault detection. Considering the 
success of previously developed data-based approaches in the literature, the fault 
detection of railway point systems is considered as a classification task. Bayesian 
Belief Networks, K-Nearest neighbours, Neural Networks and Support Vector 
Machines are four commonly used classification methods. Each of them has its own 
advantages and disadvantages discussed next providing justification of the choice of 
the classification method used in this study. 
2.3.1 Bayesian Belief Networks 
The idea of a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) is that certain features of the object 
influence the probability of the object belonging to distinct classes. Causal 
relationships between the features are defined and BBN becomes a probabilistic 
directed acyclic graph. The BBN approach is commonly used for fault detection when 
one considers a system consisting of different subsystems with sensors to measure 
parameters which describe the system state, e.g. water flow and level sensors used 
in a water tank system (Lampis and Andrews, 2009a). However, in this study only the 
current on a POE is measured and no other measurements are obtained, thus a BBN 
approach is not suitable for this particular problem. Furthermore, building a BBN 
usually requires some expert knowledge of system behaviour and prior probabilities 
of fault occurrence. Therefore, this model-based approach will not be used in this 
study. 
2.3.2  K-nearest neighbours 
K-nearest neighbours (K-NN) method was first introduced in an unpublished report 
by Fix and Hodges (Fix and Hodges, 1951) and it is one of the simplest classification 
algorithms. The idea of the K-NN is to find K neighbours in the training dataset for a 
new query object. Those K neighbours are assumed to be the closest to the query 
and the similarity is usually calculated by the Euclidean distance of the object 
features. The object is then classified based on the labels of K neighbours in the 
training dataset. When ܭ ൐  ? the chosen label is the most frequent among the K 
neighbours, and when ܭ ൌ  ? it is the exact label of the neighbour. The classification 
might be problematic when using 2-NN, since there could be a chance that those 2 
neighbours are labelled as belonging to different classes. However, in such a case to 
avoid any discrepancies the neighbour with a smaller distance can be chosen. The 
advantage of K-NN method is that it does not need any heuristics associated with the 
design of the model, as is the case with BNN and NN, since it uses all of the training 
data to find the K-nearest neighbours. However, this advantage might become a 
disadvantage when large datasets are used for the training of K-NN. All of the 
training data needs to be stored and used to classify the new object, thus the 
classifier performs slower, when the amount of the training data increases, which can 
cause problems when using it as an online fault detection approach. Thus, this 
classifier will not be used in this study. 
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2.3.3 Neural networks 
The idea of Neural Network (NN) was first introduced by neurophysiologist Warren 
McCulloch and mathematician Walter Pitts (McCulloch and Pitts, 1943) and was later 
developed to a technique that is one of the most commonly used techniques to solve 
classification problems. The idea of NN is to input the data into a model, which 
consists of several interconnected layers of neurons, and get an output combined 
from the results of all neurons. Each neuron has an activation function, which 
transforms the input, and a defined weight for the output. Thus, using neurons with 
different weights and different activation function parameters allows NN to detect the 
non-linear relationships in the data and classify it accordingly. NN has been already 
applied for railway fault detection: for railway point systems fault prediction in 
(Yilboga et al., 2010) and railway track circuit fault detection in (Chen and Roberts, 
2006, Chen et al., 2008). 
However, the NN approach requires certain heuristics, as is the case with building 
BBN. The choice of the activation function of neurons and the number of neurons in 
each layer has to be made before training the model, however there is no clearly 
defined technique available on how to choose the optimal design of NN. The other 
disadvantage of NN is that it minimises the empirical risk of misclassification by 
selecting the parameters that allow NN to adapt to the training data very well. Using 
this approach a problem of over-fitting the model to the training data and losing 
generalisation might occur. This may lead to increased misclassification of new data. 
Thus, to avoid using heuristics in the design of the model and facing the over-fitting 
problems, the NN approach is not considered in this study. 
2.3.4 Support vector machines 
A fairly new technique, if compared to the other classification approaches e.g. NN 
1942, K-NN 1951, was proposed by Boser, Guyon and Vapnik in 1992 (Boser et al., 
1992) and later it was developed by Vapnik (Vapnik, 1995). The technique was 
named Support Vector Machine (SVM) and the idea of the technique was similar to 
NN. It is also a network as NN is, but here support vectors, instead of neurons, are 
combined. The support vectors are selected from the training dataset and thus the 
design of SVM is obtained from the training dataset. In addition to this difference, the 
training process of SVM is also different from the one in NN. SVM minimises the 
structural risk by balancing out the model complexity and its success to fit the training 
data, and finds the boundaries between different classes with the maximum margin 
of separation. In this way, fewer samples of training data are needed to obtain good 
results and the model can potentially be generic. Due to this structural risk 
minimisation, SVM overcomes the weakness of NN of over-fitting the model to the 
data. There are several variations of SVM and in this study One Class SVM (OCSVM) 
is chosen. 
OCSVM (Scholkopf et al., 2001) is a special case of standard SVM, proposed for 
one-class classification problems, sometimes referred to as a novelty detection 
algorithm. This method has been chosen in this study due to the high imbalance of 
data available for two classes: good (fault-free) movements significantly outnumber 
faulty movements. There are several modifications of the traditional SVM algorithm 
introduced in literature to deal with imbalances in data, e.g. by using weights to 
penalise the class that is under-represented (Akbani et al., 2004, Imam et al., 2006). 
However, when there are only several failures of point systems per year, the data 
imbalance is enormous. For example, in total 589 movements were made in one 
direction by one point system considered in this study, from which 531 were fault-free 
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movements and 58 were faulty movements, giving a ratio of almost 1 to 10. Moreover, 
when some of the faulty movements are used in the training phase of the process, 
even fewer faulty movements are left for the testing phase. Thus, even using the 
weighted SVM approaches, too few faulty movements would be used in the analysis 
and thus OCSVM, which is trained on only one class data, has been chosen. More 
details about the OCSVM approach are given in section 2.3.5. 
2.3.5 One class support vector machines 
Scholkopf et al. suggested a new modification to SVM (Scholkopf et al., 2001) to 
make it suitable to be trained on one class data only. The idea is very similar to 
binary SVM, when two classes are used, but instead of trying to find the maximum 
margin between two classes, this method tries to separate the outliers from a given 
data set. These authors developed an algorithm that creates a function ݂, which has 
the value +1 for the most of the data points in a small region and the value -1 for the 
remaining points considered as outliers. Such outliers are separated from the most of 
the data points with the maximum margin. 
If a training dataset is marked as ݔଵǡ ݔଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݔ௟ א ܺ, then this dataset can be mapped 
with a feature map Ȱǣ ܺ ՜ ܨ into an inner product space ܨ. The image of Ȱ can be 
calculated using a kernel, which is a key part of mapping the data into an inner 
product space. Different OCSVM kernel functions can be used: linear, polynomial, 
radial-basis function etc. A radial basis function (RBF) kernel is commonly used in a 
wide area of fault detection, such as fault diagnostics of power transformers (Ganyun 
et al., 2005), fault diagnostics of air conditioning systems (Li et al., 2010), fault 
detection of railway point systems (Asada and Roberts, 2011). The RBF kernel has 
also been used in this study, since it allows to choose a distance function used in the 
kernel (Dongyu et al., 2010): 
 
݇ሺݔǡ ݕሻ ൌ ൫Ȱሺݔሻ ڄ Ȱሺݕሻ൯ ൌ ሺെߛܦଶሺݔǡ ݕሻǡ ሻ 2.9 
where ߛ is the width parameter, ܦሺݔǡ ݕሻ is the selected distance function, ݔ and ݕ are 
the feature vectors. 
It is important to note that the distance function ܦሺݔǡ ݕሻ is a similarity measure of two 
time series, if the time series are the only input parameter to OCSVM. This was the 
case in this study since measurements of current were the only input. Any function 
can be used as ܦሺݔǡ ݕሻ, as long as it is a metric. For the similarity measure to be a 
metric the following conditions must be met: 
 
ܦሺݔǡ ݕሻ ൒  ?ǡ 2.10 
 
ܦሺݔǡ ݕሻ ൌ  ? if and only if ݔ ൌ ݕǡ 2.11 
 
ܦሺݔǡ ݕሻ ൌ ܦሺݕǡ ݔሻǡ 2.12 
 
ܦሺݔǡ ݖሻ ൑ ܦሺݔǡ ݕሻ ൅ ܦሺݕǡ ݖሻǡ 2.13 
A default choice for this distance function is the Euclidean distance, sometimes 
referred to as ܮଶ norm (Deza and Deza, 2009). There are some similarity measures, 
e.g. Dynamic Time Warping (Sakoe and Chiba, 1978), that hold the first three 
conditions, but violate the last condition of triangle inequality. Such similarity 
measures cannot be used as the distance function in OCSVM. The Euclidean 
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distance with several other time series similarity measures that were used in this 
study will be presented in section 2.3.6. 
The decision function of OCSVM is expressed as a hyper-plane: 
 ݂ሺݔሻ ൌ ݏ݃݊ ቀ൫ݓ ڄ Ȱሺݔሻ൯ െ ߩቁǡ 2.14 
where ݓ is the weight vector, ߩ is the bias term of the hyperplane, Ȱሺݔሻ is the feature 
mapping and ݏ݃݊ is a sign function, defined as ݏ݃݊ሺݔሻ ൌ ൜െ ?݂݅ݔ ൏  ? ?݂݅ݔ ൒  ? . 
In order to find the decision function, a quadratic program is solved: 
 ௪אிǡకאோ೗ǡఘאோ  ? ?ԡݓԡଶ ൅  ?ߥ݈ ෍ ߦ௜௜ െ ߩ 2.15 
subject to 
 ൫ݓ ڄ Ȱሺݔሻ൯ ൒ ߩ െ ߦ௜ǡ ߦ௜ ൒  ?ǡ 2.16 
where ߥ is a parameter that controls the number of support vectors and the fraction 
of the outliers, ߦ are slack variables. 
Using the Lagrangian multipliers ߙ௜ǡ ߚ௜ ൐  ? the Lagrangian is formed as follows: 
 
ܮሺݓǡ ߦǡ ߩǡ ߙǡ ߚሻ ൌ  ? ?ԡݓԡଶ ൅  ?ߥ݈ ෍ ߦ௜ െ ߩ௜ െ ෍ ߙ௜ ቀ൫ݓ ڄ Ȱሺݔ௜ሻ൯ െ ߩ ൅ ߦ௜ቁ௜െ ෍ ߚ௜ߦ௜௜ Ǥ 2.17 
Setting the derivatives in respect to the variables ݓǡ ߦ  and ߩ  equal to zero, the 
variables ݓǡ ߦ and ߩ can be found from the following equations: 
 
ݓ ൌ ෍ ߙ௜Ȱሺݔ௜ሻ௜ ǡ 2.18 
 
ߙ௜ ൌ  ?ߥ݈ െ ߚ௜ǡ 2.19 
 
෍ ߙ௜௜ ൌ  ?Ǥ 2.20 ሼݔ௜ǡ ߙ௜ ൐  ?ǡ ݅ א  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡሽ݈ are called support vectors. Substituting the equations 2.18, 
2.19 and 2.20 into the equation 2.17, the dual problem becomes: 
 
ఈ  ? ?෍ ߙ௜ߙ௝݇൫ݔ௜ǡ ݔ௝൯௜௝  2.21 
subject to 
 
 ? ൑ ߙ௜ ൑  ?ߥ݈ ǡ ෍ ߙ௜௜ ൌ  ?Ǥ 2.22 
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When ߙ௜ values are determined the bias term ߩ can be calculated in the following 
way: 
 
ߩ ൌ ݓ ڄ Ȱሺݔ௜ሻ ൌ ෍ ߙ௝݇൫ݔ௝ǡ ݔ௜൯௝ ǡ 2.23 
where ݔ௜ is a chosen support vector. 
The decision function in the equation 2.14 can be rewritten using the equation 2.18 
and the kernel expansion: 
 
݂ሺݔሻ ൌ ݏ݃݊ ൭෍ ߙ௜݇ሺݔǡ ݔ௜ሻ௜ െ ߩ൱Ǥ 2.24 
The decision function, found by the algorithm described above, forms the optimal 
separating hyper-plane with the chosen values of parameters ߥ and ߛ. It is important 
to note that in order to get the optimal classification results, the optimal values of 
these parameters must be used as well. Therefore, a technique used for the 
determination of the optimal values of the parameters of OCSVM will be described in 
section 2.4.5.3. 
In this study only the failure-free data is used in training. The training dataset should 
include a large range of good movements to represent the diversity detailed in 
section 2.1.6.3. Only then the OCSVM should be able to detect the faulty movements, 
which would be different from the ones in the training dataset. Another useful feature 
of the OCSVM is that a parameter, which controls the error allowed in the training 
data classification, can be set. This parameter bounds the fraction of the movements 
in the training dataset that are considered to be outliers, i.e. faulty movements. This 
parameter is usually a small number (e.g. 0.05), since it is expected that the majority 
of the data in the training dataset represents good movements, not faulty ones. 
2.3.6 Time series similarity measures 
As mentioned in the previous section, one of the key parts of the OCSVM method is 
the kernel function. With the RBF kernel, chosen in this study, there is a possibility to 
use different metrics instead of the Euclidean distance to define a similarity of two 
time series. To deal with the variable duration of the RPS operations, which is one of 
the main features of the real data described in section 2.1.6.3, distances or metrics 
that are able to measure the similarity of the time series of different lengths have to 
be used. Alternatively, rescaling of the data series should be done, since the 
standard Euclidean distance cannot be used for time series of different length. 
Moreover, the Euclidean distance compares two time series point by point and it 
does not take account of any variability in the data, e.g. peaks in the data might 
appear around the same time, but not at exactly the same time, thus the alignment 
given by the Euclidean distance might be misleading (an example is given in section 
2.3.6.7). 
Due to the growing interest in data mining techniques and time series matching 
methods to solve practical problems, a number of new similarity measures have been 
proposed, which allow elastic matching of time series, necessary in this study. 
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2.3.6.1 Elastic matching process 
The idea of comparing two time series with elastic matching is based on the concept 
that was proposed by Levenshtein (Levenshtein, 1966) for the matching of 
alphabetical sequences. Three operations were used during the matching: insertion, 
deletion and reversion. Two sequences were compared to each other according to 
the number of edits needed for the sequences to become identical. For example, say 
฀t฀w฀o฀ ฀s฀e฀q฀u฀e฀n฀c฀e฀s฀ ฀“฀A฀B฀C฀D฀E฀”฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀“฀E฀B฀C฀D฀A฀” are compared. For these sequences to be 
identical, ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀f฀i฀r฀s฀t฀ ฀s฀y฀m฀b฀o฀l฀ ฀“฀E฀”฀ ฀i฀n฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀s฀e฀c฀o฀n฀d฀ ฀s฀e฀q฀u฀e฀n฀c฀e฀ has to be replaced by symbol 
฀“฀A฀”฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀l฀a฀s฀t฀ ฀s฀y฀m฀b฀o฀l฀ ฀“฀A฀”฀ by ฀s฀y฀m b o฀l  “฀E฀”฀.฀ ฀T฀h฀u s฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀n฀u฀m฀b฀e฀r฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀o฀p฀e฀r฀a฀t฀i฀o฀ns required is 
2. This works well for alphabetical sequences, since it can be simply said, for 
example, letter ฀“฀E฀” is not equal to letter ฀“฀A฀”฀.฀ ฀H฀o฀w฀e฀v฀e฀r฀,฀ when sequences of real values 
are compared, it cannot be said, for example, that number 4.5 is not equal to number 
4.4, because the same thing can be said about the fact that 4.5 is not equal to 1000. 
The importance in this case is placed on how big the difference between the two 
numbers is and how this difference could be penalised. 
Different variations on how to penalise for the edit operations have been derived for 
real-valued sequences, thus giving a wide variety of methods to choose from. Some 
of the methods commonly used in practice are: dynamic time warping (DTW) (Sakoe 
and Chiba, 1978), longest common subsequence (LCSS) (Das et al., 1997), edit 
distance with real penalties (ERP) (Chen and Ng, 2004), edit distance on real 
sequence (EDR) (Chen and Özsu, 2005) and time warp edit distance (TWED) 
(Marteau, 2009). 
The output of the methods of the longest common subsequence and edit distance on 
real sequence is the total number of edits made on the sequences, as proposed by 
Levenshtein (Levenshtein, 1966). A threshold of two time series point difference is 
set in both methods to decide whether an edit operation is necessary. However, with 
these two approaches the information about the differences in the values of 
measurements is lost. For example, the differences in the measurements of current 
between two movements would be lost. Thus, these two approaches were not 
considered in the analysis. 
A recently introduced technique called time warp edit distance differs from the other 
time series similarity measures, since it allows controlling the elastic matching of time 
series (Marteau, 2009). Such control of the elastic matching depends on a parameter, 
known as stiffness parameter ߛ . Another parameter is introduced to define the 
penalty for deleting an element from the time series, known as delete penalty ߣ. 
However, a procedure to find the optimal value of these two parameters can be 
computationally costly. The authors suggested using a cross-validation technique to 
find these optimal values. Furthermore, the optimised time warp edit distance 
performed similarly to the other state of the art similarity measures when testing was 
performed on selected data sets from a widely used time series classification data 
repository of University of California, Riverside (Keogh et al., 2011). The proposed 
approach of optimised TWED achieved the best result in 10 of 20 tested datasets 
and thus might be performing differently based on the data used. Due to these 
features, this time series similarity measure was also not considered in this study. 
Dynamic time warping and edit distance with real penalties techniques were chosen 
for the measuring of time series similarity in this study. Their performance, in terms of 
fault detection accuracy, will be compared with the traditional time series similarity 
measure ฀– Euclidean distance. The chosen techniques and the proposed 
approaches of their combination are presented in the following section. 
63 
 
2.3.6.2 Euclidean distance 
A time series similarity is usually described using a distance function. For the two 
time series of equal length, the Euclidean distance is commonly used as a similarity 
measure. If two sequences of real valued numbers ܣ ൌ ሺܽଵǡ ܽଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܽேሻ  and ܤ ൌሺܾଵǡ ܾଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܾேሻ  are considered, then the Euclidean distance can be calculated as 
follows: 
 
ߜா ൌ ඩ෍ሺܽ௜ െ ܾ௜ሻଶே௜ୀଵ ǡ 2.25 
where ߜா is the Euclidean distance, ܽ௜ and ܾ௜ are the ݅-th elements of sequences ܣ 
and ܤ respectively, ܰ is the length of sequences ܣ and ܤ. 
The advantage of the Euclidean distance is that it is very fast to compute (takes ܱሺ݊ሻ 
operations). However, it is defined only for equal length time series. Furthermore, it 
performs one to one matching and is not able to cope with some variations in x-axis, 
e.g. a slightly different start time of the locking phase of the point system that is often 
observed in the in-field data. Such an incapability to deal with shifts of the time series 
might lead to errors in similarity measures, even when the overall shape of the two 
time series is similar. A simple example on how the Euclidean distance produces 
misleading alignments, when two time series are very similar, but one is slightly 
shifted in x-axis, is given in section 2.3.6.7. 
2.3.6.3 Dynamic time warping (DTW) 
A novel approach for comparing two time series, called Dynamic Time Warping 
(DTW), was first introduced in the field of speech recognition (Sakoe and Chiba, 
1978). Since the data for speech recognition greatly depends on the speed of the 
speaker and their tone, even the same words or letters will have observations of 
different length if sampled at the same sampling rate. To deal with these differences 
in the time scale and to match two similar words, a new method based on dynamic 
programming was introduced. 
Consider two words that have been pre-processed into a sequence of feature vectors: ܣ ൌ ሺܽଵǡ ܽଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܽேሻ  and ܤ ൌ ሺܾଵǡ ܾଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܾெሻ , where ܰ ് ܯ . Then an ܰ ൈ ܯ  matrix, ܦܹܶ, consisting of differences between feature vectors ܣǡ ܤ can be constructed: ܦܹܶሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ ൌ ߜா൫ܽ௜ǡ ௝ܾ൯ǡ ݅ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ܰǡ ݆ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ܯ, where ߜா  is usually the Euclidean 
distance. The elements of the new matrix correspond to the alignment between two 
points ܽ௜ and ௝ܾ. From the differences matrix we can find an optimal warping path ܹ ൌ ݓଵǡ ݓଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݓ௞ ǡ ǥ ǡ ݓ௄ , ݓ௞ ൌ ൫݅ሺ݇ሻǡ ݆ሺ݇ሻ൯ , ሺܰǡ ܯሻ ൑ ܭ ൏ ܰ ൅ ܯ െ  ? , using 
dynamic programming. There are certain constraints for a path to be a warping path: 
x Monotonic conditions. Points in the warping path ܹ must be monotonically 
spaced in time, i.e. ݅ሺ݇ െ  ?ሻ ൑ ݅ሺ݇ሻ and ݆ሺ݇ െ  ?ሻ ൑ ݆ሺ݇ሻ. 
x Continuity conditions. This condition restricts the warping path ܹ to go to 
adjacent cells only, i.e. ݅ሺ݇ሻ െ ݅ሺ݇ െ  ?ሻ ൑  ? and ݆ሺ݇ሻ െ ݆ሺ݇ െ  ?ሻ ൑  ?. 
x Boundary conditions. The warping path must start from the first elements ܽଵ 
and ܾଵ in the sequences ܣ and ܤ and finish with the last elements ܽே and ܾெ, 
i.e. ݅ሺ ?ሻ ൌ  ?ǡ ሺ݆ ?ሻ ൌ  ? and ݅ሺܭሻ ൌ ܰǡ ݆ሺܭሻ ൌ ܯ. 
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x Adjustment window condition. In some cases, to speed up the algorithm or 
to avoid improper alignments between elements that are too far away, a 
windowing condition is used: ȁ݅ሺ݇ሻ െ ݆ሺ݇ሻȁ ൑ ݎ, where ݎ is the window size. To 
acquire the original version of dynamic time warping method without the 
window, the window size must be set as ݎ ൌ ሺܰǡ ܯሻ. 
A lot of paths in the ܦܹܶ matrix satisfy the above conditions and the optimal path 
that minimises the warping cost can be found from the following expression: 
 ܹ ൌ  ඩ෍ ݓ௞௄௞ୀଵ Ǥ 2.26 
This path is found using dynamic programming to evaluate the recursion of the 
following cumulative distance: 
 
ߛሺ݅ǡ ݆ሻ ൌ Ɂ୐୔൫ܽ௜ǡ ௝ܾ൯ ൅  ቌߛሺ݅ െ  ?ǡ ݆ െ  ?ሻǡߛሺ݅ െ  ?ǡ ሻ݆ǡߛሺ݅ǡ ݆ െ  ?ሻ ቍǡ 2.27 
where Ɂ୐୔  is a selected LP-norm, usually L2 norm, also known as the Euclidean 
distance. 
Then the dynamic time warping distance is given by: 
 ߜ஽்ௐሺܣǡ ܤሻ ൌ ߛሺܰǡ ܯሻǤ 2.28 
One of the weaknesses of classical DTW is that the method does not take into 
account the shape of the time series. For example, if two identical data points are 
considered and one is on a rising trend and the other one is on a falling trend, 
classical DTW gives a zero difference between these data points, which might be 
misleading. To deal with this problem, Keogh and Pazzani introduced a modification 
to classical DTW, called derivative dynamic time warping (DDTW) (Keogh and 
Pazzani, 2001). They showed that if one would slightly change a local feature in a 
time series, e.g. the depth of a valley or the height of a peak, classical DTW would try 
to explain the difference by the distortion of X-axis. The reason for this is that DTW 
considers the values of Y-axis, and not the gradient of the curve. 
To overcome this weakness, Keogh and Pazzani improved the algorithm by replacing 
the values of time series in Y-axis with the estimates of the first derivative of these 
values. The original DTW method can be used without any changes to the algorithm 
itself, only in this case the estimates of derivatives are the input, instead of values 
themselves. For noisy datasets, the authors used the exponential smoothing 
approach to reduce the noise before estimating the derivatives. The idea to use the 
estimates of the derivatives to compare two time series was also adapted to other 
time series similarity measures used in this study. The use of estimates of the 
derivatives will be described as one of the pre-processing techniques in section 2.4.3. 
The major drawback for DTW, however, is that it is not a metric and it does not 
satisfy the triangle inequality given by 2.13. The simple way to explain the violation of 
the triangle inequality is by saying that ܣ is similar to ܤ and ܤ is similar to ܥ, but ܣ is 
not similar to ܥ . For this reason, DTW cannot be used as a replacement of the 
Euclidean distance in the kernel function of OCSVM. A different approach how to use 
DTW for time series similarity is proposed in section 2.3.8. 
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2.3.6.4 Edit distance with real penalties (ERP) 
Chen and Ng proposed an alternative method, similar to DTW, which can support a 
local time shifting, but is a metric at the same time, a necessary requirement to be 
used in the kernel function in OCSVM (Chen and Ng, 2004). The idea of ERP, was 
based on combining the L1-norm (or absolute value) and the distance function used 
for the comparison of strings, known as string edit distance: 
 
ߜௌ்ோሺݏଵǡ ݏଶሻ ൌ ൝ ?ǡ ݂݅ݏଵ ൌ ݏଶ ?ǡ ݂݅ݏଵ݋ݎݏଶ݅ݏܽ݃ܽ݌ ?ǡ ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ǡ 2.29 
where ݏଵ and ݏଶ are some symbols. 
The authors transformed the distance in 2.29 to be suitable for comparing sequences 
of real number values: 
 
݀ாோ௉ሺݔǡ ݕሻ ൌ ቐȁݔ െ ݕȁǡ ݂݅ݔܽ݊݀ݕܽݎ݁݊݋ݐ݃ܽ݌ݏǡȁݔ െ ݃ȁǡ ݂݅ݕ݅ݏܽ݃ܽ݌ǡȁݕ െ ݃ȁǡ ݂݅ݔ݅ݏܽ݃ܽ݌ǡ  2.30 
where ݔ and ݕ are real numbers, ݃ is a gap penalty. 
Consider the two time series ܣ ൌ ሺܽଵǡ ܽଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܽேሻ and ܤ ൌ ሺܾଵǡ ܾଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܾெሻ, where ܰ ് ܯ. 
Before calculating the ERP distance, normalisation of the time series needs to be 
done as indicated by the authors. The norming procedure will be described in a 
section about the pre-processing techniques 2.4.3.2. Denote the subsequence of ܣ 
as ܣ௜௣ ൌ ൫ܽ௜ǡ ܽ௜ାଵǡ ǥ ǡ ܽ௣൯ and the subsequence of ܤ as ܤ௜௤ ൌ ൫ܾ௜ǡ ܾ௜ାଵǡ ǥ ǡ ܾ௤൯. Then the 
ERP distance can be defined as follows: 
 
ߜாோ௉ሺܣǡ ܤሻ ൌ
ۖۖۖە
ۖۖ۔
ۖۓ ෍ ݀ாோ௉ሺܽ௜ǡ ݃ܽ݌ሻே௜ୀଵ ǡ݂݅ܯ ൌ  ?ǡ෍ ݀ாோ௉ሺ ௜ܾǡ ݃ܽ݌ሻெ௜ୀଵ ǡ݂݅ܰ ൌ  ?ǡ ቐ ߜாோ௉ሺܣଵேିଵǡ ܤଵெሻ ൅ ݀ாோ௉ሺܽேǡ ݃ܽ݌ሻǡߜாோ௉ሺܣଵேିଵǡ ܤଵெିଵሻ ൅ ݀ாோ௉ሺܽேǡ ܾேሻǡߜாோ௉ሺܣଵே ǡ ܤଵெିଵሻ ൅ ݀ாோ௉ሺܾெ ǡ ݃ܽ݌ሻ ቑ ǡ ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ Ǥ
 2.31 
Thus this metric uses a real penalty between two non-gap elements and a constant 
penalty value for the gap. The authors proved that for any fixed constant ݃  the 
triangle inequality 2.13 holds, thus they suggest using ݃ ൌ  ? for two reasons. The 
first reason is that, when ݃ ൌ  ?, the distance between two time series ܣ  and ܤ 
corresponds to the difference between the area under ܣ and under ܤ, if they are 
plotted with x-axis representing the time points and the y-axis representing the values 
of time series. The second reason is that, to match ܣ and ܤ, the shorter time series is 
aligned to the longer one using gap elements. Since the value of the gap element is 
equal to a gap penalty ݃, which in this case is zero, no changes to the area under the 
extended time series are made. 
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2.3.6.5 ERP combined with Euclidean distance 
Since time series are normalised before the ERP distance is calculated, the 
information about their difference in absolute values is lost. Therefore, in this study a 
new idea of how to keep the information about both differences in absolute values 
and in shapes is proposed. For this purpose, the ERP was combined with the 
Euclidean distance in the following way: the alignment of the two time series is 
calculated on the normalised time series using ERP and then the Euclidean distance 
of non-normalised time series is calculated using the alignment given by ERP. The 
newly proposed combination of two metrics, denoted ߜாா, is the result of ERP and 
the Euclidean distances combined in the following way: 
 ߜாாሺܽǡ ܾሻ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?  ? ߜாோ௉ሺܽǡ ܾሻ ൅  ?Ǥ ?  ? ߜா൫ ොܽǡ ෠ܾ൯ǡ 2.32 
where ܽ and ܾ are the original time series, ߜாோ௉ሺܽǡ ܾሻ is the result of the ERP method, ොܽ and ෠ܾ are the time series after they are warped with the ERP method, ߜா൫ ොܽǡ ෠ܾ൯ is 
the Euclidean distance of the warped time series ොܽ and ෠ܾ. The weights are chosen 
0.5 for both distances, so that the same penalty is given for the difference in the 
shape of the time series and the difference in the absolute values, but other weight 
could be chosen if it is necessary to put more emphasis on the similarity based on 
either shape or absolute values of the time series. The results of the application of 
combined metrics to evaluate for the time series similarity measures were compared 
to the application of separate metrics and will be presented in section 2.5. 
2.3.6.6 DTW combined with Euclidean distance 
A similar approach can be proposed for combining the DTW distance and the 
Euclidean distance. The alignment of the two time series is calculated using DTW 
and then the Euclidean distance of non-normalised time series is calculated using the 
alignment given by DTW. The result of DTW and the Euclidean distance is then 
combined in the following way: 
 
ߜ஽ாሺܽǡ ܾሻ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?  ? ߜ஽்ௐሺܽǡ ܾሻ ൅  ?Ǥ ?  ? ߜா൫ ොܽǡ ෠ܾ൯ǡ 2.33 
where ܽ and ܾ are the original time series, ߜ஽்ௐሺܽǡ ܾሻ is the result of DTW method, ොܽ 
and ෠ܾ are the time series after they are warped with DTW method, ߜா൫ ොܽǡ ෠ܾ൯ is the 
Euclidean distance of the warped time series ොܽ and ෠ܾ. The weights are chosen 0.5 
for both distances, so that the same penalty would be given for the difference of the 
shape of the time series and the difference of the absolute values. However, as in the 
case of DTW, this similarity cannot be used as a replacement of the Euclidean 
distance in the kernel function of OCSVM. It was used as a feature extraction 
technique as it will be explained in section 2.3.8. 
2.3.6.7 Illustrative comparison of Euclidean distance and elastic similarity 
measures 
A simple example is considered in this section to demonstrate and compare the 
capability of different similarity measures to compare two time series, which has x-
axis scaling. For illustration purposes, a part of measurements of current of one 
railway point system is taken and a shift along x-axis is added to obtain a replicated 
time series. The shift was added from the 15th point of time series by replicating the 
same value of current several times. The replicated time series is trimmed by the 
same amount of elements as it was lengthened, since the Euclidean distance can 
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only be applied on the same length data series. This way, the comparison between 
the Euclidean distance and the elastic similarity measures will be performed on the 
identical data. The original and replicated time series can be seen in Figure 2.17. 
 
Figure 2.17. Artificial problem for the time series alignment 
The alignments, calculated by the Euclidean distance, DTW and ERP methods, are 
given. Each alignment is visually compared with the perfect alignment, which should 
be obtained considering the added shift in the time series. To visualise the alignment, 
the replicated movement was shifted along the y-axis in the plot. The alignment of 
two time series is given by lines between two points: 
x Red line indicates that the alignment of two points is not perfect. 
x Green line indicates that the alignment of two points is perfect. 
Firstly, the Euclidean distance is used for the alignment of the two time series. The 
resulting alignment is plotted in Figure 2.18 on the left hand side and the perfect 
alignment is plotted on the right hand side. 
 
Figure 2.18. Alignment by Euclidean distance (left figure) and perfect alignment (right 
figure) 
As explained before, the Euclidean distance method aligns the two time series by 
one to one matching and thus it is incapable of considering any scaling of the x-axis. 
When the same peaks or valleys appear in the two time series, but they are slightly 
shifted in the x-axis, which is commonly observed in the in-field data of railway point 
systems, the similarity of the two curves given by the Euclidean distance might be 
inaccurate, since it ignores this shifting. 
68 
 
The alignment given by the DTW similarity measure is plotted in Figure 2.19, on the 
left hand side and the perfect alignment is plotted on the right hand side. 
 
Figure 2.19. Alignment by DTW (left figure) and perfect alignment (right figure) 
The DTW method is able to deal with the shifting of the time series, since most of the 
peaks were aligned after the shifting. However, it produced some unnecessary 
warping around time point 50. This is undesirable, since the resulting warping distorts 
the result of the similarity measure of the two time series by adding penalty for the 
matching of irrelative data points, when no matching of these points was needed and 
no penalty should be given. Moreover, it has some difficulties when dealing with the 
parts of the time series which are flat. This however is quite expected, since the 
values of the time series in the flat parts are of small difference and thus the elastic 
matching is penalised with a small penalty only. 
The alignment given by the ERP metric is plotted on the left hand side and the 
perfect alignment on the right hand side of Figure 2.20 
 
Figure 2.20. Alignment by ERP distance (left figure) and perfect alignment (right 
figure) 
It can be seen that the alignment given by the ERP distance is the closest to the 
perfect alignment. ERP was able to deal with the shifting of the time series and did 
not produce unnecessary warping, as in the case of DTW. However, the alignment 
given by the ERP deviated from the perfect alignment in the time points where the 
shift was added to the original movement. Thus, several points were aligned 
inadequately until the ERP method identified the shift in the time series. 
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It can be concluded that the two chosen elastic similarity measures allow a better 
alignment of the time series with shifts than the Euclidean distance. However, 
sometimes they can produce unnecessary warping of the x-axis, as observed in the 
case of DTW. 
2.3.7 An approach of using time series similarity measure as a kernel 
distance function of OCSVM 
Any time series similarity measure that is also a metric can be used within OCSVM, 
replacing the traditional Euclidean distance in the OCSVM kernel, as explained in 
section 2.3.5 and suggested in (Dongyu et al., 2010). Thus ERP distance is the only 
suitable option from the similarity measures in section 2.3.6. Thus in the case of the 
ERP metric, the kernel function of OCSVM becomes: 
 
݇ሺݔǡ ݕሻ ൌ  ቀെߛߜாோ௉ଶ ሺݔǡ ݕሻቁǡ 2.34 
where ݔ and ݕ are the time series of the measurements of current, ߜாோ௉ is the ERP 
distance as defined by equation 2.31, ߛ is the OCSVM parameter as described in 
section 2.3.5. 
Using a similarity measure as a kernel distance function requires all of the 
movements to be compared one by one. For example, if 200 movements were used 
for the analysis, then 40000 (2002) comparisons of similarity measures should be 
made. This number of comparisons can be decreased by exploiting several features 
of the metrics, given by equations 2.11 and 2.12. Therefore, the number of 
comparisons can be decreased more than twice, i.e. from 40000 to 19900, but still a 
large number of comparisons for 200 movements need to be carried out. The number 
of comparisons, ஼ܰ, needed for any number of movements, ்ܰ , can be calculated 
with the following formula: 
 ஼ܰ ൌ ்ܰǨ ?  ?ሺ்ܰ െ  ?ሻǨ ൌ ்ܰ  ?ሺ்ܰ െ  ?ሻ ?  2.35 
Thus, the time taken to train the OCSVM model increases greatly when the number 
of movements used increases. 
2.3.8 An approach of using time series similarity measure as a feature input 
to OCSVM algorithm 
To avoid large number of comparisons of movements made in OCSVM as discussed 
in 2.3.7, similarity measures can be utilised to compare the data of several previous 
movements prior to applying the OCSVM algorithm. Then the result of the similarity 
measure is used as an input time series ݔ  and ݕ  in the default OCSVM kernel 
defined by equation 2.9. This approach does not limit the choice of the similarity 
measure, thus non-metric similarity measures, such as DTW, can also be used. 
Using the similarity measure to calculate the similarity of the chosen movement with 
several previous movements, the current movement could be compared with one, 
two, five or ten previous movements. Thus the feature vectors of OCSVM would be 
of length 1, 2, 5 and 10 respectively. 
This approach requires fewer comparisons of movements than the first one 
presented in section 2.3.7. If considering the above described example, when 200 
movements are used in the analysis, with this approach the number of comparisons 
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to be made depends on how many previous movements are used to calculate the 
similarity. For example, if 10 previous movements are considered, then 2000 
comparisons should be made. The number of comparisons needed, ஼ܰ , can be 
evaluated in the following way: 
 ஼ܰ ൌ ்ܰ  ? ௉ܰ ǡ 2.36 
where ்ܰ is the number of movements used and ௉ܰ is the number of the previous 
movements considered. 
2.3.9 Summary 
A variety of classification methods, such as Bayesian Belief Networks, K-nearest 
neighbours, Neural Networks and Support Vector Machines were considered for the 
fault detection of railway point systems in this section. A brief introduction to each 
method was given, stating whether it could be used for the fault detection of in-field 
railway point systems. A modification of SVM, known as OCSVM, was chosen in this 
study, mainly due to the fact that it could deal with the features observed in the data 
of in-field railway point systems. 
After determining the most suitable fault detection method, the second key task in 
this study was to choose a method to compare the data obtained from the in-field 
railway point systems whose results would then be used in a fault detection model 
(OCSVM). Since the measurements of current were the only observed parameters in 
this study and for each operation of the railway point system the measurements of 
current in amperes over time formed a time series, time series comparison 
algorithms were considered. 
Various similarity measures to compare two time series were described in this 
section. The default similarity measure to compare two time series is the Euclidean 
distance. Alternative similarity measures, known for the elastic matching they perform, 
were presented. For the data available in this study, they have a possibility to 
overcome the weaknesses of the Euclidean distance. One such weakness of the 
Euclidean distance was the inability to deal with the shifts in time axis of the 
measurements of current. The introduced elastic similarity measures were designed 
to solve such problems. Further, a combination of Euclidean distance and elastic 
similarity measures was proposed in this study. The combination of these two 
similarity measures was formed to take into account the shape of two time series, 
while keeping the information about the differences in the absolute values. The 
comparison of the results, when the similarity measures were used separately to the 
ones when the combined similarity measures were used, will be presented in section 
2.5. 
Two approaches on how the time series similarity measures can be used in 
conjunction with the OCSVM method were proposed. One of the suggested 
approaches was to use the similarity measure as the RBF kernel distance function of 
OCSVM. In the other approach, the similarity measure was used to pre-calculate the 
similarity between several previous movements, before using these as feature 
vectors of the OCSVM. Both approaches were tested in this study and the results are 
presented in section 2.5. 
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2.4 Proposed methodology for the fault detection of railway point systems 
2.4.1 Introduction 
The first step of the proposed methodology is the automatic labelling of data 
according to the chosen labelling option (alarm or fault dates), as presented in 
section 2.1.6.4. Since any two measurements of current of the same railway point 
system differ in length, as presented in section 2.1.6.3.1, the standard Euclidean 
distance (section 2.3.6.2) cannot be used without modifying the data first (section 
2.4.3.1). An alternative way of comparing two different length time series is to use the 
elastic metrics on original data. The choice of the elastic metric, such as ERP, is 
justified in section 2.3.7. 
The effectiveness of elastic metrics and Euclidean distance will be evaluated 
considering fault detection accuracy (section 2.4.5). After the choice of the similarity 
measure, various pre-processing techniques can be used in order to speed up the 
calculation of the similarity measure or in some cases provide a better matching of 
the two time series (section 2.4.3). After the data was pre-processed (or no pre-
processing performed) the pairwise similarity measures for all movements are 
calculated. The fault detection on railway point systems in this study is considered as 
a classification task. The features observed in the data of in-field RPS (section 
2.1.6.3) had a great impact on choosing an appropriate method used for the fault 
detection problem. Due to a high imbalance between the data in each class, 
traditional multi-class or binary supervised learning classifiers are not suitable, as 
discussed in section 2.3. The one-class classifiers should be used instead, which are 
trained only on the data of good movements to detect abnormal movements. The 
OCSVM method (section 2.3.5) is chosen in this study. 
The similarity measures with the OCSVM model can be used in two ways, as 
described in sections 2.3.7 and 2.3.8. The next step is the choice of OCSVM training 
and testing technique. Two options will be presented in sections 2.4.5.1 and 2.4.5.2. 
A grid of OCSVM parameter values is selected next in order to find the best 
combination of parameter values which leads to the highest movement classification 
accuracy. Each combination of OCSVM parameter values is used for training and 
testing the model and the one with the highest classification accuracy is selected as 
will be described in section 2.4.5.3. The steps of the methodology can be 
summarised in the following flowchart in Figure 2.21. 
 
Figure 2.21. Flowchart of proposed methodology 
Select point system 
and obtain the data
Choose the 
labelling option
Pre-process the data with 
chosen techniques
Calculate pairwise similarity 
measures for all movements
Select a grid of 
parameters for OCSVM
Select a training and 
testing technique
Train 
OCSVM
Test the trained 
OCSVM
Find the parameter values with 
the best classification accuracy
Obtain the final 
OCSVM
Choose the similarity measure 
and the way it will be used
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2.4.2 Data input 
Data for the analysis is stored in Matlab structure arrays. This way, various data 
types (dates, symbolic data, double, integer values) can be kept together in one 
place. The Matlab structure consists of fields described in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2. Fields of Matlab structure 
Field name Field type Description 
PM_ID Character POE ID 
Direction Double Direction of the POE operation (1 ฀– normal to 
reverse, 2 ฀– reverse to normal) 
Date Date string Date and time of the start of operation of POE 
Current Vector of doubles Current measurements (in amperes) of the POE 
pump motor 
Time Vector of doubles Time points when the current was measured 
Duration Double Duration of POE operation 
Target Double Class number indicating fault state (-1) or fault-
free state (1) 
Depending on how a chosen similarity measure is used, two types of OCSVM input 
data exist. If the similarity measure is used as a kernel function, then the time series 
of measurements of current are the inputs to the model, denoted as ࢞ ൌ ሺܥݑݎݎ݁݊ݐଵǡ ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ݐଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ݐேሻ, where ܰ is the total number of movements. If 
the similarity measure is used to compare the similarity of several previous 
movements, then the input to the model will be the results of similarity measures for 
previous movements ࢞ ൌ ሺ࢞૚ǡ ࢞૛ǡ ǥ ǡ ࢞ࡺሻ , where ܰ  is the total number of 
movements,࢞࢏ ൌ ሺ ଵ݂ ଶ݂ ǥ ெ݂ሻ and ௜݂  is the value of similarity measure between the 
given movement and the ݅th previous movement and ܯ is the number of previous 
movements considered. The label of each ݅ th movement will be entered into the 
model as ܮ௜௧ ൌ െ ? for faulty movements, and ܮ௜௧ ൌ  ? for good movements. This 
information will be stored in vector ࡸ࢚, t in the superscript meaning that it is the true 
label of movement, to distinguish it from the label given by the output of OCSVM. 
Two automatic labelling approaches, as described in section 2.1.6.4, are considered, 
one based on the alarm levels and the other based on fault dates. 
2.4.3 Data pre-processing 
In the data pre-processing step, first of all, any trailing zeros after the completion of a 
movement were removed from each current time series. Secondly, rescaling of time 
series with uniform scaling (Fu et al., 2008) was done in order to be able to use the 
Euclidean distance as a similarity measure and compare the results with elastic 
metrics on identical data. Finally, the first 30 milliseconds of each movement were 
removed from the time series. This phase of movement is known as motor inrush and 
thus, as recommended by engineers, can be left out of the analysis. 
Several other data pre-processing techniques have been proposed to speed up 
calculations and/or possibly give better data alignments when using different 
similarity measures: 
x Smoothing of the time series with the exponential smoothing with different 
smoothing factor, ߙ, values to filter out noise (Keogh and Pazzani, 2001). 
x Down sampling of the time series by an integer factor to speed up the 
calculations (Vuori et al., 2001). 
x Norming of the time series (Chen and Ng, 2004). 
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x Calculating the estimates of the first derivatives for each data point in the time 
series (Keogh and Pazzani, 2001). 
The flowchart of possible options of the data pre-processing process is given in 
Figure 2.22. 
 
Figure 2.22. Flowchart of data pre-processing 
Different options of data pre-processing have been implemented individually and 
collectively. Procedures for implementing these options and the expected gain of 
their application are discussed in detail in further subsections. 
2.4.3.1 Rescaling time series 
In order to compare OCSVM performance results obtained using elastic metrics and 
the Euclidean distance, the time series have to be rescaled to the same length, as 
discussed in section 2.1.6.3. The rescaling is done by uniformly scaling the time 
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series to an average length of all movements of the same point system used in the 
analysis, according to a formula (Fu et al., 2008): 
 
ܽ௜ோ ൌ ܽڿ௜ ?ேȀெۀǡ ݅ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ܯǡ 2.37 
where ܽ௜ோ is the ݅-th element of the rescaled time series, ܰ is the length of the original 
time series, ܯ is the length of the rescaled time series, ڿ݅ۀ is the ceiling function of ݅ 
which calculates the smallest integer not less than ݅, ܽڿ௜ ?ேȀெۀ is the ቒ݅  ?ேெቓ element of 
original time series. 
2.4.3.2 Norming time series 
The norming of time series is carried out before aligning them for similarity 
comparison, as proposed by the authors of the ERP distance (Chen and Ng, 2004). 
For the time series ܣ ൌ ሺܽଵǡ ܽଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܽேሻ the norming is done in the following way: 
 ܽ௡௢௥௠ሺ݅ሻ ൌ ܽሺ݅ሻ െ ߤሺܣሻߪሺܣሻ ǡ ݅ ൌ  ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ܰǡ 2.38 
where ܽሺ݅ሻ is the ݅-th element of the time series ܣ, ߤሺܣሻ is the mean value of the time 
series ܣ, ߪሺܣሻ is the standard deviation of the time series ܣ, and ܰ is the length of 
time series ܣ. 
The norming of time series removes the offset between the time series and allows a 
better matching. However, the information about the absolute values of two time 
series is lost, and as for some failure modes (e.g. dry slide chairs, obstruction) an 
increase of the current usage is experienced, these failure modes might be left 
undetected, if absolute values are ignored. A simple example can be considered, 
when the norming of the time series leads to a false decision about the time series 
similarity. A shift across the y-axis by 1 Ampere is added to obtain the replicated time 
series. The original and replicated time series can be seen in Figure 2.23. 
 
Figure 2.23. Artificial problem to illustrate the loss of information after norming the 
time series 
After norming the time series, the alignment given by ERP is the same as perfect (all 
lines connecting the points of two time series are green), as can be seen in Figure 
2.24. 
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Figure 2.24. Alignment of two time series with ERP distance 
These two time series were found to be identical, since the result of the ERP 
distance was zero. However, these two time series only have identical shapes, but 
the difference between their absolute values is obvious. Thus, norming of the time 
series might result in a loss of detection of certain faults with excess of current used. 
This problem should be addressed by using Euclidean distance combined with 
elastic metrics, as proposed in sections 2.3.6.5 and 2.3.6.6. 
2.4.3.3 Exponential smoothing 
Some level of noise exists in any type of measurements of electric equipment using 
sensors. There are various methods to de-noise the time series, e.g. moving average 
filter (Lorenz and Köhler, 2005), exponential smoothing (Lorenz and Köhler, 2005), 
Kalman filter (Kalman, 1960). To smooth the time series obtained from the 
measurements of POE current, the exponential smoothing was used in this study due 
to its simplicity. For the time series ܣ ൌ ሺܽଵǡ ܽଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܽேሻ, the exponential smoothing is 
defined as follows:  
 ௝ܽௌ ൌ ௝ܽିଵௌ ൅ ߙ൫ ௝ܽ െ ௝ܽିଵௌ ൯ǡ ݆ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ܰǡ  ଵܽௌ ൌ ܽଵǡ  ? ൏ ߙ ൏  ?ǡ 2.39 
where ௝ܽ is the jth data point of the original time series, ௝ܽௌ is the jth data point of the 
smoothed time series, ߙ is the smoothing factor. 
The removal of noise is expected to improve the alignment of time series based on 
estimates of the derivatives of their values as mentioned in section 2.3.6.3. The 
positive effect of the exponential smoothing is shown in an example when two time 
series, with and without smoothing, are matched. In both cases, the estimates of the 
derivatives are used as an input to ERP. The time series without smoothing are 
plotted in Figure 2.25. As in the previous example in Figure 2.17 the original time 
series was shifted and additionally two bumps were added to test the matching 
produced by the ERP distance. 
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Figure 2.25.Time series without smoothing 
After smoothing the original time series, the smoothed time series are given in Figure 
2.26. 
 
Figure 2.26.Time series after exponential smoothing 
Since the replicated time series was created artificially, the perfect alignment of the 
time series is known. Thus, the alignment produced by ERP on smoothed and non-
smoothed data is then compared with a perfect alignment that should be produced 
given these two time series. As in the previous example, the alignment that is 
deviated from the perfect is plotted with red lines. First, the alignment on the non-
smoothed data is given in Figure 2.27. 
 
Figure 2.27. ERP alignment on non-smoothed data 
77 
 
Most of the data was perfectly aligned, except for the data points around time point 
50. A presence of noise can be visually observed in that part of the time series. This 
might be the cause of why the ERP failed to align those points perfectly. The 
alignment produced by ERP, when the data was smoothed with exponential 
smoothing is plotted in Figure 2.28. 
 
Figure 2.28. ERP alignment on data smoothed with exponential smoothing 
In this case, all of the points were aligned perfectly after smoothing was applied. The 
fluctuations in the time series that existed around time point 50, in Figure 2.27, were 
smoothed and thus the ERP produced a better alignment of these points. The effect 
of different smoothing parameter values will be analysed in terms of OCSVM 
classification accuracy in section 2.5.4. 
2.4.3.4 Down sampling 
One of the simplest ways to speed up the calculations of similarity measures is the 
down sampling of the original time series. There are some advanced methods to 
perform the down sampling like Principal Component Analysis (Pearson, 1901), 
Discrete Wavelet Transform (Haar, 1910) etc. In this study a simple technique is 
chosen ฀– linear down sampling, which was applied to speed up the recognition of 
hand written characters in (Vuori et al., 2001). If a sequence of real valued numbers ܣ ൌ ሺܽଵǡ ܽଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܽேሻ is considered, then linear down sampling can be performed in the 
following way: keep the first and then every ݇ -th data point from the original 
sequence ܣ  and abandon the intermediate data points, where ݇ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ? is the 
down-sampling factor. Consider a simple example, when down sampling factor ݇ ൌ  ? 
and the original sequence ܣ ൌ ሺ ? ?ǡ ?ǡ ?ǡ ?ǡ ? ?ǡ ? ?ǡ ? ?ሻ . The resulting down sampled 
sequence is ܣመ ൌ ሺ ? ?ǡ ?ǡ ? ?ሻ. ݇ ൌ  ? means that no down sampling is performed. Due to 
the down sampling of the original sequence, calculations of the ERP distance on the 
down sampled sequence should be performed more quickly, however some loss of 
the accuracy in the alignment is expected. The effect of different down sampling 
factors will be analysed in terms of OCSVM classification accuracy in section 2.5.4. 
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2.4.3.5 Estimates of the derivatives 
As Keogh and Pazzani showed in (Keogh and Pazzani, 2001), a better alignment for 
two time series is given, if the DTW algorithm is applied on the estimates of the 
derivatives, instead of absolute values. For the time series ܣ ൌ ሺܽଵǡ ܽଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܽேሻ, the 
derivative for a data point ܽ௜was defined as follows: 
 ܦሺܽ௜ሻ ൌ ሺܽ௜ െ ܽ௜ିଵሻ ൅ ൬ሺܽ௜ାଵ െ ܽ௜ିଵሻ ? ൰ ? ǡ  ? ൏ ݅ ൏ ܰǡ 2.40 
where ܽ௜  is the ݅th element of time series, ܰ is the total length of time series and ܦሺܽ௜ሻ is the estimate of the first derivative in point ܽ௜. 
The estimate is not defined for the first and the last elements of the time series, thus 
the first element is the same as the second one and the last is the same as the 
penultimate one: 
 ܦሺܽଵሻ ൌ ܦሺܽଶሻǡ ܦሺܽேሻ ൌ ܦሺܽேିଵሻǤ 2.41 
The alignment of two time series when evaluating similarity measures and using 
estimates of the derivatives, instead of absolute values, is expected to be better. A 
simple example is given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach. Using a 
chosen time series of measurements of current a shift across the x-axis and two 
bumps along the y-axis are added to obtain a replicated time series. The original and 
replicated time series can be seen in Figure 2.29. The shift was added at time point 
15 (as in the example in Figure 2.17) and a peak was increased from time point 26 to 
33 and the depth of a valley was increased from time point 46 to 60. 
 
Figure 2.29. Artificial problem for time series matching with ERP 
The perfect alignment of the two time series is shown in Figure 2.30. To visualise the 
alignment, the replicated movement is shifted up in the plot. As previously, the 
alignment of two time series is given by lines between two points: 
x Red line indicates that the alignment of two points is not perfect. 
x Green line indicates that the alignment of two points is perfect. 
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Figure 2.30. Perfect alignment for the artificial problem 
The alignment of the original and replicated time series given by DTW similarity 
measure is shown in Figure 2.31. It can be observed that DTW applied on absolute 
values was unable to deal with the deepened valley and it produced a lot of one to 
many matching for time point 53. Less time warping was made when DTW was 
applied on estimates of the derivatives, as seen on the right hand side of Figure 2.31, 
however, there still was some unnecessary warping and matching between points 
that differed from the perfect alignment. 
 
Figure 2.31. Alignment given by DTW based on the absolute values (left figure) and 
estimates of the derivatives (right figure) 
The alignment obtained by ERP metric is plotted in Figure 2.32. When ERP was 
applied on absolute values, the matching given for the two time series was very poor, 
especially for the points lying in the deepened valley. In several occasions points of 
one time series were matched with a long sequence of points from other time series, 
and it failed to match the valleys properly. When ERP was applied on the estimates 
of the derivatives, as shown on the right hand side of Figure 2.32, a much better 
alignment was given. Little unnecessary warping was produced and the matching of 
valleys increased significantly. 
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Figure 2.32. Alignment given by ERP based on the absolute values (left figure) and 
estimates of the derivatives (right figure) 
Less unnecessary warping was performed by ERP method (on the right hand side of 
Figure 2.32) than with DWT (on the right hand side of Figure 2.31). There were only 
a few points which were aligned differently from what was supposed to be a perfect 
alignment (red lines indicated deviation from the perfect alignment). 
Overall, the ERP method managed to deal with this artificial problem better than the 
DTW method and the usage of estimates of derivatives helped both methods to 
provide better alignments, than the usage of absolute values. Thus, the introduction 
of the estimates of derivatives helps making better alignments when there exists 
some scaling not only in the x-axis, but in the y-axis as well. The usage of estimates 
of the derivatives is expected to increase the classification accuracy of the OCSVM, 
since it was shown that the alignments between time series were improved. The 
effect of using absolute values or estimates of the derivatives for the matching of time 
series will be analysed in terms of OCSVM classification accuracy in section 2.5.4. 
2.4.4 Calculation of similarity measures 
Similarity measures were pre-calculated with all the different pre-processing options, 
before they were used in OCSVM kernel. The reasoning behind this was that to test 
the performance of OCSVM, different OCSVM parameter values had to be used and 
for each set of parameter values the similarity measures would be needed to be 
recalculated. However, the similarity measure values do not depend on the OCSVM 
parameter values, thus, calculating similarity values in advance offers a great time 
saving advantage for extensive training and testing performed in the evaluation of the 
OCSVM performance. 
Actually, pre-calculated values can be stored in a dataset and only values of relevant 
time series can be picked out for each training and testing dataset instead of 
recalculating the similarity measures each time a new OCSVM model is built. This is 
especially useful when elastic similarity measures are used, since they take more 
computational operations to complete than the standard Euclidean distance. Thus for 
each combination of different pre-processing techniques the Euclidean, ERP, ERP 
combined with Euclidean, DTW and DTW combined with Euclidean distance 
similarity measures were calculated first before inputting them to the model. 
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2.4.5 Training and testing of OCSVM 
OCSVM, as with most data-driven approaches, needs a well-defined training dataset 
to perform at its best. The dataset must therefore consist of a representative variety 
of fault-free movements. They should represent the whole variety of fault-free 
movements as well as possible, because the classification rate of OCSVM not only 
depends on chosen parameters of OCSVM but also on the training dataset given. 
The dataset structure was ሼሺ࢞ǡ ࡸ࢚ሻሽ, where ࢞ is an input vector and ࡸ࢚  is a target 
vector, as defined in section 2.4.2. 
The training of OCSVM is performed by optimising Lagrange multipliers in the 
constrained optimisation problem (Haykin, 2008). The sequential minimal 
optimisation algorithm implemented in Matlab LIBSVM package (Chang and Lin, 
2011) was used for this purpose. The training was completed in two phases. In the 
first phase distances with elastic metrics and the Euclidean distance were pre-
calculated for all the movements. In the second phase the OCSVM was trained to 
select the support vectors and form the separating boundary between normal and 
abnormal classes. This kind of approach allowed the pre-calculated similarity 
measures to be used to optimise the OCSVM parameters with a grid search, which 
will be described in section 2.4.5.3. This two-phased training approach greatly 
speeded up the training process, particularly when elastic metrics were used as 
similarity measures. Two different approaches of time series similarity measure 
usage was performed as explained in sections 2.3.7 and 2.3.8. 
During the testing phase the accuracy of the trained OCSVM model was assessed in 
the following way: the final output of the OSCVM model was either -1 if the 
movement was classified as faulty or 1 if the movement was classified as good. This 
classification result is then compared to the label given in the ࡸ࢚variable. The fraction 
of correctly classified movements is calculated to determine the classification 
accuracy.  
The training and testing of the OCSVM was performed using two different 
approaches: 
1. With a modified K-fold cross-validation procedure (Mosteller and Tukey, 
1968). 
2. By taking x% of first good movements for the training and (100-x)% for the 
testing. 
These two approaches are described with more details in the next sections. 
2.4.5.1 Modified K-fold cross-validation 
The K-fold cross-validation technique for the estimation of the classifier accuracy was 
introduced by Mosteller and Tukey in (Mosteller and Tukey, 1968). The idea of this 
approach is to randomly split the whole dataset into K mutually exclusive subsets, if 
possible of equal size. Let the whole dataset be denoted as ܦ. Then it is divided into 
K-folds: 
 ܦ ൌ ሺܦଵ ׫ ܦଶ ׫ ǥ ׫ ܦ௄ሻ, 2.42 
where ܭ is the number of folds, ܦ is the whole dataset, ׫ is the union, ܦଵǡ ܦଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܦ௄ 
are the mutually exclusive subsets. Then the classification algorithm is trained on ܦ ?ܦ௜ subset, and the excluded subset ܦ௜ is left for testing the classification algorithm. 
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This procedure is repeated until all K subsets, ݅ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ܭ are used in the testing 
phase once and the accuracy of the classification algorithm can be determined. 
Due to the high imbalance between the data in each class, using only the total 
classification accuracy of the OCSVM method might give misleading results. For 
example, if there were 400 good movements and 20 faulty movements, then, in the 
case of 5-fold cross-validation, 320 good movements would be used to train the 
OCSVM and 80 good movements and 20 faulty movements to test the classification 
accuracy. If all the 80 good movements were classified with 100% accuracy and all 
20 faulty movements were misclassified (0% accuracy), looking only at the total 
accuracy, the classification rate would still be 80% (80 of 100 movements were 
classified correctly). Thus the correct classification of good movements would 
overwhelm the poor classification of faulty movements and produce misleading 
classification accuracy. 
To deal with this issue, the classification accuracy of good and faulty movements in 
this study was evaluated separately. Only the data of movements identified as fault-
free was divided into K folds (all data is divided into K folds in the original algorithm). 
K-1 folds (or parts) of data of fault-free movements were used to train the model and 
1 fold, followed by all the movements with faults, was used for testing. 
The classification accuracy in each ݅th fold of fault-free and faulty movements, ܲீ ሺ݅ሻ 
and ிܲሺ݅ሻ respectively, was evaluated in this study by equations 2.43 and 2.44. 
 ܲீ ሺ݅ሻ ൌ  ?ீܰ௜ ෍ ܫ൫ܮܩ௝௖൯ேಸ೔௝ୀଵ  ? ? ? ? ?ǡ 2.43 
 
ிܲሺ݅ሻ ൌ  ?ܰி ෍ ܫ൫ܮܨ௝௖൯ேಷ௝ୀଵ  ? ? ? ? ?ǡ 2.44 
where ܲீ ሺ݅ሻ is the classification accuracy of fault-free movements in the ݅th fold, ீܰ೔ 
is the total number of fault-free movements in the ݅th fold, ܮܩ௝௖ is the label given by 
the classification algorithm to a ݆th fault-free movement, ிܲሺ݅ሻ is the classification 
accuracy of movements with faults, when the ݅th fold of fault-free movements is used 
for testing, ிܰ is the total number of movements with faults, ܮܨ௝௖ is the label given by 
the classification algorithm to a ݆th movement with fault and ܫ is the indicator function 
defined by equation 2.45. 
 ܫሺܮ௖ሻ ൌ ൜ ?݂݅ܮ௖ ് ܮ௧ ?݂݅ܮ௖ ൌ ܮ௧ǡ 2.45 
where ܮ௖ is the label given by the classification algorithm and ܮ௧ is the true label. 
The K-fold cross-validation accuracies of fault-free and faulty movements, ܲீ  and ிܲ 
respectively, were obtained using equations 2.46 and 2.47. 
 ܲீ ൌ  ?ܭ ෍ ܲீ ሺ݅ሻǡ௄௜ୀଵ  2.46 
 
ிܲ ൌ  ?ܭ ෍ ிܲሺ݅ሻ௄௜ୀଵ ǡ 2.47 
where ܲீ ሺ݅ሻ and ிܲሺ݅ሻ are as defined in equations 2.43 and 2.44. 
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Since the division into K-folds is done randomly, the accuracy of the classification 
algorithm given by the cross-validation estimate (equations 2.46 and 2.47) depends 
on this random division. The best estimate of the K-fold cross-validation would be 
obtained by going through all of the possible random divisions into folds. The number 
of different possibilities to divide a dataset of N elements into K equal folds (if such 
equal division is possible) can be found from: 
 ൭ܰܰܭ൱ ൅ ቌܰ െ ܰܭܰܭ ቍ ൅ ڮ ൅ ቌܰܰܭܭቍ ൌ ܰǨܰܭ Ǩ ቀܰ െ ܰܭቁ Ǩ ൅ ቀܰ െ ܰܭቁ Ǩܰܭ Ǩ ቀܰ െ  ?ܰܭቁ Ǩ ൅ ڮ ൅  ? 2.48 
where ܰ is the total number of data available, ܭ is the number of folds. 
However, this is computationally too expensive to perform. For example, the division 
of 100 data inputs into 5 folds, with 20 data inputs each, can be done in 
approximately  ?Ǥ ? כ ? ?ଶ଴  different ways. Repeating the division into folds multiple 
times should provide a good estimate of the accuracy as suggested in (Kohavi, 1995). 
However, some researchers ignore the fact of randomness and provide the estimate 
of cross-validation with one iteration of random splitting as can be observed in 
(Asada and Roberts, 2013). 
5-fold cross-validation was chosen in this study as it is a commonly used approach to 
assess the accuracy of the classification method (Asada and Roberts, 2013, 
Gudmundsson et al., 2008). The data of good movements was randomly divided into 
5 equally sized sets. 4 sets at a time were used to train OCSVM and 1 set was used 
to test OCSVM. That way each of the 5 sets was used once for testing purposes. 80% 
of good movements were in 4 sets used to train the OCSVM, while 20% of good 
movements and all of the bad movements were used to test it. In this study, the 
random division was performed 100 times in order to get a better estimate of the 
classification accuracy and still to remain within feasible time of the whole training 
and testing procedure. Such random division of data is expected to deal better with 
the changing behaviour of good movements and a possible influence of weather 
conditions, since training dataset was randomly sampled from all of the dataset 
including all four seasons of the year, thus included a bigger variety of good 
movements. 
2.4.5.2 Proportional training and testing 
An alternative technique for the evaluation of the classification algorithm accuracy will 
be used in this study, which is defined as proportional training. The idea of this 
approach is very simple: take first x% of the fault-free movements for the training 
phase and leave the other (100-x)% of the fault-free movements for the testing phase. 
All of the faulty movements will be left for the testing phase, as in the case of cross-
validation technique. Since x% of the good movements might not be an integer 
number, the following equation is used to determine the amount of good movements 
used for the training: 
 ீ்ܰ ൌ ہ ீܰ  ? ݔۂǡ 2.49 
where ீ்ܰ  is the number of movements used in training, ہ ீܰ  ? ݔۂ is the floor function, 
where the result is the biggest integer not greater than ீܰ  ? ݔ, and ݔ is the percentage 
of good movements used for training. 
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As in the case of K-fold cross-validation, the classification accuracies achieved with 
proportional training for fault-free and faulty movements were calculated separately. 
The classification accuracies of fault free and faulty movements, ܲீ  and ிܲ 
respectively, were obtained using equations 2.50 and 2.51. 
 ܲீ ൌ  ?ܰீ ෍ ܫሺܮܩ௜௖ሻேಸ௜ୀଵ  2.50 
 
ிܲ ൌ  ?ܰி ෍ ܫሺܮܨ௜௖ሻேಷ௜ୀଵ  2.51 
where ீܰ  is the total number of fault-free movements used for testing, ܮܩ௜௖  is the 
label given to the ݅th good movement by the classification algorithm, ܫ is the indicator 
function as given by equation 2.45, ிܰ is the total number of faulty movements used 
for testing, ܮܨ௜௖  is the label given to the faulty movement by the classification 
algorithm. 
This testing technique was chosen due its simplicity: no random division is needed 
and thus no repetitive retraining of the model is needed to estimate its performance, 
as in the case of K-fold cross-validation. However, this approach might give poor 
classification results, if features of data of the tested class changes with time. For 
example, if the first 20% of good movements are chosen to train and test the OCSVM 
model and the remaining 80% of the good movements somehow change their 
behaviour resulting in different shapes and values of the measurements of current, 
then OCSVM trained with such an approach might consider those movements as 
outliers and therefore classify them as faulty. It is the biggest disadvantage of this 
technique if compared to the K-fold cross-validation where movements are randomly 
chosen from the whole data set and thus should not suffer from a changing 
behaviour of good movements. 
2.4.5.3 Grid search for the optimal values of the OCSVM parameters 
The classification accuracy of the OCSVM model, as shown in section 2.3.5, 
depends on two parameters ߛ  and ߥ . These two parameters highly influence the 
classification accuracy of OCSVM. A pair of OCSVM parameters ሺߥǡ ߛሻ that gives the 
best classification accuracy can be obtained using a grid search technique, which is 
a default choice for such an optimisation, e.g. (Li et al., 2010). 
The idea of this algorithm is very straightforward: define the possible values of 
parameters to be optimised and perform an exhaustive search. For example, if the 
possible values of OCSVM parameters are ߥ ൌ ሺ ?Ǥ ? ?ǡ ?Ǥ ?ǡ ?Ǥ ? ?ሻ  and ߛ ൌ ሺ ? ?ିଷǡ  ? ?ିଶǡ  ? ?ିଵǡ  ?ሻ, fix the value of one parameter, e.g. ߥ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? and run the 
model with this value and all the possible values of ߛ parameter, giving the pairs of 
parameters ሺߥ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?ǡ ߛ ൌ  ? ?ିଷǢ ߥ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?ǡ ߛ ൌ  ? ?ିଶǢ ߥ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?ǡ ߛ ൌ  ? ?ିଵǢ ߥ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?ǡ ߛ ൌ ?ሻ. 
The algorithm used to find the pair ሺߥǡ ߛሻ that led to the best classification accuracy of 
the OCSVM model is summarised in Figure 2.33. Using the algorithm, the expected 
classification accuracies of fault-free and faulty movements, ܲீ ா  and ிܲா 
respectively, were set and a search for a model, which would satisfy a system of 
inequalities 2.52, was performed.  
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 ൜ܲீ ൒ ܲீ ாிܲ ൒ ிܲா 2.52 
If no model satisfying the inequalities 2.52 was found, the values of ܲீ ா and ிܲா were 
decreased by 1% and the search was repeated until at least one model was found. 
The decrease in accuracy of 1% was chosen as a smaller change is considered to be 
insignificant. If several models were found, the one with the highest difference 
between the expected and achieved acucracies (see equation 2.53) was chosen. 
 
൫ሺܲீ െ ܲீ ாሻ ൅ ሺ ிܲ െ ிܲாሻ൯ 2.53 
The algorithm favours the values of OCSVM parameters that have similar 
classification accuracies for both classes. Depending on the requirements of the fault 
detection process, this algorithm can be modified to place more emphasis on 
improving the accuracy of one class, for example, a higher accuracy of classification 
of movements with faults. 
 
Figure 2.33. Algorithm to find optimal values of OCSVM parameters 
The algorithm described above was also used to find the best classification 
accuracies, for every pre-processing option used separately and jointly (section 
2.4.3). The results of the analysis will be presented in section 2.5. 
2.4.6 Summary 
A proposed fault detection methodology, based on OCSVM and using elastic 
similarity measures, was presented in this section providing details of each part of 
the methodology. First an overview of different pre-processing techniques that were 
tested in this study was given. The expected advantages and disadvantages with 
certain pre-processing options were identified. 
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An idea to pre-calculate similarity measures before the training and testing of 
OCSVM was then presented. This was done to avoid repetitive calculation of 
similarity measures, this way reducing the time needed for the OCSVM training and 
testing phases. Two options of different OCSVM training and testing procedures 
were discussed: 5-fold cross-validation and proportional training. The evaluation of 
classification accuracy was presented next, detailing a chosen approach how to deal 
with the big difference of amount of two classes in the testing phase, by 
simultaneously reducing the expected classification accuracies to find the best one. 
Finally, a grid search technique was presented to find optimal values of OCSVM 
parameters ߛ and ߥ from a given grid. 
In the next section, the application of the proposed methodology is presented and the 
main results are summarised. 
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2.5 Application of the proposed methodology to the data of in-field railway 
point systems 
2.5.1 Introduction 
Data of point system movements in normal to reverse direction collected from 4 point 
systems with a clamp lock over a one year period including any alarms and faults 
registered is used to analyse performance of the proposed approach. The steps of 
the proposed methodology can be revisited in Figure 2.21. For some of the steps of 
the methodology, several options were considered. All the different options tested in 
this study can be summarised in two flowcharts, given in Figure 2.34 and Figure 2.35. 
 
Figure 2.34. Options considered when testing the proposed methodology 
In terms of notations used presenting the results, the down-sampling factor will be 
denoted as ݇ as in section 2.4.3.4. The accuracy of good movements will be denoted 
as ܲீ  and the accuracy of faulty movements as ிܲ. The similarity measures used in 
this analysis will be represented by the symbols that have been described in section 
2.3.6. The only difference here will be that if the data was rescaled, it will have a 
superscript ܴ, e.g. Euclidean distance ߜாோ. 
Select point system 
and obtain the data
Label by 
alarm dates
Label by 
fault dates
Calculate pairwise similarity 
measures for all movements
GERP GEE GDTW GDE
Select a grid of parameters for OCSVM
Q=(0.01,0.05,0.1,0.15,0.2)
J=(10-3,10-2,10-1,1,10,102,103)
Use a similarity measure 
as a distance function of 
OCSVM kernel
Use a similarity measure outside 
of OCSVM kernel, comparing with 
1, 2, 5 or 10 previous movements
OCSVM with 5-fold cross-
validation training and 
testing procedure
OCSVM with proportional training 
and testing procedure (80/20, 
40/60, 60/40, 20/80)
Train OCSVM with each combination 
of values of parameters
Test each trained OCSVM 
and obtain PG and PF
Find the pair of values of parameters 
Q and J with the best PG and PF
Obtain the final 
OCSVM
GE
Pre-process the data 
with chosen techniques
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Figure 2.35. Different pre-processing options performed 
Given the pre-processing options in Figure 2.35, the number of different 
combinations of the pre-processing options equals 120 for each similarity measure 
used, except the Euclidean distance (analysis cannot be performed on non-scaled 
data as explained in section 2.3.6.2 where the total number of best models found (as 
described in section 2.4.5.3) for every combination of pre-processing options is 60. 
The results of each similarity measure are summarised in tables with the layout given 
in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3. Layout of the presentation of results 
Similarity 
measure 
PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF Number of models with PF฀≥฀9฀5฀ ฀&฀ ฀PG ≥฀9฀5 
Number of models with 
PF฀≥฀9฀5฀ ฀&฀ ฀9฀0฀≤฀PG<95 
Number of models with 
PF฀≥฀9฀5฀ ฀&฀ ฀8฀5฀≤฀PG<90 
Number of models 
with PF฀≥฀9฀5฀ ฀&฀ ฀PG<85 
3F<95 
Number of models 
with ฀9฀0฀≤฀PF<95 & 
PG฀≥฀9฀5 
Number of models with 
฀9฀0฀≤฀PF<95 ฀&฀ ฀9฀0฀≤฀PG<95 
Number of models with 
฀9฀0฀≤฀PF<95 ฀&฀ ฀8฀5฀≤฀PG<90 
Number of models 
with ฀9฀0฀≤฀PF<95 & 
PG<85 
3F<90 
Number of models 
with ฀8฀5฀≤฀PF<90 & 
PG฀≥฀9฀5 
Number of models with 
฀8฀5฀≤฀PF < 9฀0฀ ฀&฀ ฀9฀0฀≤฀PG<95 
Number of models with 
฀8฀5฀≤฀PF < 9฀0฀ ฀&฀ ฀8฀5฀≤฀PG<90 
Number of models 
with ฀8฀5฀≤฀PF<90 & 
PG<85 
PF<85 Number of models with PF<85 & PG฀≥฀9฀5 
Number of models with 
PF<85 ฀&฀ ฀9฀0฀≤฀PG<95 
Number of models with 
PF<85 ฀&฀ ฀8฀5฀≤฀PG<90 
Number of models 
with PF<85 & PG<85 
 
 The desired classification accuracy 
 Better than average, but lower than desired classification accuracy 
 Average classification accuracy 
 Unacceptable classification accuracy 
For a better representation of quantitative performance of each similarity measure, 
the 10 best performing models will be presented with their classification rates ܲீ  and ிܲ. The results from the application of the proposed methodology are given in the 
next sections. Only the results for a single point system, denoted PM9A, will be 
presented, with the remaining results given in appendices.  
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2.5.2 Data input 
As mentioned previously, data from 4 point systems were used in the analysis. Their 
operations data in normal to reverse and reverse to normal directions were obtained 
from the databases, presented in section 2.1.6.1. Data from one calendar year of 
2012 was selected to include behaviour of railway point system from all seasons and 
different operating conditions. The amount of data used in this study is summarised 
in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4. Number of movements used in the analysis 
PM ID ்ܰ Labelling using alarm dates Labelling using failure dates ீܰ  ிܰ ீܰ  ிܰ 
PM9A 589 542 47 531 58 
PM9B 575 551 24 520 55 
PM13A 519 474 45 478 41 
PM13B 521 489 32 480 41 ்ܰ here is the total number of movements for the point system, ீܰ is the number of 
movements labelled as good according to the selected labelling strategy and ிܰ is 
the number of movements labelled as faulty. 
The summary of alarms for PM9A for the time interval considered in this study is 
given in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5. Alarm records for PM9A 
Total 
movements 
# of movements 
with alarms 
# of 
duration 
alarms 
# of 
peak 
alarms 
# of average 
current 
alarms 
589 47 44 1 21 
Note that one movement of RPS can have several alarms, that is different variables 
might exceed their thresholds at the same time. That is why the sum of duration, 
peak and average current alarms exceeds the number of movements with alarms in 
Table 2.5. 
The summary of failures for PM9A is given in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6. Failure records for PM9A 
Failure 
occurrence 
date 
Failure 
rectification 
date 
Failure 
cause 
Maintenance 
action 
05/02/2012 
15:05:51 
05/02/2012 
19:00:01 
Obstruction with snow and 
ice 
Ice removed, points 
lubricated 
25/04/2012 
08:41:56 
25/04/2012 
14:38:01 
Obstruction with ballast Ballast removed 
09/05/2012 
07:49:14 
24/05/2012 
15:00:01 
Obstruction with squashed 
cans and bottles, bolts 
missing from slide chairs 
Bolts replaced, 
obstructions removed, 
points lubricated 
14/09/2012 
06:52:00 
14/09/2012 
11:10:01 
Contamination Contamination cleared, 
points lubricated 
22/11/2012 
10:22:11 
24/11/2012 
04:48:01 
Crushed tail cable Cable replaced 
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The information about alarms and failures of other point systems are presented in 
Appendix A. 
2.5.3 Results with time series similarity measure as a kernel distance function 
2.5.3.1 5-fold cross-validation training and testing technique 
As it was explained in section 2.4.5.1, using the 5-fold cross-validation technique the 
data of good movements was divided into 5 sets. Thus the amount of data (Table 2.4) 
used for the training and testing phases with 5-fold cross-validation technique can be 
summarised in Table 2.7. 
Table 2.7. Distribution of good and faulty movements in training and testing datasets 
PM ID 
Labelling using alarm dates Labelling using failure dates 
Training Testing Training Testing ீܰ  ிܰ ீܰ  ிܰ ீܰ  ிܰ ீܰ  ிܰ 
PM9A 433/434 - 108/109 47 424/425 - 106/107 58 
PM9B 440/441 - 110/111 24 416 - 104 55 
PM13A 379/380 - 94/95 45 382/383 - 95/96 41 
PM13B 391/392 - 97/98 32 384 - 96 41 
When the total number of movements cannot be equally divided into 5 folds, two 
numbers are given with a slash. For example, for the PM9A, in some cases 433 good 
movements were used in the training dataset and the remaining 109 good 
movements were used in the testing dataset. In other cases, 434 good movements 
were used in the training dataset and the remaining 108 good movements were used 
in the testing dataset. Such division was random and was not controlled. Section 
2.5.3.1.1 shows results obtained when the movements were labelled according to 
alarm dates and section 2.5.3.1.2 shows results obtained when the movements were 
labelled according to failure dates. 
2.5.3.1.1 Data labelling according to alarm dates 
First of all, the proposed methodology is tested with the data labelling according to 
alarm dates. As mentioned in section 2.2.4.2, the alarm system is a common 
technique for detecting faults in the railway point systems. Thus, it is straightforward 
to compare the results produced by the proposed methodology and the alarm system. 
Since a simple threshold technique was able to detect abrupt changes in the current, 
it is natural to expect that a more sophisticated method would perform at least 
equally well. The results for all the similarity measures are presented next. 
The first similarity measure is the Euclidean distance and the results are summarised 
in Table 2.8. 
Table 2.8. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9A (5-fold cross 
validation, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 27 0 0 
3F<95 3 7 4 0 
3F<90 0 16 1 1 
PF<85 0 0 1 0 
91 
 
More than half of the best models (37 out of 60) managed to achieve better than 
average but lower than the desired classification accuracy. The majority of the 
models (58 out of 60) achieved at least average classification accuracy and 2 models 
had unacceptable classification accuracy. 
The results for the ERP similarity measure are summarised in Table 2.9. Both, the 
results obtained using non-scaled and rescaled data are presented. One could argue 
that there is no need to use rescaled data for elastic metrics, since it was shown in 
section 2.3.6.4, that ERP can be used in the case when two time series differ in 
length. However, the results on rescaled data are also given in order to compare the 
performance of the Euclidean distance and ERP on the identical data. 
Table 2.9. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9A (5-fold cross validation, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 6 25 0 0 PF 0 46 0 0 
3F<95 8 15 2 0 3F<95 2 9 1 0 
3F<90 0 4 0 0 3F<90 0 1 1 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 0 PF<85 0 0 0 0 
From Table 2.9, one can see that there were 6 models that achieved the desired 
classification accuracy, when ERP was used on non-scaled data. 48 out of 60 
models managed to achieve better than average but lower than the desired 
classification accuracy, while there were no models, which would have unacceptable 
classification accuracy. When ERP was used on rescaled data, slightly worse results 
were achieved: no models were able to achieve the desired classification accuracy, 
but none of them had unacceptable classification accuracy as well. Moreover, 57 out 
of 60 models managed to achieve better than average but lower than the desired 
classification accuracy. In both cases, using non-scaled and rescaled data, the ERP 
similarity measure performed better than the Euclidean distance in terms of 
movement classification accuracy. The results obtained for the remaining 3 point 
systems are given in Appendix B. 
For a detailed quantitative evaluation of performance of similarity measures, 
classification accuracies of 10 best performing models for each similarity measure 
are given in Table 2.10. 
Table 2.10. Classification rates of 10 best models for each similarity measure for 
PM9A (5-fold cross validation, labelling using alarm dates) 
# ࢾࡱࡾ ࢾࡱࡾࡼ ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  
PG PF PG PF PG PF 
1 94.01 97.83 95.24 96.37 94.31 97.64 
2 94.01 97.80 95.69 96.34 94.28 97.60 
3 94.09 96.99 95.73 96.21 94.40 97.49 
4 94.12 96.50 95.84 96.19 94.36 97.17 
5 94.15 96.32 95.84 96.15 94.17 96.27 
6 94.10 96.12 95.68 95.11 94.08 96.20 
7 94.29 95.74 95.91 94.97 94.08 96.19 
8 94.27 95.74 95.88 94.73 94.12 95.93 
9 94.25 95.74 95.97 94.47 94.04 95.77 
10 94.24 95.74 96.01 94.37 94.13 95.71 
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It can be observed, from Table 2.10, that the accuracy of classification of faulty 
movements, PF, was highest for Euclidean distance. The accuracy of classification of 
good movements, PG, was highest for the ERP distance. Nevertheless, the 
performance of both similarity measures was quite similar and no big differences in 
the classification accuracies can be observed. All the best performing models 
managed to achieve classification accuracies higher than 94% for both good and 
faulty movements. 
2.5.3.1.2 Data labelling according to failure dates 
The results achieved, when the movements were labelled according to failure dates, 
are presented in the same way as those obtained using the labelling by alarm dates. 
The results obtained with the Euclidean distance are summarised in Table 2.11. 
Table 2.11. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9A (5-fold cross 
validation, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Poor classification rates were achieved for all models. The classification accuracy of 
OCSVM was unacceptable in all 60 cases. The performance of all models changed 
drastically if compared to the case when the data was labelled according to alarm 
dates. 
The results with ERP distance are given in Table 2.12. 
Table 2.12. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9A (5-fold cross validation, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
As in the case of the Euclidean distance, the classification rates of all models fall into 
the unacceptable classification accuracy level. Such situations can be observed for 
both non-scaled and rescaled data. Once more, the classification accuracies are very 
different from the ones obtained with the ERP distance when the data was labelled 
according to alarm dates. The results for different point systems are given in 
Appendix B. 
In the same manner as in the previous section, the classification rates of 10 best 
performing models for each similarity measure are given in Table 2.13. 
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Table 2.13. Classification rates of 10 best models for each similarity measure for 
PM9A (5-fold cross validation, labelling using failure dates) 
# ࢾࡱࡾ ࢾࡱࡾࡼ ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  
PG PF PG PF PG PF 
1 54.55 59.50 58.31 59.17 51.85 51.20 
2 53.25 61.95 57.15 64.86 56.06 49.34 
3 52.13 61.40 57.44 57.86 50.32 48.73 
4 52.22 61.38 60.63 55.13 48.82 58.36 
5 52.07 58.01 55.63 63.16 48.65 53.50 
6 51.87 63.39 55.54 59.50 48.74 51.32 
7 51.61 61.97 58.07 54.47 48.37 50.74 
8 51.42 61.60 54.68 63.30 50.66 47.34 
9 58.58 50.22 54.41 55.54 56.30 46.71 
10 50.13 64.24 57.32 53.57 50.52 46.38 
The results show that not only the classification rates fell into the unacceptable 
region (PF<85 and PG<85), the best performing models were only able to achieve 
classification rates of around 50%. Such poor classification rates were very different 
from the ones achieved with the data labelled on alarm dates. 
Further investigation of the results with different labelling options will be performed in 
the next sections to find out the cause of very different classification accuracies. 
OCSVM performance results obtained with the alternative training and testing 
technique are presented in the next sections. 
2.5.3.2 Proportional training and testing technique 
In the next sections the results obtained with the proportional training technique are 
summarised similarly to those obtained with the 5-fold cross-validation technique. For 
the sake of brevity, the results of the technique when 80% of data was used for 
training and 20% for testing are presented in this section. The results obtained with 
the remaining training and testing proportions are given in Appendix B. Such 
proportions were chosen to compare this approach with the K-fold technique, since 
when 5 folds are used, the training data consists of 80% of the dataset. This way the 
random sampling for the training data and the sequential sampling can be compared. 
The distribution of movements used for training and testing phases of the 
proportional training technique is given in Table 2.14 and Table 2.15. 
Table 2.14. Distribution of good and faulty movements in training and testing 
datasets when data was labelled using alarm dates 
PM ID 
Training 
20% 
Testing 
80% 
Training 
40% 
Testing 
60% 
Training 
60% 
Testing 
40% 
Training 
80% 
Testing 
20% ீܰ ீܰ  ிܰ ீܰ ீܰ  ிܰ ீܰ ீܰ  ிܰ ீܰ ீܰ  ிܰ 
PM9A 108 434 47 216 326 47 325 217 47 433 109 47 
PM9B 110 441 24 220 331 24 330 221 24 440 111 24 
PM13A 94 380 45 189 285 45 284 190 45 379 95 45 
PM13B 97 392 32 195 294 32 293 196 32 391 98 32 
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Table 2.15. Distribution of good and faulty movements in training and testing 
datasets when data was labelled using failure dates 
PM ID 
Training 
20% 
Testing 
80% 
Training 
40% 
Testing 
60% 
Training 
60% 
Testing 
40% 
Training 
80% 
Testing 
20% ீܰ ீܰ  ிܰ ீܰ ீܰ  ிܰ ீܰ ீܰ  ிܰ ீܰ ீܰ  ிܰ 
PM9A 108 434 47 216 326 47 325 217 47 433 109 47 
PM9B 110 441 24 220 331 24 330 221 24 440 111 24 
PM13A 94 380 45 189 285 45 284 190 45 379 95 45 
PM13B 97 392 32 195 294 32 293 196 32 391 98 32 
2.5.3.2.1 Data labelling according to alarm dates 
First, results with the Euclidean distance are presented, in Table 2.16. Results 
obtained with Euclidean distance were worse when the selection of training data was 
done sequentially, rather than randomly sampling it from the whole year data as in 
the 5-fold cross-validation technique. This time 15 out of 60 models achieved better 
than average classification accuracy (37 out of 60 models achieved better than 
average classification accuracy with the 5-fold cross-validation technique). 
Furthermore, there were 5 models, which achieved unacceptable classification 
accuracy, while there were 2 such models with 5-fold cross-validation technique. 
Table 2.16. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9A (80% training and 
20% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 7 2 0 
3F<95 1 7 3 0 
3F<90 24 9 2 0 
PF<85 5 0 0 0 
A similar situation has occurred for the ERP distance whose results are summarised 
in Table 2.17. The number of models which achieved the desirable accuracy dropped 
from 6 (see Table 2.9) to 3 for the ERP distance on non-scaled data, as can be seen 
in Table 2.17. However, the number of models which achieved the desirable 
accuracy for the ERP distance on rescaled data has increased from 0 (see Table 2.9) 
to 3. The number of models with better than average classification accuracy has 
increased from 48 to 53 models when ERP was applied on non-scaled data, if 
compared to the 5-fold cross-validation case. However, the number of such models 
has decreased heavily for ERP applied on rescaled data (from 57 to 24). Moreover, 
there were 30 models with unacceptable classification accuracy, when ERP was 
applied on rescaled data. There were no such models in the case of 5-fold cross-
validation. The results obtained for other point systems are given in Appendix B.  
Table 2.17. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9A (80% training and 20% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 3 17 0 0 PF 3 16 0 2 
3F<95 27 9 1 0 3F<95 3 5 1 0 
3F<90 1 2 0 0 3F<90 1 1 0 2 
PF<85 0 0 0 0 PF<85 0 0 18 8 
The accuracies of the 10 best models for each similarity measure are given in Table 
2.18. The best performing models with ERP distance slightly outperformed the best 
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performing models with Euclidean distance, as can be seen from Table 2.18. The 
best performing model for ERP distance on non-scaled data managed to achieve PG 
= 96.33% and PF = 95.74%. A similar situation was seen with ERP combined 
distance on rescaled data, when the best performing model achieved PG = 95.41% 
and PF = 95.74%. 
Table 2.18. Classification rates of 10 best models for each similarity measure for 
PM9A (80% training and 20% testing, labelling using alarm dates) 
# ࢾࡱࡾ ࢾࡱࡾࡼ ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  
PG PF PG PF PG PF 
1 94.50 93.62 96.33 95.74 95.41 95.74 
2 93.58 97.87 95.41 95.74 95.41 95.74 
3 93.58 95.74 95.41 95.74 95.41 95.74 
4 93.58 97.87 94.50 95.74 94.50 97.87 
5 93.58 95.74 96.33 93.62 94.50 97.87 
6 92.66 95.74 95.41 93.62 94.50 95.74 
7 94.50 91.49 95.41 93.62 94.50 95.74 
8 95.41 91.49 94.50 93.62 94.50 95.74 
9 93.58 91.49 94.50 93.62 94.50 95.74 
10 93.58 91.49 93.58 97.87 94.50 95.74 
In the next section, the results of models when data was labelled according to failure 
dates, are presented. 
2.5.3.2.2 Data labelling according to failure dates 
The first similarity measure considered was the Euclidean distance, and the results 
are presented in Table 2.19. As in the case of 5-fold cross-validation (Table 2.11), 
the results obtained with all the models are very poor, since all of them fall into the 
unacceptable classification accuracy region. 
Table 2.19. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9A (80% training and 
20% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 1 59 
A similar situation can be observed for the ERP distance, whose results are 
presented in Table 2.20. The classification rates with the ERP distance are very poor 
and, once more, all of the models fall into the unacceptable classification accuracy 
region. The results obtained with other point systems are given in Appendix B. 
Table 2.20. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9A (80% training and 20% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 1 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 2 
3F<90 0 0 0 4 3F<90 0 0 0 2 
PF<85 0 0 1 55 PF<85 0 0 0 55 
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The 10 best models for each similarity measure are given next, in Table 2.21. 
Results in Table 2.21 just reconfirm that the classification accuracies are very poor, 
even for the best performing models of any similarity measure. 
Table 2.21. Classification rates of 10 best models for each similarity measure for 
PM9A (80% training and 20% testing, labelling using failure dates) 
# ࢾࡱࡾ ࢾࡱࡾࡼ ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  
PG PF PG PF PG PF 
1 51.67 46.55 71.67 75.86 65.00 67.24 
2 46.67 46.55 76.67 68.97 51.67 48.28 
3 48.33 44.83 70.00 67.24 50.00 48.28 
4 46.67 44.83 66.67 70.69 48.33 55.17 
5 56.67 43.10 66.67 68.97 48.33 53.45 
6 55.00 43.10 75.00 65.52 51.67 46.55 
7 51.67 43.10 68.33 65.52 48.33 46.55 
8 48.33 43.10 78.33 63.79 45.00 48.28 
9 45.00 43.10 71.67 62.07 41.67 96.55 
10 45.00 43.10 65.00 60.34 40.00 94.83 
Due to such poor results obtained by the labelling data based on failure dates, no 
matter which training and testing technique was chosen, a more detailed look at how 
the data was labelled according to the alarm and fault dates is needed. Since, all the 
conditions for the testing of the two data labelling approaches were the same there 
must be big differences in how the data was labelled, since the labelling was done in 
the automated way, just by considering the dates given, as was explained in section 
2.1.6.4. In the next section, the time series of the movements that were labelled as 
good and the ones that were labelled as faulty will be compared visually for the two 
chosen labelling techniques. 
2.5.3.3 Analysis of discrepancies in the data labelling 
In this section, the results of the automated movement labelling procedure (section 
2.1.6.4) are analysed. Since the classification results obtained with two data labelling 
approaches were very different, a graphical analysis was performed to identify, which 
movements were labelled as fault-free and which ones as faulty by both labelling 
procedures. The labelling given by two different automated labelling approaches was 
considered for each point system that was chosen for the fault detection analysis. 
However, in this section, the results were presented only for one point system, since 
common discrepancies were found for all of the point systems and the remaining 
example graphs can be found in Appendix C. 
In figures in this section the movements that were labelled as good using the alarm 
or failure dates were plotted in green and the movements that were labelled as faulty 
were plotted in red. Movements that were labelled based on alarm dates were 
presented for the analysis only if any discrepancies in the labelling have been 
visually observed. Other movements were not included in this analysis. All the 
movements that were recorded faulty according to fault dates were included in this 
analysis since the classification rate using labelling according to failure dates was 
very poor. 
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2.5.3.3.1 Data labelling based on alarm dates 
In the first example it can be observed that there were some changes in the data 
before the alarms have been raised (all the green curves were recorded in the 
database before the red curves), as seen in Figure 2.36. 
 
Figure 2.36. First example of imprecise labelling due to alarm dates on PM9A 
There were a few good movements (green curves) that had an increase in current, 
especially after around 2 seconds of the movements. These movements were 
recorded over a period of three days and then the alarm was raised (red curves), 
when the POE timed out and did not manage to finish the movement. Note that for 
the graphical representation, the remainder of these movements were not plotted. 
Furthermore, this alarm led to an actual fault ฀– obstruction with snow and ice. A 
possible reason for this fault might be the accumulation of snow and debris 
throughout several days and the alarm system raised an alarm when only the railway 
point system was unable to complete the operation. Thus, if the earlier movements 
that had a big increase in the current values before the alarm was raised were 
labelled as faulty movements, perhaps a better representation of a good behaviour 
and a faulty behaviour of POE would be obtained. Thus the movements that showed 
signs of changing behaviour of measurements of current could be relabelled as faulty 
(red curves). The suggested relabelling of the data, which would help to include the 
information of deteriorating condition of the point system, is plotted in Figure 2.37. 
 
Figure 2.37. Suggested relabelling for the first example 
In this first example, the inability of the alarm system to detect changes in the current 
has been shown, when an earlier detection of that change might have helped to 
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avoid the failure of the railway point system. In the next example, the inability of the 
alarm system to detect changes in the current, even when they are abrupt, is shown. 
From Figure 2.38, one can notice that there were a couple of movements (in green) 
that had an increase in current throughout the switch rail movement phase and were 
close in their profile to the movements that raised the alarm (in red). Moreover, the 
movements which were labelled as faulty raised an alarm due to the longer motor 
running duration and the increase of the current values was undetected, since it did 
not produce an average current alarm. This example shows how the alarm technique 
is unable to detect abrupt changes in the shape and absolute values of the 
measurements of current. 
 
Figure 2.38. Second example of imprecise labelling due to alarm dates on PM9A 
Again, an earlier warning can be given if the fault detection algorithm can take 
account of such changes in current. Thus, the labelling given in Figure 2.38 could be 
changed in order to include the information of the changing behaviour of 
measurements of current. The suggested relabelling for this second example is given 
in Figure 2.39. 
 
Figure 2.39. Suggested relabelling for the second example 
The most common problem found in the process of labelling according to alarm dates 
is that only the movements that significantly differed from the remaining ones raised 
an alarm in the system. Moreover, most of the alarms were raised due to the violation 
of a motor running duration threshold. Even in the case like the ones plotted in Figure 
2.38, the alarm was raised due to the longer duration of the movement. However the 
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differences of absolute values are more than obvious if looking at some of the 
movement that did not raise an alarm but looked similar to the ones that looked faulty. 
Thus if the data is labelled according to alarm dates, only the movements that greatly 
differ from the other ones would be considered as faulty ones and due to this reason 
the classification rates are very good. However, no such intelligent techniques were 
necessary to detect these abrupt changes in the data, since all of them were 
detected by the alarm threshold technique. Thus, the usage of data labelling 
according to alarm dates will not allow to train and test the classifiers to detect a prior 
condition of failure. The detection of conditions leading to faults is one of the key 
requirements of a good fault diagnostic technique as stated in section 2.2.5 and thus 
the automatic labelling of data according to alarm dates could not be used for 
detecting a deteriorating condition of the railway point system. 
2.5.3.3.2 Data labelling based on failure dates 
As in the previous section, data of one point system labelled PM9A is considered, 
since similar discrepancies were identified in all of the point systems. The graphs of 
remaining systems are given in Appendix C. Five faults were recorded for PM9A in 
the FLD database. Failure occurrence and rectification dates, number of faulty 
movements, cause of the failure and maintenance actions performed to rectify the 
failure were summarised previously in Table 2.6. 
As in the case of labelling based on alarm dates, graphical analysis was performed to 
visually compare movements labelled as good and as faulty. 5 movements that were 
labelled as good prior to the failure date and 5 movements that were labelled as good 
after the failure was rectified will be plotted together with all movements that were 
labelled as faulty. Good movements prior to the failure will be plotted in green, faulty 
movements in red and good movements after the failure was rectified in blue colour. 
The first recorded fault of PM9A in the analysis period was identified as obstruction 
by snow and ice. A rise in current usage is expected when this type of failure occurs, 
as shown in Figure 2.10. The behaviour of the point system might be unaltered until 
the moving blades meet the obstruction and two scenarios might occur, as described 
in (Bolbolamiri et al., 2012) and section 2.1.6.5. The data of the movements is plotted 
in Figure 2.40. 
 
Figure 2.40. Good movements and faulty movements with obstruction by snow and 
ice 
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From Figure 2.40 one can see that some movements, which were automatically 
labelled as good, took more than 6 seconds until the POE timed out and their current 
measurements were similar to the ones that were labelled as faulty. Moreover, some 
current measurements of movements, which were labelled as good, are clearly 
above the ones of red (faulty) movements. However, these movements were labelled 
as good according to failure dates. This excess of current usage could be the 
indication of an obstruction by snow, which was the fault cause as identified in the 
FLD. 
In the FLD, the rectification time of the failure was recorded four hours later from the 
occurrence time. However, the movement from which the increased current usage 
can be observed was performed three days earlier before the fault date and time 
given. After this movement, 4 more movements were performed by POE, all of them 
with the same excess of current usage. During the further 4 movements the point 
system failed to lock the points and the POE timed out. Only after the points failed to 
lock, the fault has been recorded. However, the growing excess of current usage in 
the previous movements should have been a good indicator that a fault might occur 
in the near future and thus such failures could be predicted. In addition, the 
movements that were labelled as faulty started behaving as good movements soon 
after the failure occurred. In total 7 more movements were recorded whose current 
trends resembled those of good movements until the fault rectification has been 
recorded in FDL. Note that this point system usually performs one movement within 
2-3 hours. This potentially shows that movements are logged in the system, when the 
engineers are checking whether they managed to rectify the fault. Thus some 
movements, that are actually fault free, are labelled as faulty ones, if the labelling is 
done automatically according to failure dates from FLD. 
The same issue with the labelling based on failure dates can be observed in Figure 
2.41. The records in FLD show that this failure was identified as ballast obstruction. 
Movements that were labelled as good drew more current from POE compared to the 
ones that were labelled as bad. 
 
Figure 2.41. Good movements and faulty movements with obstruction by ballast 
This type of failure mode, as any obstruction, should reflect a higher current used 
throughout the rail movement phase and, if the obstruction is not forced out of the 
way, it might end up failing to complete the movement. The movement plotted in 
green whose current values were higher than all of the ones of the other movements 
in Figure 2.41 was recorded on a certain date a couple of days earlier than the failure 
was logged. It is the same situation as with the previous example in Figure 2.40, 
when the failure in FLD might have been recorded later than it actually occurred. 
Moreover, the movements that were labelled as faulty (red curves in Figure 2.41) 
were almost overlaid by the good movements made after the fault was rectified (blue 
curves in Figure 2.41). Thus, once more some of the good movements were labelled 
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as faulty and vice versa when they were automatically labelled relying on the 
accuracy of the failure dates. 
Figure 2.42 shows currents of the point system operating with a broken bolt in the 
crossing block and obstruction. Once again, the obstruction should result in an 
excess of current drawn by the POE. However, current from one movement that was 
labelled as good can be clearly seen to have higher values than currents from any 
other movements. This could be the movement that actually represented the fault. 
However it was labelled as a good movement based on the fault data recorded. 
 
Figure 2.42. Good movements and faulty movements with broken bolt in the crossing 
block together with obstruction 
The movement that was labelled as good but already had a big increase in the 
current values was recorded 7 hours before the fault was recorded. Three more 
movements were logged which had an increase in the current values and occurred 
before the fault was logged. Once more, the findings suggest that the recorded date 
of the fault might not correspond to the actual date when the fault occurred. Moreover, 
plenty of movements were labelled as faulty, but they were already similar to the 
movements labelled as good, after the fault was rectified (plotted in blue), as can be 
seen from Figure 2.42. As mentioned earlier, this can happen when engineers are 
testing whether they correctly rectified a failure and whether the fitted alarm system is 
raising alarms for the rectified movements. 
The cause of the failure represented by measurements of current in Figure 2.43 was 
recorded as contamination. As in the case of dry slide chairs or obstruction, some 
excess of current usage by POE is expected. 
 
Figure 2.43. Good movements and faulty movements with contamination 
One can see in the figure that the movements that occurred before the fault was 
recorded and, therefore, were labelled as good, actually had higher current values 
than the movements that were recorded after the failure occurred and were labelled 
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as faulty. Furthermore, some movements that were labelled as good actually ended 
up by timing out, when the motor ran for more than 6 seconds. After the first 
movement that had an increase in current values was recorded, the increase of the 
current stayed constant for several days in other movements until the point system 
failed to perform a movement and it timed out. After a few hours of this incident the 
consequent movement was already recorded as faulty. However, in Figure 2.43 all 
current trends of the movements labelled as faulty are below the majority of current 
trends of green and blue movements that were labelled as good. This is not the 
expected behaviour of faulty system when there is a contamination present. 
The last failure was recorded in the database as a crushed cable. The failure data is 
plotted in Figure 2.44. 
 
Figure 2.44. Good movements and faulty movements with crushed cable 
It can be seen that several good movements (plotted in green) are very similar to the 
movements, labelled as faulty (plotted in red). However, it is unclear whether the 
movements were incorrectly labelled as good or as faulty, since it is not clear how the 
railway point system should behave when such a failure occurs. Nevertheless, there 
were several very similar movements that were labelled differently. 
The most common problem found in the labelling according to failure dates is that the 
fault actually happens earlier than the specified failure occurrence date. This might 
be due to the fact that when an alarm is raised by a condition monitoring system 
which does not disappear after a few movements, only then the engineers are sent 
out to the field to rectify the situation. The failure date therefore gets recorded later 
than the date of the first alarms. This way several movements that already represent 
the failed state are actually labelled as good. Moreover, the failure rectification date is 
usually recorded later than the date when the system has been fixed. Some 
movements that occur during the testing of the rectification might be recorded in the 
movement database and thus they are labelled as faulty despite the fact that the fault 
was already rectified. 
Thus, for these reasons, the automatic labelling of the data according to failure dates 
becomes misleading. This might explain the poor performance of the classifiers, 
since some movements are given different labels, but they are actually very similar to 
each other. With such an inconsistent labelling no classification algorithm could 
produce good results if no additional information, that would separate those two very 
similar movements, is given. Therefore, manual relabelling has been carried out and 
the analysis of the performance of the classification algorithm has been repeated. 
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2.5.3.4 Suggested data relabelling approach 
After taking a closer look at the results of automatic labelling, several deficiencies of 
both automatic labelling options were found, as explained in the previous sections, 
signifying a need for a different data labelling approach. However, with the data 
available, the only other relabelling option possible is to look at each of the individual 
trends to see whether they are more likely to represent good or faulty movements. 
Thus a combination of heuristic labelling and labelling using alarm dates and failure 
dates was performed. 
All movements that had alarms were considered to be faulty movements, since the 
alarms were raised only for current trends that highly deviated from normal ones, as 
discussed previously. The movements around failure dates were then inspected, 
identifying which movements still had the alarms, when the alarms disappeared and 
the POE seemed to be back to normal behaviour. Nevertheless, a visual inspection 
was additionally performed for each movement of POE PM9A, trying to recognise the 
movements which represented the deteriorating condition leading to an alarm or 
failure. 
The label of the movement (good or faulty) was determined subjectively, thus the 
resulting relabelled data indicate which movements looked abnormal (rather than a 
failed or a non-failed condition). The automation of the relabelling, however, would be 
impossible, but the cleansing of the data before the model is trained and tested is 
essential. The results with the relabelled data using the proposed methodology are 
given in the next section. 
2.5.4 Results with relabelled data 
After obvious discrepancies were found in both approaches of data labelling, testing 
of OCSVM where similarity measures were used for feature extraction using 
automatically labelled data was considered meaningless. A manual relabelling of the 
data was therefore performed for point system PM9A before carrying out OCSVM 
performance analysis as discussed in section 2.5.3.4. 
This time both options for utilising similarity measures will be analysed: for 
substituting kernel distance function as described in section 2.3.7 and for feature 
extraction technique as described in section 2.3.8. The same testing approach has 
been performed on this relabelled data as in section 2.5.3. 
2.5.4.1 Results with time series similarity measure as a kernel distance 
function 
2.5.4.1.1 5-fold cross-validation training and testing technique 
Due to relabelling of the data the amount of good and faulty movements has changed 
and it is summarised in Table 2.22. 
Table 2.22. Distribution of good and faulty movements in training and testing 
datasets 
PM ID Training Testing ீܰ  ிܰ ீܰ  ிܰ 
PM9A 385/386 - 96/97 107 
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The classification accuracy with the relabelled data is evaluated in the same manner 
as for labelling using alarm or failure dates. The results with the Euclidean distance 
are presented first in Table 2.23. None of the models were able to achieve either the 
desired classification accuracy, or better than average classification accuracy. 35 out 
of 60 models achieved average accuracy. 25 models fell into the unacceptable 
accuracy region. 
Table 2.23. Classification rates using Euclidean distance on rescaled data for 
PM9A (5-fold cross validation, relabelled data) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 25 4 
3F<90 0 0 10 10 
PF<85 0 0 2 9 
The results for ERP distance are given in Table 2.24. As with the Euclidean distance, 
using the ERP distance (Table 2.24), none of the models achieved the desired 
classification accuracy. The number of models that achieved the average 
classification accuracy was similar to that achieved in the case with Euclidean 
distance. 38 out of 60 models when non-scaled data was used and 35 out of 60 
models when rescaled data was used achieved the average classification accuracy. 
However, in both cases (non-scaled and rescaled data) the number of models with 
unacceptable classification accuracy was quite high (22 and 25 respectively). 
Table 2.24. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9A (5-fold cross validation, relabelled data) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 3 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 12 3 
3F<90 0 0 38 6 3F<90 0 0 23 7 
PF<85 0 0 10 6 PF<85 0 0 2 10 
The results of the best 10 models for each similarity measure are summarised in 
Table 2.25. As can be seen from the table, some of the best models are very close to 
average classification accuracies, however, none of them managed to achieve such 
accuracies (฀9฀0฀≤฀PG < 9฀5฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀9฀0฀≤฀PF<95). 
Table 2.25. Classification rates of 10 best models for each similarity measure for 
PM9A (5-fold cross validation, relabelled data) 
# ࢾࡱࡾ ࢾࡱࡾࡼ ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  
PG PF PG PF PG PF 
1 87.68 93.97 89.02 88.62 88.88 90.70 
2 87.25 94.14 89.05 88.44 88.33 90.86 
3 87.48 93.68 88.47 88.72 88.38 90.00 
4 87.32 93.79 88.43 88.58 88.56 89.64 
5 87.06 93.97 88.38 88.62 88.40 89.18 
6 87.18 93.84 88.86 88.01 88.69 88.31 
7 87.12 93.77 88.80 88.07 88.21 88.57 
8 89.47 86.46 88.69 88.10 88.43 88.31 
9 89.08 86.33 88.95 87.97 88.02 88.72 
10 89.22 86.01 89.02 87.38 88.52 88.13 
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The performance of Euclidean distance only was quite similar to the ERP distance. 
This can be explained by looking at the data of the RPS used for the analysis. As 
mentioned before, uniform scaling was performed on the data in order to be able to 
use Euclidean distance. Non-scaled data and data after uniform rescaling are plotted 
in Figure 2.45. 
 
Figure 2.45. Non-scaled (on the left hand side) and uniformly scaled (on the right 
hand side) data 
One can observe that peaks and valleys in the time series even before the rescaling 
were matched almost perfectly. Furthermore, after the uniform rescaling was applied, 
these peaks and valleys were even better aligned. Thus in such case the Euclidean 
distance gives the desired alignment of two time series and performs similarly to 
elastic metrics. However, if these peaks and valleys would not match, poor results 
might be achieved using Euclidean distance. 
The classification accuracies with relabelled data are worse than the ones obtained 
using data labelled by alarm dates (Table 2.10). However, it is not feasible to 
compare these accuracies for several reasons. The first reason is that the training 
and testing datasets differed in sizes for both cases. 434 good movements were 
used in the training dataset when the data was labelled on alarm dates, while 385 
good movements were used for the relabelled data. Furthermore the testing of the 
OCSVM model was made with 108 good movements and 47 faulty movements, 
when data was labelled on alarm dates, while 96 good movements and 107 faulty 
movements were identified in the relabelled testing dataset. 
Moreover, when the data was labelled using alarm dates, only the movements that 
were very different from normal ones were labelled as faulty as shown in section 
2.5.3.3.1. While for the relabelled data, movements that had signs of deteriorating 
behaviour before an alarm was raised were labelled as faulty. This way the OCSVM 
models using relabelled data has to deal not only with a smaller dataset in the 
training phase, but also has a more challenging dataset for testing phase. Thus, the 
comparison of classification rates achieved with data labelling using alarm dates and 
with relabelled data is very misleading and thus should not be made. However, the 
relabelled data is considered to be a better representation of actual condition of the 
railway point system, thus the results with the relabelled data is of more interest. 
The classification rates obtained on relabelled data are quite promising and a closer 
look on how the pre-processing techniques affected the results is given next. 
Influence of exponential smoothing 
The influence of exponential smoothing on the performance of the ERP distance was 
analysed, since the alignment given by the Euclidean distance does not change in 
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either case. Note that estimates of derivatives of current values rather than actual 
values are used with exponential smoothing. Only non-downsampled data was tested 
to avoid mixing the influence of downsampling and smoothing factors. Only the 
models with the best classification accuracies were selected as described in section 
2.4.5.3. The results are summarised in Table 2.26฀.฀ ฀A฀ ฀‘฀+฀’฀ ฀s฀i฀g฀n฀ ฀m฀e฀a฀n฀s฀ ฀t฀h฀a฀t฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ 
classification accuracy obtained with the tested smoothing factor was better than that 
with ߙ ൌ  ?฀.฀ ฀O฀n฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀c฀o฀n฀t฀r฀a฀r฀y฀,฀ ฀‘-฀’ s i฀g฀n  m e฀a฀n฀s฀ ฀t฀h฀a฀t฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀a฀c฀c฀u฀r฀a฀c฀y฀ ฀w฀a฀s฀ ฀w฀o฀r฀s฀e฀. 
Table 2.26. Results of best models with different smoothing parameter values 
Similarity 
measure 
ࢻ ൌ ૙Ǥ ૛ 
vs ࢻ ൌ ૚ ࢻ ൌ ૙Ǥ ૜ vs ࢻ ൌ ૚ ࢻ ൌ ૙Ǥ ૝ vs ࢻ ൌ ૚ ࢻ ൌ ૙Ǥ ૞ vs ࢻ ൌ ૚ 
PG PF PG PF PG PF PG PF ࢾࡱࡾࡼ +7.65 -1.98 +2.71 +0.38 +2.66 -1.72 +2.68 -3.94 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  +5.65 +9.33 +5.19 +8.29 +5.21 +6.27 +0.71 +7.06 
In most of the cases, the classification accuracies were better, when exponential 
smoothing was applied, as can be seen from Table 2.26. The most drops in the 
accuracies were for the ERP distance obtained using non-scaled data. However, in 
all of the cases the decrease in accuracy of faulty movement classification was 
accompanied by a rise in the accuracy of classification of good movements. The 
results confirm that the smoothing of time series should be performed before the 
estimates of the derivatives are calculated, since better alignments of two time series 
is achieved, as it was shown in section 2.4.3.3. 
Influence of downsampling 
The influence of downsampling factor on the proposed approach performance was 
tested for all of the similarity measures. This time no smoothing was performed to get 
a better view of influence of downsampling factor used separately. The results are 
presented in Table 2.27. 
Table 2.27. Influence of downsampling factor 
 Aligned 
by 
݇ ൌ  ? 
vs ݇ ൌ  ? ݇ ൌ  ? vs ݇ ൌ  ? ݇ ൌ  ? vs ݇ ൌ  ? ݇ ൌ  ? vs ݇ ൌ  ? ݇ ൌ  ? vs ݇ ൌ  ? 
PG PF PG PF PG PF PG PF PG PF ࢾࡱࡾ AV +0.09 +0.94 +0.06 -9.56 -0.47 +1.55 +2.26 +0.78 -0.34 +0.67 EOD +0.6 +14.54 +5.54 +15.41 +5.24 +17.36 +5.51 +20.73 +5.71 +15.8 ࢾࡱࡾࡼ AV +0.09 -0.04 -0.2 -0.89 -0.18 -0.44 -0.38 -2.78 -0.29 -0.48 EOD +2.15 -0.16 +7.36 -1.17 +2.21 -1.86 +3.28 -3.75 +2.24 -4.29 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  AV 0 -0.41 +0.05 -0.37 +0.08 -1.33 +0.11 +1.99 -0.08 -3.94 EOD +4.42 +6.1 +5.03 +7.74 +5.35 +8.06 +5.99 +10.66 +5.47 +7.49 
In some cases, the drops in accuracy were quite significant (-9.56%, -4.29%, -3.94%), 
but in most cases they were of only 1% order. Moreover, for the ERP distance using 
rescaled data, when data was aligned by estimates of the derivatives, the 
classification accuracies tended to be better for a bigger downsampling factor. The 
speed gain of the downsampling of data is quite significant, as it will be shown in 
section 2.5.5. Some accuracy loss is expected, however in some cases the accuracy 
has even increased after downsampling, since the downsampling can also help to 
reduce the noise in the time series. 
Influence of estimates of the derivatives 
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The performance of OCSVM when estimates of the derivatives were used was tested 
against the use of normed absolute values. As previously, the results are presented 
฀u฀s฀i฀n฀g฀ ฀‘฀+฀’฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀‘-฀’฀ ฀s฀i฀g฀n฀s฀.฀ Since the performance using estimates of the derivatives is 
expected to be better when data is smoothed, different smoothing factors are tested 
as well. The results are presented in Table 2.28. 
Table 2.28. Change in classification accuracy when the alignment was based on the 
estimates of the derivatives instead of absolute values 
 ߜாோ௉ ߜாோ௉ோ  ߙ PG PF PG PF 
0.2 -0.02 -1.06 +0.88 -6.85 
0.3 -4.93 +0.5 +0.82 -7.33 
0.4 -4.92 -1.96 +1.38 -10.05 
0.5 -4.89 -4.42 -2.73 -10.08 
1 -7.51 -1.05 -1.9 -8.1 
One can observe that classification rates were worse in almost all of the cases when 
the estimates of the derivatives were used. The interesting fact to notice is that for 
smoothed data, the difference between using estimates of the derivatives and 
normed absolute values tend to be smaller. It just confirms the fact that smoothing of 
the time series is vital for calculating estimates of the derivatives. However, it is 
unexpected that the use of estimates of the derivatives produced worse results, given 
how the alignment of two time series improves as it was shown in section 2.4.3.5. 
Moreover, a better performance of elastic similarity measures on estimates of the 
derivatives was proved in (Keogh and Pazzani, 2001). In the next section, an 
analysis of the best performing classifier, when 5-fold cross-validation was performed 
on relabelled data, is presented. 
Analysis of the best classifier 
In this section, the best performing classifier, when the 5-fold cross-validation 
technique was used to test and train the model, is analysed in more detail. The best 
classification accuracy was achieved when using the ERP distance combined with 
the Euclidean distance on time series of absolute values of current measurements 
which were down-sampled with ݇ ൌ  ? and smoothing factor ߙ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?. The classifier 
reached PG=89.02% and PF=88.62 classification accuracy on average. As mentioned 
before, if the 5-fold cross-validation is performed only once, the estimate of the 
accuracy is a random number and it might differ from this classification accuracy, 
which was obtained after 100 runs. For the visualisation purposes, one execution of 
the 5-fold cross-validation is presented. The OCSVM parameters were ߛ ൌ  ? ? and ߥ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?. The decision values of the OCSVM method are plotted in Figure 2.46. The 
colours representing the decision values of OCSVM were chosen as follows: 
x The decision values for the movements that were used to train the OCSVM 
and were identified as good movements are plotted as blue dots. 
x The decision values for the movements that were used to train the OCSVM 
and were identified as abnormal movements are plotted as red dots. 
x The movements that were correctly classified in the testing phase are plotted 
as green dots. 
x The movements that were labelled as faulty, but were classified as good, are 
plotted as red ฀‘x฀’ marks. 
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x The movements that were labelled as good, but were classified as faulty, are 
plotted as black ฀‘฀+฀’ marks. 
The red line in Figure 2.46 is the boundary between two classes, that is, if the 
decision function of OCSVM had a positive value, the movement was classified as 
good and if the decision value was negative, the movement was classified as faulty. 
The majority of training data was classified as belonging to the good class. 
 
Figure 2.46. Decision values of the OCSVM with 5-fold cross-validation 
The summary of classification results is given in Table 2.29, also known as a 
confusion matrix. The confusion matrix is one of the standard ways of visualising the 
performance of the classifier. The main idea of the confusion matrix is to show how 
many movements in different classes were classified correctly and how many 
movements were misclassified as belonging to another class. 
Table 2.29. Confusion matrix 
 Classified 
 Good Abnormal 
Ac
tu
al
 Good 89 7 
Abnormal 11 96 
From the confusion matrix in Table 2.29 it can be observed that there were 7 
movements which were labelled as good but classified as abnormal. Moreover, there 
were 11 movements which were labelled as abnormal but classified as good. A 
closer look at some of the misclassified movements is given next. An example of 
movement which was labelled as good but classified as abnormal is given in Figure 
2.47. 
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Figure 2.47.An example of a movement labelled as good, but classified as abnormal 
The movement, which was misclassified as abnormal (blue line), seems to be above 
all other movements (green lines), labelled as good and correctly classified, in the 
interval from 1 to approximately 1.5 seconds, as can be seen in Figure 2.47. Thus, it 
might be that this movement should have been labelled initially as abnormal, but it is 
also likely that the OCSVM model produced a false alarm for a good movement. Two 
examples of movements which were labelled as abnormal but classified as good are 
given in Figure 2.48 and Figure 2.49. 
 
Figure 2.48. First example of misclassified abnormal movement 
 
Figure 2.49. Second example of misclassified abnormal movement 
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In both Figure 2.48 and Figure 2.49, it can be observed that the movement, which 
was misclassified is in-between the movements classified as good and as abnormal. 
This might indicate that the movement, which was misclassified, has current values 
closer to the ones of good movements and only further increase of the current values 
was classified by the model as abnormal. If such small changes in the profile of 
current would be classified as abnormal, a lot of false alarms would be raised by the 
model. 
The results demonstrate that the performance of the classifier highly depends on the 
correct labelling of movements with similar current waveforms. If two very similar 
movements are labelled differently and if there is no other information which would 
help to separate them then the classifier would classify them as belonging to the 
same class. 
The performance of this model is next compared with the alarm threshold technique, 
by considering one example from the testing dataset when the alarms lead to an 
actual failure of PM9A recorded as crushed cable. In the failure database, the 
engineers, responsible for the visual analysis of the trends of current measurements, 
left a note that trends had an increase of current. The movement that raised average 
current and running duration alarms in the system is plotted in Figure 2.50. 
 
Figure 2.50. Alarm was raised for breaching average current and running duration 
thresholds 
However, if an increase of current is considered, then it can be seen that there were 
couple of movements, that already had the same increase in current, however only 
the motor of POE did not time out and thus an alarm was not raised. With the 
proposed approach, this increase in current is detected, before the motor of POE 
times out, as shown in Figure 2.51. 
 
Figure 2.51. Movement classification with the proposed methodology 
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Thus, changes to the profile of measurements of current can be detected better with 
the proposed methodology than with the alarm threshold technique. However, it 
cannot be concluded that the proposed approach is better at fault detection, since 
changes in the current might not always indicate a fault. Thus more testing using 
data without the discrepancies in the labelling needs to be performed. 
2.5.4.1.2 Proportional training and testing technique 
In order to compare the results of the 5-fold cross-validation technique and the 
proportional training technique, only the case when 80% of the good movements are 
used for the training is considered next. The numbers of good and faulty movements 
used for the training and testing of OCSVM using relabelled data are given in Table 
2.30. 
Table 2.30. Distribution of good and faulty movements in training and testing 
datasets when data was relabelled 
PM ID Training Testing ࡺࡳ ࡺࡲ ࡺࡳ ࡺࡲ 
PM9A 385 - 97 107 
The results of classification achieved with the Euclidean distance are given first in 
Table 2.31. 33 out of 60 models achieved a better than average classification 
accuracy, 23 models achieved the average classification accuracy and only 4 models 
had the unacceptable classification accuracy. The results are significantly better than 
the ones obtained with 5-fold cross-validation, where 25 models had the 
unacceptable classification accuracy. 
Table 2.31. Classification rates using Euclidean distance on rescaled data for PM9A 
(80% training and 20% testing, relabelled data) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 23 10 0 1 
3F<90 5 16 2 0 
PF<85 0 1 2 0 
The results for the ERP distance are given in Table 2.32. 17 out of 60 models 
achieved a better than average classification accuracy for ERP using non-scaled 
data, as can be seen from Table 2.32. For the rescaled data, the number of such 
models was a bit higher, 22 out of 60. The average classification accuracy was 
achieved by 12 models using non-scaled data, while 7 models had such accuracy 
when using rescaled data. However, more than half of the models had an 
unacceptable classification accuracy (31 for both non-scaled and rescaled data). 
Table 2.32. Classification rates using ERP (on non-scaled and rescaled data) for 
PM9A (80% training and 20% testing, relabelled data) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 5 12 0 1 3F<95 10 12 0 3 
3F<90 4 6 2 0 3F<90 2 5 0 5 
PF<85 2 11 10 7 PF<85 9 3 5 6 
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Thus, the classification accuracies seem to be better than the ones obtained with 5-
fold cross-validation. Such a result was not expected. With 5-fold cross-validation 
movements for the training dataset were chosen randomly from the whole 1 year 
period and thus the dataset should have had a greater variability of good movement 
current trends. 
10 of the best performing models for each similarity measure tested in this part of the 
analysis are presented next in Table 2.33. For all the similarity measures, the 10 best 
models presented in Table 2.33 had classification accuracies better than 90% 
(PG>90% and PF>90%). The best performing model with the ERP distance using 
non-scaled data managed to achieve PG = 97.94% and PF = 94.39%. 
Table 2.33. Classification rates of 10 best models for each similarity measure for 
PM9A (80% training and 20% testing, relabelled data) 
# ࢾࡱࡾ ࢾࡱࡾࡼ ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  
PG PF PG PF PG PF 
1 95.88 94.39 97.94 94.39 95.88 94.39 
2 95.88 94.39 94.85 94.39 96.91 93.46 
3 95.88 94.39 98.97 92.52 96.91 93.46 
4 95.88 94.39 93.81 92.52 95.88 93.46 
5 95.88 94.39 92.78 92.52 94.85 93.46 
6 95.88 94.39 93.81 91.59 94.85 93.46 
7 95.88 94.39 92.78 91.59 96.91 92.52 
8 95.88 94.39 97.94 90.65 95.88 92.52 
9 95.88 94.39 96.91 90.65 94.85 92.52 
10 95.88 94.39 95.88 90.65 93.81 92.52 
The results obtained when 80% of first good movements were used for training were 
slightly better than the ones obtained with 5-fold cross-validation. However, this time 
the Euclidean distance performed similarly to the ERP distance. Given the labelling 
of the data in this case was adopted to label abnormal looking movements as faulty 
such results are very promising. Such labelling allows detecting abnormal changes in 
the current shape and increase in the current values. 
Effects of the pre-processing techniques on the performance of OCSVM are 
considered next. 
Influence of exponential smoothing 
As in the previous section, the influence of exponential smoothing is determined the 
ERP distance. The results are summarised in Table 2.34฀.฀ ฀A฀ ฀‘฀+฀’฀ ฀s฀i฀g฀n฀ ฀m฀e฀a฀n฀s฀ ฀t฀h฀a฀t฀ a 
tested smoothing factor outperformed smoothing factor ߙ ൌ  ? (no smoothing), in 
terms of ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀c฀l฀a฀s฀s฀i฀f฀i฀c฀a฀t฀i฀o฀n฀ ฀a฀c฀c฀u฀r฀a฀c฀y฀.฀ ฀O฀n฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀c฀o฀n฀t฀r฀a฀r฀y฀,฀ ฀‘- ’฀ ฀s฀i฀g฀n฀ ฀m฀e฀a n s  ฀t฀h a t฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ t sted 
smoothing factor underperformed. 
Table 2.34. Results of best models with different smoothing parameter values 
Similarity 
measure 
ߙ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? 
vs ߙ ൌ  ? ߙ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? vs ߙ ൌ  ? ߙ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? vs ߙ ൌ  ? ߙ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? vs ߙ ൌ  ? 
PG PF PG PF PG PF PG PF ࢾࡱࡾࡼ +11.34 +3.74 +9.28 +1.87 +9.28 +0.93 +12.37 -4.67 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  +6.19 +11.21 +10.31 +7.48 +7.22 +7.48 +6.19 +5.61 
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Only in one case, the classification accuracy of faulty movements was worse, when 
smoothing was applied, as can be seen from Table 2.34. In all other cases, the 
classification accuracies after smoothing was performed increased or remained the 
same. 
Influence of downsampling 
The differences of classification accuracies for different downsampling factors are 
summarised in Table 2.35. 
Table 2.35. Influence of downsampling factor 
 Aligned 
by 
݇ ൌ  ? 
vs ݇ ൌ  ? ݇ ൌ  ? vs ݇ ൌ  ? ݇ ൌ  ? vs ݇ ൌ  ? ݇ ൌ  ? vs ݇ ൌ  ? ݇ ൌ  ? vs ݇ ൌ  ? 
PG PF PG PF PG PF PG PF PG PF ࢾࡱࡾ AV -1.03 0 -1.03 0 -1.03 -3.74 0 +3.74 -3.09 -4.67 EOD +22.68 -7.48 +24.74 -5.61 +22.68 -5.61 +20.62 -3.74 +21.65 -5.61 ࢾࡱࡾࡼ AV -3.09 -1.87 -12.37 -1.87 -12.37 -1.87 -13.4 -6.54 -14.43 +0.93 EOD +12.37 0 +13.4 -0.93 +4.12 -4.67 +12.37 -3.74 +9.28 -8.41 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  AV +2.06 -7.48 0 0 +2.06 -5.61 0 -13.08 +5.15 -7.48 EOD +4.12 +4.67 +4.12 +9.35 +10.31 +4.67 +9.28 +12.15 +6.19 +6.54 
As in the 5-fold cross-validation case, the downsampling of the data usually resulted 
in a decrease of the classification accuracy as can be observed from Table 2.35. 
However, for ERP distance using rescaled data, the classification accuracies were 
better, when estimates of the derivatives were used for the alignment of time series. 
The findings suggest that the downsampling of the data can potentially be performed, 
if analysis of fault detection has to be performed fast and some loss in accuracy is 
acceptable. 
Influence of estimates of the derivatives 
Comparison of the performance results of models when alignments of time series 
were performed using estimates of the derivatives instead of normed absolute values 
is given in Table 2.36. As in the 5-fold cross-validation case, the models with the 
alignment on the estimates of the derivatives performed significantly worse, when 
data was not smoothed. When data was smoothed with ߙ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?, a worse 
classification of good movements was compensated by a better classification of 
faulty movements. Moreover, for the ERP distance, the classification accuracies 
increased when trends of currents were aligned by the estimates of derivatives rather 
than normed absolute values. 
Table 2.36. Change in classification accuracy when the alignment was based on the 
estimates of the derivatives instead of absolute values 
 ߜாோ௉ ߜாோ௉ோ  ߙ PG PF PG PF 
0.2 +1.03 +14.02 +4.12 +14.95 
0.3 -4.12 +12.15 -1.03 +13.08 
0.4 +1.03 +9.35 +13.4 +8.41 
0.5 +4.12 +3.74 +13.4 -2.8 
1 -14.43 +8.41 +7.22 -10.28 
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Analysis of the best classifier 
In this section the best performed classifier, when proportional training technique was 
used to test and train the model, will be analysed in more detail. The best 
classification accuracy was reached with the ERP distance combined with the 
Euclidean distance, when data rescaling was performed. The best accuracy was 
achieved when two time series were aligned by the estimates of the derivatives, the 
data was down-sampled with ݇ ൌ  ? and and smoothing factor ߙ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?. The classifier 
then reached PG=97.94% and PF=94.39 classification accuracies. The OCSVM 
parameters were ߛ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? and ߥ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?. The decision values provided by the OCSVM 
method are plotted in Figure 2.52, using the same colours as those in Figure 2.46, to 
represent the decision values of different movements. 
 
Figure 2.52. Decision values of the OCSVM with proportional training (80% training 
20% testing) 
What can be seen from Figure 2.52 is that a lot of movements that were used in the 
training phase were actually considered as outliers by the model (plotted in red dots 
in Figure 2.52), i.e. most of the good movements used for training were treated as 
abnormal. This can be confirmed by testing the OCSVM model with the data that was 
used in the training dataset. From 385 good movements in the training dataset this 
trained model classifies 83 movements as abnormal, that is the accuracy of 
classification of good movements in the training dataset is only 78.44%. Nevertheless, 
the accuracies achieved are better than with the ones achieved with the 5-fold cross-
validation approach. However, if more testing with new data was done it is likely that 
a lot of false alarms would be raised, since even the data which was used for training 
this model was not classified correctly. Thus, the usage of the proportional training 
and testing technique might give misleading results and the final model obtained 
should be analysed in more detail to see whether it is actually valid. 
In the next section, the results when the time series similarity measures are used as 
feature inputs to the OCSVM are presented. 
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2.5.4.2 Results with time series similarity measure as a feature input to 
OCSVM 
As described in sections 2.3.7 and 2.3.8, time series similarity measures can also be 
used as feature extraction tools. For this purpose a similarity measure is evaluated 
for each movement comparing it with several previous movements and then used as 
inputs to OCSVM with the standard Euclidean distance as the kernel distance 
function. Due to the deficiencies that were observed in the data labelling, this 
approach was tested only using the relabelled data. The similarity of each movement 
with previous 1, 2, 5 and 10 movements was tested in this study. For the sake of 
brevity, the results of the best performing models when comparing 5 previous 
movements are presented. The remaining results are given in Appendix D. The 5-fold 
cross-validation technique was used, since with the proportional training technique 
the best results were achieved when a lot of good movements from the training 
dataset were considered as abnormal, as discussed in the previous section. DTW 
and DTW combined with Euclidean distance were also used for this analysis, since in 
this case there is no requirement for a similarity measure to be a norm, as it is not 
used as a kernel distance function. The notation of the new similarity measures 
followed the same principles as those used earlier. 
The results, obtained with all the similarity measures are summarised in one table, 
since all of the models for all of the similarity measures achieved the unacceptable 
classification accuracy, as shown in Table 2.37. 
Table 2.37. Classification rates using all similarity measures for PM9A (5-fold cross 
validation, relabelled data) 
 PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 
As in the previous cases, classification accuracies of the 10 best models for each 
similarity measure are presented next in Table 2.38 and Table 2.39. 
Table 2.38. Classification rates of 10 best models for each similarity measure for 
PM9A (5-fold cross validation, relabelled data) 
# ࢾࡱࡾ ࢾࡱࡾࡼ ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  ࢾࡱࡱ ࢾࡱࡱࡾ  
PG PF PG PF PG PF PG PF PG PF 
1 71.27 71.43 79.59 56.43 66.68 72.26 79.28 63.31 70.39 77.81 
2 71.48 71.07 78.33 56.61 66.49 72.38 79.40 62.54 70.98 76.59 
3 71.07 71.34 78.66 55.79 66.12 72.54 79.31 62.37 70.71 76.86 
4 71.88 70.94 78.45 55.83 66.08 72.25 79.36 62.23 70.27 77.26 
5 72.08 70.55 78.55 55.41 66.21 72.07 79.41 61.95 70.81 76.59 
6 70.70 71.79 78.48 55.44 66.87 71.25 79.45 61.15 70.26 76.83 
7 70.74 71.69 79.87 54.19 66.38 71.00 79.04 61.10 70.68 76.17 
8 70.24 71.96 79.49 53.69 65.44 72.77 79.51 60.73 69.13 79.41 
9 70.32 71.70 79.31 53.72 65.68 72.25 79.58 60.53 69.38 78.65 
10 70.48 71.38 79.53 53.29 65.03 69.85 79.53 59.92 69.43 78.53 
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Table 2.39. Classification rates of 10 best models for each similarity measure for 
PM9A (5-fold cross validation, relabelled data) (continued) 
# ࢾࡰࢀࢃ ࢾࡰࢀࢃࡾ  ࢾࡰࡱ ࢾࡰࡱࡾ  
PG PF PG PF PG PF PG PF 
1 79.25 53.26 79.48 60.99 79.46 63.05 78.68 68.33 
2 79.58 52.71 79.46 60.50 79.39 62.63 78.82 67.11 
3 79.71 52.18 79.42 59.66 79.67 62.20 78.84 64.47 
4 78.88 51.90 79.56 58.73 79.19 62.41 78.57 64.44 
5 78.75 51.83 77.36 57.95 79.47 60.74 77.42 64.90 
6 79.86 50.42 76.38 57.97 79.58 60.39 78.88 63.06 
7 79.68 50.49 76.24 57.29 79.48 60.15 78.85 63.07 
8 79.76 50.40 73.62 57.63 79.54 59.66 77.43 63.43 
9 79.36 50.75 79.43 56.11 79.43 59.61 77.30 63.32 
10 79.41 50.53 77.31 56.98 79.33 59.67 77.13 63.30 
None of the models was able to achieve better than 80% classification accuracy. A 
similar situation was observed when 1, 2 and 10 previous movements were used for 
the analysis, with the results presented in Appendix D. A number of reasons might 
have caused such poor classification accuracies. 
First of all, when only two consecutive movements are compared and the first 
abnormal movement after a good movement is detected, but the next movement 
after the first abnormal movement is also abnormal, then this second abnormal 
movement would be considered as a good movement, since it is very similar to one 
previous movement. A similar situation would be observed for 3 consecutive 
movements. A different situation is observed when more consecutive movements are 
used for similarity matching. For example, when 10 earlier movements are compared 
with the one in question and 8 or 9 previous movements are very similar but only one 
movement is different from normal, this difference might be averaged out with other 8 
or 9 previous movements and the abnormal movement left out unnoticed. 
Thus, in this case it is necessary to use some additional information about previous 
movements. Such additional information could be information about whether the new 
movement has higher absolute values in most of the movement than the movement 
before or whether the previous movement already differed from normal behaviour etc. 
However, due to the discrepancies already present in the data labelling, further 
testing of this approach was left out of this study scope. In the next section, the 
computational times of calculating similarity measures, training and testing 
procedures are overviewed. 
2.5.5 Results of computational time 
Computational times of similarity measures and training and testing procedures are 
presented in the next subsections. The results are presented for point system PM9A, 
the one that was used to represent the results of OCSVM performance analysis. 
2.5.5.1 Computational time of similarity measures 
The results of computational time for the ERP distance (all of the elastic metrics 
require similar operational time, thus only one similarity measure was chosen) on 
non-scaled and rescaled data are given in Table 2.40. 
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Table 2.40. Computational times of similarity measures 
k ࢾࡱࡾࡼ ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  
Average 
Time, s 
Standard 
deviation 
Average 
Time, s 
Standard 
deviation 
1 725.72 4.67 634.70 2.70 
2 183.85 1.80 163.92 2.25 
3 83.11 0.20 74.77 0.33 
4 47.85 0.18 43.44 0.21 
5 31.23 0.11 27.93 0.31 
6 22.44 0.14 20.60 0.14 
With no downsampling, the pairwise similarity measure of 589 movements takes 
about 726 seconds to complete on non-scaled data and 635 seconds on rescaled 
data. According to equation 2.35, calculation of 173166 similarity measures had to be 
performed, meaning that calculation of two time series similarity measure took 
around 0.0042 seconds, when data was non downsampled and non-scaled. For the 
non-scaled downsampled data, when ݇ ൌ  ?, all the calculations were finished in 
22.44 seconds, meaning that calculation of two time series similarity measure took 
around 0.00013 seconds to complete, that is more than 32 times faster than for non 
downsampled data. A similar situation was observed for rescaled data. Even 
downsampling the data with ݇ ൌ  ? speeds up the algorithm roughly 4 times, thus the 
downsampling of the data should be considered if the algorithm is to be used as an 
online fault detection algorithm and a slight loss in model classification accuracy is 
acceptable. 
2.5.5.2 Computational time of training and testing procedures 
The 5-fold cross-validation technique was the most computationally exhaustive part 
of this study. Since the similarity measures were pre-calculated, as explained 
previously, the training and testing part of the OCSVM took less time to complete. 
However, since the simulations were run for 100 repetitive times to get better 
estimate of the OCSVM parameters, the training and testing procedures, when a grid 
of 35 different combinations of the OCSVM parameter values (7 values of parameter ߛ and 5 values of parameter ߥ) was chosen, took roughly two minutes to complete. 
That is, 3500 different OCSVM models were trained and tested in 120 seconds, 
including the data input and output to the model procedures. Thus, one OCSVM 
model took about 0.034 seconds to be trained and tested. 
2.5.6 Summary of the experiments 
2.5.6.1 Discrepancies in data labelling 
Results that were achieved with two types of automatic labelling procedures were 
very different. For most of the point systems the classification rates were over 90%, 
when the labelling of movements was done using alarm dates. In comparison, 
classification rates of only around 60% were achieved, when the labelling was done 
using failure dates. This difference in results suggested that in some instances 
movements that were very similar were labelled differently, when the labelling was 
done according to failure dates. A detailed analysis of data labelling results with both 
labelling techniques was performed. 
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It was found that only significant changes in the value of current raised an alarm and 
thus, when the data was labelled according to alarm dates, only the movements 
which were very different from the normal behaviour, i.e. usually the duration of POE 
operation was significantly longer, were labelled as faulty. Thus it was concluded that 
data labelling using alarm dates should not be performed, since it does not allow 
identifying more subtle changes in the profile of current trends, necessary for 
incipient fault detection. 
From a closer look at failure dates, it was found that a lot of movements that 
represented the already rectified state of the railway point system (therefore, they 
were similar to the good state) using an automatic labelling approach were still 
labelled as faulty. Moreover, the failure dates recorded in the database were usually 
later than the actual failure date, i.e. the failure date was recorded after the engineers 
found the failure cause, but the movements that were performed prior to the recorded 
date were already similar to the faulty state. Such discrepancies in the labelling 
technique using failure dates resulted in poor classification rates and none of the 
combinations of pre-processing options or different similarity measures used in the 
analysis helped to achieve better results. 
Due to the discrepancies found in both labelling options, the automatic labelling of 
the data could not be used. In the further study, the movements of one point system 
were therefore labelled manually, by considering movements that looked abnormal 
and that looked fault-free. After the manual editing of the discrepancies of the 
labelling it was shown that the OCSVM model can perform well, as shown in section 
2.5.4 and published in (Vileiniskis et al., 2013, Vileiniskis et al., 2015). Ideally, 
specific RPS engineering knowledge is needed for such data cleansing process, and 
it would be impractical to relabel a large number of movements. 
2.5.6.2 Training and testing procedures 
Two different training and testing techniques were used to evaluate the performance 
of the OCSVM classifiers. The 5-fold cross-validation showed that the results 
obtained with this technique are more reliable than the ones obtained with the 
proportional training. It was shown that the best classifier obtained with the 
proportional training method achieved good classification accuracies by allowing big 
misclassification rates of the training dataset: a lot of movements representing the 
fault-free condition of RPS were classified as faulty in the training dataset. Such an 
approach would lead to a situation when newly recorded good movements would be 
classified as abnormal if they were similar to the ones used in the training phase. 
Thus the proportional training and testing technique should not be used to obtain the 
OCSVM model. However, in order to obtain the OCSVM models with the 5-fold 
cross-validation method more computational time is required, since the validation 
needs to be performed repetitively, as discussed in section 2.4.5.1. 
If only a single iteration of 5-fold cross-validation is performed to reduce the time, the 
results might be biased, since the estimates of the classification accuracy depend on 
the random division of data. 
2.5.6.3 Pre-processing techniques 
The influence of different pre-processing techniques on classification accuracy has 
been considered. The use of estimates of the derivatives, in addition to absolute 
values, for the alignment of data time series did not increase the classification 
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accuracies in most of the cases, despite the evidence provided in section 2.4.3.5, 
when it overcomes some weaknesses of the alignment using only absolute values of 
current measurements. 
The classification accuracy usually dropped after downsampling of the data. However, 
the drop in the accuracy was only around 1% and, as it was shown in section 2.5.5.1, 
the downsampling can decrease the computational time significantly. If such loss of 
accuracy is acceptable, the data could be downsampled when the method is applied 
in practice. Moreover, in some cases the downsampling of data even increased the 
classification accuracy. Thus the down-sampling might be a good step of the analysis 
to implement if this approach was to be considered for the online fault detection. 
The smoothing parameter had some influence on OCSVM performance, when two 
time series were aligned by the estimates of the derivatives. Almost in all cases, the 
accuracy of the model increased if the data was smoothed, when the alignment of 
time series was based on the estimates of the derivatives. 
The effect of rescaling the data was not considered, since the rescaling was only 
done as an intermediate step to compare the Euclidean distance and elastic similarity 
measures on identical data. 
2.5.6.4 Different ways of using similarity measures 
Two approaches of using time series similarity measures were tested in this study. 
The first approach was to use a similarity measure as a kernel distance function. The 
second approach was to calculate the similarity measures with several previous 
movements and then use them as a feature input to OCSVM. Initially, the latter 
approach was considered to be more useful, since by comparing consecutive 
movements the model could update the knowledge on the changing behaviour of 
good movements and in this way seasonal effects could be included in the model. 
Different numbers of consecutive movements for comparison were considered for the 
analysis and the comparison of one movement with 5 previous movements proved to 
be the best from the ones tested. However, using this approach to classify the 
movement did not provide good classification accuracy. To improve the accuracy of 
this approach, some sort of weighting of the previous movements could be 
considered or some additional information used in the model, such as the 
increase/decrease of values of the measurements of current for every movement, the 
information about the class of the previous movement etc. 
2.6 Conclusions 
2.6.1 Introduction 
Failures of the railway point systems cause a lot of delays on the UK railway network. 
Moreover, inappropriate or delayed maintenance of RPS might lead to safety issues 
and hazardous situations if the poor condition of RPS is not timely detected. A lot of 
research has been focussed on finding a technique to timely detect the deteriorating 
condition of RPS. The most common drawback among the proposed methods is the 
inability to take account of features of in-field RPS data. Weather conditions, usage 
frequency and forces acting when trains pass the RPS are usually not considered 
when the data is obtained from the laboratory RPS. The features of in-field RPS data 
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were overviewed in section 2.1.6 of this thesis. These features were the major factor 
for choosing an appropriate method for fault detection of RPS used in this study. 
In this thesis, several novel aspects were proposed for the fault detection of railway 
point systems. These aspects will be overviewed in the following sections. 
2.6.2 OCSVM as a fault detection technique of RPS 
Firstly, the proposed methodology considered fault detection of RPS as a 
classification problem: classify the movements belonging to a fault-free or a failure 
class. A special case of the classification algorithm commonly referred to as a novelty 
or outlier detection algorithm was chosen. The idea of such a method is to detect 
abnormal data from the majority of good data, when the abnormal data is highly 
underrepresented. This type of algorithm can also be referred to as one class 
classification methods. 
The use of the OCSVM model was proposed in this study. The OCSVM is an 
extension of SVM algorithm in the case of unlabelled data. The advantage of these 
models is that they can be trained only on the data of one class. This is very 
important when there are big differences in the amount of data available for several 
classes. In this way, a proportion of data from the good class can be used to train the 
model and all the data from the abnormal class and the remaining data from the good 
class can be used to test the trained model. Such a proposed approach was 
important in this study, since the amount of movements representing a faulty 
condition of the RPS was very small compared to the amount of movements 
representing the fault-free condition. 
In addition, the OCSVM approach allowed to detect the changing behaviour of profile 
of current, before large increases in current would be observed and the standard 
alarm threshold technique would give an alarm. However, the results of the OCSVM 
approach need to be used carefully, since the changing profile of current might not 
always indicate a failure of the system, thus more alarms can be raised than with the 
standard alarm threshold technique. Nevertheless, there might be situations when 
the knowledge about the deteriorating state of the system, i.e. before a failure occurs, 
can be useful in planning maintenance to reduce disruptions for the most convenient 
time of railway operations. Such situations can be detected using the OCSVM model. 
2.6.3 Elastic metrics as similarity measures 
In this study, each operation of RPS was represented by a time series of 
measurements of current over time. The similarity of two time series in the 
classification problems is commonly measured by the Euclidean distance. Due to the 
operating conditions of RPS, the obtained time series varied in length, as was 
discussed in section 2.1.6.3.1. Thus the Euclidean distance could not be used on raw 
data, since this distance cannot be defined for the different length time series. The 
data had to be transformed in some way in order to be able to use the Euclidean 
distance. This was done by uniformly rescaling the data to make it of the equal length. 
The use of similarity measures which are defined for different length time series was 
proposed as an alternative to the Euclidean distance for the comparison of two time 
series of measurements of current. Not only do they overcome the limitation of the 
Euclidean distance to be used on different length time series, but they also allow a 
different type of matching, i.e. finding the most similar areas of the time series and 
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matching them. This elastic matching provides a more realistic alignment of two time 
series, by matching corresponding peaks or valleys of time series, even if they are 
not perfectly aligned in time, when measured. The alignment of the time series using 
elastic metrics is based on absolute values. However, as shown in section 2.4.3.5, 
such alignments might be improper. 
The two time series can be aligned by their shape as proposed by Keogh and 
Pazzani in Derivative Dynamic Time Warping method (Keogh and Pazzani, 2001): 
calculate the estimates of the derivatives in each point of the time series and then 
use the derivatives, instead of absolute values, to match the two time series. But in 
this case, the information about the differences between the absolute values of the 
two time series is lost. An approach of combining the estimates of the derivatives and 
the information of the absolute values, to obtain the similarity of two time series, was 
proposed in this study. This process can be described in several steps: 
x Calculate the estimates of the derivatives for each point in the time series; 
x Match each point of the estimates of the derivatives of the time series using 
the elastic metrics; 
x Use the matching provided by the elastic metrics to calculate the Euclidean 
distance on the original time series; 
x Sum the weighted results obtained from matching with elastic metrics and 
Euclidean distance. 
The best performing model in this study was the one using the Edit distance with real 
penalties. However, the performance of the Euclidean distance was quite similar to 
the proposed elastic metric. The similar results were obtained because the phases of 
the POE movements matched almost perfectly after the uniform rescaling of data 
was done, as shown in Figure 2.45. However, if after the rescaling, the peaks and 
valleys in the data appeared at different time points, then the alignment provided by 
the Euclidean distance would probably be worse. 
The aim of this proposed methodology was to perform all phases of the fault 
detection (including training of the models) with minimal need of heuristics. However, 
the choice of the similarity measure can be made by looking at the data and, in the 
cases as illustrated in Figure 2.45, Euclidean distance could be used in order to 
speed up the fault detection process and still obtain similar results as when using the 
ERP distance. 
2.6.4 Testing the proposed methodology using in-field data 
The final aspect of novelty of this approach was that the proposed methodology was 
developed for and tested on data of infield railway point systems. In the research 
done previously, most of the proposed methodologies were based on the data from 
laboratory RPS. The main difference between in-field and laboratory data is that the 
data obtained from the laboratory point system to represent the fault-free movements 
has very little variance. All movements are performed one after another and thus the 
obtained measurements are almost identical, which is not the case for infield railway 
point systems. Every movement of the infield RPS is performed after a certain time 
interval, for some systems it may be a half of the day, if they are not used frequently, 
for others it might be 2 hours or 2 minutes. Thus, the behaviour of the railway point 
system can change with time and there can be a lot of variability even in the non-
faulty behaviour of the system. 
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In addition, the operation of railway point system might also be influenced by severe 
weather conditions or loads applied to the system which cause variability. When 
relatively small sample sizes of laboratory data are used to validate the performance 
of the proposed approaches, the variability of good and faulty behaviour of the 
system is difficult to replicate. When failures are manually inserted to the system in 
the laboratory their effects are severe and result in a big deviation from the normal 
behaviour, which can be easy to detect. The in-field data shows that some failures 
cause subtle effects to the behaviour of the system, and the proposed method in this 
study aims to detect such effects. 
2.6.5 Impact of labelling deficiencies on the OCSVM performance 
The performance of all classification methods highly depends on the correct labelling 
of the data before it is actually used in the methods. One of the problems, when 
dealing with in-field RPS data, was that there were deficiencies in both automatic 
labelling options performed in this study. The summary of the deficiencies was given 
in section 2.5.3.3. The main problem found was that the labelling, given by the dates 
of alarms and failures in the databases used in this study, labelled similar looking 
time series of movements as belonging to different classes. This deficiency was 
particularly observed using the labelling approach using failure dates. Due to the 
deficiencies found in the data labelling, the OCSVM performance highly differed for 
two labelling options. 
Very high classification rates were achieved, when data was labelled using alarm 
dates, with classification accuracies over 90%. On the contrary, the classification 
rates, when data was labelled using failure dates, were only around 50%. One could 
argue that the classification rates achieved using labelling on alarm dates, are very 
good and thus this labelling option should be considered. However, this labelling 
option does not allow detecting the deteriorating condition of the RPS, since the 
alarms are raised in the system only when abrupt changes in the measurements of 
current are detected as discussed in section 2.2.4.2. Thus the correct labelling of 
data is essential for the proposed approach to be able to perform at its best. Ideally 
some expert knowledge is required to correctly label the available data. 
2.6.6 Practical application of the methodology 
The aim of this research was the development of a practical fault detection tool for 
railway point systems. The majority of the requirements, given in section 2.2.5, for 
the RPS fault detection tool have been achieved. Each requirement will be briefly 
overviewed by stating to what extent it has been achieved and what further research 
is needed. 
Able to identify a deteriorating condition prior to a fault occurrence. This 
requirement was partly fulfilled since it was shown that the changing behaviour of a 
railway point system can be detected using the proposed methodology. However, as 
mentioned before, the changing profile or absolute values of current might not always 
indicate a failure of the system, since it might represent changes occurring due to 
weather or operating conditions. The testing done with the relabelled data showed 
that with the proposed methodology a movement was usually classified as faulty 
earlier than using the alarm threshold technique. However, the testing of the 
proposed approach suffered from a high number of deficiencies in the labelling of the 
data. Thus further testing of the approach can be carried out if data relabelling is 
performed using expert knowledge. 
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Universal in terms of using data from any type of point system. This approach 
can be applied to any type of point system, as long as the current trends of POE 
motor can be obtained. However, the development of the OCSVM model for an 
individual point system would have to be carried out when a new point system is 
considered, since optimal parameters of OCSVM have to be found for each RPS 
considered. 
Able to deal with a lack of historical data of faulty conditions. One of the main 
features of in-field data was a small amount of the failure data available for each RPS. 
The use of OCSVM solved this issue by using only the data of a fault-free state of 
RPS to train the model. All the available failure data was then used to test the model. 
If, however, no historical data of failures was available for the specific RPS, such 
data series would have to be generated in some intelligent way. It would be feasible 
to test the model with the data that was generated using expert knowledge about the 
common types of failures of RPS. In this way, the user of this methodology could test 
whether the OCSVM model can detect the expected changes in the measurements 
of current due to certain failures. However, with such an approach there is a risk of 
inducing changes in the data that are too abrupt or too subtle, thus only an 
experienced engineer could generate such data. Furthermore, without having any 
failure data, the training phase of the OCSVM model cannot be automated. Overall, 
the proposed approach deals with little historical data of faulty conditions, but expert 
knowledge has to be used, when no data of faulty conditions is available. 
Able to detect failure modes that were not present in historical data. Such ability 
of the proposed methodology comes from the OCSVM model, since the idea of this 
model is to separate the outliers from the majority of data. In that way, any failure 
mode that has significant differences from the fault-free state in terms of 
measurements of current would be detected. 
Have a small as possible false alarm ratio. The false alarm ratio (misclassification 
rate of good movements as abnormal) for the best performing OCSVM model on 
relabelled data was similar to the misclassification ratio of abnormal movements as 
good ones. 8 good movements were falsely classified as abnormal, while 100 
movements were correctly classified as abnormal, giving the false alarm ratio as 
7.41%. 7 faulty movements were falsely classified as good movements, while 88 
movements were correctly classified as good, giving the misclassification rate of 
7.37%. However, these results were obtained only for one RPS using relabelled data 
and thus more testing needs to be done to show the efficiency of the proposed 
approach in other cases. 
Have an automated and fast fault detection algorithm, suitable for on-line 
regime. One of the biggest issues of using the proposed approach in practice is the 
need to retrain the model if movements of railway point system without a fault change 
over time, which has been observed in data. Then a good movement potentially 
would raise a false alarm, since it would not be similar to the other good ones, which 
were used to train the OCSVM model. The training process requires a lot of 
computing time to find the best performing OCSVM. Moreover, the need to choose 
the OCSVM parameters prevents from having a fully automated process to identify 
the best performing OCSVM model. The choice of parameter ߥ is easy to define, 
since it controls the allowed error in the training dataset, and thus for this type of 
problem a small value (ߥ ൏  ?Ǥ ?) should be chosen. However, parameter ߛ has to be 
chosen experimentally, for example, using the grid search technique and thus 
requires extensive computational resources and some heuristics to choose a grid of 
possible values. This would become a big issue if the model would need to be 
retrained often, due to the reason described previously. 
124 
 
Moreover, since the changing profile or absolute values of current might not always 
indicate a failure of the system, the ability of OCSVM to detect this changing 
behaviour cannot be considered as an automated fault detection algorithm. The 
process of OCSVM decision about the new movement is automated, however the 
output of OCSVM would probably have to be reviewed to confirm or reject a failure, 
since at this stage of the research there was a lack of trustworthiness of the data 
used in the OCSVM training and testing processes. The proposed approach would 
be suitable for on-line application, since the computational time required when the 
training phase of OCSVM is complete is low. To reduce the time needed for the 
training phase, the downsampling of the data is necessary, since it speeds up the 
calculations significantly, as shown in section 2.5.5. If expert knowledge on the data 
available in this study was gained, further development of the methodology could be 
performed in order to automate the training process. 
Some of the requirements introduced for the new fault detection technique have been 
fulfilled either fully or partially. However, this methodology needs further development 
in order to be applied in practice, such as the selection of a suitable grid for the 
optimisation of OCSVM parameters or inclusion of additional information to the model. 
Moreover, data cleansing is needed, which ideally should be done applying 
engineering expertise. The possible improvements of the methodology, if engineering 
support was available, are suggested in the next section. 
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2.7 Future work 
The research performed in this study leaves several future areas to be explored for a 
better fault detection technique for RPS. One of the options is to extend the use of 
similarity measures as feature extraction techniques by incorporating additional 
information to the measurements of current in the OCSVM model, as listed below. 
Another option could be the division of the measurements of current into phases 
before the analysis in order to provide some diagnostic capabilities, i.e. to identify 
which part of the system has failed. 
Additional information, such as increasing absolute values of the measurements of 
current with every movement or detection of abnormal current shapes in earlier 
movements or weather conditions etc. could be included in the OCSVM model in 
order to improve the accuracy of fault detection when the similarity measures are 
used as feature extraction techniques. The use of similarity measures as feature 
extraction techniques could solve the problem of changing ฀“good฀” behaviour and 
seasonal dependencies in the data. Only several consecutive movements need to be 
compared with such an approach. This way more subtle changes in the data could 
be detected, since the consecutive movements are expected to be similar. Moreover, 
the comparison of only a couple of movements reduces the computational time 
required for the calculation of similarity measures, as discussed in section 2.3.8.  
The time series of measurements of current could be divided into operational phases, 
as shown in Figure 2.2, to provide some diagnostic capabilities. The detection of 
changes in certain phases would narrow down the number of possible causes of 
failure. Comparing operational phases separately would also allow more subtle 
changes in each phase to be detected, since subtle changes in one phase only could 
be left undetected, when the movement is compared as a whole. 
The proposed approach has only been used as a fault detection technique of railway 
point system. However, fault detection on similar systems could also be performed. 
The condition of the system should be represented by measurements of some 
parameters over one operation (e.g. force, current) and the change of shape and 
absolute values of the measured parameters should indicate a deteriorating condition 
of the system. Common examples of such systems might be actuators of doors (e.g. 
automatic train carriage doors, elevator doors) or bridge lifting mechanisms. 
  
126 
 
3 Study on fault detection and diagnostics for three-phase 
separators 
3.1 Three-phase oil, water and gas separators 
The three-phase separator is one of the main components in the oil production plant. 
This unit is responsible for separating gas, water and solid impurities from oil. The 
operation of the three-phase separator is based on the laws of gravity, allowing a 
liquid with a higher density, such as water, to settle on the bottom of the separator, 
and a liquid with a lower density, such as oil, as well as gas, to flow to the top of the 
separator. Different types of separators can be used in industry, the most common 
ones being horizontal, vertical and spherical. A horizontal separator is most 
commonly used due to the ease of maintenance, good separation quality and low 
initial set-up costs. In this study, a horizontal three-phase separator with a weir is 
considered. However, the proposed methodology is generic and with some minor 
adjustments it could be applied to other types of separators. 
In the next sections a commonly used design of the three-phase separator and 
undesirable events commonly observed during the operation of the three-phase 
separator are discussed. 
3.1.1 System description 
A schematic diagram of a typical horizontal three-phase gravity separator with a weir 
can be seen in Figure 3.1. The whole vessel can be roughly divided into three 
sections: 
1. The gravity settling section (or the liquid separation section), where the 
separation of water and oil takes place (the section to the left of the weir). 
2. The separated oil section, where the separated oil is flowing from the liquid 
separation section (the section to the right of the weir). 
3. The remaining space of the vessel is left for the gas phase (separated gas 
section). 
 
Figure 3.1. Horizontal three-phase separator schematic of configuration with weir 
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The process of oil, gas and water separation can be briefly described as follows 
(Arnold and Stewart, 2008): 
1. The first separation occurs when the incoming fluid hits an inlet diverter and 
the heavier oil and water emulsion settles on the bottom of the vessel (the 
gravity settling section). The lighter gas concentrates at the top of the vessel 
(the separated gas section) and leaves the vessel through the gas outlet. 
2. In the gravity settling section the water separates from oil. The more dense 
water goes to the bottom of the vessel, while the oil remains on top of the 
water. The water then leaves the vessel through the outlet at the base of the 
vessel. 
3. The oil that goes over the weir (in the separated oil section) leaves the vessel 
through an oil outlet. 
The main internal components of the horizontal three-phase separator are listed in 
Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1. Internal components of the three-phase separator (Arnold and Stewart, 
2008) 
Component Description 
Inlet diverter An inlet diverter is usually a metal plate or a spherical dish, 
which performs the very first separation of the incoming mixture 
of fluids. The inlet diverter provides a rapid change in the 
velocity and direction of the incoming mixture. This sudden 
change makes the heavier liquids (water and oil) flow below the 
diverter to the bottom of the vessel while the lower density gas 
flows above the diverter towards the top of the vessel. 
Weir A separated oil section of the vessel is created by using a weir. 
The weir physically blocks the passage of a heavier liquid to the 
next section of the vessel. Since the oil floats on top of the water 
(due to lower density), it is the only liquid flowing over the weir to 
the separated oil section, if the water level is kept at a desired 
level below the weir. The level of water (the interface level 
between water and oil) should be controlled so that it would 
never flow over the weir. Otherwise the water would mix with the 
oil, which has already separated. 
For the efficient and safe operation of the three-phase separator, an automatic 
control mechanism has to be set up to control the water and oil interface level in the 
gravity settling section, the separated oil level in the separated oil section and the 
pressure in the vessel. The components used to monitor and control the three-phase 
separator, summarised in Table 3.2, can be grouped based on the process variable 
that they monitor and control. 
The water level is monitored and controlled by components LT1, LC1, CV1 and FT1, 
the oil level is monitored and controlled by components LT2, LC2, CV2 and FT2 and 
the pressure level ฀– by components LT3, LC3, CV3 and FT3. Each group of 
components is known as a closed control loop, which is discussed in more detail in 
Section 3.1.4.2. The common control loop feature can be exploited when developing 
a generic methodology for the fault detection and identification of systems similar to 
that of the three-phase separator, such as oil desalters or produced water treatment 
systems. A generic fault detection and identification module can be created for a 
control loop. 
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Table 3.2. Components to monitor and control three-phase separator (Arnold and 
Stewart, 2008) 
Name Component Purpose 
FT0 Flow rate 
transmitter 
Measures the multiphase flow (water, oil and gas 
individually) coming to the separator from the 
upstream equipment. Provides the information to 
predict the water, oil and gas level changes in the 
separator. 
LT1 Level transmitter Measures the levels of water and oil in the gravity 
settling section. Provides the information to control the 
water-oil interface level for safe and efficient use of the 
separator. 
LC1 PI controller Provides a control command to keep control valve 
CV1 at the necessary opening so that the water-oil 
interface is maintained at a desired level (based on 
Proportional Integral (PI) control mode further 
described in section 3.1.4). Receives the information 
from the LT1 level transmitter. 
CV1 Control valve Provides a way to control the water-oil interface level 
in the gravity settling section by opening/closing when 
the corresponding command is received from the 
controller LC1. 
FT1 Flow rate 
transmitter 
Measures the flow of the liquid allowed by the opening 
of the control valve CV1 to monitor the outflowing 
water from the separator. 
LT2 Level transmitter Measures the level of oil in the separated oil section. 
Provides the information to control the oil level for safe 
and efficient use of the separator. 
LC2 PI controller Provides a control command to keep control valve 
CV2 at the necessary opening so that the separated 
oil is maintained at a desired level. Receives the 
information from the LT2 level transmitter. 
CV2 Control valve Provides a way to control the oil level in the separated 
oil section by opening/closing when the corresponding 
command is received from the controller LC2. 
FT2 Flow rate 
transmitter 
Measures the flow of the liquid allowed by the opening 
of the control valve CV2 to monitor the outflowing 
separated oil from the separator. 
LT3 Pressure 
transmitter 
Measures the pressure in the separator. Provides the 
information to control the pressure inside the vessel 
for safe and efficient use of the separator. 
LC3 PI controller Provides a control command to keep control valve 
CV3 at the necessary opening so that the pressure is 
maintained at a desired level. Receives the 
information from the LT3 level transmitter. 
CV3 Control valve Provides a way to control the pressure inside the 
separator by opening/closing when the corresponding 
command is received from the controller LC3. 
FT3 Flow rate 
transmitter 
Measures the flow of the gas allowed by the opening 
of the control valve CV3 to monitor the outflowing gas 
from the separator. 
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3.1.2 Undesirable events in the water, oil and gas separation 
There are six undesirable events that can occur during three-phase separation, as 
identified by API 14C (American Petroleum Institute, 2001): overpressure, under-
pressure, liquid overflow (or liquid carryover), gas blowby, leak and excess 
temperature if the vessel is heated. In this study, the four first events are considered. 
The undesirable events have a potential to cause injury, pollution, or damage, and 
this fact has to be taken into account when designing a protection system to prevent 
such events. Usually, two levels of protection are implemented in the separators. 
Primary protection must be provided either to prevent the undesirable event from 
occurring or to minimise its effects. Secondary protection must be provided as a 
backup if the primary protection fails. These levels of protection can be provided by 
individual devices (e.g., pressure safety high/low sensors, level safety high/low 
sensors) or by specially designed systems. 
The four undesirable events that are relevant to the three phase separator 
considered in the study are now described in more detail. An overpressure is a 
pressure which exceeds the maximum allowable working pressure. An overpressure 
of the vessel might lead to a sudden rupture of the vessel or piping and can cause 
the leak of hydrocarbons. The main causes of overpressure include a pressure gas 
valve failed closed, a situation when the inflowing amount of gas significantly 
exceeds the outflowing amount, gas blowby in the upstream component or the failure 
of a pressure control system. The primary protection from overpressure is a high 
pressure safety sensor, whose readings warn about a need to shut off the inflow. The 
secondary protection is provided by a pressure safety valve, which should be opened 
if the pressure is not reduced by the cutoff of inflow. 
An underpressure is defined as a pressure which is lower than the designed collapse 
pressure. This is a hazardous event, since the vessel can collapse and release 
hydrocarbons into the environment. It might also be followed by explosions or fires. 
The main cause of underpressure is a significantly larger amount of gas outflowing 
the vessel than that inflowing the vessel. Such a situation might occur if the inlet 
valve is blocked and the outlet valve fails open. The primary protection from 
underpressure is provided by a gas makeup system, i.e. gas is added to the vessel 
through an alternative inlet. The secondary protection is provided by a low pressure 
safety sensor to initiate the shut off of the inflow and outflow. 
A liquid overflow is a process when liquids are discharged from the vessel through 
the gas outlet. The effects of the liquid overflow can be either excess liquid in a 
downstream component, overpressure or release of hydrocarbons into the 
atmosphere. It is usually a consequence of an incoming flow rate exceeding the limit 
that the vessel has been designed for, improper water or oil level control or 
instantaneous liquid inrush. The primary protection from liquid overflow is achieved 
by initiating the shut off of the inflow based on the readings from a high level safety 
sensor. The secondary protection is provided by a standalone Emergency Support 
System. 
One of the most hazardous situations that might occur during the operation of a 
three-phase separator is a gas blowby. Gas blowby is a process when gas leaves the 
vessel through the oil or water outlet and thus causes an over-pressure in the 
downstream vessel or pipeline. The over-pressure of the vessel or pipeline might 
lead to an explosion, fire and further hazardous events in other parts of the plant. 
Gas blowby might occur if the liquid level in the separator is low, which is usually 
caused by a failure of the liquid level control system, or if vortices form near the 
130 
 
outlets, which suck in gas together with liquid. The primary protection for gas blowby 
is a low liquid level sensor that initiates the shut off of the outflow from the vessel 
when the liquid level drops below the lowest acceptable operating level. The 
secondary protection is installed in the downstream process components, which is 
equipped with a pressure safety sensor and a valve to protect them from the 
consequences of a gas blowby. 
3.1.3 Failure mode and effects analysis 
A simple, yet effective technique to identify possible failure scenarios of a system is 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). The idea is to list components of the 
system by considering how system performance would be affected if that particular 
component failed in a particular failure mode. It is a good technique to identify the 
system weaknesses at a component level. The downside of FMEA is that it only 
considers single failures of components and does not take into account combinations 
of failures, which are of more concern in most industrial systems. 
A simple FMEA was performed for the three-phase separator as a part of the study 
and the results are presented in Table 3.3. Note that the FMEA was performed for a 
set of selected failure modes and the list of failure modes considered is not 
exhaustive. The FMEA was performed to get a better understanding how single 
failures can influence the control and performance of the three-phase separator. The 
findings were used when developing the simulator model and when building the 
OOBN model for the fault detection and diagnostics. 
 
131 
 
 
Table 3.3. FMEA of three-phase separator 
Component 
name 
Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure detection 
Flow rate 
transmitter FT0 
Measures the 
flow rate of 
incoming 
mixture 
Failed stuck 
Local effect: The flow rate 
measurement value remains 
constant 
System effect: No effect on system 
performance, since it is used only 
for monitoring purposes 
The levels of water and oil (indicated by LT1 
and LT2) and pressure (indicated by LT3) are 
changing differently than expected given flow 
rates indicated by FT0. 
Level 
transmitter LT1 
Measures the 
levels of 
water and 
total liquid in 
the gravity 
settling 
section 
Failed stuck 
Local effect: The level 
measurement value remains 
constant 
System effect: Improper control of 
the water level that could lead to 
gas blowby or liquid carryover 
The water level shown as constant by LT1, 
when it is expected to change, constant water 
outflow (indicated by FT1) when the water 
inflow changes (indicated by FT0), total liquid 
level shown as constant. 
PI controller 
LC1 
Send the 
command to 
the control 
valve CV1 
Failed high 
Local effect: Sends the command 
to open the CV1 no matter what the 
water level is in the vessel 
System effect: Low water level that 
could lead to gas blowby or liquid 
carryover 
A high outflow rate in FT1 even when the 
CV1 is supposed to be closed based on LT1 
readings 
Failed low 
Local effect: Sends the command 
to close the CV1 no matter what the 
water level is in the vessel 
System effect: High water level 
that could lead to liquid carryover 
No outflow in FT1 even when the CV1 is 
supposed to be opened based on LT1 
readings 
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Component 
name 
Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure detection 
Control valve 
CV1 
Opens or 
closes the 
way for 
leaving water 
Failed open 
Local effect: Uncontrolled water 
outflow 
System effect: Low water level that 
could lead to gas blowby 
A high outflow rate in FT1 even when the 
outlet valve CV1 is supposed to be closed 
based on LT1 readings 
Failed closed 
Local effect: No water outflow 
System effect: High water level 
that could lead to liquid carryover 
No outflow in FT1, even when the outlet valve 
is CV1 supposed to be opened based on LT1 
readings 
Flow rate 
transmitter FT1 
Measures the 
flow rate of 
leaving water 
Failed stuck 
Local effect: The flow rate 
measurement value remains 
constant 
System effect: No effect on system 
performance, since it is used only 
for monitoring purposes 
The level of the water - oil interface (indicated 
by LT1) is changing differently than expected 
with a given flow rate (indicated by FT1). 
Level 
transmitter LT2 
Measures the 
separated oil 
level 
Failed stuck 
Local effect: The level 
measurement value remains 
constant 
System effect: Improper control of 
oil level that could lead to gas 
blowby or liquid carryover 
Oil level shown as constant by LT2, when it is 
expected to change, constant oil outflow 
(indicated by FT2) when the oil inflow 
changes (indicated by FT0) and the oil level 
is equal with the weir in the gravity settling 
section (indicated by LT1). 
PI controller 
LC2 
Sends the 
command to 
the control 
valve CV2 
Failed high 
Local effect: Sends the command 
to open the CV2 no matter what oil 
level is in the vessel 
System effect: Low oil level that 
leads to gas blowby 
A high outflow rate in FT2 even when the 
CV2 is supposed to be closed based on LT2 
readings 
Failed low 
Local effect: Sends the command 
to close the CV2 no matter what oil 
level is in the vessel 
System effect: High oil level that 
could lead to liquid carryover 
No outflow in FT2 even when the CV2 is 
supposed to be opened based on LT2 
readings 
 
133 
 
Component 
name 
Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure detection 
Control valve 
CV2 
Opens or 
closes the 
way for 
leaving oil 
Failed open 
Local effect: Uncontrolled oil 
outflow 
System effect: Low oil level that 
could lead to gas blowby 
A high outflow rate in FT2 even when the 
outlet valve CV2 is supposed to be closed 
based on LT2 readings 
Failed closed 
Local effect: No oil outflow 
System effect: High oil level that 
could lead to liquid carryover 
No outflow in FT2, even when the outlet valve 
is CV2 supposed to be opened based on LT2 
readings 
Flow rate 
transmitter FT2 
Measures the 
flow rate of 
leaving oil 
Failed stuck 
Local effect: The flow rate 
measurement value remains 
constant 
System effect: No effect on system 
performance, since it is used only 
for monitoring purposes 
The level of oil (indicated by LT2) is changing 
differently than expected with a given flow 
rate (indicated by FT2). 
Pressure 
transmitter LT3 
Measures the 
pressure in 
the vessel 
Failed stuck 
Local effect: The pressure 
measurement value remains 
constant 
System effect: Improper control of 
pressure level that could lead to 
under-pressure or over-pressure 
Pressure shown as constant by LT3, when it 
is expected to change, constant gas outflow 
(indicated by FT3) when the gas inflow 
changes (indicated by FT0) 
PI controller 
LC3 
Sends the 
command to 
the control 
valve CV3 
Failed high 
Local effect: Sends the command 
to open the CV3 no matter what 
pressure is in the vessel 
System effect: Low pressure that 
could lead to under-pressure 
A high outflow rate in FT3 even when the 
CV3 is supposed to be closed based on LT3 
readings 
Failed low 
Local effect: Sends the command 
to close the CV3 no matter what 
pressure is in the vessel 
System effect: High pressure that 
could lead to over-pressure 
No outflow in FT3 even when the CV3 is 
supposed to be opened based on LT3 
readings 
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Component 
name 
Function Failure mode Failure effect Failure detection 
Control valve 
CV3 
Opens or 
closes the 
way for 
leaving gas 
Failed open 
Local effect: Uncontrolled gas 
outflow 
System effect: Low pressure that 
could lead to under-pressure 
A high outflow rate in FT3 even when the 
outlet valve CV3 is supposed to be closed 
based on LT3 readings 
Failed closed 
Local effect: No gas outflow 
System effect: High pressure that 
could lead to over-pressure 
No outflow in FT3, even when the outlet valve 
is CV3 supposed to be opened based on LT3 
readings 
Flow rate 
transmitter FT3 
Measures the 
flow rate of 
leaving gas 
Failed stuck 
Local effect: The flow rate 
measurement value remains 
constant 
System effect: No effect on system 
performance, since it is used only 
for monitoring purposes 
The pressure inside the separator (indicated 
by LT3) is changing differently than expected 
with given volume available to the gas and 
flow rate (indicated by FT3). 
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3.1.4 Automatic control of three-phase separators 
Since most processes in the oil and gas industry include hazardous materials, it is 
very important that a process remains within safe operable limits. The control of the 
process is achieved by keeping specific parameters of the process at a desired level, 
usually defined as a set point (SP). Usually the parameters are controlled 
automatically. However, the supervision of the automatic control is also required. 
An effective automatic process control is especially important for the three-phase 
separators, since it not only guarantees economic benefits, but more importantly, it 
also guarantees the safe operation of the separator. A temperature, liquid level, flow 
and pressure are commonly controlled during the gas and oil processing. 
The majority of controllers found in industrial applications are Proportional Integral (PI) 
controllers with over 90% of total population and these are the ones that are used in 
the control of three-phase separators (Svrcek et al., 2006). A control function 
provided by this type of controller is based on the PI algorithm, which is presented 
next. 
3.1.4.1 Proportional Integral controllers 
The PI control algorithm is based on two actions: change the controller output 
proportionally to the error (deviation from a set point) and integrate previous errors 
of the controller. 
Most controller algorithms these days are implemented using digital electronics, thus 
a discrete form of a PI controller output has to be used. A discrete form of the PI 
algorithm can be written in two different ways: a positional or a velocity form. The 
positional form of the controller algorithm indicates the current position of the final 
control element (FCE), e.g. a valve, while the velocity form indicates in which 
direction and how much the position of the FCE has to be changed. The positional 
form of the discrete PI control algorithm output is: 
 
ܥܱሺ݊ሻ ൌ ܥܱ௕ ൅ ܭ஼ ൭݁ሺ݊ሻ ൅ ȟܶݐ௜ ෍ ݁ሺ݇ሻ௡௞ୀଵ ൱ǡ 3.1 
where ݊ is the discrete sampling time point, ܥܱሺ݊ሻ is the controller output at time ݊, ܥܱ௕ is the controller output bias value, ܭ஼ is the controller gain, ݁ሺ݊ሻ ൌ ܵܲ െ ܯܸሺ݊ሻ is 
the error at time ݊, ܵܲ is the set point or desired value of the controlled variable, ܯܸሺ݊ሻ is the measured value of the controlled variable at time ݊ , ȟݐ  is the time 
difference between two sampling times, ௜ܶ is the integral time. 
However, this form of the algorithm suffers from a phenomenon known as a reset or 
integral windup. This is a phenomenon when the integral sum  ? ݁ሺ݇ሻ௡௞ୀଵ  in equation 
3.1 grows to a limit that the control output ܥܱሺ݊ሻ requires the FCE to open or close 
more than it is physically capable (FCE saturates). For example, a liquid outlet valve 
is fully opened, but the liquid inflow is greater than the maximum allowable outflow. 
The integral sum will keep increasing and the controller will keep the outlet valve fully 
opened for longer than it is necessary when the inflow decreases. If a control 
algorithm is not properly secured from such a phenomenon, control actions might be 
inadequate and result in extreme points of the operation (i.e. draining the tank or 
overfilling it). 
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There are two ways to avoid integral windup. One way is to use some bounding logic 
to avoid the sum becoming too large. The other way is to use a velocity form of the PI 
control algorithm. The velocity form of the PI control algorithm can be defined as the 
difference between two control outputs: 
 
ȟܥܱሺ݊ሻ ൌ ܥܱሺ݊ሻ െ ܥܱሺ݊ െ  ?ሻ 3.2 
The velocity form of the PI control can be obtained by using equation 3.1 and 
equation 3.2: 
 
ȟܥܱሺ݊ሻ ൌ ܭ஼ ൭൬ ? ൅ȟܶݐ௜ ൰ ݁ሺ݊ሻ െ ݁ሺ݊ െ  ?ሻ൱ǡ 3.3 
where ݁ሺ݊ሻ  is the error at sampling time ݊ , ݁ሺ݊ െ  ?ሻ  is the error at a previous 
sampling time ݊ െ  ?, ȟݐ is the time difference between sampling points ݊ and ݊ െ  ?. 
There are several ways in which the velocity form algorithm is used. One way is to 
use it as it is given in equation 3.3, when only a change in the command is sent to 
the FCE. This way the FCE itself provides protection from integral windup: when the 
FCE is at its maximum or minimum opening, the command to open or close it more 
will not have effect since it cannot be physically opened or closed more. The other 
way is to avoid sending a command which would need the FCE to be moved above 
its physical limits, as suggested in (Smith, 2009): 
1. Calculate a change in command ȟܥܱሺ݊ሻ as in equation 3.3. 
2. Check if such a change in the FCE position would force the FCE above its 
physical limits and adjust ȟܥܱሺ݊ሻ correspondingly: 
 
ȟܥܱሺ݊ሻ ൌ ൜ȟܥܱሺ݊ሻǡ ݂݅ܥ ெܸ௜௡ ൑ ܥܱሺ݊ െ  ?ሻ ൅ ȟܥܱሺ݊ሻ ൑ ܥ ெܸ௔௫ ?ǡ ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁  3.4 
3. Calculate the command sent to the FCE as following: 
 
ܥܱሺ݊ሻ ൌ ܥܱሺ݊ െ  ?ሻ ൅ ȟܥܱሺ݊ሻǡ 3.5 
The algorithm defined by the three steps above will be implemented to model the 
velocity form of the PI control algorithm in the three-phase simulation model in this 
study to avoid the undesirable effects caused by the integral windup phenomenon. 
3.1.4.2 Control loops in the three-phase separator 
The control of the separation process is achieved by controlling three key process 
variables: a water-oil interface level in the gravity settling section, an oil level in the 
separated oil section and a pressure in the separator. Each key process variable in 
the three-phase separator has its own control loop (see Figure 3.2): a water-oil 
interface level control loop, a separated oil level control loop and a vessel pressure 
control loop. 
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Figure 3.2. Control loops of a three-phase separator: water-oil interface level 
(represented by blue rectangle), separated oil level (represented by brown rectangle) 
and pressure level (represented by red rectangle) control loops 
In this study, all of the control loops, as mentioned in section 3.1.1, are controlled by 
PI controllers. 
Interface level control 
The water-oil level control loop consists of transmitter LT1 (for measuring the 
interface level), PI controller LC1 and valve CV1 as FCE. Flow transmitter FT1 is not 
used in the control loop, but it indicates what flow is allowed through valve CV1 and 
is important for detecting abnormal conditions of water flow from the vessel. 
An interface level between oil and water has to be maintained at a desired set point 
for normal operation of the separator. If the interface level is high, less space is 
available for the oil separation and thus the quality of separated oil might be affected. 
Furthermore, if the interface level control fails, there is a possibility for water to flow 
over the weir. This would be detrimental to the whole separation process, since the 
water would mix with the separated oil, which is kept in the adjacent compartment of 
the vessel. If the interface level is low, the separation process is faster than the oil 
transfer into the separated oil section and thus the separator is not working efficiently. 
Moreover, if the interface level is very low, some oil might be outflowing from the 
vessel through water drain valve CV1. This would result in economic losses. Two 
worst case scenarios might occur due to a poor interface level control: the vessel 
might become overfilled, leading to overpressure, liquid overflow or leaking, or the 
vessel might become drained causing underpressure and gas blowby, as described 
in section 3.1.2. Such situations result in risk to personnel and economic losses. 
Separated oil level control 
The control of the separated oil level is simple, since there is only one liquid in the 
separated oil section. A simple float device might be sufficient to measure the level of 
oil. As in the interface level control, there is transmitter LT2, which measures the oil 
level and sends the information to the PI controller LC2, which then sends the control 
command to valve CV2. 
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If the control of the oil level is lost and there is no outflowing oil through valve CV2, 
the level might rise up to a point where it starts flowing back over the weir into the 
gravity settling section. This would interfere with the separation process and would 
reduce the efficiency of the separator. 
If the control of the separated oil level fails, an undesirable event, i.e. gas blowby, 
might occur. If the oil level becomes very low, there is a chance that some gas might 
be sucked in through the valve CV2 together with the outflowing oil. If necessary 
safety systems are not installed or they have failed, this may lead to a very 
hazardous situation, since only oil is expected to leave through CV2 and the 
downstream equipment is usually set up to operate at a lower pressure. When there 
is a significantly large amount of gas still left in the oil, the downstream equipment 
might be overpressured and eventually rupture, releasing hydrocarbons into the 
processing plant and the environment. Hydrocarbon release is a potential source of 
fire, if there is a possibility of a spark happening nearby. 
Thus, the effective control of the oil level is not only important for the efficiency of the 
process but also in terms of safe operation of the three-phase separator. 
Vessel pressure control 
The control of pressure in the vessel is somewhat different from liquid level control. 
Since gas can be compressed, pressure in the vessel not only depends on the 
molecular amount of gas, but also on the volume available for gas and the 
temperature in the vessel. Thus, the same volume of gas might result in a different 
pressure in the vessel. In this study, it is considered that the vessel is not heated and 
the temperature inside the vessel is constant. It is also assumed that the ideal gas 
law holds: 
 
ܸܲ ൌ ܴ݊ܶǡ 3.6 
where ܲ is the pressure of gas in pascals (ܲܽ), ܸ is the volume of gas in cubic meters 
(݉ଷ), ݊ is the amount of gas in moles (݉݋݈), ܴ is the Avogadro constant (ܬܭିଵ݉݋݈ିଵ), ܶ is the temperature in Kelvins (ܭ). 
Thus the pressure in the vessel can be expressed from equation 3.6 as: 
 ܲ ൌ ܴܸ݊ܶ Ǥ 3.7 
As ܴ is a constant and ܶ is assumed to be constant, the volume of gas ܸ and the 
amount of gas ݊ are the variables that change and determine the pressure ܲ. 
The pressure control loop consists of the transmitter LT3, PI controller LC3 and valve 
CV3. As in the previous two control loops, flow transmitter FT3 is not used for control 
purposes, but it indicates the gas flow allowed through valve CV3 and is important for 
monitoring the gas outflow. The pressure control loop can have two failure modes: 
overpressure or underpressure. Both of these failure modes are considered as 
undesirable events and were described in section 3.1.2. 
3.1.5 Summary 
A three-phase oil, water and gas separator was presented in this section. A 
description of the system was given, identifying its main components and their 
functionality. The components used in three-phase separators were grouped into 
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control loops, providing a potential to produce a generic fault detection and 
diagnostic methodology. Common undesirable events were presented next, as 
identified by the American Petroleum Institute. A brief description of each undesirable 
event was given, identifying their causes and consequences. Common failure modes 
of the considered system and their effects were analysed using FMEA. The FMEA 
allowed a better understanding of the system and how single component faults 
influence the performance of the separator. This will aid the building of the simulation 
model of the separator as well as the developing the fault detection and diagnostic 
methodology. 
The topic of control loops was revisited by presenting a theory of automatic process 
control by highlighting the chosen control method with PI controllers used in the study. 
This control method uses a velocity form of the PI control algorithm in order to 
overcome the issues of windup. The control loops used in a three-phase separator 
introduced earlier were described in more detail emphasising how improper control in 
a specific loop can result in economic losses or hazardous situations. 
A summary of findings from a literature review of the fault detection and diagnostics 
techniques applied in the oil and gas industry is given in the next section. 
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3.2 Literature review 
The literature review section is divided into two major subsections: firstly the methods 
for fault detection and diagnostics in the oil and gas industry are presented, followed 
by a more detailed description of Bayesian Belief Networks. 
3.2.1 Fault detection and diagnostics in oil and gas industry 
An extensive literature review was performed to identify the state of the art of 
methods used for fault detection and diagnostics in the oil and gas industry. The 
reviewed approaches are divided into three categories: model based approaches, 
expert systems and statistical analysis approaches. These methods are discussed in 
the next subsections by introducing the problem they solve, the methodology that 
was proposed and how the methods were tested and validated. 
3.2.1.1 Model based approaches 
Diagnostic Model Processor 
Fault diagnostics of an oil production plant prototype was performed using a 
Diagnostic Model Processor in (Dias et al., 1993). The main idea of the Diagnostic 
Model Processor is to evaluate a set of residuals ܧ ൌ ሺ݁ଵǡ ݁ଶǡ ǥ ݁ேሻ, generated by 
equations, which define the condition of the system at current time and compare 
them to residuals generated by the steady state of the system under a set of 
assumptions ܣ ൌ ሺܽଵǡ ܽଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܽெሻ , which represent the fault-free condition of the 
system, e.g. ܽଵ ൌ ฀“฀T฀h฀e฀r฀e฀ ฀i฀s฀ ฀n฀o฀ ฀b฀i฀a฀s฀ ฀i฀n฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀o฀u฀t฀p฀u฀t฀ ฀s฀i฀g฀n฀a฀l฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀l฀e฀v฀e฀l฀ ฀c฀o฀n฀t฀r฀o฀l฀l฀e฀r฀ ฀L฀I฀C- 1 ” .  The 
comparison is done by calculating the likelihood of the violation of the assumptions: 
 
௜ܲ ൌ  ? ൫ ௜ܵ௝ݏ ௝݂൯ே௝ୀଵ ? ห ௜ܵ௝หே௝ୀଵ ǡ 3.8 
where ௜ܲ is the likelihood of violating assumption ܽ௜, ௜ܵ௝ is the sensitivity of residual ௝݁ 
with respect to assumption ܽ௜, ݏ ௝݂ is the violation level that indicates the degree to 
which residual ௝݁ is satisfied. 
The drift of the residuals from zero values would indicate that the system has 
deviated from the steady state due to a failure. The increasing likelihood of the 
violation of the assumptions would allow a distinct failure of the system to be isolated. 
If several failures have an increase in likelihood, the ones with ௜ܲ ൐  ?Ǥ ? are favoured. 
The measurements of oil level, pressure, oil temperature, hot water temperature, and 
oil outflow sensors were used for the analysis. The Diagnostic Model Processor 
contained 38 residual equations with 51 assumptions. Results with several failure 
modes were illustrated. In some cases the model could correctly identify the violation 
฀o฀f฀ ฀s฀o฀m฀e฀ ฀a฀s฀s฀u฀m฀p฀t฀i฀o฀n฀s฀,฀ ฀s฀u฀c฀h฀ ฀a฀s฀ ฀“฀T฀h฀e฀r฀e฀ ฀i฀s฀ ฀n฀o฀ ฀b฀i฀a฀s฀ ฀i฀n฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀p฀r฀e฀s฀s฀u฀r฀e฀ c o฀n฀t r฀o฀l l e r  ฀i฀n p u t  ฀P I฀C- 1฀”฀ 
but failed to indicate the v฀i฀o฀l฀a฀t฀i฀o฀n฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀a฀s฀s฀u฀m฀p฀t฀i฀o฀n฀ ฀“฀L฀o฀s฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀a฀i฀r฀ ฀s฀u฀p฀p฀l฀y฀ ฀t฀o฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ 
pneumatic mechanism of control valve LCV-฀2฀”฀. 
The authors have concluded that their model is capable of identifying single failures. 
However, in the majority of the cases the model finds more than one failure even 
when only a single failure occurs. Moreover, the authors indicated that a very good 
understanding of the system processes is needed in order to define the steady-state 
equations for the oil production plant and the steady-state cannot change with time 
since that would require a set of new residual equations. 
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Linear model and Kalman filter 
Another model-based approach for fault detection in process control systems was 
proposed in (Afonso et al., 1998). The authors used a stirred tank prototype to 
implement and test their approach. The whole system consisted of three tanks (cold 
water tank, hot water tank and stirring reactor tank) and a cooling system. Water from 
cold and hot water tanks was flowing into a stirring tank, which was partially cooled 
by a cooling system. The process in the stirred tank was defined using a linear model 
given by equations 3.9 and 3.10: 
 
݄௞ାଵ ൌ ݄௞ ൅ ȟݐܣ ൫ܳଵǡ௞ ൅ ܳଶǡ௞ െ ܳଷǡ௞൯ǡ 3.9 
 
௞ܶାଵ ൌ ௞ܶ െ ȟݐ ௚ܷߨ݀ݎߩܥ௣ܣ ሺ ௞ܶ െ ܶܿ௞ሻ ൅ ȟݐܣ ൭ܳଶǡ௞݄௞ ൫ ଶܶǡ௞ െ ௞ܶ൯ ൅ ܳଵǡ௞݄௞ ൫ ଵܶǡ௞ െ ௞ܶ൯൱൅ ȟݐ ௚ܷߩܥ௣݄௞ ሺܶܿ௞ െ ௞ܶሻǡ 3.10 
where ݄௞ାଵǡ ݄௞ are the heights of liquid in the stirring tank at time steps ݇ ൅  ? and ݇ 
respectively, ȟݐ ൌ  ?Ǥ ?݉ ݅݊ is the size of the time step, ܳଵǡ௞ǡ ܳଶǡ௞ǡ ܳଷǡ௞ are cold water 
inflow, hot water inflow and mixed liquid outflow rates at time step ݇ respectively, ௞ܶାଵǡ ௞ܶ are the temperatures of liquid in the stirred tank at time steps ݇ ൅  ? and ݇ 
respectively, ܶܿ௞  is the temperature of coolant at time step ݇ , ଵܶǡ௞ǡ ଶܶǡ௞  are 
temperatures of inflowing cold and hot water respectively at time step ݇ , and 
operating conditions ௚ܷ ൌ  ? ? ? ?ܬ݀݉ିଶ݉݅݊ିଵܭିଵ , ܣ ൌ  ? ?Ǥ ?݀ ݉ଶ , ݀ݎ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?, ܥ௣ ൌ ? ? ? ?ܬܭ݃ିଵܭିଵ , ߩ ൌ  ?ܭ݃݀݉ିଷ . The model parameters in equations 3.9 and 3.10 
were estimated with a Recursive Least Squares algorithm at each time step, when 
observations from the stirring tank were obtained. 
The fault detection stage involved performing statistical tests on the model 
parameters in equations 3.9 and 3.10. The model parameters were assumed to 
follow a Normal distribution in the selected time window, and the Fisher statistic was 
used to check the hypothesis of equal variances of two subsequent time windows. 
The width of the time window was found experimentally to be equal to 101 time steps. 
If the variances of model parameters of the subsequent time windows were found to 
be unequal, an alarm was issued. 
When a failure was detected, an Extended Kalman Filter was used to estimate the 
state of the process and compare it to sensor readings to identify the failure cause. If 
the estimated state was different from the sensor readings, the sensors were 
considered to be faulty. The authors, however, did not provide details of how the 
estimated state and sensor readings were compared. Moreover, the assumption was 
made that multiple failures could not occur simultaneously. The authors did not 
provide the exact figures for the efficiency of the method, and only stated that the 
proposed technique gave promising results and further research had to be performed 
in order to improve the technique. 
CUSUM test on modelled system residuals 
A fault detection and isolation technique based on residual patterns of a gas-liquid 
separator (system of two connected tanks for separating gas from water) model was 
presented in (Kinnaert et al., 2000). Five measurements from the system (pressure, 
water level in the first tank, water level in the second tank, flow of air from the first 
tank and flow of water from the second tank) were available, thus providing five 
residual signals. The fault detection and isolation methodology proposed was based 
on the fact that fault-free residual signals should follow a Normal distribution with a 
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zero mean, while faulty residual signals should follow a Normal distribution with a 
non-zero mean. The variances of these signals were assumed to be equal. 
A cumulative sum control chart (CUSUM) test was performed on the residuals to test 
whether they had a fault-free or faulty distribution with selected threshold values for 
fault detection and isolation. The proposed approach was tested with a step-like bias 
introduced to the five readings mentioned above with five different magnitudes. The 
results presented showed that the performance of the fault detection and isolation 
technique highly varied for different fault magnitudes and different fault detection 
thresholds. The authors indicated that the technique needed further testing in the 
presence of modelling uncertainties and validation with the actual plant data. 
Petri Net model 
The research presented in (Al-Hajri and Rossiter, 2010) developed a fault detection 
and isolation technique based on a Petri Net model. A methodology for building Petri 
Nets for an oil producing station was presented. The whole station model was built by 
joining smaller Petri Nets developed for individual components of the oil producing 
station. Fault detection and isolation was performed by comparing two Petri Nets: a 
Petri Net which represented the normal behaviour of the system (places of the Petri 
Net represented the components with working states only) and a diagnostic Petri Net 
(places of the Petri Net involved failed states of the components). Whenever the 
markings of places in these two Petri Nets were different, the system was considered 
to be faulty. The proposed approach was validated using an example of a flow 
control valve unit. It was shown that the model built was able to detect failures of 
pressure and flow transmitters in the flow control valve unit. The authors indicated 
that their proposed approach could decrease the gap between academic research in 
fault detection and diagnostic techniques and their application in industrial solutions, 
but validation of the Petri Net technique should be performed on a real system. 
3.2.1.2 Expert systems 
An expert decision support system for petroleum production and separation 
processes was presented in (Chan, 2005). The main goal of this research was to 
acquire knowledge about the petroleum production and separation process from a 
number of engineers, so that common information could be obtained for an expert 
decision support system. From the knowledge obtained, if-then rules were formed to 
give warnings to operators, when certain parameters of the process deviate from 
normal operating conditions. Additionally, other control actions were suggested by 
the decision system if knowledge on how to control the deviating process was 
available. The decision system was evaluated by two expert engineers, who 
highlighted that the system outputs were useful and valid for the chosen 
malfunctioning scenarios. Specific details about the rules of the decision support 
system were omitted in this paper and only an example of rules for a water treater 
temperature assessment was given: 
x If temperature is 125-135 F, then no action. 
x If temperature is 100-125 F or 135-150F, then a yellow warning is given, no 
action. 
x If temperature is 65-100 F or 150-185 F, then a red warning is given, no 
action. 
x If temperature is 185-200 F, an alarm is given and suggestion to operators is 
฀g฀i฀v฀e฀n฀:฀ ฀“฀t฀h฀i฀s฀ ฀m฀i฀g฀h฀t฀ ฀b฀e฀ ฀c฀a฀u฀s฀e฀d฀ ฀b฀y฀ ฀(฀1฀)฀ ฀n฀o฀ ฀e฀x฀i฀t฀ ฀f฀l฀o฀w฀ ฀f฀r฀o฀m฀ ฀t฀r e a t r฀,฀ ฀(฀2฀)฀ ฀h฀e฀a฀t฀e฀r฀ 
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฀m฀a฀l฀f฀u฀n฀c฀t฀i฀o฀n฀”฀,฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀a฀c฀t฀i฀o฀n฀s฀ ฀s฀u฀g฀g฀e฀s฀t฀e฀d฀ ฀t฀o the operator are: (1) turn off the heater, 
(2) if (1) does not work, then shut down production pump. 
3.2.1.3 Statistical analysis approaches 
Autonomous recursive task decomposition 
A statistical analysis approach to diagnose faults on industrial plants was suggested 
in (Roverso, 2002). Roverso proposed a methodology that can be applied to any 
industrial plant, given measurements of process variables are available and they 
change as a failure occurs. The proposed methodology consisted of recurrent neural 
network ensembles, a wavelet on-line pre-processing (WOLP) and autonomous 
recursive task decomposition (ARTD). 
First of all measurements of the process variables were pre-processed with the 
WOLP technique to reduce a dimensionality of the input data, extracting the mean 
residual as well as the maximum and minimum wavelet coefficients from the input 
data. Since the plants usually consist of many components, there were many 
measurements available which could be used for the diagnostics of the plant. 
Moreover, a lot of different failure modes might occur in the plant. This led to a 
problem when a neural network had to be trained to classify a large amount of data 
into a lot of different classes (32 classes in this case). Thus the ARTD method was 
presented to decompose the classification problem into smaller sub-problems. The 
results of neural networks from sub-problems were then combined into a tree, 
forming an ensemble of recurrent neural networks, which was then used for the plant 
diagnostics. 
The proposed methodology was tested with artificial data representing dynamics of 
the plant process. The author showed that decomposition of the classification into 32 
classes to smaller sub-classifiers led to an increase in algorithm speed allowing 
similar or even better results to be obtained than those without the decomposition. 
The downside of the proposed methodology is that it requires intensive computing 
resources for network training with a large amount of data representing all the 
possible dynamics of the process under consideration. This data might not always be 
available, especially for failure scenarios. 
Generalised Parity Vector 
The fault detection and isolation of a three-phase separator was performed using a 
Generalized Parity Vector technique in (Omana and Taylor, 2007) and (Taylor and 
Omana, 2008). The idea of the technique is to form vectors from system input and 
output variables (e.g. incoming oil stream and outcoming oil stream) with a big angle 
between them when the system is in a non-faulty state. Whenever a big difference 
between system input and output occurs, the angle between these vectors reduces 
to almost zero, this way indicating a failure in the system. Different failures should 
produce parity vectors with different characteristics and that would be the way to 
isolate the failures. 
The authors tested the technique with several scenarios generated by a simulated 
model of the three-phase separator, showing that the fault detection is 
straightforward and their technique is capable of detecting failures as soon as they 
are inserted in the simulation model. However, the identification of failures was more 
difficult and several angles of parity vectors changed, indicating several different 
failure modes even when a single failure was simulated. The technique proposed by 
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the researchers was implemented in a system to monitor, control and manage the 
petroleum production facilities model in (Taylor and Sayda, 2008). The same 
deficiency was observed as the proposed technique was not able to isolate failures. 
Principal Component Analysis 
A methodology combining Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and wavelet analysis 
was proposed to diagnose faults for an oil gas water separator in (Gao et al., 2009). 
An idea of the methodology was to pre-process the data obtained from the simulation 
model of oil gas water separator with a wavelet analysis and use the pre-processed 
data to find the principal components. Hotelling ܶଶ  and Squared Prediction Error 
(SPE) statistics were calculated from the principal components. Thresholds for these 
statistics were set experimentally. Whenever these thresholds were breached, it was 
considered that a failure had occurred in the system. 
Several scenarios were tested by the authors to validate the performance of the 
methodology. One scenario showed a clear identification of a failure in the system, 
while another showed that the calculated statistics were fluctuating above and below 
the set thresholds. Thus the fault detection was dependable on a good selection of 
thresholds for the Hotelling ܶଶ and SPE statistics, which might not be straightforward 
in all cases. 
A fault detection and identification technique based on PCA for monitoring the 
condition of an offshore oil and gas production process was also presented in 
(Natarajan and Srinivasan, 2010). A dynamic model of an offshore system was first 
built to obtain performance data, such as measurements of flow rates of water or oil, 
for the system in fault-free, faulty and under-maintenance states. In total, 32 different 
measurements were available from the dynamic model. These measurements were 
clustered using a k-means algorithm into 13 clusters which were then used to build 
PCA models for normal operation and for operation with faults present. Whenever 
new data became available it was fitted to each of 13 previously obtained clusters 
and the PCA model corresponding to the best-fit cluster was chosen. For the chosen 
PCA model, the Q statistic was calculated. If the Q statistic was within the confidence 
limits for the selected PCA model, the process was considered to be fault-free. 
Alternatively, if the Q statistic exceeded predetermined confidence limits, the process 
was considered to be faulty. 
Three different fault scenarios to test the proposed methodology were presented in 
this paper: a valve leak fault, a test separator temperature controller fault and a 
temperature sensor fault. The testing performed showed that all three scenarios were 
identified early, i.e. before the failures affected the process to a large extent. Even 
though the proposed methodology was shown to be useful for fault detection and 
identification, an individual PCA model had to be built for each failure mode 
considered. This is a significant deficiency when a large system with a high number 
of failure modes is considered. Moreover, multiple failure modes might occur in the 
system and thus individual PCA models would need to be built for all possible failure 
combinations. 
3.2.1.4 Summary 
A variety of techniques have been developed for the detection and diagnostics of 
faults in equipment used in the oil and gas industry. Three broad categories were 
identified: model-based approaches, expert systems and statistical analysis 
approaches. 
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Model-based approaches needed a very good understanding of the processes 
considered in order to be able to build a precise mathematical model for the system. 
Testing of the developed model residuals was one of the common ways to perform 
the fault detection and diagnostics (Dias et al., 1993, Kinnaert et al., 2000). With such 
a technique, subtle changes in the residuals generated by the model can be 
identified and in some cases a certain failure mode can be isolated. However, if the 
normal process operating conditions change, for example inflows of liquids or a set 
point of liquid levels change, the whole mathematical model has to be rebuilt to take 
into account those changes. Moreover, extensive testing of the proposed approaches 
was not reported in the papers, thus it is hard to evaluate the actual performance of 
the proposed methodology. The detail of results presented in (Afonso et al., 1998) 
again does not allow evaluation of the actual performance of the methodology. The 
authors also indicated that their technique is invalid for multiple failures. This is a big 
deficiency of the method, since it is common that multiple failures occur on real 
systems. A Petri Net based approach presented in (Al-Hajri and Rossiter, 2010) was 
another example of a fault detection technique from this category. The authors 
indicated that the initial results were promising; however as in previously described 
examples, extensive testing with different failure modes was not presented in the 
study. Therefore, clearer conclusions cannot be drawn. 
A simple expert system based on ฀‘if-else฀’ conditions was presented in (Chan, 2005). 
The main deficiency of such an approach is that it cannot take into account complex 
relationships between system components. Usually such systems can only be used 
to provide warnings when a failure has already caused a severe effect on the 
process performance. 
Recently statistical analysis approaches became popular for the detection and 
diagnostics of faults of different industrial systems. The main advantage of these 
methods is that they do not need a detailed mathematical model of the system to 
perform the fault detection and diagnostics. Instead they are based on features of 
historical data obtained from these systems. Thus the same technique can be 
adapted to individual systems using their data. However, the biggest deficiency of 
statistical analysis approaches is that they need historical data of failure modes to be 
detected (Roverso, 2002). In some cases, such data is hard or even impossible to 
acquire. 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was a common technique in the statistical 
analysis approaches category used for fault detection and diagnostics in the oil and 
gas industry. However, the results obtained from PCA usually need additional 
processing in order to perform fault detection. Moreover, individual PCA models had 
to be built for each failure mode from historical data, as mentioned previously. If 
multiple failures were considered, individual PCA models would also have to be built 
for each combination of failures. This could be a problem for a larger system in terms 
of the duration of the analysis. 
The lack of detail in the results presented in the studies reported does not allow a 
clear judgement to be made as to their usefulness and performance. However, 
several deficiencies were identified: 
x The model-based approaches tend to be developed for specific operating 
conditions, while detailed analysis is needed to adjust the model if the 
operating conditions change. 
x The models are unable to detect multiple faults. 
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x Historical data of system faults is needed to build fault detection and 
diagnostics models. Such data might not always be available, specifically for 
faults that cause hazardous events. 
Bayesian belief networks, as an alternative fault detection and diagnostics approach, 
which is introduced in the next section, can deal with all of the earlier mentioned 
deficiencies of the techniques presented. 
3.2.2 Bayesian Belief Networks 
A causal network that consists of a set of variables and a set of directed links which 
form a structure is called a directed graph. If there is a link from variable ܣ to ܤ, we 
say that ܤ is a child of ܣ, and ܣ is a parent of ܤ. Causal networks can be used to 
identify how a change of the certainty in one variable may affect the certainty of other 
variables. A Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) is a causal network, which has a 
quantitative representation of the causal links (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007). A BBN 
consists of the following: 
x A set of variables and a set of directed edges between variables. 
x Each variable has a finite set of mutually exclusive states. 
x The variables together with the directed edges form an acyclic directed graph 
(abbreviated DAG). A directed graph is acyclic if there is no directed path ܣଵ ՜ ڮ ՜ ܣ௡ so that ܣଵ ൌ ܣ௡. 
x A conditional probability table ܲሺܣȁܤଵǡ ǥǡ ܤ௡ሻ is attached to each variable ܣ 
with parents ܤଵǡ ǥ ǡ ܤ௡ . If ܣ  has no parents, then the table reduces to the 
unconditional probability table ܲሺܣሻ. 
A BBN lends itself to a graphical representation. An example BBN is given in Figure 
3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3. Example of a BBN 
The BBN variables are represented as nodes ܣǡ ܤ ? and ܤ ?, which are connected with 
the directed edges. The direction of an edge identifies the causal relationship 
enabling the parent and child nodes to be identified from the graphical representation 
of the BBN. For example, ܤ ? and ܤ ? are child nodes of ܣ, while ܣ is the parent node 
of ܤ ? and ܤ ?. Moreover, ܤ ? is the parent node of ܤ ?, thus ܤ ? has two parent nodes. 
To define the BBN completely, an unconditional probability table ܲሺܣሻ and conditional 
probability tables ܲሺܤ ?ȁܣሻ and ܲሺܤ ?ȁܤ ?ǡ ܣሻ have to be specified. BBNs are usually 
built using expert knowledge. 
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3.2.2.1 Bayes theorem 
The concept of the BBN technique is based on Bayes฀’ rule, which provides a way to 
update beliefs about a certain variable ܤ, given information about another variable ܣ, 
using conditional probabilities. Variables ܣ and ܤ must have a finite set of mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive states, denoted as ሺܽଵǡ ܽଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܽேሻ  and ሺܾଵǡ ܾଶǡ ǥ ǡ ܾெሻ 
respectively. The probability of variable ܣ being in state ܽ௜ is denoted by ܲሺܣ ൌ ܽ௜ሻ, 
or, in short, ܲሺܽ௜ሻ. The conditional probability of variable ܤ given variable ܣ, ܲሺܤȁܣሻ, 
can be expressed as: 
 
ܲሺܤȁܣሻ ൌ ܲሺܣǡ ܤሻܲሺܣሻ ǡ 3.11 
where ܲሺܣǡ ܤሻ is the joint probability of variables ܣ and ܤ, and is a ܰ  ? ܯ set of joint 
probabilities ܲ൫ܽ௜ǡ ௝ܾ൯. Given a joint probability ܲሺܣǡ ܤሻ, the probability ܲሺܣሻ can be 
found by marginalising variable ܤ out of ܲሺܣǡ ܤሻ: 
 
ܲሺܽ௜ሻ ൌ ෍ ܲ൫ܽ௜ ǡ ௝ܾ൯ெ௝ୀଵ ǡ 3.12 
 
ܲሺܣሻ ൌ ൫ܲሺܽଵሻǡ ܲሺܽଵሻǡ ǥ ǡ ܲሺܽேሻ൯Ǥ 3.13 
The marginalising can be represented in short as: 
 
ܲሺܣሻ ൌ ෍ ܲሺܣǡ ܤሻ஻ Ǥ 3.14 
Identically, the probability ܲሺܤሻ is found by marginalising variable ܣ out of ܲሺܣǡ ܤሻ. 
Having the notations defined, Bayes฀’ rule is formed: 
 
ܲሺܤȁܣሻ ൌ ܲሺܣȁܤሻܲሺܤሻܲሺܣሻ ൌ ܲሺܣǡ ܤሻ ? ܲሺܣǡ ܤሻ஻ ǡ 3.15 
where ܲሺܤȁܣሻ is the posterior probability of ܤ given ܣ, ܲሺܣȁܤሻ is the likelihood of ܣ 
given ܤ, ܲሺܤሻ is the prior probability of ܤ and ܲሺܣሻ is the prior probability of ܣ. 
Similarly, the variable ܤ might be conditioned on several variables, say an additional 
variable ܥ, turning equation 3.15 into: 
 
ܲሺܤȁܣǡ ܥሻ ൌ ܲሺܣȁܤǡ ܥሻܲሺܤȁܥሻܲሺܣȁܥሻ ൌ ܲሺܣǡ ܤȁܥሻ ? ܲሺܣǡ ܤȁܥሻ஻ ǡ 3.16 
All of the probability updating in the BBN is performed using equation 3.16. 
3.2.2.2 Chain rule for Bayesian Belief Networks 
Let ܷ ൌ ሼܣଵǡ ǥ ǡ ܣ௡ሽ  be a universe of variables in the BBN. If we know the joint 
probability table ܲሺܷሻ ൌ ܲሺܣଵǡ ǥ ǡ ܣ௡ሻ, then we can also calculate ܲሺܣ௜ሻ as well as ܲሺܣ௜ȁ݁ሻ, where ݁ is evidence about some of the variables in the BBN. However, ܲሺܷሻ 
grows exponentially with the number of variables and the table becomes intractably 
large. Therefore, the general chain rule can be applied to the BBN. A unique joint 
probability distribution ܲሺܷሻ can be given by the product of all conditional probability 
tables specified in the BBN: 
 ܲሺܷሻ ൌ ෑ ܲ൫ܣ௜หሺܣ௜ሻ൯௡௜ୀଵ ǡ 3.17 
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where ሺܣ௜ሻ are the parents of ܣ௜ in the BBN, and ܲሺܷሻ reflects the properties of the 
BBN. 
The main purpose of the BBN is to update beliefs of occurrences of different node 
values in the BBN, after evidence to the variables has been introduced. Evidence ݁௜ 
for variable ܣ௜ with ܰ states is inserted as an ܰ-dimensional vector of zeros and ones. 
After inserting evidence ݁ଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݁௠ for variables throughout a Bayesian network, the joint probability table can be updated using the chain rule (see equation 3.17): 
 ܲሺܷǡ ݁ሻ ൌ ෑ ܲ൫ܣหሺܣሻ൯஺א௎ ෑ ݁௜௠௜ୀଵ ǡ 3.18 
and for ܣ א ܷ we have 
 ܲሺܣȁ݁ሻ ൌ  ? ܲሺܷǡ ݁ሻ௎ ?ሼ஺ሽܲሺ݁ሻ  3.19 
The initial probabilities of BBN variables are known as prior probabilities, while the 
updated probabilities after evidence was inserted into the BBN are known as 
posterior probabilities. 
3.2.2.3 Graphical representation of BBN 
Specialised software tools with a graphical user interface are often used to build a 
BBN graph. HUGIN software was used in this study to build and analyse BBNs. 
Different types of BBN nodes, which are used in this study are listed in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4. Types of BBN nodes used in the study 
Node symbol Node type Description 
 
Discrete chance 
node 
Discrete chance nodes are the basic and 
most-used nodes of the BBN. They can 
further be divided into different types: 
labelled, Boolean, numbered and interval. 
Labelled nodes are the ones that are used in 
this study. States of the labelled nodes are 
labels of a certain event or condition, e.g. 
labelled nodes are used to represent the 
working and failed states of components. 
 
Instance node 
An instance node is used to create a modular 
BBN. If certain parts of the BBN are repetitive 
these can be constructed as instances and 
then used throughout the BBN. For example, 
an instance node can be created for the level 
control loop and if there are several level 
control loops with an identical structure, the 
instance node can be used to reduce the 
graphical complexity of the BBN. The BBN 
that has instance nodes is known as an 
Object Oriented Bayesian Network (OOBN). 
 
Input node 
An input node is used to connect instance 
nodes to other nodes in the BBN. Input nodes 
must be chosen when a BBN, which is used 
as an instance node, is built. Input nodes 
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Node symbol Node type Description 
have to be of the same type and of the 
identical structure as the nodes of the BBN 
outside the instance node which are 
connected to the input nodes. 
 
Output node 
An output node is used to provide an output 
(or multiple outputs) from the instance node.  
 
Information node 
An information node is an additional type of a 
node derived to make a graphical 
representation of the BBN clearer. These 
nodes are used to provide evidence in the 
BBN. These nodes are coloured in pale 
green. 
 
Condition node 
Nodes that represent states of every 
component (e.g. LT1 failure, LC1 failure) in 
฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀B฀B฀N฀ ฀a฀r฀e฀ ฀“฀C฀o฀n฀d฀i฀t฀i฀o฀n฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀s฀”฀.฀ ฀T฀h฀e฀s฀e฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀s฀ 
are coloured in dark blue. 
3.2.2.4 Bayesian Belief Networks for fault detection and diagnosis 
Bayesian belief networks are widely used for modelling systems subject to a high 
level of uncertainty. The systems usually consist of a number of different components 
and the complexity and uncertainty lies in the interactions between those 
components. Some of the examples of the BBN method applied to such systems 
include aeroplane engines in (Sahin et al., 2007), a water tank system in (Lampis and 
Andrews, 2009b) and rotating flexible rotors in (Xu, 2012). 
The BBN technique was combined with a particle swarm optimization (PSO) method 
for the fault detection and diagnostics of aeroplane engines in (Sahin et al., 2007). 
The proposed methodology consisted of three steps: pre-processing of input data, 
identifying the best structure of the BBN model with the PSO method and performing 
fault diagnostics with the BBN model. 
Representative data was collected during a flight from various sensors measuring 
temperature, pressure and altitude. The available data was used in the PSO 
algorithm to generate a BBN with the best structure, based on the fault detection 
ability. A fault was considered as detected if the probability of the fault, given by the 
BBN, was bigger than a certain threshold. 
A case study of an aeroplane engine was presented, where data from 15 oil-related 
sensors of the aeroplane engine were available. Various structures of BBNs were 
tested (fault nodes with different numbers of parents, nodes with different numbers of 
states). The best performing BBN obtained a 94.34% rate for correctly detecting 
faulty scenarios. However, 28.77% of the non-faulty scenarios were also detected as 
faulty. The high number of false alarms would result in unnecessary maintenance of 
the engine, if such an approach was used in practice. Nevertheless, the authors 
indicated that further tuning of parameters used in the PSO algorithm might lead to 
better results. 
BBNs were used to detect and diagnose failures of a water tank system in (Lampis 
and Andrews, 2009b). This system somewhat resembles the system analysed in this 
thesis (both systems consisting of valves, controllers), however it is a relatively 
simple system, where only one liquid level has to be controlled and there are no 
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interactions between the flows from one subsection of the system to another, as 
observed in the three-phase separator. 
The authors introduced a method to convert fault trees into BBNs. Four non-coherent 
fault trees were converted into BBNs. These networks were then connected to form a 
single network. The sensor readings from the water tank system were input as 
patterns in the BBN (for example constant flow, no flow, from constant to no flow and 
oscillating flow). In order to test the method proposed, a simulation model to simulate 
the operation of the water tank system was built using C++. 98.7% of the failures 
identified by the BBN corresponded to actual failure causes in the simulation model. 
The testing of the proposed approach showed the potential of the BBN technique to 
be used to detect and diagnose failures of similar systems. 
A methodology based on BBN for the fault diagnosis of rotating machinery was 
proposed by Xu (Xu, 2012). Three layers were chosen to build the BBN: a machine 
running conditions layer (for example, uneven heating of rotors), a machine faults (for 
example, rotor crack) layer and a fault symptoms layer (for example, large magnitude 
of rotor vibrations). These three layers were interconnected in the BBN, which is 
given in Figure 3.4. Nodes belonging to machine running conditions, machine faults 
and fault symptoms layers are coloured in yellow, purple and green respectively. 
 
Figure 3.4. BBN for the fault diagnostics of rotating flexible rotors 
The prior probabilities for the root nodes in the layer of machine running conditions 
were initially estimated by field experts and then refined by technicians according to 
the specific conditions of the machine. The conditional probabilities tables in the 
second and third layers were determined by experts. 
Several scenarios with single and multiple faults were used to test the capabilities of 
the proposed BBN for the fault diagnostics. Faults were successfully diagnosed in 4 
tested scenarios. However more extensive testing should be performed in order to 
validate the proposed methodology. 
Overall, the BBN techniques used for fault detection and diagnostics have the 
following advantages: 
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x The modelled system is represented graphically, thus it is easier to visualise 
and understand the interactions between the components and subsystems of 
the whole system. 
x Prior knowledge about the modelled system can be incorporated in the model 
based on historical statistical data or expert knowledge. 
x The model can be developed and improved further without altering the 
structure of BBN, when new data about system components and their failure 
modes becomes available. 
x The fault diagnostics can be performed iteratively. For example, an engineer 
is certain that some failure modes have not occurred. Evidence for these 
failure modes can be entered in the BBN to update the posterior probabilities 
of remaining failure modes. 
Based on the success of previous studies and the mentioned advantages of the BBN 
modelling technique the methodology proposed in this study is also based on BBNs. 
3.2.2.5 Summary 
An extensive literature review has been carried out to identify the state of the art in 
fault detection and diagnostics used in the oil and gas industry. The majority of the 
approaches were based on mathematical models of the systems investigated (e.g. 
separators, stirring tanks) whose outputs were then compared to the performance 
data obtained from the systems. Residuals from these comparisons were then 
analysed in order to detect system failures. However, details of the results presented 
in the studies did not allow a meaningful evaluation of the performance of most of the 
model-based approaches to be performed. 
The other big group of methods used for fault detection and diagnostics was 
statistical analysis methods, where the operational data of systems considered was 
used to perform a statistical analysis and classify the operation as faulty or fault-free. 
The main deficiency of such methods was the need to use operational data with 
faults present in the system for a training phase of the methods. Such data is usually 
not available in practice, especially for hazardous failure modes, since they occur 
rarely. Moreover, multiple failure modes were not considered in the studies 
investigated. 
The Bayesian Belief Network technique was identified as a possible method to tackle 
the deficiencies of the previous approaches. An introduction to the technique was 
given and the chain rule for updating the posterior probabilities of the BBN was 
presented. Specific features, such as the colour coding used to identify different 
types of BBN nodes in the HUGIN software chosen to be used to build the BBNs, 
were described next. 
Finally, several examples of fault detection and diagnostic techniques based on the 
BBN method were presented. Three different systems were considered, aeroplane 
engines, rotating flexible rotors and a water tank system. The performance of these 
techniques in the fault detection and diagnostics of the considered systems was 
discussed and their general advantages were identified. These showed a potential of 
the BBN method to be suitable for the fault detection and diagnostics of a three-
phase separator. 
The three-phase separator simulation model is presented in the next section. 
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3.3 Three-phase separator simulation model 
When developing a fault detection and diagnostic technique for an industrial system, 
it is essential to test the technique in as close to real operating conditions as possible. 
This can be done in several ways: having a scaled version of the real operating 
system (Yang, 2006) or modelling the system and its operation using specialised 
software tools (Dias et al., 1993, Taylor and Omana, 2008). The first option is more 
desirable, since a scaled system can have operating conditions similar to those of the 
real system. However, this option is rarely used in practice, since building a test 
system can be costly. Moreover, testing using such a system usually takes more time, 
since all effects of failures have to be removed from the system before another failure 
can be inserted in the system. It might even be unsafe to induce specific failure 
modes, which might lead to the damage of the system. 
The second option ฀– system models ฀– are favoured, since they can capture the main 
operating conditions of real systems and are cheap to implement. Furthermore, the 
data from the models is easily obtainable and even hazardous failure modes can be 
easily tested. The cost of developing models, the time taken to get the data and the 
ease of modelling different failures are the most important factors making the system 
models a preferred option for testing and validating fault detection and diagnostic 
techniques. The latter approach was also used in the research presented in this 
thesis. 
Software with a graphical user interface for modelling the operation of a three-phase 
separator under both normal and affected by faults operating conditions was written 
in C++. A simplified model of a three-phase separator was considered. If necessary, 
the complexity of the simulation model can be increased by modifying model 
assumptions. The assumptions used for the three-phase separator modelling are as 
follows: 
1. The separation process is assumed to be perfect. All of the incoming mixture 
is completely separated into three different phases, i.e. water, oil and gas, 
and the separation occurs instantly. 
2. The layers of different phases are formed on top of each other and do not mix, 
just separate. 
3. The volume of internal components (e.g. inlet diverter, weir) is not considered. 
4. The maximum inflow is twice as high as an average inflow. Control valves are 
designed to allow the same maximum outflow rates as those of the maximum 
inflows, when the valves are fully open. When outlet valves are half opened, 
an amount corresponding to an average inflow is released from the vessel. 
5. The precision of level transmitters is 1 cm, the precision of flow rate 
transmitters is 0.001 m3 (1 litre) and the precision of pressure transmitters is 1 
kPa. 
6. Control valves can be opened with a 5% precision ranging from being fully 
closed (opened 0%) to fully opened (opened 100%). 
7. A control command sent from the controller to a control valve is recalculated 
every 5 seconds, while levels of water, oil and gas are monitored every 
second. 
8. There is no dead time between time points when the level of each phase is 
measured and sent from the transmitter to the controller; and then the control 
command is sent from the controller to the control valve. 
9. Selected PI control parameters ܥܱ௕ (controller bias value), ܭ஼ (controller gain) 
and ௜ܶ  (integral time) are such that they do not cause a disruption to the 
operation of the three-phase separator when all of the control components 
are working. 
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10. Physical design parameters of the separator (e.g. weir height, separator 
radius etc.) and normal operating conditions (e.g. water-oil interface set point, 
oil level set point), given in Table 3.5 are assumed to be chosen appropriately. 
11. Discrete 1 second time steps are used to model the operation of the three-
phase separator. 
Table 3.5. Parameters of the three-phase separator model 
Parameter Value 
Separator radius 2 m 
Gravity settling section length 7 m 
Separated oil section length 3 m 
Weir height 2 m 
Water-oil interface set point 1 m 
Oil level set point 1 m 
Pressure set point 500 kPa 
Maximum flow through valve CV1 0.15 m3/s 
Maximum flow through valve CV2 0.15 m3/s 
Maximum flow through valve CV3 0.15 m3/s 
Initial water level 1 m 
Initial oil level 1 m 
Initial pressure level 500 kPa 
3.3.1 Simulating the operation of a three-phase separator 
This section explains how the operation of the three-phase separator is simulated in 
the C++ model. Firstly, the structure of the C++ model to perform a single step of 
simulation of three-phase separator is presented in Figure 3.5. Note that the structure 
of the model involves only C++ functions and variables, which form a core for the 
simulation model. Additional functions and variables are used (mainly for inputting 
and outputting data) but are not given in the figure. 
 
Figure 3.5. Structure of the three-phase separator simulation model in C++ 
The types of functions and variables are given in bold in Figure 3.5. The function that 
is responsible for the modelling of the water, oil and gas level changes in the 
฀s฀e฀p฀a฀r฀a฀t฀o฀r฀ ฀i฀s฀ ฀n฀a฀m฀e฀d฀ ฀“฀L฀e฀v฀e฀l฀_฀c฀h฀a฀n฀g฀e฀s฀_฀i฀n฀_฀t฀h฀r฀e฀e฀_฀p฀h฀a฀s฀e฀s฀”฀. Once this fun tion is 
executed, the execution of updating functions to update the information of 
components of three-phase separator is started. 
Controller LC1
void update_controller
Valve CV1
void update_valve
Transmitter FT1
void update_transmitter
Transmitter FT2
void update_transmitter
Transmitter FT3
void update_transmitter
Controller LC2
void update_controller
Controller LC3
void update_controller
Transmitter LT1
void update_transmitter
Transmitter LT2
void update_transmitter
Transmitter LT3
void update_transmitter
Valve CV2
void update_valve
Valve CV3
void update_valve
Water 
outflow
Oil 
outflow
Gas 
outflow
Water 
inflow
Oil inflow
Gas 
inflow
T_Failure 
FT0_F
void Level_changes_in_three_phases
T_Failure 
LT1_F
C_Failure 
LC1_F
V_Failure 
CV1_F
T_Failure 
FT1_F
T_Failure 
LT2_F
C_Failure 
LC2_F
V_Failure 
CV2_F
T_Failure 
FT2_F
T_Failure 
LT3_F
C_Failure 
LC3_F
V_Failure 
CV3_F
T_Failure 
FT3_F
Transmitter FT0_g
void update_transmitter
Transmitter FT0_w
void update_transmitter
Transmitter FT0_o
void update_transmitter
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Each component of the three-phase separator (see Table 3.2) is represented by a 
certain C++ structure ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀y฀p฀e฀ ฀“฀T฀r฀a฀n฀s฀m฀i฀t฀t฀e฀r฀”฀,฀ ฀“฀C฀o฀n฀t฀r฀o฀l฀l฀e฀r฀”฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀“฀V฀a฀l฀v฀e฀”, giv n in Figure 
3.6. Each structure has a function associated with it ฀(฀“฀u฀p฀d฀a฀t฀e฀_฀t฀r฀a฀n฀s฀m฀i฀t฀t฀e฀r฀”฀,฀ 
฀“฀u฀p฀d฀a฀t฀e฀_฀c฀o฀n฀t฀r฀o฀l฀l฀e฀r฀”฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀“฀u฀p฀d฀a฀t฀e฀_฀v฀a฀l฀v฀e฀”฀)฀ in o der to update the information of 
variables in the structure. 
 
Figure 3.6. Types of structures in C++ to represent flow and level transmitters 
(Transmitter), PI controllers (Controller) and control valves (Valve) 
The structures presented above are used in conjunction with additional structures 
that contain information about the failures of each component, as given in Figure 3.7. 
For example, a flow transmitter FT1 has an associated structure of type T_failure, 
฀w฀h฀e฀r฀e฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀w฀x฀S฀t฀r฀i฀n฀g฀ ฀“฀n฀a฀m฀e฀”฀ ฀i฀n฀ ฀t฀h฀i฀s฀ ฀s฀t฀r฀u฀c฀t฀u฀r฀e฀ ฀i฀s฀ ฀“฀F฀T฀1฀”฀,฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ B฀o o l e a฀n฀ ฀v฀a฀r฀i฀a฀b฀l฀e฀ ฀“฀F฀a i฀l฀”฀ 
represents either faulty ฀(฀“฀t฀r฀u฀e฀”฀)฀ o  non-faulty ฀(฀“฀f฀a฀l฀s฀e฀”฀)฀ condition and integer variables 
฀“฀F฀_฀s฀_฀t฀i฀m฀e฀”฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀“฀F฀_฀e฀_฀t฀i฀m฀e฀”฀ ฀r฀e฀p฀r฀e฀s฀e฀n฀t฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀s฀t฀a฀r฀t฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀e฀n฀d฀ ฀t฀i฀m e  ฀o f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀c฀o฀n฀s฀i฀d e r฀e d  f฀a i l฀u฀r฀e฀ 
mode. 
 
Figure 3.7. Types of structure in C++ to represent failure modes of transmitters 
(T_failure), controllers (C_failure) and valves (V_failure) 
The above described structures form a core of the simulation model. The way the 
simulation is performed is presented next. The simulation can be summarised as 
given in the Figure 3.8. 
Several input parameters have to be specified to initialise the separator model, for 
example the duration of simulation and the type of inflow into the separator 
(presented in section 3.3.2). Once the necessary parameters are initialised, the 
failure modes that will be simulated in the simulation run have to be specified. The 
start and end time points of the failure modes have to be set. However the 
rectification of component failures was not considered in this study, thus the end time 
of failure modes coincide with the end of the simulation run. The necessary inputs for 
the simulation model are set and the simulation can start. 
ControllerTransmitter
wxString     name
double        shown_info
double        true_info
double        min_info
double        max_info
Valve
wxString      name
double         min_flow
double         max_flow
double         min_opening
double         max_opening
double         previous_opening
double         current_opening
double         allowable_flow
wxString     name
double        K_c
double        T_i
double        prev_error
double        set_point
double        set_point_m3
int                sample_time
double        V_step
double        command_sent
double        command_on_level
double        prev_command_sent
double        prev_command_on_level
void update_transmitter
void update_controller
void update_valve
T_failure
wxString     name
bool             Fail
int                F_s_time
int                F_e_time
C_failure
wxString     name
bool             Fail
int                F_s_time
int                F_e_time
double        F_severity
V_failure
wxString     name
bool             Fail
int                F_s_time
int                F_e_time
double        F_severity
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Figure 3.8. Simulating the operation of three-phase separator 
At each time step of the simulation model the conditions for alarms (see section 3.3.7) 
or undesirable events (see section 3.1.2) are checked first. If none of the conditions 
are satisfied, the operation of the three-phase separator can be simulated further. 
The readings from transmitter FT0 about inflowing water, oil and gas are updated: 
the condition of transmitter FT0 is checked, and if the transmitter has not failed, the 
readings are set corresponding to true inflows. Otherwise, the readings are set 
corresponding to a certain failure mode. Next, the water, oil and gas levels are 
adjusted according to the inflowing and outflowing amounts of each phase. Once the 
levels are adjusted, the readings of level transmitters LT1, LT2 and LT3 are updated. 
If any of these transmitters failed, their readings are adjusted accordingly. Otherwise, 
the actual level, given the chosen precision of the level transmitter is set. The 
readings of level transmitters LT1, LT2 and LT3 are sent to the corresponding 
controllers LC1, LC2 and LC3. 
The commands of PI controllers LC1, LC2 and LC3 are not continuously updated, 
since this helps to prolong the useful life of a valve. If the command of the PI 
controller has to be updated at the simulated time step, it is calculated based on the 
PI algorithm (see section 3.1.4) and depending on the state of the controller (working 
or in one of the failure modes) the respective command is sent to the corresponding 
valve. 
The openings of valves CV1, CV2 and CV3 are adjusted in accordance to the 
commands sent by the corresponding controllers and the current states of the valves 
(working or in one of the failure modes). The readings of flow transmitters FT1, FT2 
and FT3 are then updated, based on the flows through valves CV1, CV2 and CV3 
and the condition of the flow transmitter (working or in one of the failure modes). 
This procedure is repeated for the whole simulation duration or before an alarm is 
raised or an undesirable event occurs. Readings obtained from specific flow and 
level transmitters of the simulation model at each time step are then used to visualise 
the results of the simulation or to perform the fault detection and diagnostic process, 
which is introduced in section 3.4. More details on separate parts of the model are 
given in the next subsections, starting with the possible inflow options to be simulated. 
3.3.2 Inflow options 
Different inflow types are considered in the model of a three-phase separator in order 
to test whether the fault detection and diagnostics technique is able to cope with 
changing separator operating conditions. When different inflows of production fluids 
are considered, separated water, oil and gas levels can change due to variable inflow 
rates as well as component faults, thus making the fault detection and diagnostics 
more challenging. The types of liquid/vapour flows considered in this study are: 
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oscillating flow, increasing flow, decreasing flow and random flow. Details about 
these flows are given next. 
3.3.2.1 Oscillating flow 
An oscillating flow is modelled as a sine function. The minimum and maximum values 
of flow (ܮܤ and ܷܤ respectively) have to be specified together with a number of full 
sine waves, ܰ௪௔௩௘௦, throughout the simulation duration, ௦ܰ௜௠. Then the flow can be 
simulated by the equation: 
 
݂݈݋ݓሺݐሻ ൌ  ? ?ሺሺݔሻ ൅  ?ሻሺܷܤ െ ܮܤሻ ൅ ܮܤǡ 3.20 
where ݂݈݋ݓሺݐሻ is the simulated flow at time ݐ and ݔ is defined as follows: 
 
ݔ ൌ  ?  ? ௪ܰ௔௩௘௦௦ܰ௜௠  ? ݐ  ? ߨǡ 3.21 
where ௪ܰ௔௩௘௦ is the number of full sine waves occurring during the simulation. 
Using equations 3.20 and 3.21, the simulated flow is ensured to have a selected 
number ( ௪ܰ௔௩௘௦) of full sine waves throughout the simulation duration ( ௦ܰ௜௠). The 
flow values range from ܮܤ to ܷܤ. 
3.3.2.2 Increasing/decreasing flow 
An increasing/decreasing flow is simulated in two different ways: by 
increasing/decreasing the flow linearly from the start to the end of the simulation and 
by increasing/decreasing the flow by certain step sizes. As in the case of the 
oscillating flow, the ܮܤ  and ܷܤ  values have to be specified. The linearly 
increasing/decreasing flow is simulated as follows: 
 
݂݈݋ݓሺݐሻ ൌ ݂݈݋ݓሺݐ െ  ?ሻ ൅ ݏ݅݃݊  ?ሺܷܤ െ ܮܤሻ௦ܰ௜௠ െ  ? ǡ ݐ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ௦ܰ௜௠ǡ 3.22 
where ݂݈݋ݓሺݐ െ  ?ሻ is the simulated flow at time ݐ െ  ?, ௦ܰ௜௠ is the simulation duration 
and ݏ݅݃݊ ൌ ൜െ ?ǡ݅ ݂݀݁ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݅݊݃݂݈݋ݓ൅ ?ǡ݅ ݂݅݊ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݅݊݃݂݈݋ݓ . 
Note that, when ݐ ൌ  ?, the starting conditions of the simulated flows are given by the 
following equation: 
 
݂݈݋ݓሺ ?ሻ ൌ ൜ ܮܤǡ ݂݅݅݊ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݅݊݃݂݈݋ݓܷܤǡ ݂݅݀݁ܿݎ݁ܽݏ݅݊݃݂݈݋ݓǤ 3.23 
The increasing/decreasing flow with discrete step sizes needs a number of steps ௦ܰ௧௘௣௦ to be defined. Then the simulation of flow can be described by the following 
equation: 
 
݂݈݋ݓሺݐሻ ൌ ቐ݂݈݋ݓሺݐ െ  ?ሻ ൅ ݏ݅݃݊  ?ሺܷܤ െ ܮܤሻ௦ܰ௧௘௣௦ ǡ ݂݅݉݋݀ ቆݐǡ ௦ܰ௜௠௖ܰ௛௔௡௚௘ቇ  ൌ  ?݂݈݋ݓሺݐ െ  ?ሻǡ ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁  3.24 
where ݉݋݀ሺݔǡ ݕሻ is the modulus operation, which is the remainder of ݔ divided by ݕ. 
The same equation as that in 3.23 holds for the step size increase. 
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3.3.2.3 Random flow 
A random flow is simulated as a random variable with the Normal distribution. The 
necessary inputs are ܮܤ, ܷܤ and ௖ܰ௛௔௡௚௘. The mean ߤ for the Normal distribution is 
calculated as an average of ܮܤ and ܷܤ . The standard deviation ߪ  of the Normal 
distribution can be calculated based on the three-sigma rule: 
 
ܲሺߤ െ  ?  ? ߪ ൑ ݔ ൑ ߤ ൅  ?  ? ߪሻ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?ǡ 3.25 
The three-sigma rule states that observation ݔ, which is distributed with the Normal 
distribution ܰሺߤǡ ߪሻ , lies within interval ሾߤ െ  ?  ? ߪǢ ߤ ൅  ?  ? ߪሿ  with 0.9973 probability. 
For example, if 10000 observations were generated using ܰሺߤǡ ߪሻ, approximately 
9973 of them would be within interval ሾߤ െ  ?  ? ߪǢ ߤ ൅  ?  ? ߪሿ . Thus the standard 
deviation can be calculated using this rule to generate random numbers, with the 
majority of them being in the ሾܮܤǡ ܷܤሿ interval, in the following way: 
 
ߤ െ  ?  ? ߪ ൌܮܤǡ 3.26 
 
ߤ ൅  ?  ? ߪ ൌܷ ܤǡ 3.27 
Given ߤ ൌ ௅஻ା௎஻ଶ , the standard deviation ߪ can be expressed from equations 3.26 
and 3.27 as: 
 
ߪ ൌ ܷܤ െ ܮܤ ? Ǥ 3.28 
Then the flow is simulated as in the following equation: 
 
݂݈݋ݓሺݐሻ ൌ ቐܰሺߤǡ ߪሻǡ ݂݅݉݋݀ ቆݐǡ ௦ܰ௜௠௖ܰ௛௔௡௚௘ቇ  ൌ  ?݂݈݋ݓሺݐ െ  ?ሻǡ ݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁ ǡ ݐ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ௦ܰ௜௠ 3.29 
Note that, the starting conditions of the simulated flow are given by the following 
equation: 
 
݂݈݋ݓሺ ?ሻ ൌ ܰሺߤǡ ߪሻǤ 3.30 
Since 99.73% of the simulated values are within the wanted interval ሾܮܤǡ ܷܤሿ  as 
given by the 3-sigma rule, the generated flows with equation 3.29 are bounded, to 
deal with the 0.27% of the values that are not within the wanted interval in the 
following way: 
 
݂݈݋ݓሺݐሻ ൌ ൫൫ܮܤǡ ݂݈݋ݓሺݐሻ൯ǡ ܷܤ൯Ǥ 3.31 
3.3.3 Liquid flow through a valve 
Valves are usually fitted as final control elements in the liquid level control loop. It is 
important to define how the flow of a liquid changes depending on the opening of the 
valve to be able to determine the expected flow with a given valve opening. Several 
valve characteristics influence an allowable liquid flow through it: a valve type (e.g. 
butterfly, globe, gate), a valve response time (time needed to change the openness 
of the valve by an indicated step size), valve inherent flow characteristic (e.g. linear, 
equal percentage, fast opening). 
The most basic equation (Emerson Process Management, 2001) describing the flow 
of a liquid through a valve is: 
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ܳ௅ ൌ ܥ௩ඨ ଵܲ െ ଶܲܩ௙ ǡ 3.32 
where ܳ௅ is the volumetric flow rate through the valve in gallons per minute, ܥ௩ is the 
valve flow coefficient, which indicates the number of gallons per minute of water that 
will flow through the fully opened valve with 1 PSI of pressure drop, ଵܲ is the valve 
upstream pressure in PSI, ଶܲ is the valve downstream pressure in PSI and ܩ௙ is a 
liquid specific gravity (1 for water) having no units. 
The flow through the valve is a non-linear function of a pressure drop across the 
valve, as can be seen from equation 3.32. Thus, the flow through the valve not only 
depends on the opening of the valve, but also on the liquid level in the vessel and the 
working pressure of the vessel. However, this only holds if the liquid flows through 
the valve due to gravitational forces. In cases when the flow through the valve is 
regulated by a pump, the downstream pressure would be adjusted to obtain a 
required constant flow with a set valve opening angle. The latter valve operation 
scenario will be considered in this research. Thus the liquid flow through the valve 
will be a linear function of a valve opening and the maximum allowable flow: 
 
ܳ௅ ൌ ௢ܸ௣௘௡ܳ௅௠௔௫ǡ 3.33 
where ௢ܸ௣௘௡ is the relative measure of valve opening (0-fully closed, 1-fully opened), ܳ௅௠௔௫ is the maximum allowable liquid flow through the valve. 
3.3.4 Gas flow through a valve 
Gas flow through a valve is different from that of liquids, since gas is compressible. 
When the gas experiences a pressure change its density also changes. Equation 
3.32 for liquid flow through a valve has to be modified to describe the gas flow 
through a valve (Emerson Process Management, 2001): 
 
ܳீ ൌ  ? ? ?ܥ௩ඨሺ ଵܲ െ ଶܲሻሺ ଵܲ ൅ ଶܲሻܩ௚ܶ ǡ 3.34 
where ܳீ is the gas flow through the valve in standard cubic feet per hour, ܥ௩ is the 
valve flow coefficient, also used in equation 3.32, ଵܲ is the gas pressure upstream of 
the valve in PSIA, ଶܲ is the gas pressure downstream of the valve in PSIA, ܩ௚ is a 
specific gravity of gas (1 for air), ܶ is the temperature of gas in degrees Rankine (°R). 
However, this equation only holds when the gas stream velocity does not approach 
the speed of sound, i.e. when ଶܲ ൒ ଵଶ ଵܲ (Emerson Process Management, 2001). 
The gas flow through the valve can be controlled to provide a constant flow of gas 
and a constant decrease of pressure in the vessel for a given constant valve opening. 
Instead of using a pump, a compressor or a blower can be used to regulate the gas 
flow. For the sake of simplicity, the gas flow will be regulated in this study, giving a 
linear relationship between valve opening and gas flow through the valve: 
 
ܳீ ൌ ௢ܸ௣௘௡ܳீ௠௔௫ǡ 3.35 
where ௢ܸ௣௘௡ is the relative measure of valve opening (0-fully closed, 1-fully opened), ܳீ௠௔௫ is the maximum allowable gas flow through a valve. 
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3.3.5 Precision of transmitters 
The precision of transmitters is implemented in the model in the following way: 
 
௦ܶ௛௢௪௡ ൌ ݂݈݋݋ݎሺ݇  ? ௧ܶ௥௨௘ሻ݇  3.36 
where ௧ܶ௥௨௘ is the true information of the measured process variable, expressed in SI 
units, ௦ܶ௛௢௪௡ is the level indicated by a transmitter expressed in SI units, and ݇ is the 
constant depending on the chosen precision, expressed as the ratio between one SI 
unit and the chosen precision in the SI unit, operation ݂݈݋݋ݎ is defined as: 
 
݂݈݋݋ݎሺݔሻ ൌ ௠א௓ ሺ݉ ൑ ݔሻǡ 3.37 
where ܼ is the set of integers. 
The precision of the level transmitter is 1 cm, giving ݇ ൌ ଵ௠଴Ǥ଴ଵ௠ ൌ  ? ? ?. The precision 
of the flow rate transmitter is 0.001 m3, giving ݇ ൌ ଵ୫య଴Ǥ଴଴ଵ୫య ൌ  ? ? ? ?. The precision of 
the pressure transmitter is 1 kPa, giving ݇ ൌ ଵ௉௔ଵ଴଴଴௉௔ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ?. 
An example is given to show how the actual level is converted to a level indicated by 
a transmitter. Assume that a precise level is ௧ܶ௥௨௘ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?݉. Then, according to 
equation 3.36, ௦ܶ௛௢௪௡ ൌ ௙௟௢௢௥ሺ௞ ?೟்ೝೠ೐ሻ௞ ൌ ௙௟௢௢௥ሺ଼ଵǤହଶሻଵ଴଴ ൌ ଼ଵଵ଴଴ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?݉ . Thus, when a 
precise level is ௧ܶ௥௨௘ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ? ? ?݉, the transmitter will show it as ௦ܶ௛௢௪௡ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?݉. 
One could argue that it is better to round the number instead of using the floor 
operation, since this would introduce smaller deviations from the actual values. 
However, the floor operation was chosen so that the level which has already been 
reached can be displayed. If the value was rounded, the transmitter would show level ௦ܶ௛௢௪௡ ൌ  ?Ǥ ? ?݉, before the actual level of 0.82 metres was reached. 
3.3.6 Material movement in the separator 
Flows of liquid and gas in the separator are modelled at discrete time steps of 1 
second. Even though the movement of materials in the vessel happens 
simultaneously, it is modelled through discrete changes in their levels in the following 
order: 
1. With the incoming fluid, the levels of liquids and the volume of gas in the 
gravity settling section are increased accordingly, i.e. the level of water gravity 
settling section, the level of oil in the gravity settling section and the volume of 
gas in the separator. 
2. The water is the first to leave the separator through valve CV1 and the water 
level and the total liquid level in the gravity settling section are adjusted 
accordingly. 
3. The flow over the weir is calculated based on the total liquid level in the 
gravity settling section. 
4. The oil leaves the separator through valve CV2 and the oil level in the 
separated oil section is adjusted accordingly. 
5. The volume of gas in the separator is calculated. 
6. The gas leaves the separator through valve CV3 and the pressure is adjusted 
accordingly. 
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This process is repeated at each time step of the simulation. 
3.3.7 Primary protection from undesirable events 
Protection systems are used in order to avoid undesirable events, as mentioned in 
section 3.1.2. An alarm system is considered to be a protection system in this study. 
For each monitored variable (water-oil interface level, oil level and pressure) low and 
high level alarm thresholds are defined. The thresholds are set for the corresponding 
transmitters and when they are breached an alarm is raised. For the water-oil 
interface level the low level alarm threshold is denoted as WLLA (water low level 
alarm) and the high level alarm threshold is denoted as WHLA (water high level 
alarm). For the oil level the low level alarm threshold is denoted as OLLA and the 
high level alarm threshold as OHLA. Similarly, for the pressure, the low level alarm 
threshold is denoted as PLLA and the high level alarm threshold as PHLA. In this 
study the low level alarm thresholds WLLA and OLLA are chosen as equal to 20% of 
the weir height and the high level alarm thresholds WHLA and OHLA as 80% of the 
weir height. The PLLA is chosen as a deviation of -20% from a set point and the 
PHLA is chosen as a deviation of +20% from a set point. Values of alarm thresholds 
are given in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6. Alarm values for primary protection 
Alarm Value 
Water-oil interface low level alarm (WLLA) 0.4 m 
Water-oil interface high level alarm (WHLA) 1.6 m 
Oil low level alarm (OLLA) 0.4 m 
Oil high level alarm (OHLA) 1.6 m 
Pressure low level alarm (PLLA) 400 kPa 
Pressure high level alarm (PHLA) 600 kPa 
It is considered that if an alarm is raised, appropriate preventative actions are 
performed and the undesirable event is avoided. If the alarm is not raised at an 
appropriate time the undesirable event occurs, given the operating conditions of the 
three-phase separator do not change in the meantime. For example PHLA is raised 
when level transmitter LT3 indicates a higher than 600 kPa value. Note that, if the 
transmitter has failed stuck indicating a lower level, an alarm will not be raised and an 
undesirable event of overpressure will occur. The simulation of the system operation 
is stopped if any of the alarms is raised or an undesirable event occurs. 
3.3.8 Modelling failure modes 
Component failure modes considered in the simulation model are associated with the 
automatic control and measuring of the liquid levels and flows of the three-phase 
separator and are given in Table 3.7. 
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Table 3.7. Failure modes of components of a three-phase separator 
Component name Failure mode The way the failure mode is 
modelled 
Flow transmitter 
(FT0, FT1, FT2, FT3) 
1 ฀– Failed stuck 
(FS) 
The flow rate shown remains the 
same as at the time of failure 
irrespective of the actual flow rate. 
Level transmitter 
(LT1, LT2, LT3) 
1 ฀– Failed stuck 
(FS) 
The level shown remains the same as 
that at the time of failure and this level 
is sent to the controller each time the 
control command is updated, 
irrespective of the actual level. 
PI controller 
(LC1, LC2, LC3) 
1 ฀– Failed low (FL) The minimum output command is sent 
to the control valve, regardless of the 
actual information received from the 
corresponding transmitter. 
2 ฀– Failed high (FH) The maximum output command is 
sent to the control valve, regardless of 
the actual information received from 
the corresponding transmitter. 
Control valve 
(CV1, CV2, CV3) 
1 ฀– Failed closed 
(FC) 
The valve remains closed and 
prevents any flow, regardless of the 
actual command received from the 
controller 
2 ฀– Failed opened 
(FO) 
The valve remains fully opened and 
allows maximum flow, irrespective of 
the actual command received from the 
controller 
Once a component has failed it is considered that it remains in that state until the end 
of the simulation and therefore it cannot fail again with a different failure mode. For 
example, if a controller has failed low it cannot fail high during the same simulation 
instance. 
3.3.9 Graphical user interface 
A graphical user interface was developed using a C++ library called wxWidgets 
(wxWidgets) to allow the user to interactively change physical parameters of the 
three-phase separator, choose the type of inflows to be modelled, insert failures in 
the simulation model and visualise the simulation results. A variety of physical 
parameters of separator (e.g. weir height, separation section length and etc.), 
different inflow options and the remaining input parameters (e.g. duration of 
simulation) can be set as shown in Figure 3.9. 
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Figure 3.9. A graphical user interface to set the parameters of the three-phase 
separator model 
Once these parameters are set, the next screen allows users to specify the faults to 
be modelled in the selected simulation run as shown in Figure 3.10. Here, a diagram 
of a three-phase separator is given so that the user could clearly see a position of the 
component in question in the separator and which section of the separator will be 
directly affected by a component fault. 
 
Figure 3.10. A graphical user interface to induce faults in the components of three-
phase separator 
After component faults have been selected (or imported from a data file) the 
simulation model can be run. Once the simulation has finished, changes in water, oil 
and gas levels in the separator can be plotted, as shown in Figure 3.11. The plots 
show the actual levels of liquids and the ones indicated by the level transmitters LT1, 
LT2 and LT3. The difference between actual levels and shown levels depend on the 
selected precision of level transmitters and their conditions, i.e. whether they are 
working or failed stuck. 
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Figure 3.11. An example screen of the modelled water/oil interface level dynamics in 
the separation section given the oscillating water inflow 
3.3.10 Summary 
A common approach to test the fault detection and diagnostic technique is to use a 
simulation model of the operation of the considered system. Such an approach was 
chosen in this study and a simulation model of a three-phase separator was built. 
The main aim of the simulation model was to simulate the effects of component faults. 
The simulation model has a lot of flexibility built in. For example, several different 
types of oil, water and gas inflows can be modelled, different physical parameters of 
the separator can be chosen and different precisions of level transmitters can be set. 
The core structure of the simulation model was presented first. This was followed by 
more detailed information about the specifics of the model, such as how different 
inflows were modelled, how the failure modes were inserted in the simulation model. 
Finally, a graphical user interface was presented, showing screenshots from the 
developed software and briefly introducing the sequence of the user input required to 
run the simulation model of the three-phase separator. 
The information obtained from the simulation model was then used for the fault 
detection and diagnostics process, which is introduced in the next section. 
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3.4 Proposed methodology for the fault detection and diagnostics of three-
phase separators 
3.4.1 Overview of the proposed methodology 
The proposed methodology for fault detection and diagnostics of a three-phase 
separator is based on the BBN technique. It models changes of water, oil and gas 
levels in the individual sections and the whole separator when the system is free from 
faults as well as when some faults exist. Since the three sections of the separator are 
highly dependable on one another, a failure in one section will usually have a 
noticeable impact on other sections. This can be detected if the measuring 
equipment has not failed in the remaining sections. 
The idea of the methodology proposed for fault detection and diagnostics is to split 
the operation period of the three-phase separator into time intervals and then 
compare sensor readings recorded during several successive time intervals (called 
time slices in this study). The length for each time slice could be chosen depending 
on the operational conditions of the three-phase separator. Commonly used types of 
sensors are considered, such as flow transmitters and level transmitters. For the 
analysis purposes some pre-processing of the readings of transmitters is required in 
order to derive additional information about the processes in the separator (e.g. 
combination of flow rate transmitter readings) as well as capturing the dynamics of 
the separator (see section 3.4.2). 
The BBN model was developed by replicating the way that water, oil and gas are 
propagated through each section before they leave the separator. The nodes in the 
BBN model represent conditions of three-phase separator components, sensor 
readings and changes in levels of oil, gas and water. Two types of nodes are defined: 
condition and information nodes. Condition nodes are used to represent states of 
components. Information nodes are used to input sensor readings into the model. 
The arcs are used to model the causal relationships between the nodes. For example, 
arcs are used to join the respective nodes to model the effect of the component 
failure on sensor readings. 
The BBN for the fault detection and diagnostics was developed in a modular way. 
First of all, generic rules were formed and a BBN called ³)7B,'JLYHQ/7B,'´ was 
built to model a control loop in a three-phase separator (see section 3.4.3.1). Then 
generic rules were formed for constructing a BBN to model the liquid or vapour 
changes in a generic section (see section 3.4.3.2) which also includes the previously 
built BBN ³)7B,'JLYHQ/7B,'´. Due to distinctive features of each section, section 
specific rules were also developed in addition to the generic rules and individual 
BBNs were built for each section. The BBNs ³6HSDUDWLRQ VHFWLRQ´, ³Separated oil 
VHFWLRQ´ and ³*DV VHFWLRQ´ can be found in sections 3.4.3.3, 3.4.3.4 and 3.4.3.5, 
respectively. 
Once the BBNs for the individual sections were built, a BBN to model interactions 
between these sections was developed, combining individual section BBNs and was 
called a ³6LQJOHWLPHVOLFH´ BBN (see section 3.4.3.6). It models changes of water, oil 
and gas levels in all sections during an observed time slice. Multiple instances of the 
³6LQJOHWLPHVOLFH´ BBNs were then ฀c฀o฀m฀b฀i฀n฀e฀d฀ ฀(฀a฀d฀d฀i฀n฀g฀ ฀n฀o฀t฀a฀t฀i฀o฀n฀ ฀t฀o฀ ฀e฀a฀c฀h฀ ฀“฀t-3=>t-฀2฀”฀,  “ t-
2=>t-฀1฀”฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀“฀t-฀1฀=฀>฀t฀”฀)฀ ฀t฀o฀ ฀o฀b฀t฀a฀i฀n฀ ฀a฀ ³7ULSOHWLPHVOLFH´ BBN, which was used to perform 
the fault detection and diagnostics stage. The structure of the final BBN model is 
given in Figure 3.12. When BBNs are built in this way (using BBNs as a part of 
another BBN), they are referred to as Object Oriented Bayesian Networks (OOBN). 
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Figure 3.12. Structure of the whole system OOBN model ³7ULSOHWLPHVOLFH´ used for 
fault detection and diagnostics 
Note that specific shapes representing individual parts of the system OOBN in Figure 
3.12 are used to denote BBNs with identical structure (for example, FT1 given LT1 
and FT2 given LT1). 
When simulating the operation of the system, the posterior probabilities of the states 
of condition nodes (nodes representing conditions of components, see section 
3.2.2.3) in the last slice of the ³7ULSOHWLPHVOLFH´ OOBN (namely ³6LQJOHWLPHVOLFHW-
 !W´) are being monitored during the simulation time. A certain component failure 
mode is considered to be detected if the posterior probability representing that mode 
exceeds a certain threshold. Thus the fault detection and diagnostics stage is 
performed simultaneously. Note that, whenever the fault detection and diagnostics 
model will be mentioned in the further sections, it will represent the OOBN ³7ULSOH
WLPHVOLFH´. 
The developed methodology is presented in the next sections in more detail. 
3.4.2 Fault detection and diagnostics model input data 
As mentioned previously, there are components in the three-phase separator, which 
provide a way to monitor the operation of the separator. Flow rate transmitters and 
level transmitters (which are primarily used as part of process control equipment) are 
the components which can provide the information needed for fault detection and 
diagnostics purposes. Their provided readings are used as input data for the OOBN 
model. In the proposed methodology this data is obtained from the simulation model. 
The majority of information available from transmitters in the separator simulation 
model is pre-processed before it can be inputted into the OOBN. Moreover, not only 
readings from single transmitters but also several combinations of transmitter 
readings are considered in order to derive additional information to be used in the 
OOBN. The transmitter data used in the OOBN and its pre-processing is discussed in 
more detail next. 
3.4.2.1 Combining the information from the transmitters 
Combining the information from multiple transmitters installed on the separator allows 
supplementary data about the processes in the separator to be obtained without a 
need to install additional equipment. For example, in the separation section the 
combination of transmitter FT0 and FT1 readings can be used to determine the water 
level change rate, since FT0 transmitter has information about the inflowing water 
and FT1 transmitter has information about the outflowing water. Moreover, the water 
level change rate can also be determined from the readings of transmitter LT1. Thus, 
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by comparing the data of combined transmitters FT0 and FT1 and single transmitter 
LT1 the actual water level change rate can be evaluated and failure of one of the 
transmitters can be detected. Combinations of the transmitter readings (addition or 
subtraction of values) considered in this study are listed in Table 3.8. 
Table 3.8. Combinations of transmitter readings 
Combination Purpose 
฀“฀F฀T฀0฀ ฀w฀a฀t฀e฀r฀ ฀– F฀T 1 ” Determines the water level change rate in the separation 
section and aids the fault detection of transmitters FT0, 
FT1 and LT1 
฀“฀F฀T฀0฀ ฀w฀a฀t฀e฀r฀ ฀–FT1 + FT0 
฀o฀i฀l฀” 
Determines the total liquid level change rate in the 
separation section and aids the fault detection of 
transmitters FT0, FT1 and LT1 
฀“฀F฀T฀0฀ ฀g฀a฀s฀ ฀– F฀T฀3฀” Determines the gas level change rate in the separator 
and aids the fault detection of transmitters FT0, FT3 and 
LT3 
฀“฀F฀T฀0฀ ฀w฀a฀t฀e฀r฀ - FT1 + FT0 
oil - ฀F฀T฀2฀” 
Determines the volume change for gas in the separator 
and aids the fault detection of transmitters FT0, FT1, FT2, 
LT1 and LT2 
฀“฀L฀T฀1฀ ฀t฀o฀t฀a฀l฀ ฀l฀i฀q฀u฀i฀d฀ ฀l฀e฀v฀e฀l฀ 
change + LT2 level 
฀c฀h฀a฀n฀g฀e฀” 
Determines the volume change for gas in the separator 
and aids the fault detection of transmitters FT0, FT1, FT2, 
LT1 and LT2 
The use of the listed combinations of transmitter readings improves the accuracy of 
fault detection. For example, if the ฀“฀L฀T฀1฀ ฀t฀o฀t฀a฀l฀ ฀l฀i฀q฀u฀i฀d฀ ฀l฀e฀v฀e฀l฀ ฀c฀h฀a฀n฀g฀e฀ ฀+฀ ฀L฀T฀2฀ ฀l฀e฀v฀e฀l฀ ฀c฀h฀a฀n฀g฀e฀”฀ 
and the ฀“฀F฀T฀0฀ ฀w฀a฀t฀e฀r฀ ฀– FT1 + FT0 oil – F฀T฀2฀”฀ ฀r฀e฀a฀d฀i฀n฀g฀s฀ ฀d฀i฀f฀f฀e฀r฀,฀ ฀i฀t฀ ฀i฀n฀d฀i฀c฀a฀t฀e฀s฀ ฀t฀h฀a฀t฀ ฀o฀n฀e฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ 
components FT0, FT1, FT2, LT1 or LT2 might have failed. 
3.4.2.2 Pre-processing the readings from the transmitters 
As mentioned previously, a pre-processing of readings from transmitters is performed 
before this information is used as input data of the OOBN. The available information 
is summarised in Table 3.9, giving the name of the information and the type of the 
pre-processing that is performed on it. Note that readings from the same transmitters 
may be pre-processed in several ways. The different pre-processing options, PP01-
PP06, performed in this study are presented in the next subsections. 
Table 3.9. Sensor readings as inputs to the OOBN model 
Information name Pre-processing 
FT0 water inflow info PPO1, PPO4 (CV1), PPO6 
FT0 oil inflow info PPO1, PPO4 (CV2), PPO6 
FT0 gas inflow info PPO1, PPO4 (CV3), PPO6 
LT1 info PPO2, PPO1, PPO6 
LT2 info PPO2, PPO1, PPO6 
LT3 info PPO2, PPO1, PPO6 
FT1 info PPO1, PPO4 (CV1), PPO6 
FT2 info PPO1, PPO4 (CV2), PPO6 
FT3 info PPO1, PPO4 (CV3), PPO6 
FT0 info varied PPO5, PPO6 
FT1 info varied PPO5, PPO6 
FT2 info varied PPO5, PPO6 
FT3 info varied PPO5, PPO6 
LT1 total liquid level PPO1, PPO6 
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Information name Pre-processing 
LT1 water level change rate PPO3, PPO4 (CV1), PPO6 
LT1 total liquid level change rate PPO3, PPO4 (CV1), PPO6 
LT2 oil level change rate PPO3, PPO4 (CV2), PPO6 
LT3 pressure level change rate PPO3, PPO4 (CV3), PPO6 
FT0 water ฀– FT1 PPO1, PPO4 (CV1), PPO6 
FT0 water ฀– FT1 + FT0 oil PPO1, PPO4 (CV1), PPO6 
FT0 gas ฀– FT3 PPO1, PPO4 (CV3), PPO6 
FT0 water ฀– FT1 + FT0 oil ฀– FT2 PPO1, PPO4 (CV1+CV2), PPO6 
LT1 total liquid level change + LT2 level change PPO3, PPO4 (CV1+CV2), PPO6 
3.4.2.2.1 Averaging at selected sampling intervals (PPO1) 
Readings obtained from flow and level transmitters has to be averaged at certain 
sampling times (denoted as pre-processing option 1, PPO1) in order to present the 
information about a flow/level during a certain time period in the format compatible 
with the OOBN requirements. This is performed by dividing the information from 
transmitters into sampling intervals. For example, if the sampling time is every 10 
seconds, the information from a transmitter is then extracted every 10 seconds, 
giving 10 readings (if the transmitter records one reading per second) which are then 
averaged. Thus the averaging at selected sampling intervals can be summarised as 
follows: 
1. Extract the relevant information from a selected transmitter for the chosen 
sampling time. 
2. Calculate the average of the information based on the formula: 
 
ݔҧ ൌ  ?݊෍ ݔ௜௡௜ୀଵ ǡ 3.38 
where ݔҧ is the averaged reading from the selected transmitter, ݔ௜ is the reading from 
the selected transmitter at the ݅th point of the sampling interval, ݊ is the number of 
time points in the sampling interval. 
3.4.2.2.2 Transforming into a corresponding PI command (PPO2) 
The information from level transmitters measuring water, oil or pressure levels is 
transformed into a corresponding PI command by mimicking the PI controller 
algorithm (denoted as pre-processing option 2, PPO2). This is done in order to 
determine the exact command that would be sent to a control valve, given the 
readings of a level transmitter if the controller is functioning correctly. For example, if 
level transmitter LT1 shows a water level of 1 meter, the PI controller algorithm, as 
defined in 3.1, is used to determine what command (CO) would be indicated by the 
controller with the given LT1 level. So the information provided by level transmitters 
is transformed into a PI controller command, specifying how much the valve should 
be opened for a given level of the substance measured. 
3.4.2.2.3 Calculating the difference at selected sampling intervals (PPO3) 
The difference of the level transmitter readings is calculated in order to provide the 
OOBN model with information on how the levels of substances measured change 
over time. As in the case of averaging transmitter readings, the information from a 
168 
 
transmitter is divided into sampling intervals first. The difference between the end 
and start points of the sampling interval is then calculated (denoted as pre-
processing option 3, PPO3) based on the formula: 
 
ݔௗ௜௙௙ ൌ ݔ௡ െ ݔଵ݊ ǡ 3.39 
where ݔௗ௜௙௙  is the averaged difference of readings from the transmitter, ݔ௡  is a 
reading from the transmitter at the end point of the sampling interval, ݔଵ is a reading 
from the transmitter at the start point of the sampling interval. 
3.4.2.2.4 Norming to the maximum (PPO4) 
The norming of the transmitter readings in this study (denoted as pre-processing 
option 4, PPO4 (name of the corresponding valve)) is usually performed after the 
averaging or difference calculation of the transmitter readings has been performed. 
For example, norming of flow transmitter readings is performed to transform the 
readings into a relative opening of the corresponding valve. The norming of the 
information is performed based on the formula: 
 
ݔ௜௡௢௥௠ ൌ ݔ௜ݔ௠௔௫  ? ? ? ? ?ǡ 3.40 
where ݔ௜  is the actual information, ݔ௠௔௫  is the specified maximum, ݔ௜௡௢௥௠  is the 
normed to the maximum reading. 
Since each transmitter is associated with a respective valve, the maximum value for 
norming is defined as the maximum possible flow through that valve. For example, 
readings from FT0 on incoming water are normed according to the maximum flow 
allowed by valve CV1. 
3.4.2.2.5 Calculating variance at selected sampling intervals (PPO5) 
A variance of flow rate transmitter readings (denoted as pre-processing option 5, 
PPO5) is calculated at selected sampling intervals. It is done in order to input the 
information about the changes of flow during a selected time interval into the OOBN 
and aid the fault detection and diagnostics of flow transmitters. The information from 
the transmitters is divided into sampling intervals and then the variance is calculated 
based on the formula: 
 
ߪଶ ൌ  ?݊෍ ݔ௜ െ ݔҧ௡௜ୀଵ ǡ 3.41 
where ߪଶ is variance, ݊ is the number of readings in the sampling interval, ݔ௜ is the ݅ th reading, ݔҧ  is the average of readings in the sampling interval as defined by 
equation 3.38. 
3.4.2.2.6 Discretising into selected states (PPO6) 
All of the readings from transmitters are discretised (denoted as pre-processing 
option PPO6), since only discrete nodes are used in our OOBN. Discrete intervals 
are defined separately for individual transmitters, based on their association with 
respective valves, and are then used as states of respective nodes in the OOBN. 
Simple if-then rules are used to assign the pre-processed information from the 
readings of the transmitters to these discrete states. The specific discrete intervals 
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and corresponding states of the nodes will be presented when the OOBN model and 
individual BBN models are described in later sections. 
3.4.3 Fault detection and diagnostic OOBN model for the three-phase 
separator 
As mentioned at the beginning of section 3.4.1, the OOBN model for fault detection 
and diagnostics was built in a modular way. In this section the BBN models that were 
developed as modules of the OOBN model are discussed in more detail and the 
procedure of fault detection and diagnostics of a three-phase separator with the 
OOBN is given. 
First, the model for a control loop is presented, giving a set of rules to build the BBN 
called ³)7JLYHQ/7´. Next, some generic rules to build a BBN model for a section are 
given. Using these rules, the instances of previously developed BBN ³)7JLYHQ/7´ 
and some section specific rules, BBN models for each individual section, named as 
³6HSDUDWLRQ VHFWLRQ´, ³6HSDUDWHG RLO VHFWLRQ´ and ³*DV VHFWLRQ´, respectively are 
developed. The methodology how to combine BBNs for three sections into a larger 
BBN called ³6LQJOH WLPH VOLFH´ to model the interactions between those sections is 
provided next. Finally, it is explained how three instances of ³6LQJOHWLPHVOLFH´ BBNs 
are joined to obtain a ³7KUHHWLPHVOLFH´ OOBN, which is used for fault detection and 
diagnostics of three-phase separator. 
3.4.3.1 BBN model for a control loop 
Firstly, a BBN is built to model the flow through a valve. The order in which 
information is circulated between components is exploited to decide which nodes are 
parent nodes and which ones are child nodes in the constructed control loop BBN. 
The information is circulated in the following order: level transmitter LT -> controller 
LC -> control valve CV -> flow transmitter FT. For example, a control signal sent from 
the controller LC to the control valve CV depends on the information received by the 
controller from the transmitter and the condition of the controller. Thus a node 
representing the information the controller receives from the transmitter and the node 
representing the condition of the controller are made parent nodes of a node 
representing the control signal sent from the controller LC to the control valve CV. 
A generic sequence of steps can be determined to model the flow through a valve 
with a BBN: 
Step 1. Create a node to represent all the possible levels of the process variable 
(for example, water level, separated oil level) obtained from transmitter LT 
฀(฀“฀L฀T฀ ฀i฀n฀f฀o฀”฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀i฀n฀ Figure 3.13). Assign a prior probability table for the node. 
Step 2. Create a node with states representing all the possible failure modes of 
฀t฀r฀a฀n฀s฀m฀i฀t฀t฀e฀r฀ ฀L฀T฀ ฀a฀s฀ ฀w฀e฀l฀l฀ ฀a฀s฀ ฀a฀ ฀s฀t฀a฀t฀e฀ ฀f฀o฀r฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀w฀o฀r฀k฀i฀n฀g฀ ฀m฀o฀d฀e฀ ( “ L T f a i฀l฀u฀r฀e฀”฀ ฀n฀o d e฀ i n  
Figure 3.13). Assign the prior probabilities for the failure modes. The prior 
probability of working mode is obtained by subtracting the probabilities of all 
failure modes from 1. 
Step 3. Create a node with states representing all the possible levels of a 
process variable transformed into the PI output (as explained in section 
3.4.2.2.2) whic฀h฀ ฀a฀r฀e฀ ฀s฀e฀n฀t฀ ฀t฀o฀ ฀c฀o฀n฀t฀r฀o฀l฀l฀e฀r฀ ฀L฀C฀ ฀(฀“฀L฀T฀ ฀s฀e฀n฀d฀s฀ ฀i฀n฀f฀o฀ ฀t฀o฀ ฀L฀C฀”฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e i n  
Figure 3.13). 
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Step 4. ฀M฀a฀k฀e฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀s฀ ฀“฀L฀T฀ ฀i฀n฀f฀o฀”฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀“฀L฀T฀ ฀f฀a฀i฀l฀u฀r฀e฀”฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀p฀a฀r฀e฀n฀t฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀“฀L฀T฀ ฀s฀e฀n d฀s  
command t฀o฀ ฀L฀C฀”฀.฀ ฀S฀p฀e฀c฀i฀f฀y฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀c฀o฀n฀d฀i฀t฀i฀o฀n฀a฀l฀ ฀p฀r฀o฀b฀a฀b฀i฀l฀i฀t฀y฀ ฀t฀a฀b฀l฀e฀ ฀f฀o฀r฀ ฀no฀d฀e฀ “ L฀T฀ ฀s฀e฀n d s  
฀i฀n฀f฀o฀ ฀t฀o฀ ฀L฀C฀”฀,฀ ฀b฀y฀ ฀c฀o฀n฀s฀i฀d฀e฀r฀i฀n฀g฀ ฀h฀o฀w฀ ฀a฀ ฀c฀e฀r฀t฀a฀i฀n฀ ฀f฀a฀i฀l฀u฀r฀e฀ ฀m฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀fr฀o m฀ ฀“฀L฀T฀ ฀f a i฀l฀u฀r฀e฀”฀ 
influences the inform฀a฀t฀i฀o฀n฀ ฀(฀o฀b฀t฀a฀i฀n฀e฀d฀ ฀f฀r฀o฀m฀ ฀“฀L฀T฀ ฀i฀n฀f฀o฀”฀) se t to the controller. 
Step 5. Create a node with states representing all the possible failure modes of 
฀c฀o฀n฀t฀r฀o฀l฀l฀e฀r฀ ฀L฀C฀ ฀t฀o฀g฀e฀t฀h฀e฀r฀ ฀w฀i฀t฀h฀ ฀a฀ ฀s฀t฀a฀t฀e฀ ฀f฀o฀r฀ ฀a฀ ฀w฀o฀r฀k฀i฀n฀g฀ ฀m฀o฀d฀e  ฀( “ L C฀ ฀f฀a฀i l u r e ” n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀i฀n  
Figure 3.13). Assign the prior probabilities for the states. 
Step 6. Create a node with states representing all the commands that can be 
฀s฀e฀n฀t฀ ฀t฀o฀ ฀v฀a฀l฀v฀e฀ ฀C฀V฀ ฀(฀“฀L฀C฀ ฀s฀e฀n฀d฀s฀ ฀c฀o฀m฀m฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀t฀o฀ ฀C฀V฀”฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀i฀n฀ Figure 3.13). 
Step 7. ฀M฀a฀k฀e฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀s฀ ฀“฀L฀T฀ ฀s฀e฀n฀d฀s฀ ฀c฀o฀m฀m฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀t฀o฀ ฀L฀C฀”฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀“฀L฀C฀ ฀f฀a฀i฀l฀u฀r฀e฀”฀ ฀t฀h฀e ฀p฀a฀r e t s  f  
฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀“฀L฀C฀ ฀s฀e฀n฀d฀s฀ ฀c฀o฀m฀m฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀t฀o฀ ฀C฀V฀”฀.฀ ฀S฀p฀e฀c฀i฀f฀y฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀c฀o฀n฀d฀i฀t฀i฀o฀n฀a฀l฀ p r o b฀a฀b฀i l i฀t฀y  ฀t฀a฀b฀l฀e฀ ฀f฀o฀r฀ 
฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀“฀L฀C฀ ฀s฀e฀n฀d฀s฀ ฀c฀o฀m฀m฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀t฀o฀ ฀C฀V฀”฀,฀ ฀b฀y฀ ฀c฀o฀n฀s฀i฀d฀e฀r฀i฀n฀g฀,฀ ฀h฀o฀w฀ ฀a฀ ฀c฀e฀rt฀a i n  f฀a฀i฀l u฀r฀e฀ ฀m฀o฀d฀e฀ 
฀f฀r฀o฀m฀ ฀“฀L฀C฀ ฀f฀a฀i฀l฀u฀r฀e฀”฀ ฀i฀n฀f฀l฀u฀e฀n฀c฀e฀s฀ ฀t฀h฀e c฀o฀m฀m a฀n฀d฀ (฀o฀b฀t฀a฀i฀n฀e฀d฀ ฀f฀r฀o฀m฀ ฀“฀L฀T฀ ฀s฀e฀n฀d฀s฀ ฀i฀n฀f฀o฀ ฀t฀o฀ 
฀L฀C฀”฀)฀,฀ ฀s฀e฀n฀t฀ ฀t฀o฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀v฀a฀l฀v฀e฀. 
Step 8. Create a node with states representing all the possible failure modes of 
฀v฀a฀l฀v฀e฀ ฀C฀V฀ ฀t฀o฀g฀e฀t฀h฀e฀r฀ ฀w฀i฀t฀h฀ ฀a฀ ฀s฀t฀a฀t฀e฀ ฀f฀o฀r฀ ฀w฀o฀r฀k฀i฀n฀g฀ ฀m฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀(฀“฀C฀V฀ f a i l฀u r฀e ”฀ n o d฀e฀ ฀i n  Figure 
3.13). Assign the prior probabilities for the states. 
Step 9. Create a node with states representing all the possible openings of valve 
฀C฀V฀ ฀(฀“฀C฀V฀ ฀o฀p฀e฀n฀i฀n฀g฀”฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀i฀n฀ Figure 3.13). 
Step 10. ฀M฀a฀k฀e฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀s฀ ฀“฀L฀C฀ ฀s฀e฀n฀d฀s฀ ฀c฀o฀m฀m฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀t฀o฀ ฀C฀V฀”฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀“฀C฀V฀ ฀f฀a฀i฀l฀u฀r฀e฀”฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ 
฀p฀a฀r฀e฀n฀t฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀“฀C฀V฀ ฀o฀p฀e฀n฀i฀n฀g฀”฀.฀ ฀S฀p฀e฀c฀i฀f฀y฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀c฀o฀n฀d฀i฀t฀i฀o฀n฀a฀l r฀o฀b a b i l i฀t฀y฀ ฀t a b฀l฀e฀ ฀f฀o฀r฀ 
฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀“฀C฀V฀ ฀o฀p฀e฀n฀i฀n฀g฀”฀,฀ ฀b฀y฀ ฀c฀o฀n฀s฀i฀d฀e฀r฀i฀n฀g฀,฀ ฀h฀o฀w฀ ฀a฀ ฀c฀e฀r฀t฀a฀i฀n฀ ฀v฀a฀l฀v฀e฀ failure mode from 
฀“฀C฀V฀ ฀f฀a฀i฀l฀u฀r฀e฀”฀ ฀i฀n฀f฀l฀u฀e฀n฀c฀e฀s฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀o฀p฀e฀n฀i฀n฀g฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀v฀a฀l฀v฀e฀,฀ ฀w฀h฀i฀c฀h฀ ฀s฀h o u l฀d฀ ฀b฀e฀ ฀g฀i฀v฀e฀n฀ ฀b y  ฀“฀L฀C  
฀s฀e฀n฀d฀s฀ ฀c฀o฀m฀m฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀t฀o฀ ฀C฀V฀”฀. 
Step 11. Create a node with states representing all the possible failure 
฀m฀o฀d฀e฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀f฀l฀o฀w฀ ฀t฀r฀a฀n฀s฀m฀i฀t฀t฀e฀r฀ ฀F฀T฀ ฀t฀o฀g฀e฀t฀h฀e฀r฀ ฀w฀i฀t฀h฀ ฀a฀ ฀s฀t฀a฀t฀e฀ ฀f฀o฀r฀ ฀w o฀r k i n g  m฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀(฀“ F฀T฀ 
f฀a฀i฀l฀u฀r฀e฀”฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀i฀n฀ Figure 3.13). Assign the prior probabilities for the states. 
Step 12. Create a node with states representing all the possible flows 
through valv฀e฀ ฀C฀V฀ ฀(฀“฀F฀T฀ ฀i฀n฀f฀o฀”฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀i฀n฀ Figure 3.13). 
Step 13. ฀M฀a฀k฀e฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀s฀ ฀“฀C฀V฀ ฀o฀p฀e฀n฀i฀n฀g฀”฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀“฀F฀T฀ ฀f฀a฀i฀l฀u฀r฀e฀”฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀p฀a฀r฀e฀n฀t฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀“฀F฀T฀ 
฀i฀n฀f฀o฀”฀.฀ ฀S฀p฀e฀c฀i฀f฀y฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀c฀o฀n฀d฀i฀t฀i฀o฀n฀a฀l฀ ฀p฀r฀o฀b฀a฀b฀i฀l฀i฀t฀y฀ ฀t฀a฀b฀l฀e ฀f฀o฀r฀ ฀n฀o d฀e฀ ฀“฀F฀T฀ ฀i฀n฀f฀o฀” ,  b
฀c฀o฀n฀s฀i฀d฀e฀r฀i฀n฀g฀,฀ ฀h฀o฀w฀ ฀a฀ ฀c฀e฀r฀t฀a฀i฀n฀ ฀f฀l฀o฀w฀ ฀t฀r฀a฀n฀s฀m฀i฀t฀t฀e฀r฀ ฀f฀a฀i฀l฀u฀r฀e฀ ฀m฀o฀d฀e f r o฀m฀ ฀“฀F฀T฀ ฀f฀a i฀l฀u฀r฀e ”  
influences the information which should be shown by the flow transmitter, 
฀g฀i฀v฀e฀n฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀s฀t฀a฀t฀e฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀“฀C฀V฀ ฀o฀p฀e฀n฀i฀n฀g฀”฀. 
The BBN, developed following these steps, was used as an instance node (see 
description in section 3.2.2.3) in the BBNs developed for specific sections of three-
phase separators. The graphical representation of the developed BNN is given in 
Figure 3.13. Note that different shades of nodes represent different types of nodes, 
as explained in section 3.2.2.3. The details of the BBN nodes can be found in Table 
10.1 (see Appendix E). 
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Figure 3.13. BBN ฀“)7B,'JLYHQOHYHO/7B,'´ for a control loop 
3.4.3.2 Generic rules to build a BBN model for a section 
The concept of building a BBN for an individual section of the separator is based on 
the representation of the propagation of liquid or vapour flows in that section. First an 
inflow of the material to the selected section and inflow measurements (if the inflow is 
measured) are modelled. Nodes representing sensor readings of flows/levels are 
made child nodes of nodes representing the true flows/levels and conditions of the 
components, which measure flows/levels. Similarly, the outflow of liquid or vapour 
฀f฀r฀o฀m฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀s฀e฀l฀e฀c฀t฀e฀d฀ ฀s฀e฀c฀t฀i฀o฀n฀ ฀i฀s฀ ฀m฀o฀d฀e฀l฀l฀e฀d฀.฀ ฀E฀a฀c฀h฀ ฀s฀e฀c฀t฀i฀o฀n฀ ฀h฀a฀s฀ ฀a฀n i n s t a n฀c e  ฀n฀o d฀e฀ “FT giv n 
OHYHO/7´, i.e. a BBN that represents a control loop. The inflows and outflows of the 
liquids or vapour are compared by looking at how the level of liquid or vapour 
changes given inflow to the section and outflow from the section. Nodes that model 
the liquid/vapour level changes and the ones that represent conditions of 
components which measure the liquid/vapour level changes are made parent nodes 
of the nodes that represent sensor readings about the liquid/vapour level changes. 
The generic rules to build a BBN for a section are given next. 
Rule 1. Create a node labelled ³/LTXLGYDSRXULQIORZ´ to represent a flow of each 
type of liquid/vapour. Specify all possible discrete levels of the flow as states 
of this node, expressed as a percentage of maximum outflow of a 
corresponding valve (used to release the liquid/vapour from this section or the 
vessel itself). Specify prior probabilities for the states of the node: if 
information about the inflowing liquid/vapour is known, the prior probability for 
the corresponding state(s), representing that flow can be increased, otherwise 
prior probabilities of each state are made equal. 
Rule 2. Create a node labelled ³)7B,'OLTXLGYDSRXULQIORZIDLOXUH´ to represent a 
condition of each transmitter, measuring the inflowing liquid/vapour (if a 
transmitter is present). The working condition is set as the first state of the 
node, while the remaining states represent failure mode(s). Prior probabilities 
for each state have to be specified. 
Rule 3. Create a node labelled ³)7B,' OLTXLGYDSRXU LQIORZ LQIR´ to represent 
readings from a transmitter (if a transmitter is present) for every type of liquid 
or vapour flowing to the section. States of this node are identical to those of 
³/LTXLGYDSRXU LQIORZ´. Make the nodes /LTXLGYDSRXU LQIORZ´ and ³)7B,'
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OLTXLGYDSRXU LQIORZ IDLOXUH´ parents of the node ³)7B,' OLTXLGYDSRXU LQIORZ
LQIR´ A conditional probability table of the node is then used to model the 
effects on the readings of the transmitter based on the condition of the 
transmitter and the rate of the inflowing liquid/vapour. 
Rule 4. Create an instance node labelled ³)7B,'JLYHQOHYHO/7B,'´ (see the BBN 
model in Figure 3.13 in section 3.4.3.1) to model a control loop for any 
liquid/vapour level that is controlled. 
Rule 4.a. Create a node labelled ³/7B,' LQIR´ to represent readings 
from level transmitter converted to a PI command and make it a 
parent of input node ³/7 LQIR´ Set equal prior probabilities for each 
state. 
Rule 4.b. Create a node labelled ³/7B,' IDLOXUH´ to represent the 
condition of the level transmitter and make it a parent of input node 
³/7IDLOXUH´. Set prior probabilities for each state. 
Rule 4.c. Create a node labelled ³/&B,' IDLOXUH´ to represent the 
condition of the level controller in the control loop and make it a parent 
of input node ³/&IDLOXUH´. Set prior probabilities for each state. 
Rule 4.d. Create a node labelled ³&9B,' IDLOXUH´ to represent the 
condition of the control valve in the control loop and make it a parent 
of input node ³&9IDLOXUH´. Set prior probabilities for each state. 
Rule 4.e. Create a node labelled ³)7B,' IDLOXUH´ to represent the 
condition of the flow transmitter indicating the flow through the control 
valve in the control loop and make it a parent of input node ³)7IDLOXUH´. 
Set prior probabilities for each state. 
Rule 4.f. Create a node labelled ³)7B,' LQIR´ to represent readings of 
the flow transmitter measuring the flow through the control valve in the 
control loop and make the output node labelled ³)7 LQIR´ a parent of 
the created node. The conditional probability table must have zero 
entries everywhere, except the diagonal, which is formed of ones. 
Rule 4.g. Create a node labelled ³/LTXLGYDSRXU RXWIORZ´ to represent 
the flow through the control valve in the control loop and make the 
output node labelled ³&9RSHQLQJ´ a parent of the created node. The 
conditional probability table must have zero entries everywhere, 
except the diagonal, which is formed of ones. 
Note that, the parent and child nodes in the Rule 4 have to have identical states. 
Rule 5. Create a node(s) labelled ³/LTXLGYDSRXUFKDQJHUDWH´ to model changes 
of every liquid/vapour in the section, using given liquid/vapour inflow and 
outflow. This node is a child node of earlier created nodes ³/LTXLGYDSRXU
LQIORZ´ and ³/LTXLGYDSRXU RXWIORZ´ (for each liquid/vapour). The conditional 
probability table of ³/LTXLGYDSRXU FKDQJH UDWH´ specifies what the 
liquid/vapour change rate will be for the given liquid/vapour inflow and outflow. 
Rule 6. Create a node labelled ³)7B,' OLTXLGYDSRXU ± )7B,'´ to represent the 
combined information from flow transmitters indicating liquid/vapour inflow 
and outflow. This node is made a child node of earlier created nodes 
³/LTXLGYDSRXULQIORZ´, ³/LTXLGYDSRXURXWIORZ´, ³)7OLTXLGYDSRXULQIORZIDLOXUH´
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and ³)7B,'IDLOXUH´. The conditional probability table of ³)7B,'OLTXLGYapour ± 
)7B,'´ specifies what combined readings of the transmitters will be for their 
given conditions. 
Rule 7. Create a node labelled ³/7B,' OLTXLGYDSRXU OHYHO FKDQJH UDWH´ to 
represent the information of liquid/vapour change rate given by level 
transmitter LT_ID. This node is made a child node of earlier created nodes 
³/LTXLGYDSRXUFKDQJHUDWH´ and ³/7B,'IDLOXUH´. 
Note that labels of nodes, which have symbols ³B,'´, are used to represent 
components that are available in the section and the labels of nodes, which have 
symbols ³/LTXLGYDSRXU´ correspond to the type of liquid or vapour considered. For 
example, the labels of nodes in Rule 4.a, Rule 4.b, Rule 4.c, Rule 4.d and Rule 4.e in 
the separated oil section will be ³/7LQIR´, ³/7IDLOXUH´, ³/&IDLOXUH´, ³&9IDLOXUH´ 
and ³)7 IDLOXUH´ respectively and the label of the node in the Rule 4.g will be ³2LO
RXWIORZ´. 
These rules are the basis for creating a BBN for each section of the three-phase 
separator. Since all three sections are different, some alterations are required to the 
generic rules to suit specific needs of each section. For example, the separated oil 
section does not have a flow transmitter to measure the incoming oil from the 
separation section, thus Rule 2, Rule 3 and Rule 6 does not apply to this section. The 
BBNs for each section are presented next. 
3.4.3.3 BBN model for the separation section 
The BBN for the separation section was developed using the generic rules, described 
in section 3.4.3.2. Additional nodes (namely ³/LTXLGGLIIHUHQFH´, ³)7ZDWHU± FT1 + 
)7RLO´, ³7RWDOOLTXLGOHYHO´, ³/7WRWDOOLTXLGOHYHO´, ³)ORZRYHUZHLU´, ³7RWDOOLTXLGOHYHO
FKDQJHUDWH´, ³/7WRWDOOLTXLGOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´) had to be also included in the BBN, 
since this section has an overflow weir, which controls the maximum level of the 
liquid in the section and the amount of oil flowing into the separated oil section. The 
additional nodes were created and integrated into the BBN in the following manner: 
Step 1. A node labelled ³)7ZDWHU± FT1 + FT0 RLO´ was created in a similar way 
as described in Rule 6 in section 3.4.3.2. However, this time a combination of 
readings of water and oil inflows together with water outflow was used. Such 
a combination provides information about the liquid changes (difference 
between inflowing water and oil and outflowing water) in the separation 
section. The nodes labelled ³:DWHULQIORZ´, ³:DWHURXWIORZ´, ³2LOLQIORZ´, ³)T0 
IDLOXUH´ and ³)7 IDLOXUH´ are made parents of the created node. The 
conditional probability table of the created node shows what the readings of 
the combined transmitters are when actual liquid change and conditions of 
flow transmitters FT0 and FT1 are given. 
Step 2. A node labelled ³7RWDO OLTXLG OHYHO´ was created in order to aid the 
modelling of flow over the weir. States of this node represent discrete levels 
of the total liquid level, which determines the amount of liquid flowing over the 
weir. For example, if the total liquid level is below the weir by an amount 
which is greater than the maximum liquid increase in the separation section, 
then there would be no flow of liquid to the separated oil section. The prior 
probabilities for each state of the node should be set. Since during normal 
operation of the separator it is expected that the total liquid level is equal with 
the weir, this should be reflected in the prior probabilities. 
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Step 3. A node labelled ³/7 WRWDO OLTXLG OHYHO´ was created to input total liquid 
level readings from transmitter LT1. This node has the same states as the 
node labelled ³7RWDOOLTXLGOHYHO´. Nodes labelled ³7RWDOOLTXLGOHYHO´ and ³/7
IDLOXUH´ are made parents of this created node. The conditional probability 
table of this node shows what readings from transmitter LT1 are expected for 
the given actual total liquid level and the condition of transmitter LT1. Thus, it 
can be used to model the effects of LT1 failure modes on the readings of the 
total liquid level. 
Step 4. A node labelled ³)ORZRYHUZHLU´ was created to model the flow of oil into 
the separated oil section based on the total liquid level and the liquid changes 
in the section. Previously created nodes labelled ³7RWDO OLTXLG OHYHO´, ³:DWHU
LQIORZ´฀,฀ ฀“฀W฀a฀t฀e฀r฀ ฀o฀u฀t฀f฀l฀o฀w฀”฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀“฀O฀i฀l฀ ฀i฀n฀f฀l฀o฀w฀”฀ ฀a฀r฀e฀ made parents of this node. The 
conditional probability table of this node shows what flow is expected over the 
weir given the total liquid level and the liquid changes in the section. 
Step 5. A node labelled ³7RWDO OLTXLG OHYHOFKDQJH UDWH´ was created to model a 
change in the total liquid level in the separation section. It is expected that the 
total liquid level would not change under the normal operation of the 
separator and stay equal with the weir. Nodes labelled ³7RWDO OLTXLG OHYHO´ 
³:DWHULQIORZ´฀,฀ ฀“฀W฀a฀t฀e฀r฀ ฀o฀u฀t฀f฀l฀o฀w฀”฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀“฀O฀i฀l฀ ฀i฀n฀f฀l฀o฀w฀”฀ ฀a฀r฀e฀ ฀m฀a฀d฀e฀ ฀p฀a฀r฀e฀n฀t฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀i s  ฀n฀o฀d e .  
The conditional probability table of this node shows how the total liquid level 
changes given the total liquid level and the liquid difference in the section. 
Step 6. A node labelled ³/7WRWDO OLTXLG OHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ was created to input 
readings of a total liquid level change rate and to model the effects of LT1 
failure on these readings. Nodes labelled ³7RWDOOLTXLGOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ and 
³/7IDLOXUH´ are made parents of this node. The conditional probability table 
of this node shows how the condition of LT1 transmitter affects the readings 
of the total liquid level change rate. 
The BBN that was developed for the separation section can be seen in Figure 3.14. 
The details of the BBN nodes can be found in Table 10.2 (see Appendix E). 
 
Figure 3.14. BBN ³6HSDUDWLRQVHFWLRQ´ to model liquid propagation in separation 
section 
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3.4.3.4 BBN model for the separated oil section 
When building the BBN for the separated oil section some of the generic rules, 
described in section 3.4.3.2, were not used (specifically Rule 2, Rule 3 and Rule 6), 
since this section does not have a flow transmitter to measure the inflowing oil from 
the separation section. No additional section specific rules were necessary. The BBN 
that was developed for the separated oil section can be seen in Figure 3.15. The 
details of the BBN nodes can be found in Table 10.3 (see Appendix E). 
 
Figure 3.15. BBN ³6HSDUDWHGRLOVHFWLRQ´ to model liquid propagation in separated oil 
section 
3.4.3.5 BBN model for the gas section 
Rule 5 and Rule 7 described in section 3.4.3.2 were not used when building a BBN 
for the gas section. However, additional nodes had to be created (namely ³&KDQJHRI
YROXPH IRU JDV´, ³3UHVVXUH OHYHO FKDQJH UDWH´, ³/7 SUHVVXUH OHYHO FKDQJH UDWH´), 
since gas is a compressible material and the change of its volume has an effect on a 
pressure level change rate in the separator. The additional nodes were created in the 
following order: 
Step 1. Node labelled ³&KDQJH RI YROXPH IRU JDV´ was created to model a 
change in gas volume in the separator. This node is connected to nodes in 
BBNs of other section, as will be discussed in section 3.4.3.6. The prior 
probabilities of all states of this node are equal. 
Step 2. Node labelled ³3UHVVXUH OHYHO FKDQJH UDWH´ was created to model 
pressure changes in the separator based on changes in gas level and volume. 
Nodes ³*DV OHYHO FKDQJH UDWH´ and ³&KDQJH RI YROXPH IRU JDV´ are made 
parents of this created node. The conditional probability table shows what the 
expected pressure level change rate is for the given gas level change rate 
and gas volume change. 
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Step 3. Node labelled ³/7 SUHVVXUH OHYHO FKDQJH UDWH´ was created to input 
readings of a pressure level change rate and to model the effects of LT3 
failure on these readings. Nodes labelled ³3UHVVXUH OHYHO FKDQJH UDWH´ and 
³/7IDLOXUH´ are made parents of this node. The conditional probability table 
of this node shows how the condition of transmitter LT3 affects the readings 
of the pressure level change rate. 
The BBN that was developed for the gas section can be seen in Figure 3.16. The 
details of the BBN nodes can be found in Table 10.4 (see Appendix E). 
 
Figure 3.16. BBN ³*DVVHFWLRQ´ to model gas propagation in the separator 
3.4.3.6 BBN model for interactions between the sections of the three-phase 
separator 
The BBN to model the liquid/vapour propagation in the three-phase separator in a 
single time slice was developed by combining the individual section BBNs (a 
separation section (represented by the blue rounded rectangle in Figure 3.17), a 
separated oil section (represented by the brown rounded rectangle in Figure 3.17) 
and a gas section (represented by the red rounded rectangle in Figure 3.17)) 
presented in the previous subsections. The three individual sections were joined by 
considering how one section can influence flow/level changes of phases in other 
sections. The following steps were performed to build additional nodes required to 
model interactions between the three sections: 
Step 1. The BBN for the separation section was connected to the BBN for the 
separated oil section. For that purpose a node labelled ³)ORZRYHUZHLU´ was 
created, which had identical states to those of the output node labelled ³)ORZ
RYHUZHLU´ in the separation section BBN. The output node was made parent 
of the newly created node. The conditional probability table was filled with 
ones along the diagonal for the created node. This created node was then 
made a parent node of the input node labelled ³2LOLQIORZ´ in the separated oil 
section BBN. 
177 
 
Step 2. A node labelled ³7RWDO OLTXLG OHYHO FKDQJH UDWH VLQJOH´ was created to 
obtain the output from the separation section BBN node with the same label 
(except for ³VLQJOH´) and was made a child of the output node. The conditional 
probability table was filled with ones along the diagonal for the created node. 
Step 3. A node labelled ³2LO OHYHOFKDQJHUDWHVLQJOH´ was created to obtain the 
output from the separated oil section BBN node with the same label (except 
for ³VLQJOH´) and was made a child of the output node. The conditional 
probability table was filled with ones along the diagonal for the created node. 
Step 4. Four nodes were created to represent the inflows and outflows of water 
(³:DWHU LQIORZVLQJOH´³:DWHURXWIORZVLQJOH´) and oil (³2LO LQIORZVLQJOH´³2LO
RXWIORZ VLQJOH´) in order to model the change of volume of gas in the 
separator. The four nodes were used to get the outputs from the separation 
section and separated oil section BBNs, thus were made child nodes of the 
฀c฀o฀r฀r฀e฀s฀p฀o฀n฀d฀i฀n฀g฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀s฀ ฀“฀W฀a฀t฀e฀r฀ ฀i฀n฀f฀l฀o฀w฀”฀,฀ ฀“฀W฀a฀t฀e฀r฀ ฀o฀u฀t฀f฀l฀o฀w฀”฀,฀ ฀“฀O฀i฀l฀ ฀i n f l฀o w ”฀,  “ O฀i l  o u฀t฀f฀l฀o฀w฀”฀. 
Step 5. The BBNs for the separation and the separated oil sections were 
connected to the BBN for the gas section by creating a new node ³&KDQJHRI
YROXPHIRUJDVIURP)7´. This node was then made a parent of the input node 
labelled ³&KDQJHRIYROXPHIRUJDV´in the gas section BBN. At the same time, 
this newly created node was made a child node of nodes created in Step 4 
and labelled ³:DWHU LQIORZVLQJOH´ ³:DWHURXWIORZVLQJOH´, ³2LO LQIORZVLQJOH´
³2LO RXWIORZ VLQJOH´. The conditional probability table of the newly created 
node shows how the gas volume changes in the separator for given inflows 
and outflows of the water and oil. 
Step 6. An output node labelled ³)7ZDWHU± FT1 + FT0 oil ± )7´ was created It 
is used to input the information on how the liquid levels change in the 
separator using readings of the flow transmitters showing changes in gas 
volume. The conditional probability of this node shows what readings will be 
shown for the given water and oil inflows and outflows and conditions of flow 
transmitters FT0, FT1 and FT2. 
Step 7. An output node labelled ³/7WRWDOOLTXLGOHYHOFKDQJH/7OHYHOFKDQJH´ 
was created. It is used to input the information on how the liquid levels in the 
separator change using readings of the level transmitters showing changes in 
gas volume. The conditional probability of this node indicates what readings 
will be shown by transmitters given the actual changes of in gas volume and 
conditions of level transmitters LT1 and LT2. 
Step 8. Nodes labelled ³)7YDULHG´, ³)7YDULHG´, ³)7YDULHG´ and ³)7YDULHG´ 
were created to indicate whether readings of the corresponding transmitters 
have changed through a considered sampling interval. They were made as 
child nodes to nodes labelled ³)7 IDLOXUH´, ³)7 IDLOXUH´, ³)7 IDLOXUH´ and 
³)7IDLOXUH´ respectively. 
Step 9. The remaining nodes created for this BBN are identical to those input and 
output nodes of the three sections created previously (except for nodes 
labelled ³)ORZ RYHU ZHLU´, ³7RWDO OLTXLG OHYHO FKDQJH UDWH´, ³2LO OHYHO FKDQJH
UDWH´ and ³&KDQJHRIYROXPHIRU JDVIURP)7´ which were created in Step 1, 
Step 2, Step 3 and Step 5). 
The BBN that was developed for the interactions between the sections of the 
three-phase separator can be seen in Figure 3.17. The details of the BBN nodes 
can be found in Table 10.5 (see ). Multiple instances of the BBN developed in this 
section were then used to build the final OOBN model. 
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Figure 3.17. BBN ³6LQJOHWLPHVOLFH´ for interactions between the sections of three-phase separator 
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3.4.3.7 Triple time slice OOBN for fault detection and diagnostics of the three-
phase separator 
The fault detection and diagnostics OOBN model was developed by combining three 
instances of the ³6LQJOHWLPHVOLFH´ BBN introduced in section 3.4.3.6. Three ³6LQJOH
WLPHVOLFH´ instances were combined, by making the condition nodes from a previous 
time slice parents of the same nodes in the next time slice, as shown in Figure 3.19. 
This way, if a failure is detected during one of the time slices, sensor readings in the 
next slices can be used to validate whether the sensor readings actually correspond 
to a failure or not. The information nodes (coloured in pale green in Figure 3.19) are 
used to input sensor readings into the OOBN model. The condition nodes (coloured 
in dark blue in Figure 3.19) are used to get the output of the OOBN model. 
The flowchart given in Figure 3.18, demonstrating how conditions of the components 
of the three-phase separator are monitored throughout the whole operational time is 
summarised in the following steps: 
Step 1. Enter the pre-processed sensor readings into the OOBN. If any sensor 
readings are present in the OOBN, shift sensor readings in information nodes 
(nodes coloured in pale green in Figure 3.19) back by one time slice when 
new sensor readings become available. For example, sensor readings 
entered in information node ³)7LQIRW- !W´ are shifted to information node 
³)7LQIRW-2=>t-´. 
Step 2. Update the posterior probabilities throughout the OOBN given new 
sensor readings. 
Step 3. Track how the posterior probabilities of the condition nodes in the most 
recent time slice changes (nodes coloured in dark blue in Figure 3.19 with a 
suffix ³W- !W´) in order to detect and identify failures of components. A certain 
threshold has to be set for posterior probabilities so that failure modes could 
be detected and identified. 
Step 4. Check if posterior probabilities of the condition nodes differ from prior 
probabilities of the same condition nodes in adjacent time slices. A certain 
threshold can be set in order to ignore very small differences between the 
prior and posterior probabilities. For example, if the posterior probabilities of 
condition node ³)7 IDLOXUH W-2=>t-´ differ only slightly from the prior 
probabilities of condition node ³)7IDLOXUHW-3=>t-´, the difference is ignored. 
Step 5. If the difference between posterior and prior probabilities found in Step 4 
is significant, make posterior probabilities of the condition nodes as prior 
probabilities of the condition nodes in a previous time slice For example, the 
posterior probabilities of condition node ³)7IDLOXUHW-2=>t-´ are set as prior 
probabilities of condition node ³)7IDLOXUHW-3=>t-´. 
Step 6. Repeat the procedure described in steps 1 to 5 when new sensor 
readings become available. 
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Figure 3.18. A flowchart of fault detection and diagnostics process with OOBN 
Such an approach allows conditions of components of the three-phase separator to 
be monitored once sensor readings become available for all three time slices 
following the initial start of the monitoring. 
Time slices of different lengths can be selected for the analysis and this choice 
depends on the operation of the separator. For example, if a chosen time slice is too 
long, by the time the failure is detected it is not possible to prevent the hazardous 
event. However, if a chosen time slice is too short, no changes in the readings of 
level transmitters can be observed for a long time due to the operating conditions of 
the three-phase separator. For the separator considered in this study a time slice of 
10 seconds was found to be adequate in order to detect faults in a timely way and 
observe any changes in the readings of level transmitters when inflows of the liquids 
or gas differ from their outflows. 
฀N฀o฀t฀e฀ ฀t฀h฀a฀t฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀B฀B฀N฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀“฀S฀i฀n฀g฀l฀e฀ ฀t฀i฀m฀e฀ ฀s฀l฀i฀c฀e฀”฀ in Figure 3.19 are instance nodes of the 
³7ULSOH WLPH VOLFH´ BBN and are labelled as ³W-  ! W´ ³W-2 => t-´ and ³W-3 => t-´. 
Time ݐ in this case represents the current time slice of the operation, when sensor 
readings are available for the whole time slice from the previous time slice ݐ െ  ? (10 
seconds earlier in this case). The numbers 1, 2 and 3 indicate the difference of time 
slices from current time slice ݐ . A higher number of time slices could also be 
considered. 
The number of time slices and the length of a time slice should be considered 
individually based on the physical properties of the separator and available 
computing resources. In this study, three time slices were chosen, since it uses 
readings of 30 seconds of historical data and this was found to be long enough to 
detect failures of the components, based on the chosen physical properties of the 
separator. 
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Figure 3.19. ³7ULSOHWLPHVOLFH´ BBN for fault detection and diagnostics of three-phase separator 
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3.4.4 Summary 
A methodology for fault detection and diagnostics of a three-phase separator was 
presented in this section. Firstly, an overview of the proposed methodology was 
given. Secondly, the input information required for the fault detection and diagnostics 
model was introduced. Several combinations of sensor readings have been proposed 
to be used as input data in order to cross-check the information provided by sensors 
and to detect the sensor readings that deviate from the expected readings for given 
conditions. Required pre-processing of input data was also discussed. Pre-
processing was performed in order to transform sensor readings into a format 
suitable for use in the BBN model for fault detection and diagnostics. 
Finally, the OOBN model and its constituent parts used for fault detection and 
diagnostics of three-phase separators were presented. Generic rules for building a 
BBN model for a separator section were introduced. These rules, together with 
section specific rules, were used to build a specific section BBN. Then, the BBN to 
perform the fault detection and diagnostics for the whole separator for a single time 
step was introduced; it was constructed by joining three individual section BBNs. 
Multiple BBNs of a single time step were then joined to create a multiple time slice 
OOBN. The latter is used to perform fault detection and diagnostics by taking into 
account sensor readings and condition states of the separator components obtained 
at multiple time instances. 
An application of the proposed methodology is presented in the next section, 
demonstrating the results when single and multiple component failures are 
introduced in the simulation model of the three-phase separator. 
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3.5 Application of the proposed methodology using the data of the three-
phase separator simulation model 
Fault detection and diagnostic capabilities of the proposed methodology are tested 
by modelling failures in the three-phase separator simulation model and then using 
the outputs (as detailed in section 3.4.2) from the simulation model as evidence in 
the OOBN model information nodes to obtain posterior probabilities of component 
failures in the corresponding condition nodes. An increase in the posterior probability 
of the failure mode of a particular component in the OOBN will be considered as an 
indication of the presence of the failure of that component in the simulation model. 
Several thresholds for prior and posterior probabilities in the OOBN model had to be 
set, as discussed in section 3.4.3.7. The threshold of posterior probabilities for failure 
detection and diagnostics was set to 0.1. The choice of this threshold is arbitrary. It 
was chosen to reduce the number of false alarms, which might occur if there is a 
slight increase in the posterior probability, even when no failure is present. 
The threshold for the difference of posterior and prior probabilities of the same node 
in two adjacent time slices was set as 0.01. If this threshold was not exceeded, no 
updating of prior probabilities was performed for the particular node. 
A number of different failure scenarios were used to test the proposed methodology 
and the results are presented in this section. All of the considered failure scenarios 
were simulated with the three-phase separator simulation model first and then 
produced sensor readings were iteratively inserted as evidence in the OOBN model. 
Several specific scenarios were chosen to demonstrate both capabilities of the model 
when dealing with complex and challenging tasks and further advancements needed 
to improve the capabilities of methodology. For example, testing was performed with 
oscillating flow, since this type of flow is more dynamic than other flow options and 
thus it is more similar to the actual operating conditions of a three-phase separator. A 
more extensive testing of single and multiple failure scenarios was also performed in 
order to evaluate the performance of the OOBN developed. 
3.5.1 Prior probabilities of component failure modes 
The prior probabilities of component failure modes used for testing of the 
methodology are given in Table 3.10. 
Table 3.10. Prior probabilities of component failure modes 
Failure mode Prior probability 
LT1 FS, LT2 FS, LT3 FS  ? ?ିହ 
LC1 FL, LC2 FL, LC3 FL  ?  ? ? ?ି଺ 
LC1 FH, LC2 FH, LC3 FH  ?  ? ? ?ି଺ 
CV1 FL, CV2 FL, CV3 FL  ?  ? ? ?ି଺ 
CV1 FH, CV2 FH, CV3 FH  ?  ? ? ?ି଺ 
FT0 FS, FT1 FS, FT2 FS, FT3 FS  ? ?ିହ 
The prior probability of a working state for the same components was obtained by 
simply subtracting the prior probabilities of all failure modes from 1. The prior 
probabilities are usually obtained from historical data or are set based on expert 
knowledge. The latter option was used in this study. 
Results with the selected scenarios are presented in the next sections. 
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3.5.2 Results from the analysis of specific scenarios 
Results of the selected scenarios are presented by plotting the posterior probabilities 
of the states of condition nodes, which relate to the failure mode considered. 
Moreover, if additional failures are falsely detected by the OOBN, posterior 
probabilities of the states of the condition nodes representing these failures are also 
plotted. The posterior probabilities of a condition node are plotted as a stacked 
column bar chart, where the posterior probability of a certain state of condition node 
(representing a certain failure mode of component) is represented by an individual 
colour. A scenario when a single failure mode of control valve CV2 failing closed is 
presented next. 
3.5.2.1 Scenario 1 ± Control valve CV2 failed closed 
The first scenario considered is when control valve CV2 fails closed. This failure 
mode prevents the separated oil from leaving the three-phase separator, leading to 
overfill of the separated oil section if no preventative actions are taken on time. The 
failure has been entered after 60 seconds (red circle in Figure 3.20 identifies the 
failure mode and the time it was inserted) from the start of the simulated operation of 
the separator. Figure 3.20 and Figure 3.21 show that the OOBN has identified two 
possible failure modes (CV2 failed closed and LC2 failed low), based on the readings 
provided. The posterior probability of CV FC failure mode of valve CV2 increased to 
0.5, as can be seen in Figure 3.20, at the same time as the failure was inserted in the 
simulation model. Identical behaviour was observed for controller LC2 (see Figure 
3.21). This can be explained by the same effect that these failure modes (LC2 failed 
low and CV2 failed closed) have on the operation of the separator. In both cases, 
valve CV2 is fully closed and prevents the oil flow out of the separator. Even though 
the OOBN cannot isolate the exact failure cause it detects a fault in the separator 
immediately, i.e. as soon as the information from the sensor readings of the three-
phase simulation model with the failure presence is passed on to the OOBN. 
 
Figure 3.20฀.฀ ฀P฀o฀s฀t฀e฀r฀i฀o฀r฀ ฀p฀r฀o฀b฀a฀b฀i฀l฀i฀t฀i฀e฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀s฀t฀a฀t฀e฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀la฀b e l l e d  “ C฀V฀2฀ ฀f฀a฀i฀l u฀r e฀ ฀t-1 
฀=฀>฀ ฀t฀” 
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Figure 3.21. ฀P฀o฀s฀t฀e฀r฀i฀o฀r฀ ฀p฀r฀o฀b฀a฀b฀i฀l฀i฀t฀i฀e฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀s฀t฀a฀t฀e฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀l฀a฀b฀e฀l฀l฀e฀d฀ ฀“฀L฀C 2฀ f a i l u r  ฀t-1 => 
฀t฀” 
In the following examples the plots for the level controller failure are omitted, due to 
the reason that it is always identified as a possible failure mode if a control valve fails 
and vice versa. 
Multiple failures occurring at the same time and with a time lag are presented in the 
next sections. 
3.5.2.2 Scenario 2 ± Level transmitter LT1 failed stuck and control valve CV1 
failed opened 
Failures of level transmitter LT1 failed stuck and control valve CV1 failed opened are 
considered in this scenario. Both failures are inserted at the same time (60 seconds 
after the start of the simulation) in the simulation model. The posterior probabilities of 
failure modes that were identified by the OOBN are given in Figure 3.22 and Figure 
3.23. As mentioned previously, the plot for LC1 failure has been omitted. 
 
Figure 3.22฀.฀ ฀P฀o฀s฀t฀e฀r฀i฀o฀r฀ ฀p฀r฀o฀b฀a฀b฀i฀l฀i฀t฀i฀e฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀s฀t฀a฀t฀e฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀la฀b e l l e d  “ L T฀1฀ ฀f฀a฀i฀l u r e t-1 => 
฀t฀” 
The failure of LT1 has been identified with a slight delay, as can be seen from Figure 
3.22 (failure occurred at 60 seconds, the posterior probability of failure mode LT FS 
of level transmitter LT1 increased to 1 at 80 seconds). This was due to the fact that 
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when the failure occurred the water level was above its set point (thus associated 
valve CV1 was kept open to release the excess of water) and the water inflow was 
the same as the maximum outflow possible through CV1. For this reason, the actual 
water level was not changing and therefore no change was expected in the LT1 
readings. However, when the water inflow decreased, a change in LT1 reading was 
expected and thus the failure of LT1 being stuck was identified. 
 
Figure 3.23฀.฀ ฀P฀o฀s฀t฀e฀r฀i฀o฀r฀ ฀p฀r฀o฀b฀a฀b฀i฀l฀i฀t฀i฀e฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀s฀t฀a฀t฀e฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀la฀b e l l e d  “ C฀V฀1฀ ฀f฀a฀i฀l u฀r e฀ ฀t-1 
฀=฀>฀ ฀t฀” 
The failure of CV1 failed open has not been identified as can be seen from Figure 
3.23 (the posterior probability of valve CV1 being in state CV W was 1 throughout the 
testing duration), since the failure of LT1 transmitter forced the valve CV1 to be fully 
opened and thus maximum flow was expected through CV1. Thus the failure mode of 
CV1 becomes a hidden failure and can only be detected when the failure of LT1 is 
rectified. 
The same two failure modes are considered next, however in this case the failure of 
the level transmitter occurs 60 seconds after control valve CV1 fails open. The 
posterior probabilities for these failure modes can be seen in Figure 3.24 and Figure 
3.25. 
 
Figure 3.24฀.฀ ฀P฀o฀s฀t฀e฀r฀i฀o฀r฀ ฀p฀r฀o฀b฀a฀b฀i฀l฀i฀t฀i฀e฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀s฀t฀a฀t฀e฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀la฀b e l l e d  “ L T฀1฀ ฀f฀a฀i฀l u r e t-1 => 
฀t฀” 
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This time, the failure of LT1 has been identified as soon as it was introduced (see 
Figure 3.24, red circle is the time of the failure) since the water level was expected to 
decrease given the water inflow and outflow. Moreover, this time the failure of CV1 
failed opened has been detected (posterior probability of failure mode CV FO 
increased to 0.59 at 90 seconds), as can be seen from Figure 3.25. This can be 
explained by the fact that level transmitter LT1 sent a water level reading to controller 
LC1, which indicated that control valve CV1 has to be opened less than the 
maximum opening of this valve. 
 
Figure 3.25. Posterior probabilities o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀s฀t฀a฀t฀e฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀l฀a฀b฀e฀l฀l฀e฀d฀ ฀“฀C฀V฀1฀ ฀f฀a฀i฀l฀u฀r฀e฀ ฀t-1 
฀=฀>฀ ฀t฀” 
3.5.2.3 Scenario 3 ± Control valve CV1 failed opened and level transmitter LT3 
failed stuck 
In the third scenario, the failures of CV1 failed open and LT3 failed stuck were 
inserted in the simulation model (both 60 seconds after the start of the simulation). 
The posterior probabilities for the states of nodes CV1 failure and LT3 failure 
calculated by the OOBN after the sensor readings from the simulation model were 
input into the OOBN are plotted in Figure 3.26 and Figure 3.27. 
 
Figure 3.26฀.฀ ฀P฀o฀s฀t฀e฀r฀i฀o฀r฀ ฀p฀r฀o฀b฀a฀b฀i฀l฀i฀t฀i฀e฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀s฀t฀a฀t฀e฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀la฀b e l l e d  “ C฀V฀1฀ ฀f฀a฀i฀l u฀r e฀ ฀t-1 
฀=฀>฀ ฀t฀” 
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As previously, the CV1 failed opened failure mode was identified by the OOBN with a 
time lag if compared to the time when it was inserted in the simulation model. As can 
be seen from Figure 3.26 failure occurred at 60 seconds and the posterior probability 
of CV FO increased to 0.59 at 90 seconds. This happened for the same reason as in 
the previous example, i.e. the water level was above the set point and valve CV1 was 
expected to be fully opened. As soon as such expectation has changed, the CV1 
failed open failure mode was identified. 
A similar situation occurred for the LT3 failure. The failure was detected two iterations 
after it was inserted (failure occurred at 60 seconds, the posterior probability of failure 
mode LT FS increased to 1 at 80 seconds) as can be seen in Figure 3.27. The 
reason the OOBN was incapable of detecting the failure at the same time as it 
occurred was that LT3 was displaying the pressure level as expected with the given 
inflow and outflow of gas and the changing volume available for gas. As soon as the 
gas inflow decreased, the failure of LT3 transmitter was identified, since the pressure 
level in the vessel did not decrease, as was expected. 
 
Figure 3.27฀.฀ ฀P฀o฀s฀t฀e฀r฀i฀o฀r฀ ฀p฀r฀o฀b฀a฀b฀i฀l฀i฀t฀i฀e฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀s฀t฀a฀t฀e฀s฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀la฀b e l l e d  “ L T฀3฀ ฀f฀a฀i฀l u r e t-1 => 
฀t฀” 
A summary of the analysis results of a broader choice of scenarios with single and 
multiple failure modes is presented in the next sections. 
3.5.3 Results from the analysis of single faults 
All the single failure modes (except for the controller faults, since they have the same 
effect as failures of the corresponding valve and thus cannot be distinguished from 
them) were inserted at different time points ( ௧݂ ൌ  ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ ǥ ǡ  ? ? ?) during the 
execution of simulation to test the duration of detection lags of the faults given 
different inflow options. The simulation model was executed for 600 seconds or until 
an alarm or an undesirable event occurred, whichever was first. 
Four different types of inflows were tested in order to validate the proposed 
methodology on various operating conditions of the three-phase separator. This way, 
the fault detection and diagnostics is considered to be more challenging, since the 
separated water, oil and gas levels can change in different ways due to variable 
inflow rates as well as failure modes of components. Oscillating, decreasing, 
increasing and random inflows were considered and the results with each type of 
inflow are presented separately. In total, 624 different scenarios for each type of 
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inflow modelled were produced to test the OOBN capabilities of fault detection and 
diagnostics of single failures. 
The performance of the proposed methodology is demonstrated by plotting average, 
minimum and maximum values of lags in failure detection times after the sensor 
readings from the simulation model were inserted as evidence in the OOBN model. 
Note that, if a failure mode was not detected by the OOBN model, the duration time 
of its presence in the simulation model was considered to calculate average, 
minimum and maximum values of lags. 
Additionally, a summary of both detected and undetected failure modes is given. For 
each correctly detected and diagnosed failure mode its detection and diagnostics 
potential is determined using the following equation: 
 
ܴூ஽ ൌ ௗܶܶ௣ ൈ  ? ? ? ?ǡ 3.42 
where ܴூ஽ is the ratio of fault detection and diagnostic capability of a specific failure 
mode ܫܦ, ௗܶ is the time duration, when the OOBN was aware that the failure was 
present, ௣ܶ is the time duration the failure was present in the simulation model. 
Similarly, the measure of false alarms is given as a ratio expressed using the 
following equation: 
 
ܴி಺ವ ൌ ிܶ೏௧ܶ ൈ  ? ? ? ?ǡ 3.43 
where ܴி಺ವ  is the ratio of false alarm of a specific failure mode ܫܦ, ிܶ೏ is the time 
duration, when the OOBN was falsely aware about a failure, ௧ܶ is the total time of 
simulation. The results with the oscillating inflows are presented first. 
3.5.3.1 Oscillating flow 
Oscillating flow was modelled according to the procedure, described in section 
3.3.2.1. An example of resulting oscillating water inflow can be seen in Figure 3.28. 
Oil and gas inflows are modelled in the same way. 
 
 
Figure 3.28. Oscillating water inflow as modelled with the three-phase separator 
simulation model 
The main finding of the analysis was that there were no cases where a certain failure 
mode would not be detected and an undesirable event would occur among all of the 
624 scenarios tested. Delays in fault detections using the OOBN model, when 
oscillating inflows were modelled in the simulation model, are summarised in Figure 
3.29. Average, minimum and maximum (blue diamonds, red squares and green 
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triangles, respectively, in Figure 3.29) values of fault detection delays are presented 
for each fault. 
 
Figure 3.29. Fault detection duration when oscillating inflow was modelled 
As one can observe, the average fault detection durations were no longer than 40 
seconds, which should give enough time for the operator to perform actions to 
prevent any undesirable event. The minimum fault detection duration was zero 
seconds for the majority of faults, except for the flow transmitter FT0 being failed 
stuck. The maximum fault detection duration was observed for the failure mode level 
transmitter LT2 being failed stuck. In one case, this failure mode was only detected 
by the OOBN model 130 seconds after it was inserted into the simulation model. 
Even though the detection of the failure in this case took longer than the average 
time, the failure was still detected well before the separated oil level reached the level, 
where it would raise an alarm if the level transmitter LT2 was not failed. Thus it still 
gives an earlier indication of a failure than that provided by the alarm methods. 
All the failure modes that were detected by the OOBN model are listed in Table 3.11. 
The first column of the table specifies which failure mode was inserted in the 
simulation model, while the remaining columns specify the ratios of failure modes 
identified by the OOBN. When a failure mode in the first column coincided with the 
same failure mode identified by the OOBN, equation 3.42 was used to determine the 
ratio of correctly identified failure mode (given as numbers in bold in Table 3.11), 
otherwise equation 3.43 was used to calculate the ratio of falsely detected failure 
mode. The same approach to present the results is used in further sections. 
As one can observe from Table 3.11, the ratios of time duration when the faults have 
been correctly detected were very high for the failure modes CV2 FC, FT2 FS, CV3 
FC and CV3 FO (ratios higher than 95%). Moreover, for a big number of failure 
modes tested (9 out of 13) the ratios were higher than 89%. Consequently, in the 
majority of cases only single faults were detected solely and only very small 
percentages of false alarms, i.e. additional failure modes were detected. For example, 
the ratio of false alarms for failure mode LT1 FS was 0.11%, when the FT0 FS failure 
mode was inserted in the simulation model. The biggest number of false failure 
alarms (excluding the detection of controller failures when valve failures were 
inserted and vice versa) was for the gas section components (failure modes LC3 FL, 
CV3 FC and FT3 FS). These false alarms are raised due to the way the effect of 
changing gas volume on the change of pressure level is modelled. Finer intervals for 
these two variables should be considered to achieve a better precision of modelling 
the change in pressure level and to reduce the number of false alarms. 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
FT0
FS
LT1
FS
CV1
FC
CV1
FO
FT1
FS
LT2
FS
CV2
FC
CV2
FO
FT2
FS
LT3
FS
CV3
FC
CV3
FO
FT3
FS
D
e
te
c
ti
o
n
 d
u
r
a
ti
o
n
, 
s
Fault
Average Minimum Maximum
191 
 
Table 3.11. Summary of the fault detection and diagnostics ratios, when a single fault has been inserted in the simulation model, when 
oscillating inflows were modelled 
Fault 
inserted 
Fault detected 
FT0 
FS 
LT1 
FS 
LC1 
FH 
LC1 
FL 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
LC2 
FH 
LC2 
FL 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
LC3 
FH 
LC3 
FL 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
FT0 FS 77.11 0.11                  
LT1 FS  81.79        0.64 0.64  0.64       
CV1 FC    29.32 90.12          0.40 2.87 2.47 0.40 3.21 
CV1 FO   33.60   89.89         0.32   0.32 1.06 
FT1 FS   1.40 1.26 1.26 1.40 74.32             
LT2 FS  0.17      84.50       1.01 3.69 2.68 1.01 3.19 
CV2 FC          25.30 95.29     0.87 0.87  0.94 
CV2 FO         20.46   90.41        
FT2 FS         0.22 0.25 0.25 0.22 96.64       
LT3 FS              92.66      
CV3 FC                42.43 96.74   
CV3 FO               41.27   96.47  
FT3 FS               1.33 1.11 1.29 1.15 93.91 
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3.5.3.2 Decreasing flow 
Decreasing flow was modelled according to the procedure, described in section 
3.3.2.2. An example of resulting decreasing water inflow can be seen in Figure 3.30. 
Oil and gas inflows are modelled in the same way. 
 
Figure 3.30. Decreasing water inflow as modelled with a three-phase separator 
simulation model 
The fault detection delays when decreasing inflows were modelled are summarised 
next. The results for each failure mode are given in Figure 3.31. The same graphical 
representation is used as in the previous section with the oscillating flow. 
 
Figure 3.31. Fault detection duration when decreasing inflow was modelled 
The majority of average fault detection durations once again were reasonably short, 
with less than 50 seconds of average detection lag. However, this time the average 
fault detection durations have increased significantly for failure modes FT0 FS and 
LT1 FS if compared to the case when the oscillating flow was modelled, i.e. the 
average duration of detection of FT0 FS was 30.42 seconds and 32.29 seconds for 
LT1 FS for oscillating flow while for decreasing flow these were 108.75 and 108.13 
seconds respectively. The maximum fault detection duration was observed for level 
transmitter LT1 being failed stuck and failure transmitter FT0 being failed stuck. In 
some cases, the latter failure mode was only detected by the OOBN model 210 
seconds after it was inserted into the simulation model. The delayed detection of the 
FT0 failure does not impose any risks as the failure of FT0 is not safety critical. In 
terms of the LT1 fault, even though its detection took longer than the average time, 
the fault was still detected well before the water level reached the level, where it 
would raise an alarm if the level transmitter LT1 was not failed. 
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This time, however, there were a few cases (7 out of 624 scenarios) when no failures 
were detected even though they were modelled by the simulation model, as can be 
seen from the summary given in Table 3.12. Even though these failures were not 
detected by the OOBN, none of them led to an undesirable event or an alarm during 
the simulation running time. Thus, such failures would not be identified by the 
traditional method of alarms as well. Components whose failure modes were 
undetected include flow and level transmitters. The undetected failures of flow 
transmitters are not safety critical. On the contrary, the undetected failures of level 
transmitters can be safety critical, thus they are analysed in more detail. 
Table 3.12. Summary of undetected failures with OOBN, given decreasing inflows 
Fault FT0 FS 
LT1 
FS 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
Times Fault not 
detected 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
The LT1 failure mode was undetected when it was inserted at 470 and 480 seconds 
after the start of the simulation. In both situations, the water level shown by LT1 was 
equal to the set point when the failures occurred and the actual water level fluctuated 
around the set point afterwards until the end of the simulation. Thus the shown water 
level was as expected given the inflow and outflow of water and therefore the fault 
could not be detected. If the operating conditions of the three-phase separator 
changed significantly (for example, the inflow of water started increasing, this failure 
mode would be detected with a big time lag, as seen from the similar scenarios 
analysed in this study. 
The LT3 failure mode was undetected when it was inserted at 450 seconds after the 
start of the simulation model. The failure mode was undetected because there was 
only a slight difference between the gas inflow and outflow and the volume available 
for the gas was changing compensating the difference between inflow and outflow of 
gas modelled in the OOBN. Moreover, the true pressure level never decreased or 
increased significantly to the level that would cause an undesirable event or raise an 
alarm if the level transmitter LT3 was working. Thus, given the operating conditions 
of the three-phase separator, this failure mode becomes hidden, since the effects of 
the failure mode are similar to the ones if the LT3 transmitter is working. 
As one can observe from Table 3.13, the ratios of time duration when the faults have 
been correctly detected were very high for the failure modes of valves CV1, CV2 and 
CV3 (ratios higher than 99%). Moreover, for the majority of failure modes tested (10 
out of 13) the ratios were higher than 90%. The ratios of time duration when the 
faults have been correctly detected have decreased for certain failure modes and 
have increased for other failure modes. A notable increase can be observed for the 
failure mode FT1 failed stuck. When the decreasing inflows were modelled, the 
failure mode was correctly identified by the OOBN 91.92% of the time while it was 
present in the simulation model. When the oscillating inflows were modelled this ratio 
was 74.32%. However, notable decreases were observed for failure modes FT0 
failed stuck (63.81% for the decreasing inflows and 77.11% for the oscillating inflows) 
and LT1 failed stuck (63.60% for the decreasing inflows and 81.79% for the 
oscillating inflows). 
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Table 3.13. Summary of the fault detection and diagnostics ratios, when a single fault has been inserted in the simulation model, when 
decreasing inflows were modelled 
Fault 
inserted 
Fault detected 
FT0 
FS 
LT1 
FS 
LC1 
FH 
LC1 
FL 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
LC2 
FH 
LC2 
FL 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
LC3 
FH 
LC3 
FL 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
FT0 FS 63.81 1.83                  
LT1 FS  63.60      0.31            
CV1 FC    43.35 100.00   0.14            
CV1 FO   39.22   100.00              
FT1 FS       91.92             
LT2 FS  1.19      78.31      0.72 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.26 
CV2 FC          29.22 99.79  0.18 0.18  0.30 0.30  0.30 
CV2 FO  0.13  0.13 0.13  0.19  24.13   100.00 0.06 0.45 0.26 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.39 
FT2 FS         0.32 0.07 0.14 0.29 97.01       
LT3 FS              90.16      
CV3 FC                43.82 99.35   
CV3 FO               42.14   99.31 0.05 
FT3 FS  0.04  0.04 0.04  0.04        2.33 1.44 1.80 1.90 93.59 
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3.5.3.3 Increasing flow 
Increasing flow was modelled according to the procedure described in section 3.3.2.2. 
An example of the result of increasing water inflow can be seen in Figure 3.32. Oil 
and gas inflows are modelled in the same way. 
 
Figure 3.32. Increasing water inflow as modelled with a three-phase separator 
simulation model 
The fault detection times when increasing inflows were modelled, are summarised in 
Figure 3.33. 
 
Figure 3.33. Fault detection duration when increasing inflow was modelled 
The average values of fault detection times once more were below 50 seconds for 
the majority of failure modes. They have only increased significantly, compared to the 
case when the oscillating flow was modelled, for failure modes FT0 FS and LT1 FS, 
i.e. the average time duration of detection of FT0 FS was 30.42 seconds and LT1 FS 
32.29 seconds for the oscillating flow case while for increasing flow case these were 
128.54 and 79.79 seconds respectively. The maximum fault detection delay was 
observed for the level transmitter LT1 being failed stuck failure mode. In one 
simulation this failure mode has only been detected by the OOBN model 310 
seconds after it was inserted into the simulation model. However, even though the 
detection of the failure in this case took a significantly longer time than the average 
detection time, the failure was still detected well before the water level reached the 
level, where it would raise an alarm if the level transmitter LT1 was working. 
As with the decreasing flow scenario the failures were detected in the majority of 
tested simulations (616 out of 624 successful fault detections) with a few cases when 
no failures were detected (8 out of 624 scenarios, see Table 3.14) even though they 
were inserted in the simulation model.  Despite the fact that these failures were not 
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detected by the OOBN model, none of them led to an undesirable event or an alarm 
during the simulation period. Furthermore, some undetected failures such as the 
failures of flow transmitters are not safety critical. On the contrary, undetected level 
transmitter failures can be safety critical, thus they are analysed in more detail. 
Table 3.14. Summary of undetected failures with OOBN, given increasing inflows 
Fault FT0 FS 
LT1 
FS 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
Times Fault not 
detected 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
The LT1 failure mode was undetected when it was introduced in the simulation model 
at 310, 320, 400 and 480 seconds after the start of the simulation. In all the situations 
the water level shown by LT1 was equal to the set point (the desired level) when the 
failures occurred and the actual water level did not deviate significantly from the 
desired level until the end of the simulation. Thus, the shown water level was as 
expected given the inflow and outflow of water. Moreover, the oil level in the 
separated section was not significantly affected as well as the pressure level. For this 
reason the failure of LT1 remained undetected. 
The LT3 failure mode was undetected when it was introduced in the simulation model 
at 500 seconds after the start of the simulation. The failure mode was undetected 
because there was only a slight difference between the gas inflow and outflow. 
Moreover, the volume available for the gas was changing compensating for the 
difference between inflow and outflow of gas modelled in the OOBN. Moreover, the 
true pressure level never decreased or increased significantly so it could cause an 
undesirable event or raise an alarm if the level transmitter LT3 was working. 
As one can observe from Table 3.15, the ratios of time duration when the faults have 
been correctly detected were very high for the failure modes of valves CV1, CV2 and 
CV3 (ratios higher than 98%) and flow transmitters FT1, FT2 and FT3 (ratios higher 
than 96%). Moreover, for the majority of failure modes tested (9 out of 13) the ratios 
were higher than 96%. The failure modes FT0 failed stuck and LT1 failed stuck 
proved most difficult to identify using the OOBN, as was the case with the decreasing 
flows, as the results in Table 3.15 suggest. However, uniquely to the increasing 
inflow case, there were a lot of false alarms of LT2 failed stuck (ratio up to 5.17%), 
when other failures were actually present in the separator. This was due to the fact 
that towards the end of the simulation the oil level was increasing slowly and due to 
the transmitter precision modelled the increase was not visible in the LT2 transmitter 
readings, while the flow transmitters FT0 and FT2 indicated that the level shown by 
LT2 should be increasing as well. 
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Table 3.15. Summary of the fault detection and diagnostics ratios, when a single fault has been inserted in the simulation model, when 
increasing inflows were modelled 
Fault 
inserted 
Fault detected 
FT0 
FS 
LT1 
FS 
LC1 
FH 
LC1 
FL 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
LC2 
FH 
LC2 
FL 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
LC3 
FH 
LC3 
FL 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
FT0 FS 60.01       3.95            
LT1 FS  69.91      1.80            
CV1 FC    41.05 100.00   0.10            
CV1 FO   41.23   100.00         0.10 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.50 
FT1 FS       96.58 5.17            
LT2 FS        79.92       0.20 0.41 0.20 0.20 0.41 
CV2 FC  0.06        27.56 99.12    0.06 0.18 0.12 0.06 0.25 
CV2 FO         25.65   99.75 0.13  0.32 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.38 
FT2 FS        3.48 0.07 0.18 0.18 0.07 97.08       
LT3 FS        4.18      88.34      
CV3 FC        1.22        41.95 98.85   
CV3 FO        3.42       43.82   99.35  
FT3 FS        5.17       1.01 0.57 0.43 1.15 96.33 
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3.5.3.4 Random flow 
Random flow was modelled according to the procedure described in section 3.3.2.3. 
An example of resulting random water inflow can be seen in Figure 3.32. Oil and gas 
inflows are modelled in the same way. 
 
Figure 3.34. Increasing water inflow as modelled with a three-phase separator 
simulation model 
The fault detection times when random inflows were modelled, are summarised in 
Figure 3.35. 
 
Figure 3.35. Fault detection duration when random inflow was modelled 
The average fault detection durations when using the OOBN model have increased if 
compared to the case when the oscillating flow was modelled only for the failure 
modes FT0 FS and LT1 FS. The increase, however, was not as drastic as with 
decreasing and increasing inflows, i.e. the average duration of detection of FT0 FS 
was 30.42 seconds and LT1 FS 32.29 seconds for oscillating flow while for random 
flow these were equal to 58.75 and 63.96 seconds respectively. The maximum delay 
in the fault detection was observed for level transmitter LT1 being failed stuck. In one 
simulation this failure mode has only been detected by the OOBN model 480 
seconds after it was inserted into the simulation model. Even though the detection of 
the failure in this case took a significantly longer time than the average detection time, 
the failure was still detected well before the water level reached a level, where it 
would raise an alarm if the level transmitter LT1 was working. 
As with the decreasing and increasing flows the failures were detected in the majority 
of tested simulations (622 out of 624 successful fault detections) with a few cases 
when no failures were detected (2 out of 624 scenarios, see Table 3.16) even though 
they were inserted in the simulation model. Specifically, FT3 FS failures were not 
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detected twice. Even though this failure mode was not detected in several tested 
scenarios, it is not a safety critical failure mode and it does not affect the operation of 
three-phase separator in any way, except by indicating incorrect outflow of gas. 
Table 3.16. Summary of undetected failures with OOBN, given increasing inflows 
Fault FT0 FS 
LT1 
FS 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
Times Fault not 
detected 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
The results of additionally detected failures are similar as for the other types of 
inflows modelled. The ratios of time duration when the faults have been correctly 
detected were very high for the failure modes of valves CV1, CV2 and CV3 (ratios 
higher than 93%) and flow transmitters FT1, FT2 and FT3 (ratios higher than 91%). 
Moreover, for the majority of failure modes tested (10 out of 13) the ratios were 
higher than 91%. The good performance of the OOBN model is also represented by 
a small amount of false alarms, as can be seen from Table 3.17. Moreover, with the 
random inflows, only two types of failures, FT0 failed stuck and LT1 failed stuck, 
were hard to identify (other failures were identified with rates higher than 85%). The 
identification of the flow transmitter FT0 failure was the biggest issue for the OOBN, 
when only 67.16% ratio was obtained. 
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Table 3.17. Summary of the fault detection and diagnostics ratios, when a single fault has been inserted in the simulation model, when random 
inflows were modelled 
Fault 
inserted 
Faults detected 
FT0 
FS 
LT1 
FS 
LC1 
FH 
LC1 
FL 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
LC2 
FH 
LC2 
FL 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
LC3 
FH 
LC3 
FL 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
FT0 FS 67.16                   
LT1 FS 1.71 76.55      1.71      0.08      
CV1 FC 0.18   46.13 100.00         0.05      
CV1 FO 0.11  37.46   99.86              
FT1 FS 0.07  0.07   0.07 97.57             
LT2 FS 2.10       86.44            
CV2 FC 0.74         26.48 96.62   0.06      
CV2 FO         20.91   93.24        
FT2 FS 0.90        0.90 0.90 0.83 1.04 95.34       
LT3 FS              94.65      
CV3 FC                43.52 97.17   
CV3 FO               40.88   98.80  
FT3 FS 2.73              0.90 3.99 3.70 1.29 91.42 
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3.5.3.5 Summary 
Four different inflow options were modelled using the three-phase separator 
simulation model in order to test the fault detection and diagnostics performance of 
the OOBN model with 13 different failure modes. Oscillating inflows were chosen as 
a very dynamic inflow option. Decreasing/increasing inflows were modelled as slowly 
changing towards minimum/maximum values of the inflows. Finally, random inflows 
represented a situation when the inflows changed at certain time points to a new 
random value. 
With the chosen design of the OOBN model (three time steps, each of them of 10 
seconds, specific chosen prior probabilities), the model performed best in detecting 
single failures with oscillating inflows (no single failures were left undetected, average 
detection times of failures were less than 40 seconds). 
Most of the failures were detected immediately. Where there were delays in detection, 
the average detection lags were no longer than 50 seconds for the majority of failure 
modes (except for FT0 FS and LT1 FS with decreasing, increasing and random 
inflows) allowing to give a warning about the failure well in advance of an alarm or 
undesirable event. 
The amount of false alarms produced by the OOBN model was also very small. For 
example, the maximum ratios of false alarms were 3.69%, 2.33%, 5.17% and 3.99% 
when oscillating, increasing, decreasing and random inflows were modelled 
respectively (if excluding the detection of controller failures, when valve failures were 
inserted, as mentioned previously). Thus the majority of failure modes were detected 
and diagnosed solely, allowing preventative or corrective actions to be performed on 
the components that actually need them. 
There were a few cases when the failures were left undetected, when decreasing, 
increasing and random inflows were modelled. However, they were usually not 
critical for the safe operation (failures of flow transmitters) of the three-phase 
separator. Moreover, even when some failures were not detected by the OOBN, 
none of them led to an undesirable event or an alarm during the simulation running 
time. Usually failures were left undetected, because they were inserted at the end of 
simulation run and when the true levels of water, oil and gas did not change 
significantly. 
The biggest challenge for the OOBN model was the detection of transmitter failures. 
This was due to the fact, that the effects of failures depend on the occurrence of the 
failure and in some cases the failure might be a hidden failure for a certain period of 
the simulation. This was the reason why failures of transmitters took longer to detect 
than failures of valves. However, the failure becomes hidden because of specific 
operating conditions and thus the performance of any of the techniques for fault 
detection and diagnostics would suffer due to this phenomenon. 
Another challenge for the model was slowly changing inflows. In this case the liquid 
or gas level was also changing slowly. Moreover, if the changes are very small they 
are treated as non-changing due to the way the transmitter readings are discretised 
into intervals in the OOBN model. 
Thus, the design of the OOBN (the number of time slices in the multiple time slice 
OOBN, the amount of time points in one time slice etc.) should be considered 
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carefully to fit the operating conditions of the three-phase separator. The analysis of 
the detection of multiple failure modes is given in the next section. 
3.5.4 Results from the analysis of multiple faults 
In this section, the results of the fault detection of multiple failure modes when using 
the OOBN model are presented. This time, two failure modes occurring in a single 
simulation run were modelled. The multiple failures have been inserted in the 
simulation model in the following way: first one of the level transmitter failures (LT1 
FS, LT2 FS or LT3 FS) is introduced and followed by one of the remaining possible 
failures. In total 36 combinations of two failures were obtained for the testing of the 
OOBN model. 
In the subsequent sub-sections, only the results obtained with LT1 FS failure mode 
are presented, since the same tendencies were observed for the LT2 FS and LT3 FS 
failures (results are given in Appendix F). 
As with the single failure modes, multiple failure modes were inserted at different 
time points during simulation runs to test the delay of the detection of the faults given 
different inflow options. The first failure mode was inserted at ௧݂ ൌ  ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ ǥ ǡ  ? ? ? 
seconds, while the second failure mode was inserted with a 30 second time lag after 
the first one. Once again, the simulation model was executed for 600 seconds or until 
an alarm, or an undesirable event occurred, whichever was first. In total, 1728 
different scenarios were produced for each type of inflow modelled to test the OOBN 
capabilities of fault detection and diagnostics with multiple failures. 
Identically as with the single failures, a failure was considered as detected if the 
posterior probability representing a certain failure mode in the OOBN was bigger than 
0.1. The results are summarised in a similar way as in the analysis of single faults 
(see section 3.5.3), providing a summary of undetected failures as well as the ratios 
for the detection of different failure modes considered, based on equations 3.42 and 
3.43. The results with the oscillating inflows are presented first. 
3.5.4.1 Oscillating flow 
When oscillating inflows were modelled there were no situations when both inserted 
failures would be undetected. There were only a few cases when the failure of level 
transmitter LT1 was left undetected (8 times out of 576 simulation runs, as can be 
seen from Table 3.18. Some of the failure modes which were inserted following the 
failure mode LT1 FS were detected in the majority of tested scenarios, e.g. the FT0 
FS failure mode was detected in all of the 48 tested scenarios. Similar performance 
was obtained when LT1 FS failure was inserted together with failure modes LT3 FS 
(undetected in 3 out of 48 scenarios), CV3 FC (undetected in 1 out of 48 scenarios), 
CV3 FO (undetected in 2 out of 48 scenarios) or FT3 FS (undetected in 1 out of 48 
scenarios). 
As seen previously when modelling single faults, some failures remained hidden 
failures for a number of time steps after being inserted in the simulation model and 
thus could not be detected by the OOBN model instantly. A similar issue becomes 
apparent when two failure modes are inserted into the simulation model. However, 
this time, not only conditions of the operation of the separator makes the failures 
hidden but also the existence of the first failure. 
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For example, it is highly likely, that if level transmitter LT1 has failed stuck and after 
some time flow transmitter FT1 fails stuck, the effect of the FT1 failure cannot be 
seen, since the flow is as expected given the failure and readings of the LT1. This is 
exactly the situation, which was observed in the majority of tested scenarios with LT1 
and FT1 failures, as can be seen from Table 3.18. 48 different scenarios for these 
two failures were simulated, given oscillating inflows, and in 43 of them the failure 
mode FT1 FS was left undetected due to the fact that it became a hidden failure.  
Another situation when such hidden failures might occur is when valve failures CV1 
FC or CV1 FO coincide with the failure of corresponding level transmitter LT1. The 
effect of these hidden failures can also be seen in Table 3.18 where 19 times out of 
48 the CV1 failed closed failure was undetected and 24 times out of 48 the CV1 
failed opened failure was undetected. 
A fairly high number of FT2 failed stuck failures were also left undetected (11 out of 
48). There were two different reasons why these failures were undetected: first one is 
that after the insertion of the LT1 failure, the simulation model ran only for a few time 
steps before either an alarm in the three-phase separator was raised or an 
undesirable event occurred. The second reason was that the FT2 failed while it was 
showing the expected reading given the oil level in the separated oil section and thus 
became a hidden failure. 
Table 3.18. Summary of undetected failures, when LT1 failed stuck failure was 
simulated together with another component failing, given oscillating inflows 
Fault 1 LT1 FS 
Fault 2 FT0 FS 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
Times Fault 1 not detected 1 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Times Fault 2 not detected 0 19 24 43 9 7 4 11 3 1 2 1 
Times Fault 1 and Fault 2 not 
detected 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Such challenging conditions were also well reflected in the summary of the fault 
detection and diagnostic ratios as shown in Table 3.19. The failure of LT1 has been 
detected with at least 68.34% (maximum 88.48% ratio) ratio, when this failure was 
inserted, while for example the failure of FT1 FS was detected by the OOBN only 
with 11.32% ratio. Nevertheless, in most cases the second failure detection ratio was 
above 70% which demonstrates that the model proposed can detect multiple faults 
(whenever they are not hidden failures) in a timely manner avoiding hazardous 
consequences. 
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Table 3.19. Summary of the fault detection and diagnostics ratios, when two faults have been inserted in the simulation model, when oscillating 
inflows were modelled 
Fault 1 Fault 2 
Faults detected 
FT0 
FS 
LT1 
FS 
LC1 
FH 
LC1 
FL 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
LC2 
FH 
LC2 
FL 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
LC3 
FH 
LC3 
FL 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
LT1 FS 
FT0 FS 68.03 73.33     0.99 0.10 0.35 0.74 0.39 0.35 0.69  0.30 0.49 0.20 0.30 0.49 
CV1 FC  82.37  21.15 72.08     1.87 1.87  1.87  0.32 0.64 0.32 0.32 0.96 
CV1 FO  88.48 22.08   51.95  0.35       0.26   0.26 0.87 
FT1 FS  81.79 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 11.32   0.64 0.64  0.64       
LT2 FS  81.49      62.50  2.14 2.09  2.34  1.29 2.14 2.14 1.29 3.64 
CV2 FC  77.54        22.66 75.71     1.86 1.86  1.86 
CV2 FO  68.34       17.67 1.31 1.31 77.46 1.43  2.75 0.24 0.24 2.81 2.81 
FT2 FS  81.79       0.10 14.36 14.21 0.10 71.29       
LT3 FS  81.79            76.38      
CV3 FC  80.65             0.10 29.89 86.91 0.51 1.32 
CV3 FO  72.71        0.23 0.23  0.23  21.85   89.86  
FT3 FS  81.79     0.05 0.30      0.05 4.83 7.05 6.07 5.08 73.55 
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3.5.4.2 Decreasing flow 
When the decreasing inflows were modelled in the simulation model some of the 
failure modes were detected in the majority of tested scenarios, when inserted 
following the fault LT1 FS, e.g. the CV1 FO, CV2 FO and CV3 FO failure modes 
were detected in all of the 48 tested scenarios. Similar performance was obtained 
when LT1 FS failure was inserted together with failure modes FT2 FS (undetected in 
3 out of 48 scenarios), LT3 FS (undetected in 2 out of 48 scenarios) or CV3 FC 
(undetected in 1 out of 48 scenarios). 
However, overall slightly worse results were produced by the OOBN model if 
compared to the oscillating inflows. The cases when the failure of level transmitter 
LT1 was left undetected have increased (85 times out of 576 simulation runs, as can 
be seen from Table 3.20), when decreasing inflows were modelled. The majority of 
the cases, when LT1 was left undetected, was observed when this failure mode 
coincided with failure modes CV2 FC or CV2 FO. Such a situation has occurred due 
to the fact that the water inflow was slowly decreasing and thus a change in the LT1 
readings was not expected. Moreover, when the CV2 FC or CV2 FO failures were 
inserted, the oil level in the separated oil section quickly reached the level where it 
produced either a high oil level alarm or a low oil level alarm respectively. Thus, the 
simulation model ran only for a short period of time after CV2 FC or CV2 FO failures 
were inserted before the simulation was terminated, which was not long enough for 
the LT1 failure to be detected. When the simulation model was run longer, the failure 
LT1 FS was detected after a long delay, given the decreasing inflows. If referred 
back to single failures (see Figure 3.31), the LT1 FS failure mode was detected with 
an average time lag of 108.13 seconds and thus in most cases the model did not run 
for long enough time after the second failure was inserted. 
Moreover, there were a few situations when both inserted failures were undetected (4 
times out of 576 simulation runs). This happened twice for the FT0 FS failure and 
FT1 FS failure, when inserted together with the LT1 FS failure. It was due to the fact 
that the effects of the failures on three-phase separator operation were the same as 
those when both component work. 
Table 3.20. Summary of undetected failures, when LT1 failed stuck failure was 
simulated together with another component failing, given decreasing inflows 
Fault 1 LT1 FS 
Fault 2 FT0 FS 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
Times Fault 1 not detected 2 2 0 2 10 21 31 2 2 7 4 2 
Times Fault 2 not detected 4 3 0 35 10 5 0 3 2 1 0 3 
Times Fault 1 and Fault 2 not 
detected 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The results in Table 3.21 show that the second failures were detected quicker than in 
the case of oscillating flow, where the majority of ratios were above 89%. The 
amount of undetected LT1 FS failures can also be seen in the summary of the fault 
detection and diagnostics ratios of the OOBN model, given in Table 3.21. The fault 
detection ratio of failure LT1 FS ranged from 28.89% (inserted together with CV2 FO 
failure mode) to 84.82% (inserted together with CV1 FC failure mode). As one can 
observe, a low number of false alarms was raised by the model with the highest 
number of LC2 FL and CV2 FC (4.65% of all time points), when the LT1 FS and FT2 
FS failure modes were inserted in the simulation model. 
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Table 3.21. Summary of the fault detection and diagnostics ratios, when two faults have been inserted in the simulation model, when 
decreasing inflows were modelled 
Fault 1 Fault 2 
Faults detected 
FT0 
FS 
LT1 
FS 
LC1 
FH 
LC1 
FL 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
LC2 
FH 
LC2 
FL 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
LC3 
FH 
LC3 
FL 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
LT1 FS 
FT0 FS 45.40 66.34      0.23      0.15      
CV1 FC  84.82  44.46 96.21  0.24 0.77            
CV1 FO  84.15 39.74   98.22 1.08 0.32            
FT1 FS  63.88     20.20 0.31            
LT2 FS  62.37      70.78      0.19 0.19 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.19 
CV2 FC  41.90        27.22 90.03  0.05 0.11  0.16 0.16  0.16 
CV2 FO  28.89      0.18 20.95   99.72 0.18       
FT2 FS  63.60      0.46 0.69 4.65 4.65 0.69 94.46       
LT3 FS  63.60      0.31      89.24      
CV3 FC  52.70      0.18        40.84 98.82   
CV3 FO  44.42      0.38       37.10   99.24 0.09 
FT3 FS  63.60      0.31       0.54 1.69 1.77 0.54 94.62 
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3.5.4.3 Increasing flow 
Similar tendencies to the ones observed for the decreasing inflows have been 
observed when the increasing inflows were modelled (see Table 3.22). Some of the 
failure modes were detected in the majority of tested scenarios, when inserted 
together with LT1 FS, e.g. the CV3 FC failure mode was detected in all of the 48 
tested scenarios. Similar performance was obtained when the LT1 FS failure was 
inserted together with failure modes LT3 FS (undetected in 1 out of 48 scenarios) or 
CV3 FO (undetected in 1 out of 48 scenarios). 
As with the decreasing inflows, the LT1 FS failure was most likely to be undetected 
when it was followed by CV2 FC and CV2 FO failure modes. Once more, the flows of 
mixture into the separator were increasing more slowly when compared to the 
dynamic behaviour of the oscillating flow, thus the water level indicated by LT1 
transmitter was expected to remain the same for a longer time. Thus, this should be 
taken into account when building the OOBN model, if it is known that the inflows to 
the three-phase separator change slowly. 
The highest number of undetected failures was observed for the FT1 FS failure mode. 
This failure was undetected in 21 out of 48 scenarios. As discussed previously, this is 
the outcome of the FT1 FS becoming a hidden failure, since it is inserted after the 
effects of the LT1 FS failure influence the readings of FT1. 
As with the decreasing inflows, there were a few situations when both of the failures 
were undetected. An interesting situation occurred, when the LT1 FS and FT3 FS 
failure modes were inserted. Since, a failure of LT1 influences the water level in the 
separation section as well as the flow of oil to the separated oil section, the gas 
volume changes. The gas pressure level change indicated by transmitter LT3 
suggested that given the gas inflow and the change of gas volume, the gas outflow 
has to be maximum, precisely the reading that FT3 transmitter got stuck at. However, 
the FT3 reading did not correspond to the LT3 issued command, thus the OOBN 
model indicated that the failure that occurred was only CV3 FO, instead of two 
failures LT1 FS and FT3 FS. 
Table 3.22. Summary of undetected failures, when LT1 failed stuck failure was 
simulated together with another component failing, given increasing inflows 
Fault 1 LT1 FS 
Fault 2 FT0 FS 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
Times Fault 1 not detected 5 0 2 4 3 13 12 4 4 8 8 4 
Times Fault 2 not detected 8 5 6 21 10 3 5 7 1 0 1 4 
Times Fault 1 and Fault 2 not 
detected 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
The summary of the fault detection and diagnostics ratios of the OOBN model is 
given in Table 3.23. Once again, there was only a small number of false alarms, if the 
detection of a controller failure, when the valve failure was inserted, is not considered. 
However, the fault detection of certain failures took a long time, due to the reasons 
discussed previously (hidden failures and slowly changing inflows). 
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Table 3.23. Summary of the fault detection and diagnostics ratios, when two faults have been inserted in the simulation model, when increasing 
inflows were modelled 
Fault 1 Fault 2 
Faults detected 
FT0 
FS 
LT1 
FS 
LC1 
FH 
LC1 
FL 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
LC2 
FH 
LC2 
FL 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
LC3 
FH 
LC3 
FL 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
LT1 FS 
FT0 FS 49.34 63.55      2.20      0.04      
CV1 FC  86.99  34.94 84.85  0.22 1.07      0.09      
CV1 FO  86.70 39.94   91.58 0.34 3.29            
FT1 FS  70.62  0.08 0.08  46.50 1.80            
LT2 FS  71.08      69.69      0.13 0.18  0.04 0.18 0.18 
CV2 FC  58.18        23.15 87.74  0.06   0.17 0.17  0.17 
CV2 FO  60.06  0.06 0.06  0.50 0.22 24.21   91.19 0.67  0.17   0.17 0.17 
FT2 FS  69.91      1.43 0.73 4.29 2.86 1.47 87.07       
LT3 FS  69.04      1.83      84.31      
CV3 FC  61.54      1.40        35.99 99.07   
CV3 FO  64.57      1.34       38.08   97.86  
FT3 FS  69.91      1.80       1.51 0.73 0.73 1.51 93.00 
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3.5.4.4 Random flow 
Random inflows were the last type of inflows that were modelled in the simulation 
model. Similarly to the previously tested inflow types, some of the failure modes were 
detected in the majority of tested scenarios, when inserted together with LT1 FS, e.g. 
the CV2 FO, LT3 FS, CV3 FC and CV3 FC failure modes were detected in all of the 
48 tested scenarios. Moreover, the total amount of scenarios, when both failures 
were undetected decreased to only 3 out of 576 scenarios, if compared to decreasing 
and increasing inflows. The failures were undetected in those scenarios, due to 
difference in actual inflow and outflow of the water being small and thus in all of the 
OOBN nodes, that used this information, it was considered as being in the same 
discrete interval. 
The biggest challenges for the OOBN model were detecting the failure mode FT1 FS 
(detected in 20 out of 48 scenarios). However, once again, this failure of FT1 
becomes a hidden failure in a majority of cases, when it occurs after the failure of 
LT1 FS. 
Table 3.24. Summary of undetected failures, when LT1 failed stuck failure was 
simulated together with another component failing, given random inflows 
Fault 1 LT1 FS 
Fault 2 FT0 FS 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
Times Fault 1 not detected 3 0 0 0 2 8 14 0 0 3 3 0 
Times Fault 2 not detected 19 9 9 28 12 5 0 5 0 0 0 11 
Times Fault 1 and Fault 2 not 
detected 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The summary of the fault detection and diagnostics ratios obtained with the OOBN 
model once again suggests that there were only a few false alarms (see Table 3.25). 
The largest number of false alarms was for the LC3 FL and CV3 FC failure modes, 
when the failures of LT1 FS and FT3 FS were inserted. As identified in the increasing 
flow section, failures of LC3 FL and CV3 FC were identified instead of LT1 FS and 
FT3 FS respectively due to the reading, the FT3 got stuck at and the way the 
pressure level changed in the separator. 
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Table 3.25. Summary of the fault detection and diagnostics ratios, when two faults have been inserted in the simulation model, when random 
inflows were modelled 
Fault 1 Fault 2 
Faults detected 
FT0 
FS 
LT1 
FS 
LC1 
FH 
LC1 
FL 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
LC2 
FH 
LC2 
FL 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
LC3 
FH 
LC3 
FL 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
LT1 FS 
FT0 FS 31.61 80.47      1.05      0.31      
CV1 FC 0.45 89.73  40.79 80.52  0.19       0.04      
CV1 FO 0.64 88.31 33.09   83.07 0.46 0.68            
FT1 FS 1.51 76.55     35.74 1.05      0.08      
LT2 FS 2.95 76.41      64.86      0.09  0.14 0.14  0.14 
CV2 FC 1.90 65.47      1.30  22.71 79.81  0.05       
CV2 FO 1.87 65.95       26.27   89.44  0.05 0.16   0.16 0.16 
FT2 FS 2.95 77.76      2.60 6.32 4.65 3.80 6.55 77.76 0.08      
LT3 FS 1.92 75.83      1.72      91.57      
CV3 FC 1.96 73.16      2.00        38.23 95.78   
CV3 FO 1.39 71.30      1.44       36.48   99.09  
FT3 FS 10.43 78.19      1.09  0.31 0.08 0.23 0.19 0.39 5.35 10.24 10.20 5.54 66.40 
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3.5.4.5 Summary 
Four different types of inflows were modelled in the simulation model in order to test 
the fault detection abilities of the OOBN model, when multiple faults were present in 
the separator. Similarly to the single faults case, the multiple faults were inserted at 
different time points of the simulation. All testing results are given in Appendix F and 
only a part of them was presented in the previous subsections. The numbers given in 
this section correspond to the full analysis of the scenarios with multiple failure 
modes. 
The OOBN model for fault detection and diagnostics achieved a high performance, 
when the oscillating flow was modelled. There were no cases when both inserted 
failures would be left undetected in all of the 1728 scenarios (see Appendix F for 
Table 11.1 and Table 11.2). Slightly worse results were obtained for other types of 
inflows were both failures were undetected in 5 out of 1728, 11 out of 1728 and 3 out 
of 1728 scenarios for decreasing (see Appendix F for Table 11.4 and Table 11.5), 
increasing (see Appendix F for Table 11.7 and Table 11.8) and random flows (see 
Appendix F for Table 11.10 and Table 11.11) respectively. Even though they were 
undetected through the simulation runtime it was usually due to the fact that another 
failure was detected (for example, due to the lack of detail the pressure level was 
modelled the CV3 valve failure was commonly identified instead of flow transmitter 
failure FT3) or the simulation ran only for a short period of time after the failures were 
inserted and due to the operating conditions that were present at that time. 
Hidden failures due to the operating conditions of the three-phase separator were a 
major challenge for the timely detection of the failures, when a single failure was 
inserted. In the case of multiple failures, the number of hidden failures in the tested 
scenarios just increased. Not only did the failures become hidden because of the 
operating conditions of the three-phase separator, but also in certain situations an 
effect of one failure hid the effect of another failure and thus one of the failures was 
left undetected. This highly influenced the performance of the OOBN model. As a 
result some of the faults were undetected by the OOBN model in the majority of 
scenarios (for example FT1 FS was undetected in a lot of scenarios when inserted 
after the LT1 FS fault). 
An issue of multiple failures not being detected in some of the cases was also 
observed due to the discretisation of inputted information into the OOBN model. 
When the discretisation of sensor readings was performed the precise information 
was lost, which led to slight changes in the flow and level transmitter readings being 
undetected. One of the possible ways to deal with it is to discretise the continuous 
data into finer intervals. However, these would lead to OOBN nodes having more 
states and bigger conditional probability tables, which could increase the computation 
complexity. 
3.5.5 Summary of the application of the proposed methodology 
The results of the application of the proposed methodology for the fault detection and 
diagnostics of three-phase separator were presented in this chapter. A methodology 
chosen for testing the capabilities of the OOBN model was introduced along with 
prior probabilities used for the OOBN condition nodes. Three specific scenarios were 
chosen to illustrate how the OOBN model can detect and diagnose certain failure 
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modes and what are the main challenges for the model. A more extensive testing of 
the fault detection and diagnostics ability of the OOBN was presented next. 
Firstly, only single faults were simulated in the three-phase separator by varying the 
time points when they occur and the type of inflows to the three-phase separator. 
Results were expressed as average, minimum and maximum times of the fault 
detection along with a summary of the undetected faults and the detection and 
diagnostics ratios of specific failure modes. The OOBN model performed 
exceptionally well when the oscillating inflows were modelled. No failure modes were 
left undetected and the average detection times for all of the failure modes were 
below 40 seconds. Such a fast failure mode detection and identification would allow 
the operator of the three-phase separator to be aware of a developing hazardous 
situation in advance and to perform any preventative actions needed. Moreover, the 
amount of false alarms produced by the OOBN model was also very small. For 
example, the maximum ratio of false alarms was 3.69%. 
For other types of inflows there were a few failure modes left undetected, mainly due 
to hidden faults, since given certain operating conditions of the three-phase separator 
some components that failed demonstrated the expected behaviour. Nevertheless, 
these failure modes were either not safety critical or the operating conditions of the 
three-phase separator did not deviate significantly from the normal operating 
conditions throughout the simulation run. In addition, the maximum ratios of false 
alarms were 2.33%, 5.17% and 3.99% when increasing, decreasing and random 
inflows were modelled respectively. 
Slowly changing operating conditions of the three-phase separator and very small 
differences between the flow and level transmitter readings, which were lost when 
discretising the information into the discrete states of the OOBN, were among other 
challenges for the OOBN model. They influenced the majority of lags in fault 
detection and diagnostics times, when increasing and decreasing inflows were 
modelled. 
The OOBN model performed slightly worse when multiple failure modes were 
inserted in the three-phase separator simulation model. The major finding from the 
analysis of the results with oscillating inflows was that there was no single scenario 
from all of the 1728 scenarios tested, when both failure modes would be undetected. 
This is a very promising result, since the OOBN model used for fault detection and 
diagnostics shows that it can cope with highly varying operating conditions of the 
three-phase separator. 
Slightly worse results were obtained for other types of inflows modelled, where 
several scenarios existed when both failures were not detected. Nevertheless, they 
were undetected due to the fact that another failure mode was detected. Thus the 
model managed to detect a fault and only the type of the fault was identified 
incorrectly. In other cases, the simulation ran only for a short period of time after the 
failures were inserted and due to the operating conditions that were present at that 
time, the failures could not be detected in a timely fashion. They would have been 
detected if the model would have run for a longer time, as observed for the similar 
scenarios, where the failure modes have been detected with a bigger time lag. 
The issue of hidden faults became even more apparent when multiple faults were 
inserted in the simulation model. In some cases one of the faults could not be 
detected due to the fact that the first failure that occurred hid the effects of the 
second failure. Thus, the end user of the model should be aware of the fact that there 
might be hidden failures and therefore should interpret model results critically. 
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3.6 Conclusions 
3.6.1 Introduction 
The three-phase separator is a critical component of oil and gas processing plants. 
Effective operation of the three-phase separator ensures that the oil and gas 
processing plant is working at its maximum capacity and is providing a good quality 
oil product. Unexpected failures which lead to shutdowns of the three-phase 
separator or the whole oil and gas processing facility leads to big losses for 
companies. Moreover, such failures might result in hazardous events, introducing risk 
to the workforce. Thus techniques to detect and identify failing components as soon 
as possible are essential. 
A common approach used for fault detection is an alarm based system, when certain 
thresholds are determined and the process is shut down if these are violated. 
However, such an approach does not allow the timely detection of failures and thus, 
in the majority of cases, the three-phase separator has to be shut down. Model-
based approaches were developed in order to detect faults early, i.e. at their 
developmental stage. However, the majority of currently-available models cannot 
cope with multiple failures or are defined for specific system operating conditions and 
need extensive modifications for the same methodology to be applied to a similar 
system with different operating conditions. 
In this thesis, several novel aspects were proposed for the fault detection and 
diagnostics of a three-phase separator. The proposed methodology using the OOBN 
model includes detection and diagnostics of multiple failure modes, which is a major 
improvement if compared to the previously-proposed approaches. Several other 
aspects will be overviewed in the following sections. 
3.6.2 Bayesian Belief Networks for fault detection of three-phase separator 
The methodology for the fault detection and diagnostics of three-phase separator 
proposed in this thesis is based on the BBN method. An Object Oriented Bayesian 
Network (OOBN) was built in a modular way: 
x Generic rules for building a BBN to model a control loop were proposed. The 
instances of this BBN were then used to develop BBNs for specific sections. 
x Generic rules for building a BBN in a structured way for a section of three-
phase separator were proposed. Section-specific rules were introduced to 
take into account the uniqueness of each section of the three-phase 
separator. A set of generic and section-specific rules was used to build 
individual BBNs built for each section (separation section, separated oil 
section and gas section). 
x The BBNs for individual sections were then joined into a single BBN to model 
operation of three-phase separator during a single time slice (a fixed length 
time interval). This way the BBN becomes modular and only a corresponding 
individual section BBN need to be modified if certain operating conditions or 
physical parameters of one section change. 
x A multiple time slice OOBN was proposed by combining multiple instances of 
the BBN modelling the operation of the three-phase separator during a single 
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time slice in order to take into account the condition of components in 
previous time slices. 
Two types of specific nodes were introduced in the OOBN to insert input data 
(information nodes) and get the output (condition nodes) from the model. Sensor 
readings of a three-phase separator (in this case it was a simulation model) were 
used as inputs of the information nodes of the OOBN model. Several pre-
processing procedures were considered in order to be able to input the 
continuous data obtained from the separator into the discrete information nodes 
in the OOBN. Moreover, combinations of transmitter readings were proposed in 
order to obtain supplementary data about the processes in the separator without 
a need to install additional equipment. Once the sensor readings from the 
separator were inserted in the information nodes of the OOBN, the model 
produced posterior probabilities of the condition nodes states (working state or 
one of the failure modes of certain component). 
The monitoring of the condition of the three-phase separator components was 
performed by monitoring the posterior probabilities of the condition nodes states 
in the OOBN model throughout the operation of the three-phase separator, as 
detailed in section 3.4.3.7, Figure 3.18. Whenever the posterior probabilities in 
one time slice have changed significantly, these were then set as the prior 
probabilities of a previous time slice. Such an approach made it possible to keep 
track of the failures detected by the OOBN earlier. The posterior probabilities in 
the last time slice of the OOBN were compared to a threshold and whenever it 
was exceeded the corresponding failure mode was considered to be detected 
and diagnosed. 
3.6.3 Testing the proposed methodology on the simulated three-phase 
separator 
A simulation model of the three-phase separator was built to simulate failures of 
components of the separator and their effects. 
The chosen approach to simulate the operation of a three-phase separator allowed 
extensive testing of the fault detection and diagnostic abilities of the OOBN model 
proposed. Four different inflow types were chosen for the testing phase. Single and 
multiple faults were inserted in the simulation model at different time points. 
Advantages and disadvantages of the built OOBN model were identified during the 
testing phase. 
The testing of the OOBN model with single failures showed that it can successfully 
cope with fault detection and diagnostics, especially when oscillating flow was 
modelled. In that case, failures were detected and diagnosed in all of the 624 
scenarios. Moreover, the average detection times were no longer than 40 seconds. 
Thus, an early warning of one of the component failures can be given to allow the 
responsible personnel to deal with the developing failure of the separator, before an 
undesirable event occurs. The maximum ratio of false alarms produced by the OOBN 
model was 3.69%. Slightly worse results were obtained for other types of modelled 
inflows, when there were a few cases of undetected failures. Nevertheless, the 
extensive testing performed with single failures has shown great potential for the 
developed OOBN model to successfully perform fault detection and diagnostics when 
using only data available from existing system components. 
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The testing of the OOBN model with multiple failures was more challenging and thus 
the obtained results were worse than the ones for the single failures. Nevertheless, 
the OOBN model successfully detected and diagnosed at least one of the inserted 
failure modes in all of the 1728 scenarios considered for the oscillating inflows. 
Slightly worse results were obtained for other inflow options where a few scenarios 
existed, when both of the inserted failures were not detected by the OOBN model. 
However, even in those scenarios, the failures were either not safety critical or the 
operating conditions of the three-phase separator did not deviate significantly from 
the normal operating conditions throughout the simulation run. 
Hidden faults were the biggest challenge, which was observed for both single and 
multiple failures. In the case of single failures, this occurred when effects of some 
failures on the operation of the three-phase separator cannot be observed, because 
given the process conditions the component would perform identically whether it has 
failed or not. In the case of multiple failures, the effects of some faults on the 
operation of three-phase separator cannot be observed because another component 
fault has happened before as well as due to the situations described previously. In 
order to detect such faults additional sensors would need to be used in the system. 
Another issue for the OOBN model was to identify very subtle changes in the 
operation of the three-phase separator caused by failure of some components, since 
these subtle changes were usually lost when discretising the sensor readings. This 
was the main reason for the delay in detection and diagnostics of some of the faults. 
These issues should be addressed as part of future developments of the model if it 
was to be applied in practice. 
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3.7 Future work 
The research performed showed the potential for the Bayesian Belief Network 
technique to be used as a fault detection and diagnostic tool for three-phase 
separators. However, further developments of the proposed methodology are 
necessary in order to be able to use it in practical applications. 
There were two major issues identified in the current form of the proposed 
methodology, which need to be addressed first. Firstly, the issue of not being able to 
detect slight changes in the operating conditions of the three-phase separator which 
could lead to undetected failures and hazardous events have to be dealt with. A 
solution for this problem could be finer intervals of discrete nodes or even the use of 
continuous nodes to represent readings from flow and level transmitters. This could 
lead to more accurate fault detection and diagnostics. Secondly, the identification of 
hidden faults should be addressed. However, this task might be a very hard or near 
impossible one. Even using finer intervals for discrete nodes or using continuous 
nodes may not be able to resolve this issue. Additional or redundant sensors could 
be considered in order to overcome this issue. 
The methodology could also be enhanced in order to model the separation process 
by the BBN. In the study performed in this thesis, the separation process was 
considered to be perfect and instant, i.e. the liquid and gas flowing into the separator 
gets separated fully and instantly. The addition of the separation process modelling 
capability to the BBN would probably make the process of detecting faults more 
challenging. On the other hand, it should help to identify certain faults. For example, 
the pressure level has an effect on the speed of the separation process, thus if the 
separation process is different from what is expected faults related to the pressure 
control and monitoring loop could be detected with this new feature. 
Another important feature that has to be taken into account for the fault detection and 
diagnostics of the three-phase separator is leak detection. Leaks in different places 
of the separator might have different effects on the liquid or gas levels in the 
separator and in some cases might be a critical failure of the separator. Thus, the 
inclusion of leak modelling in the BBN is recommended. 
The proposed methodology is based on monitoring the changes of the liquid/gas in 
the three-phase separator using sensor readings and does not take into account the 
actual levels of liquid/gas (except when a PI controller output is calculated). The 
addition of current levels of liquids/gas and their propagation from one time slice to 
another could be also included in the methodology. 
Other extensions to the proposed methodology could include modelling additional 
component failure modes (for example valve being stuck half open/closed) or even 
automatically building a BBN from the specifications of a three-phase separator. 
Further applications of the proposed methodology can be investigated. The proposed 
methodology can also be used to build BBN models for the fault detection of similar 
systems, for example, two inter-connected separators, free water knockout systems, 
desalters and other vessel based systems (having similar components: controllers, 
transmitters, valves) used in the oil and gas industry. It would require slight 
adjustment of the BBN model to the specific needs of the considered system. 
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4 Final conclusions 
The main objectives that were set out in the beginning of this thesis were fully or 
partially achieved in the research performed. Each of the objectives is briefly 
reintroduced next, highlighting the extent to which it was achieved for individual 
systems. 
Propose a methodology for the fault detection and diagnostics of the 
considered system. 
Railway point systems 
The methodology for the fault detection of railway point systems based on One Class 
Support Vector Machines and time series similarity measures was proposed. The 
choice of the selected methods was done in order to take into the account the 
features of in-field data of RPS. The fault detection of RPS was considered as a 
classification task, where the abnormal sensor readings, i.e. POE motor current 
corresponding to faulty behaviour of RPS, would be isolated from the majority of 
sensor readings corresponding to the failure free behaviour of RPS. The POE motor 
currents were compared using time series similarity measures and this information 
was fed into the OCSVM model to perform the classification between faulty and 
failure free behaviour of RPS. 
However, fault diagnostics for the RPS was not considered in this study. The main 
reason behind this was the lack of representative data of each failure mode. 
Moreover, the analysis of system operation under different failure modes present 
revealed an increase of current used by POE motor for most of the cases. Thus the 
discrimination between different fault types using only current measurements is 
impossible in most cases. 
Three-phase separators 
The methodology for the fault detection and diagnostics of three-phase separators 
based on Bayesian Belief Networks was proposed in this study. A modular OOBN 
was built to model changes of water, oil and gas levels in the individual sections and 
the whole separator when the system is free from faults as well as when some faults 
exist. The idea of the methodology for fault detection and diagnostics was based on 
analysing sensor readings from a number of adjacent time intervals of operation of 
three-phase separator. The posterior probabilities of the states of the nodes 
representing the condition of components of TPS were monitored throughout the time 
after sensor readings are inserted in the OOBN model. The increase of the posterior 
probability representing a certain component failure mode was considered as an 
indication of that failure present in the system. Thus, the fault detection and 
diagnostics for the TPS was performed simultaneously. 
Implement the proposed methodology in software. 
Railway point systems 
The software for the fault detection of RPS was developed using a combination of 
Matlab, C++ and LIBSVM package. Matlab was used to pre-process the data as 
necessary and provide input to the OCSVM model as well as to obtain output from 
the OCSVM model and visualise the results. The time series similarity measures 
were calculated using C++ to take advantage of the speed provided by C++ if 
compared to Matlab. The OCSVM model was implemented in the LIBSVM package, 
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which is implemented as Matlab functions to call the C++ engine to perform the 
calculations necessary and obtain the output in the Matlab format. The software was 
developed to be as automated as possible, where minimal user input is necessary to 
perform the analysis and obtain the results from the OCSVM model. 
Three-phase separators 
Firstly a TPS simulation model was built using C++ and the wxWidgets libraries to 
create graphical user interfaces. User friendly software with GUI was built in order to 
allow the user to interactively specify the physical and operational parameters of the 
TPS as well as the failure modes to be modelled in the selected simulation run. The 
outputs of each simulation run, that is the sensor readings, were plotted graphically 
as well as exported to text files for further input to the OOBN model. 
The software for fault detection and diagnostics with OOBN was developed using 
HUGIN graphical user interface (GUI) and application program interface (API) for the 
C++. BBN models were first built using the GUI of HUGIN and these were later used 
in the C++ API to perform the fault detection and diagnostics of OOBN. The posterior 
probabilities of the selected nodes of the OOBN were exported to the text files at 
selected time intervals as well as the failure modes that exceeded the set thresholds 
for the fault detection and diagnostics. Visual Basic and Windows scripts were written 
to automatically compose the results from individual scenarios into a summary of 
fault detection and diagnostics performance for the selected type of inflow. 
Validate the proposed methodology on data representing the operation of 
considered system. 
Railway point systems 
The proposed methodology was tested on data of infield RPS. The main difference 
between in-field and laboratory data was that the data obtained from the laboratory 
point system to represent the fault-free movements had very little variance. The 
behaviour of the RPS changed with time and there was a lot of variability even in the 
non-faulty behaviour of the system. In addition, the operation of RPS was also 
influenced by severe weather conditions or loads applied to the system which cause 
this variability. The in-field data showed that some failures cause subtle effects to the 
behaviour of the system, and the proposed method in this study aimed to detect such 
effects. 
The testing performed in this study was highly affected by the discrepancies present 
in the data labelling. Results that were achieved with automatic labelling procedures 
based on alarm or failure dates were very different. A detailed analysis of data 
labelling results with both labelling techniques was performed which led to a 
combination of the labelling procedures together with some expert knowledge. The 
relabelled data was used to test the OCSVM model again and it was shown that the 
OCSVM model can perform well, as shown in section 2.5.4 and published in 
(Vileiniskis et al., 2013, Vileiniskis et al., 2015). 
Three-phase separators 
The proposed methodology was tested on the data obtained from a three-phase 
separator simulation model. A high number of different scenarios, including single 
and multiple failures and different inflow options were simulated. This data was then 
used to perform fault detection and diagnostics with OOBN model. The extensive 
testing performed with single failures has shown the potential to successfully perform 
fault detection and diagnostics with the developed OOBN model. 
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The testing of the OOBN model with multiple failures was more challenging and thus 
the obtained results were worse than the ones for the single failures. Nevertheless, 
the OOBN model successfully detected and diagnosed at least one of the inserted 
failure modes in the majority of all of the scenarios considered (5165 out of 5184 
scenarios). Moreover, in the scenarios where both failures were undetected, they 
never led to undesirable events or liquid/vapour levels where an alarm would be 
raised if the components were working. The biggest challenge for the OOBN model 
was hidden failures, which were observed for both single and multiple failures. 
Application in practice 
Railway point systems 
Before applying the methodology in practice, several aspects have to be considered. 
Firstly, the proposed methodology to detect the changing profile or absolute values of 
current might not always indicate a failure of the system. Thus the OCSVM cannot be 
considered as an automated fault detection algorithm, rather an indicating technique 
of changing behaviour of the system. The output of OCSVM would probably have to 
be reviewed to confirm or reject a failure, since at this stage of the research there 
was a lack of trustworthiness of the data used in the OCSVM training and testing 
processes. 
Secondly, the development of the OCSVM model for an individual point system 
would have to be carried out when a new point system is considered, since optimal 
parameters of OCSVM have to be found for each RPS considered. 
Finally, the performance of the proposed methodology highly depends on the quality 
of data used for the training and testing of the OCSVM model to obtain the optimal 
parameters for the OCSVM to be used as the fault detection model. Thus, one has to 
consider ways of cleansing the data of discrepancies before using it to train and test 
the OCSVM model. Otherwise, the obtained results might be very misleading if 
labelling deficiencies exist in the data. 
Three-phase separators 
The proposed methodology has to be enhanced to model the separation process by 
the OOBN, in order to be applicable in practice. In the study performed in this thesis, 
the separation process was considered to be perfect and instant, i.e. the liquid and 
gas inflowing in the separator gets separated fully and instantly. 
Moreover, the ability to detect leaks in various places of the TPS has to be added to 
the OOBN. Leaks in different places of the separator might have different effects on 
the liquid or gas levels in the separator and in some cases might be a critical failure 
of the separator. 
Finally, the testing of the proposed methodology should be done on an actual TPS or 
a scaled model of TPS. This might indicate some difficulties in the fault detection and 
diagnostics that cannot be observed using the simulation model. For example, 
vibration of the equipment could cause random noise in the readings of level or flow 
transmitters. 
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6 Appendix A 
Table 6.1. Alarm records for PM9B, PM13A and PM13B 
PM ID Total 
movements 
# of 
movements 
with alarms 
# of motor running 
duration alarms 
# of peak 
alarms 
# of average 
current alarms 
PM9B 575 24 22 0 17 
PM13A 519 45 7 0 38 
PM13B 521 32 8 0 25 
Table 6.2. Failure records for PM9B 
Failure 
occurrence 
date 
Failure 
rectification 
date 
Failure cause Maintenance action 
05/02/2012 
15:05:51 
05/02/2012 
19:00:01 
Obstruction with snow and ice Ice removed, points 
lubricated 
25/04/2012 
08:41:56 
25/04/2012 
14:38:01 
Obstruction with ballast Ballast removed 
09/05/2012 
07:49:14 
24/05/2012 
15:00:01 
Obstruction with squashed cans and 
bottles, bolts missing from slide 
chairs 
Bolts replaced, obstructions 
removed, points lubricated 
14/09/2012 
06:52:00 
14/09/2012 
11:10:01 
Contamination Contamination cleared, points 
lubricated 
22/11/2012 
10:22:11 
24/11/2012 
04:48:01 
Crushed tail cable Cable replaced 
Table 6.3. Failure records for PM13A 
Failure 
occurrence 
date 
Failure 
rectification 
date 
Failure cause Maintenance action 
07/02/2012 
20:59:45 
08/02/2012 
14:00:58 
Dry slide chairs and crushed ballast Points cleaned and slide 
chairs lubricated 
04/12/2012 
10:22:41 
11/01/2013 
17:13:56 
Alarm system thresholds needs 
seasonal adjustment 
Alarm system thresholds 
adjusted 
Table 6.4. Failure records for PM13B 
Failure 
occurrence 
date 
Failure 
rectification 
date 
Failure cause Maintenance action 
07/02/2012 
20:59:45 
08/02/2012 
14:00:58 
Dry slide chairs and crushed ballast Points cleaned and slide 
chairs lubricated 
04/12/2012 
10:22:41 
11/01/2013 
17:13:56 
Alarm system thresholds needs 
seasonal adjustment 
Alarm system thresholds 
adjusted 
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7 Appendix B 
Results with time series similarity measure as a kernel distance function 
Table 7.1. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9B (5-fold cross 
validation, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 7 25 0 0 
3F<95 27 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 1 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 0 
Table 7.2. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9B (5-fold cross validation, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 29 0 0 PF 1 30 0 0 
3F<95 2 2 1 0 3F<95 0 0 1 9 
3F<90 0 4 6 2 3F<90 0 3 4 1 
PF<85 0 6 7 1 PF<85 0 0 11 0 
Table 7.3. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13A (5-fold cross 
validation, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 3 57 
Table 7.4. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13A (5-fold cross validation, labelling using alarm  ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 2 3F<90 0 0 0 1 
PF<85 0 0 0 58 PF<85 0 1 6 52 
Table 7.5. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13B (5-fold cross 
validation, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 4 3 
PF<85 0 2 14 37 
Table 7.6. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13B (5-fold cross validation, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 8 0 3F<95 0 6 1 0 
3F<90 0 2 18 0 3F<90 0 21 1 1 
PF<85 0 1 1 30 PF<85 0 1 2 27 
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Table 7.7. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9B (5-fold cross 
validation, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 7.8. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9B (5-fold cross validation, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 7.9. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13A (5-fold cross 
validation, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 36 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 1 0 23 
Table 7.10. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13A (5-fold cross validation, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 6 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 54 
Table 7.11. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13B (5-fold cross 
validation, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 7.12. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13B (5-fold cross validation, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 1 59 
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Table 7.13. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9B (80% training and 
20% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 50 6 0 0 
3F<95 4 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 0 
Table 7.14. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9B (80% training and 20% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 30 6 1 0 PF 30 9 1 0 
3F<95 2 12 1 0 3F<95 5 15 0 0 
3F<90 0 8 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 0 PF<85 0 0 0 0 
Table 7.15. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13A (80% training and 
20% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 6 
PF<85 0 0 8 46 
Table 7.16. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13A (80% training and 20% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 3 3F<95 0 0 0 1 
3F<90 0 0 0 5 3F<90 0 0 0 4 
PF<85 0 0 5 47 PF<85 0 0 4 51 
Table 7.17. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13B (80% training and 
20% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 2 
3F<90 0 0 0 2 
PF<85 0 2 6 48 
Table 7.18. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13B (80% training and 20% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 2 18 0 0 PF 0 1 3 4 
3F<95 6 4 0 0 3F<95 0 2 7 2 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 3 7 0 
PF<85 0 0 6 24 PF<85 0 0 0 31 
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Table 7.19. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9A (60% training and 
40% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 3 9 1 30 
3F<95 2 7 1 0 
3F<90 3 4 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 0 
Table 7.20. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9A (60% training and 40% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 7 1 0 PF 0 1 1 3 
3F<95 21 25 0 0 3F<95 1 7 4 0 
3F<90 2 3 0 0 3F<90 1 9 5 0 
PF<85 1 0 0 0 PF<85 2 6 15 5 
Table 7.21. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9B (60% training and 
40% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 47 9 0 0 
3F<95 4 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 0 
Table 7.22. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9B (60% training and 40% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 29 1 7 0 PF 23 0 4 0 
3F<95 2 1 1 0 3F<95 9 6 10 0 
3F<90 0 5 10 1 3F<90 0 3 4 0 
PF<85 0 2 1 0 PF<85 0 0 1 0 
Table 7.23. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13A (60% training and 
40% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 3 57 
Table 7.24. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13A (60% training and 40% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
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Table 7.25. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13B (60% training and 
40% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 1 2 0 
3F<90 0 3 4 1 
PF<85 0 0 6 43 
Table 7.26. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13B (60% training and 40% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 2 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 3 1 3F<95 0 3 3 4 
3F<90 0 0 4 1 3F<90 0 7 5 2 
PF<85 0 3 15 31 PF<85 0 1 5 30 
Table 7.27. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9A (40% training and 
60% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 5 0 9 
3F<95 3 11 0 0 
3F<90 3 5 1 19 
PF<85 1 0 0 3 
Table 7.28. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9A (40% training and 60% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 9 0 0 PF 0 0 0 2 
3F<95 19 7 1 0 3F<95 1 5 0 2 
3F<90 8 12 1 0 3F<90 1 7 1 9 
PF<85 2 0 0 1 PF<85 3 1 9 19 
Table 7.29. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9B (40% training and 
60% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 5 23 15 0 
3F<95 8 1 0 0 
3F<90 8 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 0 
Table 7.30. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9B (40% training and 60% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 21 11 2 1 PF 1 8 1 4 
3F<95 1 3 0 3 3F<95 2 11 6 0 
3F<90 0 0 3 1 3F<90 0 2 7 1 
PF<85 9 0 3 2 PF<85 6 8 2 1 
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Table 7.31. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13A (40% training and 
60% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 2 58 
Table 7.32. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13A (40% training and 60% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 1 1 1 57 PF<85 0 2 0 58 
Table 7.33. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13B (40% training and 
60% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 1 1 
3F<90 0 1 4 1 
PF<85 0 0 3 49 
Table 7.34. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13B (40% training and 60% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 1 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 1 
PF<85 0 0 3 57 PF<85 0 0 0 58 
Table 7.35. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9A (20% training and 
80% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 1 44 
3F<95 0 1 1 5 
3F<90 1 3 1 0 
PF<85 3 0 0 0 
Table 7.36. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9A (20% training and 80% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 1 0 45 PF 0 0 0 26 
3F<95 0 0 0 9 3F<95 1 0 0 28 
3F<90 0 0 0 1 3F<90 0 0 0 3 
PF<85 2 1 0 1 PF<85 0 0 0 2 
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Table 7.37. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9B (20% training and 
80% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 15 13 1 30 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 1 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 0 
Table 7.38. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9B (20% training and 80% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 4 44 PF 0 0 0 38 
3F<95 0 0 0 4 3F<95 0 0 0 5 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 2 
PF<85 2 1 1 4 PF<85 3 4 0 8 
Table 7.39. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13A (20% training and 
80% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 2 5 53 
Table 7.40. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13A (20% training and 80% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 5 55 PF<85 0 0 6 54 
Table 7.41. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13B (20% training and 
80% testing labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 4 56 
Table 7.42. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13B (20% training and 80% testing, labelling using alarm dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 7 1 52 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
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Table 7.43. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9B (80% training and 
20% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 1 
PF<85 0 0 0 59 
Table 7.44. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9B (80% training and 20% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 2 17 14 27 PF<85 2 6 6 46 
Table 7.45. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13A (80% training and 
20% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 29 31 
Table 7.46. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13A (80% training and 20% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 18 42 PF<85 0 0 7 53 
Table 7.47. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13B (80% training and 
20% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 7.48. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13B (80% training and 20% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
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Table 7.49. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9A (60% training and 
40% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 7.50. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9A (60% training and 40% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 2 
PF<85 0 0 1 59 PF<85 0 0 0 58 
Table 7.51. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9B (60% training and 
40% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 7.52. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9B (60% training and 40% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 3 57 PF<85 0 2 3 55 
Table 7.53. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13A (60% training and 
40% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 17 43 
Table 7.54. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13A (60% training and 40% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 2 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 3 57 PF<85 0 0 0 58 
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Table 7.55. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13B (60% training and 
40% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 1 
3F<95 0 0 0 3 
3F<90 0 0 0 5 
PF<85 0 0 15 36 
Table 7.56. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13B (60% training and 40% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 4 1 55 
Table 7.57. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9A (40% training and 
60% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 7.58. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9A (40% training and 60% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 7.59. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9B (40% training and 
60% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 7.60. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9B (40% training and 60% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
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Table 7.61. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13A (40% training and 
60% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 7.62. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13A (40% training and 60% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 7.63. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13B (40% training and 
60% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 2 
3F<95 0 0 0 1 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 57 
Table 7.64. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13B (40% training and 60% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 7.65. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9A (20% training and 
80% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 7.66. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9A (20% training and 80% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
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Table 7.67. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9B (20% training and 
80% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 7.68. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9B (20% training and 80% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 7.69. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13A (20% training and 
80% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 7.70. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13A (20% training and 80% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 4 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 3 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 53 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 7.71. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM13B (20% training and 
80% testing labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 10 
3F<90 0 0 0 4 
PF<85 0 0 0 46 
Table 7.72. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM13B (20% training and 80% testing, labelling using failure dates) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 1 59 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
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8 Appendix C 
Analysis of discrepancies in the data labelling based on alarm dates 
 
Figure 8.1. Example of imprecise labelling due to alarm dates on PM9A 
 
Figure 8.2. Example of imprecise labelling due to alarm dates on PM9B 
 
Figure 8.3. Example of imprecise labelling due to alarm dates on PM13A 
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Figure 8.4. Example of imprecise labelling due to alarm dates on PM13B 
Analysis of discrepancies in the data labelling based on failure dates 
 
Figure 8.5. Good movements and faulty movements with the obstruction of snow 
 
Figure 8.6. Good movements and faulty movements with the obstruction of ballast 
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Figure 8.7. Good movements and faulty movements with broken bolt in the crossing 
block together with obstruction 
 
Figure 8.8. Good movements and faulty movements with contamination 
 
Figure 8.9. Good movements and faulty movements with contamination 
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Figure 8.10. Good movements and faulty movements with dry slide chairs and 
crushed ballast 
 
Figure 8.11. Good movements and faulty movements which needed seasonal 
adjustments for the threshold values 
 
Figure 8.12. Good movements and faulty movements with dry slide chairs and 
crushed ballast 
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Figure 8.13. Good movements and faulty movements which needed seasonal 
adjustments for the threshold values 
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9 Appendix D 
Results with time series similarity measure as a feature input (with 1 
previous movement) to OCSVM 
Table 9.1. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9A (5-fold cross 
validation, relabelled data) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 9.2. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9A (5-fold cross validation, relabelled data) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 9.3. Classification rates with ERP distance combined with Euclidean distance 
(on non-scaled and rescaled data) for PM9A (5-fold cross validation, relabelled data) ࢾࡱࡱ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡱࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 9.4. Classification rates with DTW distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9A (5-fold cross validation, relabelled data) ࢾࡰࢀࢃ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡰࢀࢃࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 9.5. Classification rates with DTW distance combined with Euclidean distance 
(on non-scaled and rescaled data) for PM9A (5-fold cross validation, relabelled data) ࢾࡰࡱ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡰࡱࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
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Results with time series similarity measure as a feature input (with 2 
previous movements) to OCSVM 
Table 9.6. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9A (5-fold cross 
validation, relabelled data) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 9.7. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9A (5-fold cross validation, relabelled data) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 9.8. Classification rates with ERP distance combined with Euclidean distance 
(on non-scaled and rescaled data) for PM9A (5-fold cross validation, relabelled data) ࢾࡱࡱ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡱࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 9.9. Classification rates with DTW distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9A (5-fold cross validation, relabelled data) ࢾࡰࢀࢃ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡰࢀࢃࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 9.10. Classification rates with DTW distance combined with Euclidean distance 
(on non-scaled and rescaled data) for PM9A (5-fold cross validation, relabelled data) ࢾࡰࡱ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡰࡱࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
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Results with time series similarity measure as a feature input (with 10 
previous movements) to OCSVM 
Table 9.11. Classification rates with Euclidean distance for PM9A (5-fold cross 
validation, relabelled data) ࢾࡱࡾ PG 3G<95 853G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 9.12. Classification rates with ERP distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9A (5-fold cross validation, relabelled data) ࢾࡱࡾࡼ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡾࡼࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 9.13. Classification rates with ERP distance combined with Euclidean distance 
(on non-scaled and rescaled data) for PM9A (5-fold cross validation, relabelled data) ࢾࡱࡱ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡱࡱࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF . 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 9.14. Classification rates with DTW distance (on non-scaled and rescaled data) 
for PM9A (5-fold cross validation, relabelled data) ࢾࡰࢀࢃ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡰࢀࢃࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 0 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 60 
Table 9.15. Classification rates with DTW distance combined with Euclidean distance 
(on non-scaled and rescaled data) for PM9A (5-fold cross validation, relabelled data) ࢾࡰࡱ PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 ࢾࡰࡱࡾ  PG 3G<95 3G<90 PG<85 
PF 0 0 0 0 PF 0 0 0 0 
3F<95 0 0 0 0 3F<95 0 0 0 0 
3F<90 0 0 0 0 3F<90 0 0 0 2 
PF<85 0 0 0 60 PF<85 0 0 0 58 
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10 Appendix E 
Table 10.1. Summary of BBN for the flow through valve indicated by flow rate transmitter FT given level command indicated by level transmitter 
LT 
Node label Description Node states 
³/7LQIR´ Represents the level information transformed into a PI controller output command. A prior probability table has to 
be specified for this node. 
Parent of nodes: ³/7VHQGVLQIRWR/&´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
1 - CV 0, 
2 - CV (0-20], 
3 - CV (20-40], 
4 - CV (40-60), 
5 - CV [60-80), 
6 - CV [80-100), 
7 - CV 100 
³/7IDLOXUH´ Represents the condition of the transmitter LT. The first state of the node represents the non-failed condition, while 
the remaining states can be used to represent all the possible failure modes (in this case only one failure mode ฀– 
failed stuck). The prior probabilities for each state have to be specified. 
Parent of nodes: ³/7VHQGVLQIRWR/&´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Condition node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
1 ฀– LT W, 
2 ฀– LT FS 
³/7 VHQGV LQIR WR
/&´ 
Node to model the information sent from transmitter LT to a controller LC. The probability table of this node shows 
the probability for a transmitter LT to send specific information to LC, given the condition of the transmitter ³/7
IDLOXUH´ and the information of transmitter LT ³/7LQIR´. 
For example, if the node ³/7IDLOXUH´ ฀i฀s฀ ฀i฀n฀ ฀a฀ ฀s฀t฀a฀t฀e฀ ฀“฀1฀ ฀– ฀L T  W฀”฀ ฀a฀n฀d฀ ฀t฀h฀e฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ³/7LQIR´ is in a state ³- CV (40-´, 
the state of node ³/7VHQGVLQIRWR/&´ will be ³- CV (40-´ 
Parent of nodes: ³/&VHQGVFRPPDQGWR&9´ 
Child of nodes: ³/7LQIR´³/7IDLOXUH´ 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: none 
1 - CV 0, 
2 - CV (0-20], 
3 - CV (20-40], 
4 - CV (40-60), 
5 - CV [60-80), 
6 - CV [80-100), 
7 - CV 100 
³/&IDLOXUH´ Represents the condition of the controller LC. First state of the node represents the non-failed condition, while the 
remaining states can be used to represent all the possible failure modes (in this case two failure modes ฀– failed 
low and failed high). The prior probabilities for each state have to be specified. 
Parent of nodes: ³/&VHQGVFRPPDQGWR&9´ 
Child of nodes: none 
1 ฀– LC W, 
2 ฀– LC FL, 
3 ฀– LC FH 
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Node label Description Node states 
Type of node: Condition node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
³/& VHQGV
FRPPDQGWR&9´ 
Node to model the command sent to the valve CV from the controller LC. The probability table of this node shows 
the probability for a controller LC to send a specific command to CV, given the condition of the controller ³/&
IDLOXUH´ and the level received from transmitter LT ³/7VHQGVLQIRWR/&´. 
For example, if the node ³/&IDLOXUH´ is in a state ³± /&:´ and the node ³/7VHQGVLQIRWR/&´ is in a state ³- 
CV (40-´, the state of the node ³/&VHQGVFRPPDQGWR&9´ will be ³- CV (40-´. 
Parent of nodes: ³&9RSHQLQJ´ 
Child of nodes: ³/7VHQGVLQIRWR/&´³/&IDLOXUH´ 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: none 
1 - CV 0, 
2 - CV (0-20], 
3 - CV (20-40], 
4 - CV (40-60), 
5 - CV [60-80), 
6 - CV [80-100), 
7 - CV 100 
³&9IDLOXUH´ Represents the condition of the valve CV. First state of the node represents the non-failed condition, while the 
remaining states can be used to represent all the possible failure modes (in this case two failure modes ฀– failed 
closed and failed opened). The prior probabilities for each state have to be specified. 
Parent of nodes: ³&9RSHQLQJ´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Condition node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
1 ฀– CV W, 
2 ฀– CV FC, 
3 ฀– CV FO 
³&9RSHQLQJ´ Node to model the opening of the valve CV. The probability table of this node shows the probability for a valve CV 
to be in a specific opening, given the condition of the valve ³&9IDLOXUH´ and the command sent to the valve ³/&
VHQGVFRPPDQGWR&9´. 
For example, if the node ³&9IDLOXUH´ is in a state ³± &9)2´, the state of the node ³&9RSHQLQJ´ will be ³± CV 
´ no matter what is the state of the node ³/&VHQGVFRPPDQGWR&9´. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7LQIR´ 
Child of nodes: ³/&VHQGVFRPPDQGWR&9´³&9IDLOXUH´ 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1 - CV 0, 
2 - CV (0-20], 
3 - CV (20-40], 
4 - CV (40-60), 
5 - CV [60-80), 
6 - CV [80-100), 
7 - CV 100 
³)7IDLOXUH´ Represents the condition of the flow transmitter FT. First state of the node represents the non-failed condition, 
while the remaining states can be used to represent all the possible failure modes (in this case one failure mode ฀– 
failed stuck). The prior probabilities for each state have to be specified. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7LQIR´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Condition node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
1 ฀– FT W, 
2 ฀– FT FS 
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Node label Description Node states 
³)7LQIR´ Node to model the flow information shown by the flow transmitter FT. The probability table of this node shows the 
฀p฀r฀o฀b฀a฀b฀i฀l฀i฀t฀y฀ ฀f฀o฀r฀ ฀a฀ ฀f฀l฀o฀w฀ ฀t฀r฀a฀n฀s฀m฀i฀t฀t฀e฀r฀ ฀t฀o฀ ฀s฀h฀o฀w฀ ฀c฀e฀r฀t฀a฀i฀n฀ ฀i฀n฀fr฀m a฀t฀i o n  ฀g i฀v n  t h e฀ ฀c o n d฀i t฀i฀o n  o f  t h฀e฀ ฀f฀l฀o฀w฀ ฀t฀r฀a฀n฀s฀m฀i฀t฀t฀e฀r “฀F฀T  ฀f฀a i฀l฀u฀r฀e฀”฀ 
and the opening of valve ³&9RSHQLQJ´. 
For example, if the node ³)7 IDLOXUH´ is in the state ³ ± )7 )6´, then the node ³)7 LQIR´ can be in any state, 
regardless of the state of the node ³&9RSHQLQJ´. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³&9RSHQLQJ´³)7IDLOXUH´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1 - CV 0, 
2 - CV (0-20], 
3 - CV (20-40], 
4 - CV (40-60), 
5 - CV [60-80), 
6 - CV [80-100), 
7 - CV 100 
 
Table 10.2. Summary of the BBN ³6HSDUDWLRQVHFWLRQ´ 
Node label Description Node states 
³:DWHULQIORZ´ Rule 1 was used to create this node. It represents the inflowing water into the separation section. If 
certain knowledge is available about the inflowing water, this can be represented by increasing the 
probabilities of specific states of the node. It is assumed that different inflows have equal 
probabilities, thus each state of the node has the same prior probability. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7ZDWHULQIORZLQIR´, ³:DWHUOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´³)7ZDWHU± )7´³)7ZDWHU
± )7)7RLO´³)ORZRYHUZHLU´³7RWDOOLTXLGOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1: CV 0, 
2: CV (0-20], 
3: CV (20-40], 
4: CV (40-60), 
5: CV [60-80), 
6: CV [80-100), 
7: CV 100 
³2LOLQIORZ´ Rule 1 was used to create this node. It represents the inflowing oil into the separation section. If 
certain knowledge is available about the inflowing oil, this can be represented by increasing the 
probabilities of specific states of the node. It is assumed that different inflows have equal 
probabilities, thus each state of the node has the same prior probability. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7RLO LQIORZLQIR´³)7ZDWHU± )7)7RLO´³)ORZRYHUZHLU´³7RWDOOLTXLG
OHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1: CV 0, 
2: CV (0-20], 
3: CV (20-40], 
4: CV (40-60), 
5: CV [60-80), 
6: CV [80-100), 
7: CV 100 
³)7IDLOXUH´ Rule 2 was used to create this node. Note that the flow transmitter FT0 is a multi-flow transmitter, 
thus only one failure node is created. It represents the condition of flow transmitter FT0. First state 
1: FT W, 
2: FT FS 
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Node label Description Node states 
of the node represents the non-failed condition (FT W), while the second state represents the failure 
mode ฀– failed stuck (FT FS). This node is linked to any nodes, which represent the information 
shown by the flow transmitter FT0, so that the failure effects of specific failure modes could be 
modelled. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7ZDWHULQIORZLQIR´³)7RLOLQIORZLQIR´³)7ZDWHU± )7´³)7ZDWHU± FT1 
)7RLO´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Condition node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
³)7ZDWHU LQIORZ
LQIR´ 
Rule 3 was used to create this node. It is used to input the readings from the flow transmitter FT0 
about the water flow into the separator. The probability table of this node is used to model the 
failure effects of flow transmitter FT0 on the information that it is showing about the water flow. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³)7IDLOXUH´³:DWHULQIORZ´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1: CV 0, 
2: CV (0-20], 
3: CV (20-40], 
4: CV (40-60), 
5: CV [60-80), 
6: CV [80-100), 
7: CV 100 
³)7 RLO LQIORZ
LQIR´ 
Rule 3 was used to create this node. It is used to input the readings from the flow transmitter FT0 
about the oil flow into the separator. The probability table of this node is used to model the failure 
effects of flow transmitter FT0 on the information that it is showing about the oil flow. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³)7IDLOXUH´³2LOLQIORZ´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1: CV 0, 
2: CV (0-20], 
3: CV (20-40], 
4: CV (40-60), 
5: CV [60-80), 
6: CV [80-100), 
7: CV 100 
³)7 JLYHQ OHYHO
/7´ 
Rule 4 was used to create this node. This is an instance node to model the interface level control 
loop. 
Inputs of node: ³/7LQIR´³/7IDLOXUH´³/&IDLOXUH´³&9IDLOXUH´³)7IDLOXUH´ 
Outputs of node: ³)7LQIR´³&9RSHQLQJ´ 
Type of node: Instance node 
Input/output of the BBN: none 
- 
³/7LQIR´ Rule 4.a was used to create this node. It represents the water level information transformed into a 
PI controller output command. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7/7LQIR´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Information node 
1: CV 0, 
2: CV (0-20], 
3: CV (20-40], 
4: CV (40-60), 
5: CV [60-80), 
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Node label Description Node states 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 6: CV [80-100), 
7: CV 100 
³/7IDLOXUH´ Rule 4.b was used to create this node. It represents the condition of the transmitter LT1. The first 
state of the node represents the non-failed condition (LT W), while the second state represents the 
failure mode ฀– failed stuck (LT FS).  This node is linked to any nodes, which represent the 
information shown by the LT1 transmitter, so that the failure effects of specific failure modes could 
be modelled. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7/7IDLOXUH´³/7ZDWHUOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´³/7WRWDO OLTXLG
OHYHO´³/7WRWDOOLTXLGOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Condition node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
1: LT W, 
2: LT FS,  
³/&IDLOXUH´ Rule 4.c was used to create this node. It represents the condition of the controller LC1. First state of 
the node represents the non-failed condition (LC W), while the remaining states represent the two 
failure modes ฀– failed low (LC FL) and failed high (LC FH). This node is linked to any nodes, which 
represent the command that the controller LC1 sends to the valve CV1, so that the failure effects of 
specific failure modes could be modelled. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7/&IDLOXUH´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Condition node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
1: LC W, 
2: LC FL, 
3: LC FH 
³&9IDLOXUH´ Rule 4.d was used to create this node. It represents the condition of the valve CV1. First state of the 
node represents the non-failed condition (CV W), while the remaining states represent the two 
failure modes ฀– failed closed (CV FC) and failed opened (CV FO). This node is linked to any nodes, 
which represent the opening of valve CV1, so that the failure effects of specific failure modes could 
be modelled. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7&9IDLOXUH´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Condition node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
1: CV W, 
2: CV FC, 
3: CV FO 
³)7IDLOXUH´ Rule 4.e was used to create this node. It represents the condition of the flow transmitter FT1. First 
state of the node represents the non-failed condition (FT W), while the second state represents the 
failure mode ฀– failed stuck (FT FS) This node is linked to any nodes, which represent the 
information shown by the flow transmitter FT1, so that the failure effects of specific failure modes 
1: FT W, 
2: FT FS 
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Node label Description Node states 
could be modelled. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7)7IDLOXUH´³)7ZDWHU± )7´³)7ZDWHU± )7)7RLO´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Condition node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
³)7LQIR´ Rule 4.f was used to create this node. It is used to input the readings from the flow transmitter FT1 
about the water outflow from the separator. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO /7)7LQIR´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1: CV 0, 
2: CV (0-20], 
3: CV (20-40], 
4: CV (40-60), 
5: CV [60-80), 
6: CV [80-100), 
7: CV 100 
³:DWHURXWIORZ´ Rule 4.g was used to create this node. It is used to obtain the information from the output node ³&9
RSHQLQJ´ of the instance node ³)7 JLYHQ OHYHO /7´. It is further used to model the water level 
difference in the separation section. 
Parent of nodes: ³:DWHUOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´³)7ZDWHU± )7´³)7ZDWHU± )7)7RLO´³)ORZ
RYHUZHLU´³7RWDOOLTXLGOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ 
Child of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7&9RSHQLQJ´ 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1: CV 0, 
2: CV (0-20], 
3: CV (20-40], 
4: CV (40-60), 
5: CV [60-80), 
6: CV [80-100), 
7: CV 100 
³:DWHU OHYHO
FKDQJHUDWH´ 
Rule 5 was used to create this node. It is used to model the water level change rate. The probability 
table is used to represent the certainty of water level change rate, given the states of the nodes 
³:DWHULQIORZ´ and ³:DWHURXWIORZ´. 
For example, if the ³:DWHULQIORZ´ node is in the state ³&9-@´ and the ³:DWHURXWIORZ´ is in 
the state ³&9-@´, the state of the node ³:DWHUOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ will be either ³&9 
´ or ³&9 ´. 
Parent of nodes: ³/7ZDWHUOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ 
Child of nodes: ³:DWHURXWIORZ´³:DWHULQIORZ´ 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: none 
1: CV -100, 
2: -100 < CV <= -80, 
3: -80 < CV <= -60, 
4: -60 < CV < -40, 
5: -40 <= CV < -20, 
6: -20 <= CV < 0, 
7: CV 0, 
8: 0 < CV <= +20, 
9: +20 < CV <= +40, 
10: +40 < CV < +60, 
11: +60 <= CV < +80, 
12: +80 <= CV < +100, 
13: CV +100 
³)7 ZDWHU ± Rule 6 was used to create this node. It is used to input the difference of the readings from flow 1: CV -100, 
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Node label Description Node states 
)7´ transmitter FT0 about the water inflow and the readings from flow transmitter FT1 about the water 
outflow. The probability table of this node is used to model the failure effects of flow transmitters 
FT0 and FT1 on the information about the water inflow and outflow difference. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³:DWHULQIORZ´³:DWHURXWIORZ´³)7IDLOXUH´³)7IDLOXUH´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
2: -100 < CV <= -80, 
3: -80 < CV <= -60, 
4: -60 < CV < -40, 
5: -40 <= CV < -20, 
6: -20 <= CV < 0, 
7: CV 0, 
8: 0 < CV <= +20, 
9: +20 < CV <= +40, 
10: +40 < CV < +60, 
11: +60 <= CV < +80, 
12: +80 <= CV < +100, 
13: CV +100 
³/7 ZDWHU OHYHO
FKDQJHUDWH´ 
Rule 7 was used to create this node. It is used to input the readings from transmitter LT1 about the 
water level change rate. The probability table of this node is used to model the failure effects of 
transmitter LT1 on the information that it is showing about the water level change rate. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³:DWHUOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´³/7IDLOXUH´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1: CV -100, 
2: -100 < CV <= -80, 
3: -80 < CV <= -60, 
4: -60 < CV < -40, 
5: -40 <= CV < -20, 
6: -20 <= CV < 0, 
7: CV 0, 
8: 0 < CV <= +20, 
9: +20 < CV <= +40, 
10: +40 < CV < +60, 
11: +60 <= CV < +80, 
12: +80 <= CV < +100, 
13: CV +100 
³)7ZDWHU± FT1 
)7RLO´ 
This node was created as explained in the Step 1 of this section. It is used to input the difference of 
the readings from flow transmitter FT0 about the water inflow and the readings from flow 
transmitters FT1 about the water outflow and FT0 about the oil outflow. The probability table of this 
node is used to model the failure effects of flow transmitters FT0 and FT1 on the information about 
the liquid difference. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³:DWHULQIORZ´³:DWHURXWIORZ´³2LOLQIORZ´³)7IDLOXUH´³)7IDLOXUH´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1: CV -100, 
2: -100 < CV <= -80, 
3: -80 < CV <= -60, 
4: -60 < CV < -40, 
5: -40 <= CV < -20, 
6: -20 <= CV < 0, 
7: CV 0, 
8: 0 < CV <= +20, 
9: +20 < CV <= +40, 
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Node label Description Node states 
10: +40 < CV < +60, 
11: +60 <= CV < +80, 
12: +80 <= CV < +100, 
13: CV +100, 
14: CV > +100 
³7RWDOOLTXLGOHYHO´ This node was created as explained in the Step 2 of this section. It is used to model the total liquid 
level in the separation section. 
Parent of nodes: ³)ORZRYHUZHLU´³7RWDOOLTXLGOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´³/7WRWDOOLTXLGOHYHO´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: none 
1: Equal with weir, 
2: Below, + 0 < CV <= 20 
3: Below, + 20 < CV <= 40, 
4: Below, + 40 < CV < 60, 
5: Below, + 60 <= CV < 80, 
6: Below, + 80 <= CV < 100, 
7: Below, + CV 100, 
8: Below, > + CV 100 
³/7 WRWDO OLTXLG
OHYHO´ 
This node was created as explained in the Step 3 of this section. It is used to input the readings 
from transmitter LT1 about the total liquid level in the separation section. The probability table of this 
node is used to model the failure effects of transmitter LT1 on the information that it is showing 
about the total liquid level. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³7RWDOOLTXLGOHYHO´³/7IDLOXUH´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
1: Equal with weir, 
2: Below, + 0 < CV <= 20 
3: Below, + 20 < CV <= 40, 
4: Below, + 40 < CV < 60, 
5: Below, + 60 <= CV < 80, 
6: Below, + 80 <= CV < 100, 
7: Below, + CV 100, 
8: Below, > + CV 100 
³)ORZRYHUZHLU´ This node was created as explained in the Step 4 of this section. It is used to model the flow over 
weir of the liquid from the separation section. The flow over weir depends on the total liquid level in 
the separation section and the incoming and outflowing liquid difference. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³:DWHULQIORZ´³:DWHURXWIORZ´³2LOLQIORZ´³7RWDOOLTXLGOHYHO´ 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1: CV 0, 
2: CV (0-20], 
3: CV (20-40], 
4: CV (40-60), 
5: CV [60-80), 
6: CV [80-100), 
7: CV 100, 
8: CV > 100 
³7RWDO OLTXLG OHYHO
FKDQJHUDWH´ 
This node was created as explained in the Step 5 of this section. It is used to model the change rate 
of total liquid level. The probability table is used to represent the certainty of total liquid level change 
rate, given the states of the nodes ³7RWDOOLTXLGOHYHO´, ³:DWHULQIORZ´³:DWHURXWIORZ´and ³2LOLQIORZ´ 
Parent of nodes: ³/7WRWDOOLTXLGOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ 
Child of nodes: ³:DWHULQIORZ´³:DWHURXWIORZ´³2LOLQIORZ´³7RWDOOLTXLGOHYHO´ 
1: CV -100, 
2: -100 < CV <= -80, 
3: -80 < CV <= -60, 
4: -60 < CV < -40, 
5: -40 <= CV < -20, 
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Node label Description Node states 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
6: -20 <= CV < 0, 
7: CV 0, 
8: 0 < CV <= +20, 
9: +20 < CV <= +40, 
10: +40 < CV < +60, 
11: +60 <= CV < +80, 
12: +80 <= CV < +100, 
13: CV +100, 
14: CV > +100 
³/7 WRWDO OLTXLG
level change 
UDWH´ 
This node was created as explained in the Step 6 of this section. It is used to input the readings 
from transmitter LT1 about the total liquid level change rate. The probability table of this node is 
used to model the failure effects of transmitter LT1 on the information that it is showing about the 
total liquid level change rate. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³7RWDOOLTXLGOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ ³/7IDLOXUH´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1: CV -100, 
2: -100 < CV <= -80, 
3: -80 < CV <= -60, 
4: -60 < CV < -40, 
5: -40 <= CV < -20, 
6: -20 <= CV < 0, 
7: CV 0, 
8: 0 < CV <= +20, 
9: +20 < CV <= +40, 
10: +40 < CV < +60, 
11: +60 <= CV < +80, 
12: +80 <= CV < +100, 
13: CV +100, 
14: CV > +100 
 
Table 10.3. Summary of the BBN ³6HSDUDWHGRLOVHFWLRQ´ 
Node name Description Node states 
³2LOLQIORZ´ Rule 1 was used to create this node. It represents the flow of oil from the separation section. 
Parent of nodes: ³2LOOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
1: CV 0, 
2: CV (0-20], 
3: CV (20-40], 
4: CV (40-60), 
5: CV [60-80), 
6: CV [80-100), 
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7: CV 100, 
8: CV > 100 
³)7 JLYHQ OHYHO
/7´ 
Rule 4 was used to create this node. This is an instance node to model the oil level control loop. 
Inputs of node: ³/7LQIR´³/7IDLOXUH´³/&IDLOXUH´³&9IDLOXUH´³)7IDLOXUH´ 
Outputs of node: ³)7LQIR´³&9 RSHQLQJ´ 
Type of node: Instance node 
Input/output of the BBN: none 
- 
³/7LQIR´ Rule 4.a was used to create this node. It represents the oil level information transformed into a PI 
controller output command. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7/7LQIR´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
1: CV 0, 
2: CV (0-20], 
3: CV (20-40], 
4: CV (40-60), 
5: CV [60-80), 
6: CV [80-100), 
7: CV 100 
³/7IDLOXUH´ Rule 4.b was used to create this node. It represents the condition of the transmitter LT2. The first state of 
the node represents the non-failed condition (LT W), while the second state represents the failure mode ฀– 
failed stuck (LT FS). This node is linked to any nodes, which represent the information shown by the LT2 
transmitter, so that the failure effects of specific failure modes could be modelled. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7/7IDLOXUH´³/7RLOOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Condition node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
1: LT W, 
2: LT FS,  
³/&IDLOXUH´ Rule 4.c was used to create this node. It represents the condition of the controller LC2. First state of the 
node represents the non-failed condition (LC W), while the remaining states represent two failure modes 
฀– failed low (LC FL) and failed high (LC FH). This node is linked to any nodes, which represent the 
command that the controller LC2 sends to the valve CV2, so that the failure effects of specific failure 
modes could be modelled. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7/&IDLOXUH´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Condition node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
1: LC W, 
2: LC FL, 
3: LC FH 
³&9IDLOXUH´ Rule 4.d was used to create this node. It represents the condition of the valve CV2. First state of the 
node represents the non-failed condition (CV W), while the remaining states represent two failure modes 
฀– failed closed (CV FC) and failed opened (CV FO). This node is linked to any nodes, which represent 
1: CV W, 
2: CV FC, 
3: CV FO 
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the opening of valve CV2, so that the failure effects of specific failure modes could be modelled. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7&9IDLOXUH´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Condition node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
³)7IDLOXUH´ Rule 4.e was used to create this node. It represents the condition of the flow transmitter FT2. First state 
of the node represents the non-failed condition (FT W), while the second state represents the failure 
mode ฀– failed stuck (FT FS). This node is linked to any nodes, which represent the information shown by 
the flow transmitter FT2, so that the failure effects of specific failure modes could be modelled. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7)7IDLOXUH´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Condition node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
1: FT W, 
2: FT FS 
³)7LQIR´ Rule 4.f was used to create this node. It is used to input the readings from the flow transmitter FT2 about 
the oil outflow from the separator. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7)7LQIR´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1: CV 0, 
2: CV (0-20], 
3: CV (20-40], 
4: CV (40-60), 
5: CV [60-80), 
6: CV [80-100), 
7: CV 100 
³2LORXWIORZ´ Rule 4.g was used to create this node. Node is used to obtain the information from the output node ³&9
RSHQLQJ´ of the instance node ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7´. It is further used to model the oil level change rate 
in the separated oil section. 
Parent of nodes: ³2LOOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ 
Child of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7&9RSHQLQJ´ 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: none 
1: CV 0, 
2: CV (0-20], 
3: CV (20-40], 
4: CV (40-60), 
5: CV [60-80), 
6: CV [80-100), 
7: CV 100 
³2LO OHYHO FKDQJH
UDWH´ 
Rule 5 was used to create this node. It is used to model the oil level change rate. The conditional 
probability table is used to represent the certainty of oil level change rate, given the states of the nodes 
³2LOLQIORZ´ and ³2LORXWIORZ´. 
For example, if the ³2LOLQIORZ´ node is in the state ³&9-@´ and the ³2LORXWIORZ´ is in the state ³
CV (0-@´, the state of the node ³2LOOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ will be either ³&9 ´ or ³0 < CV 
 ´. 
Parent of nodes: ³/7RLOOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ 
1: CV -100, 
2: -100 < CV <= -80, 
3: -80 < CV <= -60, 
4: -60 < CV < -40, 
5: -40 <= CV < -20, 
6: -20 <= CV < 0, 
7: CV 0, 
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Child of nodes: ³2LOLQIORZ´³2LORXWIORZ´ 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
8: 0 < CV <= +20, 
9: +20 < CV <= +40, 
10: +40 < CV < +60, 
11: +60 <= CV < +80, 
12: +80 <= CV < +100, 
13: CV +100 
³/7 RLO OHYHO
FKDQJHUDWH´ 
Rule 7 was used to create this node. It is used to input the readings from level transmitter LT2 about the 
oil level change rate. The conditional probability table of this node is used to model the failure effects of 
level transmitter LT2 on the information that it is showing about the oil level change rate. 
Parent of nodes: Output 
Child of nodes: ³2LOOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´³/7IDLOXUH´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: none 
1: CV -100, 
2: -100 < CV <= -80, 
3: -80 < CV <= -60, 
4: -60 < CV < -40, 
5: -40 <= CV < -20, 
6: -20 <= CV < 0, 
7: CV 0, 
8: 0 < CV <= +20, 
9: +20 < CV <= +40, 
10: +40 < CV < +60, 
11: +60 <= CV < +80, 
12: +80 <= CV < +100, 
13: CV +100 
 
Table 10.4. Summary of the BBN ³*DVVHFWLRQ´ 
Node name Description Node states 
³*DVLQIORZ´ Rule 1 was used to create this node. It represents the inflowing gas into the separator. If certain 
knowledge is available about the inflowing gas, this can be represented by increasing the prior 
probabilities of specific states of the node. It is assumed that different inflows have equal probabilities, 
thus each state of the node has the same prior probability. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7JDVLQIR´, ³*DVOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: none 
1: CV 0, 
2: CV (0-20], 
3: CV (20-40], 
4: CV (40-60), 
5: CV [60-80), 
6: CV [80-100), 
7: CV 100 
³)7IDLOXUH´ Rule 2 was used to create this node. It represents the condition of flow transmitter FT0. First state of the 
node represents the non-failed condition (FT W), while the second state represents the failure mode ฀– 
1: FT W, 
2: FT FS 
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failed stuck (FT FS). This node is linked to any nodes, which represent the information shown by the flow 
transmitter FT0, so that the failure effects of specific failure modes could be modelled. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7JDVLQIORZLQIR´³)7JDs ± )7´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Condition node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
³)7 JDV LQIORZ
LQIR´ 
Rule 3 was used to create this node. It is used to input the readings from the flow transmitter FT0 about 
the gas flow into the separator. The probability table of this node is used to model the failure effects of 
flow transmitter FT0 on the information that it is showing about the gas flow. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³)7IDLOXUH´³*DVLQIORZ´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1: CV 0, 
2: CV (0-20], 
3: CV (20-40], 
4: CV (40-60), 
5: CV [60-80), 
6: CV [80-100), 
7: CV 100 
³)7 JLYHQ level 
/7´ 
Rule 4 was used to create this node. This is an instance node to model the pressure level control loop. 
Inputs of node: ³/7LQIR´³/7IDLOXUH´³/&IDLOXUH´³&9IDLOXUH´³)7IDLOXUH´ 
Outputs of node: ³)7LQIR´³&9RSHQLQJ´ 
Type of node: Instance node 
Input/output of the BBN: none 
- 
³/7LQIR´ Rule 4.a was used to create this node. It represents the pressure level information transformed into a PI 
controller output command. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7/7LQIR´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
1: CV 0, 
2: CV (0-20], 
3: CV (20-40], 
4: CV (40-60), 
5: CV [60-80), 
6: CV [80-100), 
7: CV 100 
³/7IDLOXUH´ Rule 4.b was used to create this node. It represents the condition of the transmitter LT3. The first state of 
the node represents the non-failed condition (LT W), while the second state represents the failure mode 
฀– failed stuck (LT FS). This node is linked to any nodes, which represent the information shown by the 
LT3 transmitter, so that the failure effects of specific failure modes could be modelled. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7/7IDLOXUH´³/7SUHVVXUHOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Condition node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
1: LT W, 
2: LT FS,  
³/&IDLOXUH´ Rule 4.c was used to create this node. It represents the condition of the controller LC3. First state of the 1: LC W, 
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node represents the non-failed condition (LC W), while the remaining states represent two failure modes 
฀– failed low (LC FL) and failed high (LC FH). This node is linked to any nodes, which represent the 
command that the controller LC3 sends to the valve CV3, so that the failure effects of specific failure 
modes could be modelled. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7/&IDLOXUH´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Condition node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
2: LC FL, 
3: LC FH 
³&9IDLOXUH´ Rule 4.d was used to create this node. It represents the condition of the valve CV3. First state of the 
node represents the non-failed condition (CV W), while the remaining states represent two failure modes 
฀– failed closed (CV FC) and failed opened (CV FO). This node is linked to any nodes, which represent 
the opening of valve CV3, so that the failure effects of specific failure modes could be modelled. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7&9IDLOXUH´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Condition node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
1: CV W, 
2: CV FC, 
3: CV FO 
³)7IDLOXUH´ Rule 4.e was used to create this node. It represents the condition of the flow transmitter FT3. First state 
of the node represents the non-failed condition (FT W), while the second state represents the failure 
mode ฀– failed stuck (FT FS). This node is linked to any nodes, which represent the information shown by 
the flow transmitter FT3, so that the failure effects of specific failure modes could be modelled. 
Parent of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7)7IDLOXUH´³)7JDV± )7´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: Condition node 
Input/output of the BBN: Input 
1: FT W, 
2: FT FS 
³)7LQIR´ Rule 4.f was used to create this node. It is used to input the readings from the flow transmitter FT3 about 
the gas outflow from the separator. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7)7LQIR´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1: CV 0, 
2: CV (0-20], 
3: CV (20-40], 
4: CV (40-60), 
5: CV [60-80), 
6: CV [80-100), 
7: CV 100 
³*DVRXWIORZ´ Rule 4.g was used to create this node. It is used to obtain the information from the output node ³&9
RSHQLQJ´ of the instance node ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7´. It is further used to model the gas level change rate 
in the gas section. 
1: CV 0, 
2: CV (0-20], 
3: CV (20-40], 
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Parent of nodes: ³*DVOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ 
Child of nodes: ³)7JLYHQOHYHO/7&9RSHQLQJ´ 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: none 
4: CV (40-60), 
5: CV [60-80), 
6: CV [80-100), 
7: CV 100 
³*DV OHYHO
FKDQJHUDWH´ 
Rule 5 was used to create this node. It is used to model the gas level change rate. The conditional 
probability table is used to represent the certainty of gas level change rate, given the states of the nodes 
³,QFRPLQJJDV´ and ³*DVRXWIORZ´. 
For example, if the ³,QFRPLQJJDV´ node is in the state ³&9-@´ and the ³*DVRXWIORZ´ is in the 
state ³&9-@´, the state of the node ³*DVOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ will be either ³&9 ´ or ³
&9 ´. 
Parent of nodes: ³3UHVVXUHOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´³)7JDV± )7´ 
Child of nodes: ³*DVRXWIORZ´³,QFRPLQJJDV´ 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: none 
1: CV -100, 
2: -100 < CV <= -80, 
3: -80 < CV <= -60, 
4: -60 < CV < -40, 
5: -40 <= CV < -20, 
6: -20 <= CV < 0, 
7: CV 0, 
8: 0 < CV <= +20, 
9: +20 < CV <= +40, 
10: +40 < CV < +60, 
11: +60 <= CV < +80, 
12: +80 <= CV < +100, 
13: CV +100 
³)7JDV± )7´ Rule 6 was used to create this node. It is used to input the difference of the readings from flow 
transmitter FT0 about the gas inflow and the readings from flow transmitter FT3 about the gas outflow. 
The conditional probability table of this node is used to model the failure effects of flow transmitters FT0 
and FT3 on the information about the gas inflow and outflow difference. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³*DVLQIORZ´³*DVRXWIORZ´³)7IDLOXUH´³)7IDLOXUH´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1: CV -100, 
2: -100 < CV <= -80, 
3: -80 < CV <= -60, 
4: -60 < CV < -40, 
5: -40 <= CV < -20, 
6: -20 <= CV < 0, 
7: CV 0, 
8: 0 < CV <= +20, 
9: +20 < CV <= +40, 
10: +40 < CV < +60, 
11: +60 <= CV < +80, 
12: +80 <= CV < +100, 
13: CV +100 
³&KDQJH RI
YROXPHIRUJDV´ 
This node was created as explained in the Step 1 of this section. 
Parent of nodes: ³3UHVVXUHOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ 
Child of nodes: none 
Type of node: none 
1: CV -100, 
2: -100 < CV <= -80, 
3: -80 < CV <= -60, 
4: -60 < CV < -40, 
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Input/output of the BBN: Input 5: -40 <= CV < -20, 
6: -20 <= CV < 0, 
7: CV 0, 
8: 0 < CV <= +20, 
9: +20 < CV <= +40, 
10: +40 < CV < +60, 
11: +60 <= CV < +80, 
12: +80 <= CV < +100, 
13: CV +100 
³3UHVVXUH OHYHO
FKDQJHUDWH´ 
This node was created as explained in the Step 2 of this section. 
Parent of nodes: ³/7SUHVVXUHOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ 
Child of nodes: ³&KDQJHRIYROXPHIRUJDV´³*DVOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: none 
1: CV < -100 
2: CV -100 
3: -100 < CV <= -80 
4: -80 < CV <= -60 
5: -60 < CV < -40 
6: -40 <= CV < -20 
7: -20 <= CV < 0 
8: CV 0 
9: 0 < CV <= +20 
10: +20 < CV <= +40 
11: +40 < CV < +60 
12: +60 <= CV < +80 
13: +80 <= CV < +100 
14: CV +100 
15: CV > +100 
³/7 SUHVVXUH
level change 
UDWH´ 
This node was created as explained in the Step 3 of this section. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³3UHVVXUHOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´³/7IDLOXUH´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1: CV < -100 
2: CV -100 
3: -100 < CV <= -80 
4: -80 < CV <= -60 
5: -60 < CV < -40 
6: -40 <= CV < -20 
7: -20 <= CV < 0 
8: CV 0 
9: 0 < CV <= +20 
10: +20 < CV <= +40 
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11: +40 < CV < +60 
12: +60 <= CV < +80 
13: +80 <= CV < +100 
14: CV +100 
15: CV > +100 
 
Table 10.5. Summary of the BBN ³6LQJOHWLPHVOLFH´ 
Node name Description Node states 
³6HSDUDWLRQVHFWLRQ´ This is an instance node ฀o฀f฀ ฀B฀B฀N฀ ฀“฀S฀e฀p฀a฀r฀a฀t฀i฀o฀n฀ ฀s฀e฀c฀t฀i฀o฀n฀”฀. 
Inputs of node: ³/7LQIR´³)7IDLOXUH´³/7IDLOXUH´³/&IDLOXUH´³&9IDLOXUH´³)7IDLOXUH´ 
Outputs of node: ³)7ZDWHULQIORZLQIR´³)7RLOLQIORZLQIR´³)7LQIR´³)7ZDWHU± )7´³/7
water level change UDWH´³)7ZDWHU± )7)7RLO´³/7WRWDOOLTXLGOHYHO´³/7WRWDOOLTXLGOHYHO´
³/7WRWDOOLTXLGOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´³7RWDOOLTXLGOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´³)ORZRYHUZHLU´³:DWHULQIORZ´
³:DWHURXWIORZ´³2LOLQIORZ´ 
Type of node: Instance node 
Input/output of the BBN: none 
- 
³6HSDUDWHGRLOVHFWLRQ´ ฀T฀h฀i฀s฀ ฀i฀s฀ ฀a฀n฀ ฀i฀n฀s฀t฀a฀n฀c฀e฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀B฀B฀N฀ ฀“Separated oil section฀”฀. 
Inputs of node: ³/7LQIR´³/7IDLOXUH´³/&IDLOXUH´³&9IDLOXUH´³)7IDLOXUH´³2LOLQIORZ´ 
Outputs of node: ³)7LQIR´³/7RLOOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´³2LOOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´³2LORXWIORZ´ 
Type of node: Instance node 
Input/output of the BBN: none 
- 
³*DVVHFWLRQ´ ฀T฀h฀i฀s฀ ฀i฀s฀ ฀a฀n฀ ฀i฀n฀s฀t฀a฀n฀c฀e฀ ฀n฀o฀d฀e฀ ฀o฀f฀ ฀B฀B฀N฀ ฀“Gas section ” . 
Inputs of node: ³&KDQJHRIYROXPHIRUJDV´, ³/7LQIR´³/7IDLOXUH´³/&IDLOXUH´³&9IDLOXUH´
³)7IDLOXUH´³)7IDLOXUH´ 
Outputs of node: ³)7JDVLQIORZLQIR´³)7LQIR´³)7JDV± )7´³/7SUHVVXUHOHYHOFKDQJH
UDWH´ 
Type of node: Instance node 
Input/output of the BBN: none 
- 
³)ORZRYHUZHLU´ This node was created as explained in the Step 1 of this section. 
Parent of nodes: ³6HSDUDWHGRLOVHFWLRQ2LOLQIORZ´ 
Child of nodes: ³6HSDUDWLRQVHFWLRQ)ORZRYHUZHLU´ 
Type of node: none 
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Input/output of the BBN: none 
³7RWDO OLTXLG OHYHO
FKDQJHUDWHVLQJOH´ 
This node was created as explained in the Step 2 of this section. 
Parent of nodes: ³/7WRWDOOLTXLGOHYHOFKDQJH/7OHYHOFKDQJH´ 
Child of nodes: ³6HSDUDWLRQVHFWLRQ7RWDOOLTXLGOHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: none 
 
³2LO OHYHO FKDQJH UDWH
VLQJOH´ 
This node was created as explained in the Step 3 of this section. 
Parent of nodes: ³&KDQJHRIYROXPHIRUJDV´ 
Child of nodes: ³6HSDUDWHGRLOVHFWLRQ2LO OHYHOFKDQJHUDWH´ 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: none 
 
³&KDQJH RI YROXPH IRU
JDVIURP)7´ 
This node was created as explained in the Step 5 of this section. 
Parent of nodes: ³*DVVHFWLRQ&KDQJHRIYROXPHIRUJDV´ 
Child of nodes: ³:DWHULQIORZVLQJOH´³:DWHURXWIORZVLQJOH´³2LOLQIORZVLQJOH´³2LORXWIORZVLQJOH´ 
Type of node: none 
Input/output of the BBN: none 
1: CV -100 
2: -100 < CV <= -80 
3: -80 < CV <= -60 
4: -60 < CV < -40 
5: -40 <= CV < -20 
6: -20 <= CV < 0 
7: CV 0 
8: 0 < CV <= +20 
9: +20 < CV <= +40 
10: +40 < CV < +60 
11: +60 <= CV < +80 
12: +80 <= CV < +100 
13: CV +100 
³)7ZDWHU± FT1 + FT0 
oil ± )7´ 
This node was created as explained in the Step 6 of this section. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³:DWHU LQIORZ VLQJOH´ ³:DWHU RXWIORZ VLQJOH´ ³2LO LQIORZ VLQJOH´ ³2LO RXWIORZ
VLQJOH´, ³)7IDLOXUH´³)7IDLOXUH´³)7IDLOXUH´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
 
³/7 WRWDO OLTXLG OHYHO
change + LT2 level 
FKDQJH´ 
This node was created as explained in the Step 7 of this section. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³7RWDOOLTXLGOHYHOFKDQJHUDWHVLQJOH´³2LOOHYHOFKDQJHUDWHVLQJOH´³/7IDLOXUH´
³/7IDLOXUH´ 
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Node name Description Node states 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
³)7YDULHG´ This node was created as explained in the Step 8 of this section. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³)7IDLOXUH´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1: FT W, 
2: FT FS 
³)7YDULHG´ This node was created as explained in the Step 8 of this section. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³)7IDLOXUH´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1: false, 
2: true 
³)7YDULHG´ This node was created as explained in the Step 8 of this section. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³)7IDLOXUH´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1: false, 
2: true 
³)7YDULHG´ This node was created as explained in the step Step 8 of this section. 
Parent of nodes: none 
Child of nodes: ³)7IDLOXUH´ 
Type of node: Information node 
Input/output of the BBN: Output 
1: false, 
2: true 
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11 Appendix F 
Table 11.1. Summary of undetected failures, when LT2 failed stuck failure was simulated together with another component failing, given 
oscillating inflows 
Fault 1 LT2 FS 
Fault 2 FT0 FS 
LT1 
FS 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
Times Fault 1 not detected 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Times Fault 2 not detected 0 7 0 0 1 18 19 37 7 6 4 10 
Times Fault 1 and Fault 2 not detected 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 11.2. Summary of undetected failures, when LT3 failed stuck failure was simulated together with another component failing, given 
oscillating inflows 
Fault 1 LT3 FS 
Fault 2 FT0 FS 
LT1 
FS 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
Times Fault 1 not detected 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Times Fault 2 not detected 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 20 24 44 
Times Fault 1 and Fault 2 not detected 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 11.3. Faults detected with BBN, when two faults have been inserted in the simulation model, when oscillating inflows were modelled 
Fault 1 Fault 2 
Faults detected 
FT0 
FS 
LT1 
FS 
LC1 
FH 
LC1 
FL 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
LC2 
FH 
LC2 
FL 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
LC3 
FH 
LC3 
FL 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
LT2 FS 
FT0 FS 67.38 0.84      83.03        1.29 1.29  1.29 
LT1 FS  68.71      84.68  0.28 0.28  0.33  1.99 3.43 3.43 1.82 5.31 
CV1 FC  0.11  24.59 86.78   86.49  1.09 1.09  1.30  0.33 3.80 3.47 0.33 3.85 
CV1 FO  0.17 22.66   86.72  82.16       4.81 3.69 1.40 4.81 5.93 
FT1 FS  0.28 1.12 1.06 0.95 1.17 72.07 84.50       0.39 2.96 2.57 0.39 2.96 
CV2 FC  0.31      88.92  23.10 71.36    2.20 6.20 4.00 2.20 5.07 
CV2 FO  0.11      84.89 16.79   68.94 0.06       
FT2 FS  0.11      85.64 0.67   0.67 30.92   3.35 3.35  3.69 
LT3 FS  0.17      84.35      71.92      
CV3 FC  0.18      81.62        17.60 79.89   
CV3 FO  0.17      84.45       21.94 1.45 2.13 78.37 2.46 
FT3 FS  0.17      84.50 2.96 1.45 1.68 2.74 4.47 0.11 2.74 5.76 6.32 2.85 50.32 
LT3 FS 
FT0 FS 72.71 0.69            89.66      
LT1 FS  79.72            87.53      
CV1 FC    25.60 87.39         82.92      
CV1 FO   30.93   90.90        86.06      
FT1 FS   1.20 1.17 1.17 1.20 74.12       92.66      
LT2 FS  0.16      84.79      85.98      
CV2 FC          23.46 95.14   78.47      
CV2 FO         18.68   93.62  75.26      
FT2 FS         0.22 0.33 0.33 0.22 96.84 92.66      
CV3 FC              93.63  29.22 57.52  1.71 
CV3 FO              93.10 25.65   48.77 0.11 
FT3 FS              92.91     8.16 
Table 11.4. Summary of undetected failures, when LT2 failed stuck failure was simulated together with another component failing, given 
decreasing inflows 
Fault 1 LT2 FS 
Fault 2 FT0 FS 
LT1 
FS 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
Times Fault 1 not detected 0 2 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Times Fault 2 not detected 23 20 0 0 0 12 13 32 7 11 9 17 
Times Fault 1 and Fault 2 not detected 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 11.5. Summary of undetected failures, when LT3 failed stuck failure was simulated together with another component failing, given 
decreasing inflows 
Fault 1 LT3 FS 
Fault 2 FT0 FS 
LT1 
FS 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
Times Fault 1 not detected 0 1 2 3 1 2 3 5 1 2 0 1 
Times Fault 2 not detected 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 19 36 
Times Fault 1 and Fault 2 not detected 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 11.6. Faults detected with BBN, when two faults have been inserted in the simulation model, when decreasing inflows were modelled 
Fault 1 Fault 2 
Faults detected 
FT0 
FS 
LT1 
FS 
LC1 
FH 
LC1 
FL 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
LC2 
FH 
LC2 
FL 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
LC3 
FH 
LC3 
FL 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
LT2 FS 
FT0 FS 28.59 2.07      76.85      0.52      
LT1 FS  61.17      75.03        0.15 0.15  0.15 
CV1 FC  0.32  30.53 100.00   78.87      0.05 0.05 2.00 1.95 0.05 2.00 
CV1 FO  0.33 26.57   99.79 0.06 70.14       1.22 0.33 0.33 0.89 1.28 
FT1 FS  1.19 0.16   0.16 82.19 78.31      0.72 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.26 
CV2 FC  1.92  0.19 0.19  0.19 84.85  26.15 71.58  0.58  0.38 1.01 0.72 0.53 0.91 
CV2 FO  0.90      77.30 18.48   72.09 0.23 0.62 0.45 0.23 0.23 0.23 1.07 
FT2 FS  0.88      80.03  0.16 0.16  29.74 0.72 0.26 0.05 0.21 0.21 0.26 
LT3 FS  1.19      78.31      65.85      
CV3 FC  1.27      73.89      0.22 0.06 22.17 83.26 0.06 0.17 
CV3 FO  1.23      76.60      0.32 22.38   75.40  
FT3 FS  1.19      78.31  1.60 1.60  1.86 0.72 3.73 0.83 1.04 3.16 61.93 
LT3 FS 
FT0 FS 59.47 2.30            90.29      
LT1 FS  64.01      0.30      89.42      
CV1 FC    40.67 100.00   0.13      86.18      
CV1 FO   34.78   100.00        82.08      
FT1 FS       92.33       90.16      
LT2 FS  1.12      78.39      80.91      
CV2 FC          26.82 98.19  0.39 77.34      
CV2 FO  0.12  0.12 0.12  0.18  20.53   100.00 0.18 71.34      
FT2 FS         0.07 0.18 0.26 0.04 96.55 90.16      
CV3 FC              92.23  34.58 67.85  0.59 
CV3 FO              92.79 29.02   55.19 0.22 
FT3 FS              90.80 1.20   1.20 22.24 
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Table 11.7. Summary of undetected failures, when LT2 failed stuck failure was simulated together with another component failing, given 
increasing inflows 
Fault 1 LT2 FS 
Fault 2 FT0 FS 
LT1 
FS 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
Times Fault 1 not detected 0 2 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Times Fault 2 not detected 18 4 0 0 0 12 13 30 6 7 7 13 
Times Fault 1 and Fault 2 not detected 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 11.8. Summary of undetected failures, when LT3 failed stuck failure was simulated together with another component failing, given 
increasing inflows 
Fault 1 LT3 FS 
Fault 2 FT0 FS 
LT1 
FS 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
Times Fault 1 not detected 1 1 0 4 1 1 1 3 1 0 1 1 
Times Fault 2 not detected 4 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 18 38 
Times Fault 1 and Fault 2 not detected 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
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Table 11.9. Faults detected with BBN, when two faults have been inserted in the simulation model, when increasing inflows were modelled 
Fault 1 Fault 2 
Faults detected 
FT0 
FS 
LT1 
FS 
LC1 
FH 
LC1 
FL 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
LC2 
FH 
LC2 
FL 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
LC3 
FH 
LC3 
FL 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
LT2 FS 
FT0 FS 21.77 0.61      76.75      0.61      
LT1 FS  68.46      71.37        0.64 0.64  0.64 
CV1 FC    28.65 100.00   74.33      0.05 0.27 1.35 1.19 0.27 1.41 
CV1 FO   29.02   99.82 0.05 69.49      0.38 0.86 0.21 0.38 0.86 0.86 
FT1 FS  0.31  0.05 0.05  91.91 79.54            
CV2 FC  0.05      81.89  23.85 72.20  0.61 0.10      
CV2 FO        77.91 21.46   74.39 0.32  0.54 0.27 0.27 0.27 1.35 
FT2 FS        80.56  0.05 0.05  28.93       
LT3 FS        79.53      69.90      
CV3 FC        74.88        23.99 89.28   
CV3 FO        78.62       27.15   87.39  
FT3 FS        79.92 1.38 0.66 0.41 1.17 1.43  1.38 1.48 1.38 1.63 72.78 
LT3 FS 
FT0 FS 53.21       3.44      85.34      
LT1 FS  68.04      1.68      86.60      
CV1 FC    36.11 100.00   0.10      83.48      
CV1 FO   38.07   99.88 0.14       80.25      
FT1 FS   0.04   0.04 96.17 4.15      88.34      
LT2 FS        79.30      79.95      
CV2 FC  0.06        23.56 98.32  0.46 70.89      
CV2 FO         24.04   99.76  70.16      
FT2 FS        2.91 0.15 0.34 0.19 0.22 96.02 88.27      
CV3 FC        3.50      89.66  27.76 56.46  0.27 
CV3 FO        5.17      90.92 36.93   70.22 0.29 
FT3 FS        4.18      89.14     22.99 
Table 11.10. Summary of undetected failures, when LT2 failed stuck failure was simulated together with another component failing, given 
random inflows 
Fault 1 LT2 FS 
Fault 2 FT0 FS 
LT1 
FS 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
Times Fault 1 not detected 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Times Fault 2 not detected 18 7 0 0 1 21 21 42 4 16 12 31 
Times Fault 1 and Fault 2 not detected 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 11.11. Summary of undetected failures, when LT3 failed stuck failure was simulated together with another component failing, given 
random inflows 
Fault 1 LT3 FS 
Fault 2 FT0 FS 
LT1 
FS 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
Times Fault 1 not detected 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Times Fault 2 not detected 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 25 20 43 
Times Fault 1 and Fault 2 not detected 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 11.12. Faults detected with BBN, when two faults have been inserted in the simulation model, when random inflows were modelled 
Fault 1 Fault 2 
Faults detected 
FT0 
FS 
LT1 
FS 
LC1 
FH 
LC1 
FL 
CV1 
FC 
CV1 
FO 
FT1 
FS 
LT2 
FS 
LC2 
FH 
LC2 
FL 
CV2 
FC 
CV2 
FO 
FT2 
FS 
LT3 
FS 
LC3 
FH 
LC3 
FL 
CV3 
FC 
CV3 
FO 
FT3 
FS 
LT2 FS 
FT0 FS 44.08       86.12            
LT1 FS 2.51 64.86      86.64        0.48 0.48  0.48 
CV1 FC 1.56   33.27 99.70  0.05 90.06        0.61 0.61  0.61 
CV1 FO 2.63  24.43   99.77  75.52  0.11 0.11  0.11  0.57   0.57 0.57 
FT1 FS 2.21 0.11 0.11 1.33 1.33 0.11 90.82 86.28            
CV2 FC 2.83       90.82  21.44 62.16  0.15       
CV2 FO 0.40       86.51 16.19   65.44        
FT2 FS 1.88       87.38     14.90       
LT3 FS 0.66       86.44      63.06      
CV3 FC 0.53       83.65        15.98 71.20   
CV3 FO 1.95       86.15       18.64   70.23  
FT3 FS 4.09       85.80 0.06   0.06 0.06 0.17 3.09 3.04 2.82 3.09 33.27 
LT3 FS 
FT0 FS 68.49             94.84      
LT1 FS 1.64 76.81      0.62      94.52      
CV1 FC 0.13   42.52 99.80         93.68      
CV1 FO   33.68   99.85        90.44      
FT1 FS 0.15  0.07 0.18 0.18 0.07 96.80       94.77      
LT2 FS 0.73       85.00      89.52      
CV2 FC          24.32 96.62  0.06 86.39      
CV2 FO         18.70   93.07 0.06 81.93      
FT2 FS 0.99        0.99 0.84 0.84 1.10 94.52 94.65      
CV3 FC              95.09  24.08 47.07  0.04 
CV3 FO              96.08 32.22   61.27 0.14 
FT3 FS              95.55  1.91 1.91  11.10 
 
